

A Short History of The Great War

William L. McPherson

A Short History of the Great War

Dealing particularly with its
Military and Diplomatic Aspects
and the part played in it by
The United States

By

William L. McPherson

Military Critic of the *New York Tribune*,
Author of "The Strategy of the Great War"



G. P. Putnam's Sons
New York and London
The Knickerbocker Press

1920

D 521

. M 18

COPYRIGHT 1920

BY

WILLIAM L. McPHERSON



APR 19 1920

©CL.A565588

PREFACE

THE purpose of this volume is to offer the general reader an outline story of the War. In another book, *The Strategy of the Great War*, I have endeavoured to interpret the struggle in the broader sense—as a singular and enormously interesting departure from previous military experience,—due to the revolutionary conditions introduced by a sudden reversion to rigid positional, or trench warfare. The strategy of the war, determined in part by the military policies of the belligerents, but in still larger part by conditions over which the general staffs had little control, is a study in itself.

In this book the purely strategical aspects of the war are discussed only in so far as it is necessary to establish the true relation of battles and campaigns to one another and to the ultimate result. The main idea is to give a clear and accurate running account of the war's origin and progress.

Full military details are still lacking and many early impressions will undoubtedly be corrected after the war archives of the belligerent nations begin to be published. Critical studies of the battles and campaigns are exceedingly few. I will cite here again, as an admirable example of work of this sort, General Palat's (*Pierre Lehautcourt's*) uncompleted series of volumes, entitled *La Grande Guerre sur le Front Occidental*, dealing with the 1914 campaign in France and Belgium. Few German war records are as yet available. The General

Staff's series of pamphlets—about thirty in number—entitled *Kriegsberichte aus dem Grossen Hauptquartier*, is highly coloured and misleading. It is also lamentably short on routine military information.

In *My Thoughts and Actions*, which appeared in the summer of 1919, General Ludendorff has presented an elaborate defence of his conduct of the war. It contains much interesting information as to the tactics of Ludendorff's various campaigns and as to his relations with Hindenburg. But since its main purpose is to shift responsibility for Germany's defeat to other shoulders than his own—particularly to those of Bethmann-Hollweg and the civil bureaucracy—its extreme bias must be discounted. Even on his own showing Ludendorff was accountable for the fatal blunder of the renewal of indiscriminate U-boat warfare in February, 1917.

Grand Admiral Tirpitz has written a volume of memoirs (suppressed in Germany, but published in the United States), in which he, too, exculpates himself and accuses practically all the other German leaders—military, naval, and civil—of gross incompetency. Bethmann-Hollweg is bringing out a work, *Betrachtungen zum Welt-Kriege*, in which he attempts a similar exoneration. These writers all disagree as to facts. Bethmann-Hollweg, for instance, minimizes the importance of the famous consultation on July 5, 1914, at Potsdam, at which Germany's Serbian policy was shaped. He says that on that day, after the receipt through the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador of an autograph letter from Emperor Francis Joseph, the Kaiser summoned him and Zimmermann to Potsdam, and that no others were present at the conference which followed. Tirpitz says that General Falkenhayn, the Prussian Secretary of

War, and General Lyncker, the chief of the military cabinet, were also present. Most of the current German contributors to the literature of the war are manifestly more interested in domestic polemics than in the establishment of the truth.

Authorities consulted on the Western Front campaigns include Volumes II and III of General Palat's series — *Liège-Mulhouse-Sarrebourg-Morhange* and *Batailles des Ardennes et de la Sambre*; Louis Madelin's *The Victory of the Marne* (of which there is an English translation); Field Marshal Viscount French's *1914*; General Sir Frederick Maurice's *Forty Days in 1914*; Señor E. Diaz-Retg's *The Attack on Verdun* (of which there is a French translation from the Spanish); Lieutenant-Colonel Paul Azan's *The Warfare of To-day*; General Zurlinden's *La Guerre de Libération*; General Malleterre's valuable work, *Les Campagnes de 1915*; Sir Arthur Conan Doyle's *The British Campaign in France and Flanders, 1917*; Field Marshal Haig's exceptionally clear and dispassionate reports on the Battle of the Somme and on the succeeding British campaigns; General Pershing's report on the operations of the American Expeditionary Army.

For the Dardanelles-Gallipoli operation, Mr. Henry W. Nevinson's volume, *The Dardanelles Campaign*, is a model of its kind. Important facts bearing on the situation on the Turkish side are contained in *Ambassador Morgenthau's Story* and in Mr. George F. Schreiner's *From Berlin to Bagdad*.

The best first-hand authority on conditions on the Russian front is General Basil Gourko's *War and Revolution in Russia, 1914-1917*. Mr. Robert Crozier Long's *Russian Revolution Aspects* is also of value.

Among the authoritative books on the naval opera-

tions of the war are Admiral Viscount Jellicoe's *The Grand Fleet, 1914-1916*; Mr. Arthur H. Pollen's *The British Navy in Battle*, and *Naval Power in the War*, by Lieutenant-Commander Charles Clifford Gill, U. S. N.

Other sources made use of were the Italian General Staff's reports on the campaigns of 1918; General Allenby's report on the Palestine campaign; General Milne's report on the final Macedonian campaign; Mr. Oman's *The Outbreak of the War of 1914-1918*; Prince Karl Lichnowsky's *Memorandum*; Dr. Wilhelm Mühlen's diary; Lieutenant-General Baron Freytag-Loringhoven's *Deductions from the World War* and *A Nation Trained in Arms or a Militia?*; Professor Douglas W. Johnson's *Topography and Strategy in the War*; Professor John Bach McMaster's *The United States in the World War* and the *International Cyclopedia* annuals for 1914, 1915, 1916, and 1917.

The facts about the military participation of the United States contained in Chapter XLII, were drawn largely from *The War with Germany*, a statistical summary made by Colonel Leonard P. Ayres, U. S. A., and published by the Statistics Branch of the General Staff of the Army.

WILLIAM L. MCPHERSON.

NEW YORK,
September 1, 1919.

CONTENTS

CHAPTER	PAGE
I.—THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR. JUNE 28, 1914—AUGUST 5, 1914 . . .	1
II.—NUMBERS AND STRATEGY . . .	13
III.—BELGIUM AND THE MARNE. AUG. 3, 1914—SEPT. 9, 1914 . . .	19
IV.—“THE RACE FOR THE SEA”—SEPTEMBER 15, 1914—DECEMBER 1, 1914 . .	38
V.—OPERATIONS ON THE RUSSIAN FRONT. AUGUST 1, 1914—DECEMBER 31, 1914 . .	50
VI.—AUSTRIA’S FAILURES IN SERBIA. AUGUST 12, 1914—DECEMBER 14, 1914	60
VII.—TURKEY ENTERS THE WAR. OCTOBER 29, 1914—DECEMBER 31, 1914 . . .	63
VIII.—GERMANY LOSES HER COLONIES. AUGUST 25, 1914—DECEMBER 31, 1914	68
IX.—NAVAL OPERATIONS IN 1914. AUGUST 5, 1914—DECEMBER 31, 1914 . . .	72
X.—THE RUSSIAN WINTER CAMPAIGN. JANUARY 1, 1915—MAY 1, 1915 . . .	80
XI.—THE DARDANELLES-GALLIPOLI CAMPAIGN. FEBRUARY 19, 1915—DECEMBER 31, 1915	87

CHAPTER	PAGE
XII.—THE RUSSIAN RETREAT. MAY 1, 1915— OCTOBER 1, 1915	103
XIII.—ITALY ENTERS THE WAR. MAY 24, 1915—DECEMBER, 31, 1915	112
XIV.—THE CONQUEST OF SERBIA. OCTOBER 4, 1915—DECEMBER 25, 1915	121
XV.—“NIBBLING” ON THE WESTERN FRONT. JANUARY 1, 1915—DECEMBER 31, 1915	133
XVI.—ASIATIC AND COLONIAL CAMPAIGNS. JANUARY 1, 1915—DECEMBER 31, 1915	145
XVII.—NAVAL OPERATIONS, 1915	152
XVIII.—NEUTRAL RIGHTS AT SEA. THE “LUSITANIA.” AUGUST 3, 1914—DECEMBER 31, 1915	156
XIX.—VERDUN. FEBRUARY 21, 1916—DECEMBER 16, 1916	168
XX.—RUSSIA'S LAST REAL OFFENSIVE. JANUARY 1, 1916—SEPTEMBER 1, 1916	181
XXI.—THE SOMME. JULY 1, 1916—NOVEMBER 18, 1916	191
XXII.—THE TRENTINO AND GORIZIA. MAY 14, 1916—NOVEMBER 5, 1916	201
XXIII.—THE SACRIFICE OF RUMANIA. AUGUST 28, 1916—DECEMBER 31, 1916	207
XXIV.—ASIATIC AND COLONIAL CAMPAIGNS. JANUARY 11, 1916—DECEMBER 31, 1916	220
XXV.—THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND—OTHER NAVAL OPERATIONS OF 1916	226

Contents

ix

CHAPTER	PAGE
XXVI.—AMERICA DRIFTS TOWARD WAR. JANUARY 1, 1916—DECEMBER 31, 1916 . . .	237
XXVII.—GERMANY DEFIES AMERICA. JANUARY 31, 1917—JUNE 30, 1917 . . .	245
XXVIII.—RUSSIA IN REVOLUTION. MARCH 11, 1917—DECEMBER 31, 1917 . . .	253
XXIX.—WEST FRONT OPERATIONS, 1917. JANUARY 5, 1917—DECEMBER 5, 1917 . . .	262
XXX.—THE ISONZO-CAPORETTO. MAY 12, 1917—DECEMBER 31, 1917 . . .	282
XXXI.—BALKAN AND ASIATIC CAMPAIGNS OF 1917. JANUARY 1, 1917—DECEMBER 10, 1917 . . .	290
XXXII.—SUBMARINE AND NAVAL OPERATIONS, 1917 . . .	295
XXXIII.—THE DISMEMBERMENT OF RUSSIA. JANUARY 1, 1918—DECEMBER 31, 1918 . . .	299
XXXIV.—LUDENDORFF'S CHANNEL PORT OFFENSIVES—ST. QUENTIN, MARCH 21, 1918; LYS VALLEY, APRIL 9, 1918 . . .	309
XXXV.—LUDENDORFF'S PARIS OFFENSIVES. AISNE-MARNE, MAY 27, 1918. LASIGNY, JUNE 9, 1918 . . .	327
XXXVI.—THE TURN OF THE TIDE. LUDENDORFF'S FIFTH OFFENSIVE, JULY 15, 1918. FOCH'S COUNTER-OFFENSIVE, JULY 18, 1918 . . .	334
XXXVII.—THE DECISION IN THE WEST. AUGUST 8, 1918—NOVEMBER 11, 1918 . . .	342

CHAPTER	PAGE
XXXVIII.—ITALY'S INSPIRING RECOVERY, JUNE 15, 1918—NOVEMBER 5, 1918 . . .	359
XXXIX.—THE END IN THE BALKANS. JULY 7, 1918—SEPTEMBER 30, 1918 . . .	367
XL.—TURKEY GOES TO THE WALL. FEBRU- ARY 28, 1918—OCTOBER 31, 1918 . .	372
XLI.—NAVAL OPERATIONS, 1918. GERMAN NAVAL LOSSES	378
XLII.—AMERICA'S PART IN THE WAR . . .	382
APPENDIX I	393
APPENDIX II	396
APPENDIX III	399
INDEX	403

A Short History of the Great War

A Short History of The Great War

CHAPTER I

THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR. JUNE 28, 1914—
AUGUST 5, 1914

THE Serajevo assassinations on June 28, 1914, ushered in the World War. They were in no sense its cause. They merely offered the Austro-Hungarian Government a pretext for satisfying a long-standing grudge against Serbia.

The statesmen who ruled at Vienna in the name of the senile Francis Joseph had no particular desire to avenge the murder of the Archduke Francis Ferdinand and his morganatic wife, the Duchess of Hohenberg. The heir apparent was cordially disliked by the aged Emperor and in Austrian court and military circles. The Hungarians hated and feared him. He was devoted to his wife, who was a commoner and a Czech, and his fixed idea was to create a Hapsburg Slav state, to be admitted into the Empire on equal terms with Austria and Hungary. His scheme was known as "trialism." It enraged the Magyars, who saw that under it Hungary would be stripped of territory and

prestige and would lose the commanding position which she had long held in the councils of the Dual Monarchy. Austrian power, as well as Hungarian, was based on the exploitation of suppressed races. But Hungary was the harsher and more exacting master.

The ruling classes at Vienna and Budapest welcomed Francis Ferdinand's taking off. It has been charged since the war that the Serajevo assassinations were accelerated by Austrian and Hungarian politicians, interested in getting rid of the heir apparent. The circumstances of the trial of the assassins and their alleged accomplices created much suspicion. The principals were let off with light sentences. The proceedings were *in camera*. The testimony adduced by the Austro-Hungarian secret service to connect Serbian officials or patriotic societies with the crime was practically worthless.

But Vienna and Budapest jumped at the chance to lay the murder at the door of the Serbian Government and to frame demands on Serbia which were as insincere as they were provocative. Austria-Hungary needed a plausible pretext for attacking her tiny neighbour. At last she had found one.

Serbia was a hindrance to the realization of Austro-Hungarian ambitions in the Balkans. She blocked the way to Salonica. In 1908, when Count Aehrenthal nullified the Treaty of Berlin by annexing Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia had made a violent protest. She would have drawn the sword, if Russia had been ready to support her. But Russia was still recovering from the effects of her defeat by Japan in 1904-05 and would not give the signal.

The incorporation of 1,250,000 more Southern Slavs into the Hapsburg Empire gave new life to the agi-

tation for Southern Slav unity and independence. Austria-Hungary had to contend with this agitation in the South, the Czech agitation in Bohemia and Moravia, and Polish unrest in Galicia. The suppressed Slavic elements constituted an obstructive *bloc* in the Austrian Reichstag and made life miserable for the government, which was forced to rule for the greater part of the time without parliamentary sanction.

The outcome of the Balkan wars increased the irritation of the ruling classes in the Dual Monarchy. Serbia emerged from those wars triumphant over both Turkey and Bulgaria, and greatly extended her borders. Austria-Hungary was enraged at the partition made in the Treaty of Bucharest and wanted to intervene by force to prevent Serbia's expansion. She confided to Italy in 1913 her wish to attack Serbia. But Italy declined to sanction the undertaking. This refusal ended the matter, for under the terms of the Triple Alliance neither Austria-Hungary nor Italy could take aggressive measures against any of the Balkan States without first consulting the other and giving guarantees of compensation in case the territorial *status quo* in the Balkans should be altered. Germany was also probably reluctant to start a European war in 1913. That was the year of her special levy on capital for war purposes. She was just taking the final step in military preparedness.

But Germany, as well as Austria-Hungary, was headed toward war. For the latter war was a necessity growing out of domestic politics. The Dual Monarchy could not hope to recover stability and tranquillity until the Slav agitation was crushed. For Germany war was a means of restoring her shrunken international prestige. Since the Agadir venture and the Algeiras

settlement, Germany's position in Europe had steadily grown more and more uncomfortable. Her blustering diplomacy had driven Great Britain into the Triple Entente. Italy strayed away from the Triple Alliance when she made war on Turkey in 1911. She was no longer a dependable ally, but a neutral, drifting back into friendly relations with Russia and France. Germany was distrusted on all sides. Her ambitions for world power were being inflamed by a sedulous Pan-German propaganda. Her leaders felt that it was almost time to get results out of her superior military resources and organization.

To Austria-Hungary and Germany the Serajevo assassinations were therefore a godsend. The murderers and their alleged associates were all subjects of the Dual Monarchy, and the crime was committed on its soil. But it was possible to charge the conspiracy to the activities of the Serbian patriotic society, the *Narodna Odbrana*, which for some years had been engaged in Pan-Serb propaganda. Using this accusation as a pretext for excessive demands for reparation, Serbia could be forced either to humiliate herself in the eyes of the subject Slav peoples or to accept a quarrel of Austria's making.

An indispensable preliminary, from the Austrian point of view, was to secure a positive understanding with Germany. There is little reason to doubt that that was achieved as early as July 5th. Vienna carried her case to Berlin and was told there to go as far as she liked. Prince Lichnowsky, German Ambassador to London, says in his famous *Memorandum*:

Subsequently [that is, after his visit in Berlin early in July] I learned that at the decisive conversation

at Potsdam on July 5th the inquiry addressed to us by Vienna found absolute assent among all personages in authority. Indeed, they added that there would be no harm if a war with Russia would result.

Dr. Wilhelm Mühlön testifies in his *Diary*:

Immediately before the Kaiser started on his trip to Norway there was a conference in Berlin with the Austrians. The Kaiser had declared to the Austrians that this time he would go with them through thick and thin.

Count Lerchenfeld, the Bavarian Minister to Prussia, wrote on July 18, 1914, to Count Hertling, the Bavarian Minister of State:

The opinion here is general that this is Austria's hour of fate. For this reason, in reply to the inquiry from Vienna, the declaration was immediately made here than any line of action upon which Austria may resolve will be agreed to, even at the risk of war with Russia. The free hand which was given to Count Berchtold's *chef de cabinet*, Count Hoyos, who arrived in Berlin to deliver the detailed memorandum, was so extensive that the Austrian Government was authorized to negotiate with Bulgaria regarding her joining the Triple Alliance.

Corroborating all these is Ambassador Morgenthau's report of a conversation he had with Baron Wangenheim in Constantinople, in August, 1914. Wangenheim said that he had himself been present at the conference on July 5th. It was attended by several other ambassadors, by the heads of the General Staff

of the Army and the General Staff of the Navy, by bankers and industrial chiefs. The Kaiser asked them all if they were ready for war and all said "yes," except the bankers, who asked for two weeks' time in which to adjust their foreign accounts.

The Austro-Hungarian-German understanding was clear-cut and precise. Vienna was to issue an ultimatum to Serbia containing demands so exorbitant that Serbia could hardly accept them. In case of non-acceptance or qualified acceptance, war was to be declared. If any Entente Power objected and proposed mediation by the European concert, Austria-Hungary was to contend that the affair was one concerning only herself and Serbia. She was to promise not to annex any Serbian territory, as, indeed, she was practically compelled to do by her obligations to Italy under the secret Triple Alliance Treaty. If Germany were asked to take part in a mediation, she would say that she could not consent to haling her ally before "a European areopagus" for pursuing a just grievance against Serbia. She would advise moderation and a "localization" of the disturbance.

If Russia, resenting the attempt to humiliate Serbia, should mobilize against Austria-Hungary, Germany would hold that such mobilization was a threat directed against herself and would also mobilize. And mobilization, from the German point of view, meant war.

Meanwhile a comedy was to be staged to deceive the Entente. The Kaiser was to go on his Norwegian cruise; Moltke, the chief of the German General Staff, and Jagow, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, were to leave Berlin for short vacations. The German Foreign Office was to plead complete ignorance of the terms of the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum. Jagow,

according to Dr. Mühlön, confided to a friend that he "thought he could make a better impression in Paris and St. Petersburg with a statement that he never knew the contents of the note."

The presentation of the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum to Serbia was cunningly timed. It was dispatched on July 23d and an answer was required by 6 P.M., on July 25th. On July 24th, President Poincaré and Premier Viviani, who was also the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, had just started back to Paris, after a visit of courtesy to St. Petersburg. Paris itself was absorbed by the Caillaux trial. Great Britain was in the thick of the crisis over the enforcement of the Irish Home Rule law. Ulster had defied the London Government and civil war seemed imminent. The Teuton plotters evidently calculated that the Entente Powers would be unable to interfere diplomatically to protect Serbia before war between Serbia and Austria-Hungary had become an accomplished fact.

The Austro-Hungarian ultimatum was, in effect, a notice to Serbia that she must stamp out any and all Pan-Serbian propaganda and discipline all Serbians who might have been in any way engaged in it. Austrian official collaboration in this work was also insisted upon. Serbia was to remove from the military and civil services all functionaries guilty of propaganda against Austria-Hungary or designated as guilty by the Vienna Government. Austria, in brief, demanded an abdication of Serbian sovereignty.

Acting on the advice of the Entente Powers, the Serbian Cabinet prepared an extremely conciliatory reply. It granted most of the Austro-Hungarian demands and made only slight reservations as to the others. It asked for a restatement of a few obscure

points in the note and offered to refer any questions left outstanding to the Hague Tribunal.

No state ever showed more moderation under provocation than Serbia did. But the Austrian programme had been determined on in advance. Baron Giesl, the diplomatic representative of the Dual Monarchy stationed at Belgrade, received the Serbian reply at 5.45 P.M. on July 25th. Within a few minutes notice was given to Premier Pasitch that the communication was unsatisfactory. At 6.30 P.M. the Austrian Legation Staff left Belgrade. The Minister had not taken the trouble to wire the note to Vienna and await instructions. Hostilities began on July 26th. Austria-Hungary formally declared war on July 28th.

The vital question from the beginning had been how far Russia would go to protect Serbia. Russia's course was open and straightforward. Her people had recovered from the depression following the Japanese War. Defeat in the East had led the government to turn its attention again to the Balkans. The Balkan wars had helped Russia, while injuring Austria-Hungary. Popular feeling in the Empire demanded a demonstration of some sort on Serbia's behalf. Otherwise Russian prestige in the Balkans would be shattered.

About the middle of July, Sazonoff, the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, had told the British Ambassador to Russia that "anything in the shape of an Austrian ultimatum to Belgrade could not leave Russia indifferent and she might be forced to take some precautionary military measures." With the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, who delivered a copy of the ultimatum on July 24th, he was equally outspoken. Count Szapary reported to Vienna that Sazonoff's

"attitude was throughout unaccommodating and hostile." Count Pourtales, the German Ambassador to St. Petersburg, reported to Berlin that on the same day Sazonoff declared to him "most positively that Russia could not permit under any circumstances that the Serbo-Austrian difficulty should be settled between the parties concerned alone." But the latter was the only sort of settlement which Berlin and Vienna were willing to tolerate.

Diplomatic efforts between July 26th and August 1st to head off war by some sort of joint European mediation were predestined to failure. So far as the two Teuton Powers were concerned, they were a by-play intended chiefly to mystify the British Government. France and Russia both distrusted German intentions. Sir Edward Grey was more optimistic and his illusions were furthered by the fact that the German Ambassador at London, Prince Lichnowsky, an honest and high-minded diplomat, had been kept in ignorance of what was actually going on in Berlin.

On July 26th Austria-Hungary mobilized twelve of her first line army corps—eight completely and four partially. On July 29th Russia mobilized in the military districts of Odessa, Kiev, Moscow, and Kazan. Berlin had been informed in advance of this move, with a notice that there was no intention in it of aggression against Germany. On the same day Count Pourtales served notice on Sazonoff that "any further development of Russian military preparations would compel us to take counter-measures, and that meant war."

Since Russia could not mobilize effectively against Austria-Hungary without calling out the troops in the Poland district, which faced Germany as well as

Austria-Hungary, a complete mobilization was ordered on July 30th. Germany intended to make this an excuse for a mobilization against both Russia and France. On July 31st she sent an ultimatum, requiring Russia to stop within twelve hours "every measure of war against us and against Austria-Hungary." The next day Germany declared war on Russia.

The Berlin-Vienna plot had been carried out to the last detail. It is interesting to note that, at the last moment, Austria-Hungary showed signs of weakening. These may have been intended merely as a climax in deception. If they were genuine, they reflected the eleventh-hour realization of the Austrian General Staff that it was hardly prepared to fight Serbia on one front and Russia on another. At any rate, Vienna, under Entente pressure, began to admit that some discussion of the terms of the Serbian note was possible and also that Russian mobilization need not be interpreted as involving war. But by this time—late on July 31st—the German Government had clinched war by declaring practically that Russian mobilization against either Germany or Austria-Hungary constituted a *casus belli*.

It didn't suit the German General Staff to mobilize against Russia alone. France must be attacked and destroyed first. Berlin could never have imagined that France would fail to live up to her obligations to Russia. Nevertheless, it was desirable to draw France in at once. So the German Ambassador at Paris was instructed to inform the French Government, if it exhibited a desire to remain neutral, that neutrality could be purchased by the surrender to Germany, for the period of the war, of the frontier fortresses of Verdun and Toul.

France did not desire to remain neutral. She mobilized on August 1st, but neither declared war nor com-

mitted any hostile act. The German Government was, therefore, forced to invent some fictitious acts of aggression, and use them as the basis for a declaration of war against France. This declaration was made on August 3d. Thereafter, Germany was free to develop her long elaborated plans for an invasion of France.

Great Britain's attitude was still undefined. Sir Edward Grey had been the most sanguine supporter of the futile diplomacy of mediation. On August 1st he still had some faith in Germany's willingness to forego war. After Berlin had taken the final step, he began to have questionings as to the extent of Great Britain's obligations to France and Russia, particularly to France. Self-interest and self-preservation both required Great Britain to draw the sword against Germany. But the Asquith government had strongly pacifist tendencies. It had kept Great Britain unready for war, and now shrank from facing the consequences of unreadiness.

Fortunately Germany herself resolved British hesitations. The German General Staff had decided to attack France through Belgium. On August 2d the German Government demanded free passage across Belgian territory for the German armies. The Belgian Government refused this unwarranted demand. On August 3d Berlin issued an ultimatum to Belgium and followed it by violating the Belgian border.

Sir Edward Grey had now a reason for siding with Germany's enemies which could not be challenged. Great Britain had guaranteed the territorial integrity and neutrality of Belgium. Germany—succeeding to the diplomatic contracts of Prussia—was a co-guarantor. Great Britain was morally bound to defend Belgium. It was also to her obvious interest to do so. Having once

assumed that attitude, war with Germany was sure to follow.

Great Britain protested against the violation of Belgian neutrality and asked for assurances that Germany would not persist in it. Germany had no idea of giving such assurances. The British demand hardened on August 4th into an ultimatum, expiring at midnight. No assurances having been received from Berlin, Great Britain formally declared war against Germany on August 5th.

CHAPTER II

NUMBERS AND STRATEGY

WHEN on the evening of August 4, 1914, Sir Edward Goschen, the British Ambassador in Berlin, called on Bethmann-Hollweg, he found the latter in a tremendous state of excitement. The Chancellor expressed the greatest astonishment that Great Britain should think of going to war just for "a scrap of paper"—meaning her engagement to uphold Belgian neutrality. He accused Great Britain of "striking a man from behind while he was fighting for his life against two assailants." And he added with a sneer: "At what price will that compact [the Belgian treaty] have been kept? Has the British Government thought of that?"

Bethmann-Hollweg, being only a civilian and living in the unreal atmosphere of Continental diplomacy, may have been startled by the idea that German policy had driven Great Britain into full partnership in the Entente. But the German military leaders could have had no illusions as to the effect of their adventure in Belgium. They had counted the cost. They were willing to fight Great Britain rather than forego the advantages of access through Belgium to the open plain of Northern France.

At first glance it seemed as if Germany had recklessly plunged into a war in which the odds were enormously against her. She had created an enemy coalition

The Great War

comprising three Great Powers—France, Great Britain, and Russia—and three smaller states—Belgium, Serbia, and Montenegro (for Montenegro was certain to act with Serbia). Portugal had a military alliance with Great Britain. So had Japan. These two countries were to be added to Germany's enemies. Austria-Hungary was the only ally Berlin had in sight. Italy was uncertain and might not remain "benevolently neutral," as the Triple Alliance treaty required her to do in case either or both her associates engaged in a war of aggression. Rumania, formerly a satellite of the Teuton Powers, had drifted away from them in recent years almost as far as Italy had.

The two Teuton empires were greatly outnumbered at the start, and remained outnumbered. Turkey joined them in the fall of 1914. But Italy joined the Entente in May, 1915. Bulgaria sided with them in October, 1915. Rumania sided with the Entente in August, 1916, and Greece in the summer of 1917. When Russia dropped out of the war the United States came in.

At the beginning of the war the man-power equation, based on population returns for the years immediately preceding, was:

THE TEUTON POWERS

Germany.....	68,000,000
Austria-Hungary.....	52,000,000
Total.....	120,000,000

THE ENTENTE POWERS

France (without her colonies).....	39,600 000
The United Kingdom.....	46,000,000

Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa.....	20,000,000
Belgium.....	7,500,000
Serbia and Montenegro.....	3,500,000
Portugal.....	6,000,000
Russia.....	178,000,000
Total.....	300,600,000

Japan entered the war on August 23, 1914. But her man power is not included in the Entente total, because she confined her operations to Asia. She sent no troops to Europe and only a few of the smaller units of her navy to the Mediterranean. On the other hand, Great Britain was able to recruit more than one million men in her Indian possessions. These were used chiefly in Mesopotamia and Palestine (many of them in the non-combatant services). A few East Indian divisions fought in France in the fall of 1914, but the climate was too severe for them. France drew on her African colonies for more than five hundred thousand first line troops and auxiliaries. The best of these were employed regularly on the Western Front.

In 1915 the numerical equation stood:

QUADRUPLE ALLIANCE

Germany and Austria-Hungary.....	120,000,000
Turkey.....	21,000,000
Bulgaria.....	4,750,000
Total.....	145,750,000

ENTENTE

Members in 1914.....	300,600,000
Italy.....	35,000,000
Total.....	335,600,000

Germany and her associates were always outnumbered more than two to one. The defection of Russia did not lower the ratio, materially, in view of the accession of the United States, Rumania, and Greece and the steadily increasing supply of British and French colonials.

Yet the German General Staff had foreseen an enemy preponderance in crude man power, and had frankly discounted it. The Germans knew that there were other factors in modern war more important than unorganized numbers. Numbers could count little against superior military organization, unified leadership, better trained troops, heavier guns, and completer technical equipment. Germany was thoroughly prepared for war. No one of the Entente belligerents, except France, was even moderately well prepared for it.

The German General Staff counted on a relatively short war. For a European war lasting three years—and against the enemies in sight at the beginning of it—Germany and Austria-Hungary had ample man power. Their strength could be fully developed within twelve months. On the other side only France's could be. Great Britain could not be ready to fight on a large scale until the summer of 1916. Russia, owing to her isolated position and her backward condition industrially, would never be able to make effective use of her vast numbers. Italy, after she entered the war, would be held down to the defensive or to ineffectual offensives, because of military difficulties she faced on her northern frontier.

Having her military resources well in hand, Germany also expected to fight a war of elimination. She tried to crush France in 1914, and failed. But she extinguished Belgium. She overran Serbia and Montenegro

in 1915 and Rumania in 1916. She put Russia out of the lists in 1917. Had she not unnecessarily dragged the United States into the war at the same time, she might have carried the struggle against France, Great Britain, and Italy to a draw (which would have meant a substantial victory for her) before her military strength had been exhausted.

Her advantages in the way of geographical position, rapidity of mobilization, centralized command, possession of the strategic offensive, larger munitions supplies, and superiority in heavy artillery and machine guns, more than offset the Allied advantage in potential man power. Bethmann-Hollweg ludicrously distorted the facts when he pictured Germany in 1914 as a man being stabbed in the back by Great Britain while he was fighting for life with two other assailants—Russia and France. There was never any serious shortage of German troops on the Western Front until September, 1918. And Germany always possessed a decided military superiority on the Eastern Front.

The general strategic objectives of the two groups of combatants were simple enough, in the broader sense. It was Germany's plan to dispose of France first and then to turn east and crush Russia. France was not disposed of in the great onrush which ended with the First Battle of the Marne. But she was pinned down for four years to an uncomfortable defensive on her own soil.

After 1914, it was Germany's natural policy to fight a holding battle in the West, to destroy Russia, and to bring into being that Mittel-Europa of which the Pan-Germans had dreamed. She did create in 1915 and 1916 a German Empire extending from the Gulf of Riga, on the Baltic, to the mouths of the Dan-

ube and thence to the Caucasus, the lower Tigris, and the Sinai Desert. After the Russian collapse she added to it Finland, Esthonia, Livonia, Lithuania, the Ukraine, the Crimea, and Trans-Caucasia. The way was opened for German penetration to the Urals, to Bokhara and Herat.

But the German military leaders kept turning back to the original conception of a war of conquest in the West. They could not renounce the idea of capturing Paris and bringing Great Britain to her knees. So, after finishing Russia, they set out to conquer the world. It was a vain and foolish quest. For the submarine war against Great Britain forced the United States in as a belligerent and made a military decision against Germany (which before had been extremely doubtful) a practical certainty. Overweening ambition and unsound strategy cost Germany the war.

As to the Entente, its primary strategic aim was to connect the Western Front with the Eastern Front. This was never accomplished. And failure to accomplish it led to the downfall and elimination of Russia. The original Franco-Russian plan was to defeat Germany by a concerted Eastern and Western offensive. But Russia was never equal to an offensive against Germany. And the French offensive didn't really get going until July, 1918.

The Allies fought the war disjointedly. Without unity of command they could hardly hope to get anywhere. But it took nearly four years of failures and disappointments to achieve unity. The Western Allied Powers held on, each fighting for itself, while their Eastern associates went down singly to disaster. But France, Great Britain, and Italy maintained themselves until America could arrive. And that was long enough.

CHAPTER III

BELGIUM AND THE MARNE. AUG. 3, 1914—SEPT. 9, 1914

GERMANY began the war with a crime. Inheriting the treaty obligations of Prussia, the German Empire had become one of the guarantors of the territorial integrity and neutrality of Belgium. But because the German General Staff found it more practicable to attack France through Belgium than to attempt to force the strongly fortified Lorraine front, the German Government broke its faith and brutally attacked a people to whom it owed protection.

The invasion of Belgium was a revelation to the world of the moral and spiritual corruption with which the Germany of William II had been infected. Her statesmen and soldiers had lost respect even for appearances. The elder Moltke, though cold and implacable, still lived up to the recognized code of military honour. He fought cleanly in France in 1870-71. But events were soon to prove that his successors admitted no restraints on military ruthlessness. They adhered unconditionally to Bethmann-Hollweg's maxim that military necessity (meaning military convenience) "knows no law." After breaking the law of nations they began to disregard the laws of war and the humanitarian restrictions thrown about war in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. In the massacres of Dinant, Aerschot, and Louvain

they relapsed to the standards of barbarism—standards which were to be enforced thereafter by German armies wherever they went and in German warfare at sea and in the air. Within three weeks after the war began German methods had become infamous in the eyes of all civilized nations.

When King Albert was faced with the brutal German ultimatum of August 3d, he elected to lose his kingdom rather than yield his honour. He was poorly prepared to contest the passage of the Kaiser's armies across Belgian territory. But, at the least, he could delay for a few days the progress of the huge flanking movement through Northern France on which Moltke the Younger counted to envelop the French armies and to uncover Paris.

Liège was the first barrier in the path of the invaders. It lay in the lower Meuse Valley and covered the main trunk line up that valley to the French border. It was surrounded by a circle of modern forts, built by Brialmont. It was only lightly garrisoned, however; and there were not enough men to defend the spaces between the forts.

Belgium's total available forces in the first days of August, 1914, numbered 135,500. Of these 18,500 were volunteers. The Belgian Government, with a scrupulous regard for its obligations as a neutral, had mobilized on the French border and on the coast facing Great Britain, as well as on the German front. The bulk of the troops were in the West. Only the Third Division was at Liège and it had to cover the Meuse crossings below the city as well as defend the city itself.

The Belgian plan of campaign did not contemplate an engagement in force with the superior German masses. Instructions were given to the division com-

manders to avoid anything like a pitched battle and to elude envelopment, the purpose of the Belgian High Command being merely to slow up the Germans and to retire gradually, ultimately effecting a junction with the expected French and British forces. In pursuance of this sound policy, the Third Belgian Division withdrew from Liège on August 6th, about a week before Fort de Loncin fell, and General Leman, the commander of the garrison, was taken prisoner by the Germans. The last Liège forts were not reduced until August 16th and 17th.

German cavalry had crossed into Belgium on the morning of August 4th. The same day the attack on Liège opened. The Germans attempted to rush the fortress without waiting for the siege artillery to come up. These efforts failed with serious losses. In a night attack on August 5th some German troops succeeded in getting through a gap between two of the forts and reaching the city. They were thrown out, but returned on August 6th, when the Third Belgian Division was sent away.

The forts had been expected to hold out for some time although isolated. But after the German and Austrian heavy howitzers arrived it was quickly demonstrated that even the new girdle fort systems of the Brialmont type had become obsolete. The Teuton monster batteries were emplaced far beyond the range of the fort guns and made practice just as if they were on the proving grounds. And the projectiles were powerful enough to blow Brialmont's concrete and steel cupola-shaped constructions into fragments. It was the first surprise of a war which was to be full of surprises.

Until the forts yielded the enemy could not make use of the railroads up the Meuse Valley toward France.

Their gallant resistance delayed the German advance slightly, yet not materially. By August 17th, when the last one fell, the Germans had just about completed their mobilization and Kluck's and Bülow's armies were ready to execute the great wheel into Northern France.

Pushing up the Meuse Valley past Huy the German and Austrian heavy batteries invested Namur, on August 22d. That second Belgian stronghold, rated almost as high as Liège, was reduced in two days. The fall of Namur cleared the way for the advance of the First and Second German armies west and southwest toward the exposed left flank of the Allied position in the neighbourhood of Charleroi, Mons, and Maubeuge.

The Belgian army was now cut off from the French and British forces. It had been concentrated on the line of the Gette River, covering Antwerp and Brussels. On August 18th Kluck attacked this line, and since the Germans had an immense superiority in numbers, King Albert, pursuing his original policy, ordered a retirement behind the Dyle River. The next day the Belgian army, still intact, moved within the outer circle of the Antwerp forts. There it awaited events.

The stage was now completely cleared for the first German campaign in France. The German plan of operations was one long ago worked out. By striking through Belgium it sought to avoid the difficulties involved in an attack on the Belfort-Nancy-Toul-Verdun front. There was another reason. The Germans needed room to carry out the ambitious envelopment scheme which Count Schlieffen had devised. They could get room only by approaching Paris from the north-east, down the Valley of the Oise.

This plan was advertised more or less before the war. But the French General Staff apparently did not take it very seriously. Possibly because it involved a violation of international good faith and also because an exaggerated value was put on the defensive value of the fortresses of Liège and Namur, the French strategists were never inclined to believe that Germany would deliver her main attack in the north.

The French concentration plans provided for an assembling of the main strength of the French forces on the Alsace-Lorraine and Luxemburg border. In the original alignment the five French armies were grouped as follows: the First, under Dubail, in the Vosges region, from Lunéville south; the Second, under de Castelnau, covering Nancy and Toul; the Third, under Ruffey, from Verdun north to Montmédy, east of the Meuse; the Fifth, under Lanrezac, in the Sedan-Mezières section, opposite the Ardennes; the Fourth, under de Langle de Cary, in reserve behind the Third Army.

It was the purpose of the French to seize the offensive, if possible, before the Germans did, or, at least, to meet a German offensive in the north with a counter-offensive in the south. All French preconceptions were in favour of forcing the issue in the Upper Rhine Valley.

The German concentration aimed at a decision in the north. Three armies—the First, under Kluck, the Second, under Bülow, and the Third, under Hausen—were mobilized on the Belgian border north of Luxemburg. The Fourth Army, under Crown Prince Albrecht of Württemberg, covered the northern half of Luxemburg; the Fifth, under the Crown Prince of Prussia, covered the southern half, extending down to

Thionville. The Sixth Army, under Crown Prince Rupprecht of Bavaria, was behind Metz. The Seventh, under Heeringen, was on the Saar, between Metz and Strasburg. There was a special contingent, under Deimling, in Upper Alsace. The German encirclement movement was to pivot on the Fifth Army. The First Army was to be the tip of the moving spoke.

Kluck got well in motion about August 18th. By that time Joffre had already attempted to take the offensive in the south. The first effort was made on August 7th, when the mobilization was only half completed. It consisted of a reconnoissance in force from Belfort to Altkirch and Mulhouse. The latter city was occupied for a day. Then the French columns, finding German resistance stronger than they had expected, retired to the border.

The moral effect of this adventure was discouraging. So Joffre sent back a new force, called the Army of Alsace, under the aged General Pau, to recover Altkirch and Mulhouse. The movement began on August 15th. Mulhouse was retaken on August 19th. But there progress ended. Within a few days the French General Staff was occupied with more important matters than a sentimental inroad into Alsace. Pau was recalled to Belfort and the Army of Alsace was disbanded. Most of the troops composing it were already needed elsewhere.

The Lorraine offensive was on a more ambitious scale. The First and Second armies participated in it. They both moved on August 14th across the French border in a north-easterly direction, toward the general line of the railroad connecting Metz and Strasburg. They faced the German Sixth and Seventh armies. which drew back in accordance with a prearranged

plan. The First Army reached Sarrebourg—on the Metz-Strasbourg railway, about eighteen miles north-east of the frontier—on August 18th. It pushed a little north of that town and was checked there on the 19th. But its position was good and General Dubail expected to renew the offensive when he received word that the Second Army, on his left, was in trouble. Following instructions, he withdrew into France.

The Second Army had more difficult ground to march over and fight on. It reached Château Salins and pushed on toward Morhange, just south of the railroad line. There, however, it suffered a serious reverse on August 20th. Some of the French divisions were more or less demoralized by the fire of the immensely superior German heavy artillery, to which the French field artillery could make no adequate reply. The retreat was somewhat disorderly. But the German pursuit was feeble. Dubail and de Castelnau rallied the troops and restored their confidence within a few days. Three weeks later the First and Second armies completely repulsed the southern German offensive, directed at Nancy.

Joffre's Alsace and Lorraine experiments had been fruitless and costly. He was wasting strength in a subsidiary field. It was plain long before August 20th that the main German attack was to come through Belgium, and that the French lines ought to be extended north to meet it. But the French High Command remained unconvinced that the Belgian operation was anything but a demonstration, which could be halted by vigorous French offensives against the German centre and left wing.

As a halfway measure, however, the French left was carried farther north and strengthened. Lanre-

zac's Fifth Army was ordered on August 15th to move across the Belgian frontier and to occupy the angle formed by the Meuse and Sambre rivers, from Dinant north to Namur and thence west to Charleroi. Two corps and three colonial divisions were withdrawn from the Second Army and sent north. The gap created between the Fifth Army and the Third Army was filled by the Fourth Army, hitherto in reserve. Four territorial divisions were collected in the region of Arras and Lille under General d'Amade, to protect French Flanders against German cavalry raids. The British Expeditionary Army, about seventy thousand strong, was to concentrate at Maubeuge and prolong the Allied line west of Charleroi.

But Joffre still believed that he could derange the German plan by attacks on the eastern front. He therefore launched a third offensive, this time north of Metz. The Fourth Army was ordered to advance into the Ardennes Forest and strike at the enemy. Meanwhile the Third Army, supported by the special Army of Lorraine (a counterpart to Pau's Army of Alsace), was dispatched east toward the Luxemburg border. They were to defeat the German Fourth and Fifth armies, drive them back into Germany, and thus dislocate Moltke's pivoting movement.

This joint operation began on August 21st. The battle of the Ardennes was fought on August 22d; for the Germans, on their side, were also advancing. It was a confused engagement, in wooded, almost roadless country. The French Fourth Army came into action in a fragmentary, scattered way and was easily beaten. It retreated, in disorder, on August 23d. This retirement, lasting several days, carried it to the west bank of the Meuse.

The Third Army was checked at Virton, but suffered less severely than the Fourth did. But the retreat also carried it back beyond the Meuse. The special Army of Lorraine, under Maunoury, distinguished itself. Yet it was now needed elsewhere. It was broken up on August 26th. Maunoury took two of its divisions with him when he went to Montdidier to organize the new Sixth Army, which was to play so important a rôle less than two weeks later at the battle of the Marne.

The sudden collapse of the French offensive north of Verdun capped the climax of Joffre's ineffective strategy. It was a terrific setback; for the French High Command, with four of its armies beaten on terrain on which they were supposed to have strength enough to force the fighting, now had to face the problem of stopping the envelopment movement in which three of the seven German armies were fully engaged.

In a subsequent statement, entitled *L'Exposé de Six Mois de Guerre*, the French General Staff said:

On August 21st our offensive began on the centre with ten army corps. On August 22d it had failed and the reverse seemed to be a serious one.

The reasons for the failure are complex. There were faults, both individual and collective; imprudences committed under the fire of the enemy, divisions badly engaged, rash deployments, precipitate retirements, a premature wastage of men, and, finally, shortcomings of certain of our troops, and of their commanders in the employment of artillery and infantry.

In consequence of these errors the enemy, profiting from the difficulty of the terrain, was able to reap the maximum of profit and advantage from the superiority of his subaltern officers.

This was a disingenuous judgment. The troops which fought in the August offensives acquitted themselves most admirably, a couple of weeks later, in the Marne campaign. The French defeats on the east front were apparently due more to marked inferiority in artillery than to any other single cause. But the offensives themselves were wrongly conceived and badly managed. They violated the principle that an offensive should always be able to develop a marked superiority at the point of attack.

The British Expeditionary Army completed its concentration at Maubeuge on August 20th. The next day it marched north into Belgium. The day following it was in position about Mons, the right wing connecting with the left wing of Lanrezac's Fifth Army, to the south-west of Charleroi. Lanrezac had been reinforced by one corps and two North African divisions from the Second Army and three additional reserve divisions were on their way to him. Without counting these last-named units, there were about 270,000 French and British troops in the Dinant-Namur-Charleroi-Mons angle when the German northern offensive opened.

The three armies participating in it totalled about 400,000 men. The Third Army was marching across Belgium, through the northern part of the Ardennes, to attack Lanrezac's right wing, facing east on the Meuse. The Second was approaching Namur to attack Lanrezac's refused left wing. The First, the largest of all, was rushing west at top speed with the purpose of overlapping and enveloping the exposed British flank. Beyond the British left, and quite out of touch with it, were a few divisions of French territorials guarding the approaches to Valenciennes and Lille.

Namur fell on August 23d. But on August 21st Bülow had begun to attack Lanrezac at Charleroi. The battle there lasted two days. Meanwhile Hausen, with the German Third Army, had come up to the Meuse and captured Dinant, and Lanrezac's connections with the Fourth French Army were thus threatened; and on August 24th, the day Kluck fell on the British at Mons, the Fifth French Army had begun to retire. The British held out for a day at Mons against great odds. Then their position became perilous and they, too, drew back to recover connection with Lanrezac. The retreat to the Marne had begun.

Joffre had, in fact, no option now but to recoil on the whole front—from Verdun to Mons. He had misjudged the situation and his entire strategical plan was shattered. It is to his credit as a soldier that he faced the consequences of his errors coolly and resolutely. He decided to retreat, and to keep on retreating until a really favourable opportunity offered for turning and fighting. What he executed was a genuine strategical retirement. The Germans never understood that. They thought that he was merely running for safety. And that misapprehension accounts largely for their defeat at the Marne.

Joffre still had confidence in himself and his troops. His plan was to pivot his retirement on Verdun, as the Germans had pivoted their envelopment on Metz. The Allied armies were to fall back rapidly enough to avoid encirclement on the left. Paris was to be uncovered, if necessary. Meanwhile two new armies were created to come into line when a battle was to be delivered. They were the Sixth Army, assigned to Maunoury, and the Ninth, given to Foch, who had just shown his quality as a corps commander at Mor-

hange. With the new formations included in these two armies, Joffre's strength in the field was now practically equal to Moltke's.

Joffre lost the garrison of Maubeuge—40,000 strong—when, ignoring the lesson of Liège and Namur, he decided to use that fortress as an obstacle to the German advance. It would have been just as much of an obstacle if the forts had been left to take care of themselves, as the Liège forts were after the Belgian Third Division was sensibly withdrawn. Maubeuge fell on September 7th. The only advantage gained by holding it in force was the detention of three or four German reserve divisions, which could not move south until after the battle of the Marne had begun.

Joffre had lost probably more than 100,000 men in his eastern offensives. He was now to make a far greater sacrifice—the abandonment to the Germans of a great part of the rich industrial section of north-eastern France. This surrender of territory was to weigh on the French for the next four years, crippling their resources, paralyzing their freedom of movement, and injuriously localizing their strategy. It was the one irreparable consequence of the French High Command's failure to grasp the full meaning of Moltke's invasion of Belgium.

The British Expeditionary Army had to retreat farthest, and started last. Its left flank was uncovered and it had to fight to frustrate a German envelopment as it fell back. On August 26th it was so closely pressed that the left wing, under Smith-Dorrien, stood fast at Le Cateau, and fought an engagement lasting about ten hours. In his book *1914*, Field Marshal Viscount French sharply criticizes Smith-Dorrien for offering battle at Le Cateau. Not even a tacit consent

was given from British Headquarters, he says, for this stand, which played into Kluck's hand by interrupting the British retreat and might have resulted in the encirclement and capture of the Second Corps. "The loss of fourteen thousand men and sixty guns," at Le Cateau, he insists, "was felt seriously throughout the subsequent battle of the Marne, and during the early operations on the Aisne." The guns and machine guns captured by the enemy could not be replaced until late in September.

In his *Forty Days in 1914*, Major-General Sir Frederick Maurice, at that time with the British Expeditionary Army and later Director of Military Information in London, expresses a contrary view. He commends Smith-Dorrien for boldness and cool judgment and indicates that a battle was advisable in order to extricate the British left wing. He admits, however, that the Second Corps escaped on the afternoon of August 26th only because Kluck let a great opportunity slip through his fingers. General Maurice also says that the British losses in the campaign up to the end of the battle of Le Cateau were only a little over ten thousand.

French's plan of an uninterrupted retreat was, however, essentially sound. After Le Cateau the two British corps (the First, on the right, being under the command of Sir Douglas Haig) retired by forced marches until, on the morning of August 28th, French's army crossed the Somme River at Ham. After that the retreat was practically unmolested. On French's right the French Fifth Army had turned on Bülow and defeated him at Guise. On the left Kluck's army was edging more and more to the south-west and coming into contact with the French units which were being

consolidated into the new Sixth Army under Maunoury. That commander, arriving at Montdidier with a part of the disbanded special Army of Lorraine, added to it two of d'Amade's territorial divisions and Sordet's cavalry corps. Kluck, still pushing south-west, followed Maunoury's only partially organized army toward Paris. He moved south on the roads west of the Oise, whereas the British moved south on the roads east of the Oise. It was not until Kluck changed the direction of his march suddenly from south-west to south-east that he again found himself in contact with the British forces.

Joffre prolonged his general retirement until September 5th. But as early as August 25th he had given a clear indication of his purpose to halt at the opportune moment and take the offensive. On that day he issued the following instructions:

The object of our future operations will be to re-constitute on our left flank, with the Fourth and Fifth armies, the British army, and new forces drawn from our right, a mass capable of resuming the offensive while the other armies contain the enemy for the time necessary.

The arguments in favour of continuing the retreat below the Aisne, the Oise, and the Marne were numerous. In the first place, time would be given to organize the two new armies—the Sixth and the Ninth. The haste of the pursuit was carrying the Germans far ahead of their supply trains and heavy artillery. Moreover, the nearer the Allied armies drew to Paris the better protected their left wing would be against encirclement, since the left wing, more or less exposed

all the way down from the Belgian border, would rest securely on the Paris fortifications.

As Kluck approached the capital the chance of a successful envelopment of the Allied left wing went glimmering. The main Allied army had withdrawn to the south-east of Paris. The German High Command had now to modify the envelopment plan and to decide whether to invest and reduce the capital or to pursue the Allied armies toward the Upper Seine, and try there to break their connections with Paris and double them back against the eastern frontier.

Kluck did change direction away from Paris about August 31st—not very perceptibly at first, but soon unmistakably. It was evidently the new plan of the German General Staff to dispose of the enemy armies first and then return to occupy Paris. But this change of direction vitally altered the strategic situation. Heretofore the Germans had been seeking to envelop the Allied left flank. Now, by abandoning the envelopment project and drawing Kluck's army in closer to Bülow's, the German High Command carelessly exposed its own right flank to envelopment. Through overconfidence and a contemptuous undervaluation of the strength and morale of the enemy the Germans fell headlong into the trap which Joffre had been preparing to spring.

It was Moltke's revised plan to concentrate on the Allied left centre and effect a break through. The Allied line from Verdun west to Paris had taken the shape of a curve, dipping gently to the south. The armies were stationed in the following order, from east to west. The Third, now under Sarraill, stretched from Souilly, south-west of Verdun, to Revigny. It faced north-west. The Fourth, facing north, held the

front from Sermaize to Sompuis. The new Ninth lay south of La Fère-Champenoise, between Camp de Mailly and Sezanne. The Fifth, now under Franchet d'Esperey, inclined a little to the south-west, and filled the gap between Sezanne and the region below the Forest of Crécy, where the British Expeditionary Army was posted, its left resting on the south-eastern sector of the Paris entrenched camp. The Sixth Army, largely reinforced, was on the north-eastern outskirts of Paris, facing east.

It was thus already on the flank and rear of Kluck's army, which had pushed south-east toward Coulommiers and Esternay, and was confronting both the Fifth French Army and the reinforced British army. Only one reserve corps had been left behind by Kluck to protect his rear from an attack coming out of Paris. Bülow was opposite Foch. Hausen was opposite Foch and de Langle de Cary. The Duke of Württemberg confronted Cary's right and Sarraill's left. The army of the Crown Prince of Prussia extended past Sarraill's right and encircled the fortress of Verdun. South-east of Verdun the Second and First French armies stood at bay, defending Nancy.

The battle of the Marne began on September 5th, when Maunoury moved east to attack Kluck's lone reserve division, stationed to the north of Meaux. Kluck, himself, with his main force, was many miles to the south, below Coulommiers, preparing to attack the British and d'Esperey. He was quick to grasp the situation, however. He didn't know that Joffre had set September 6th as the date for the forward movement of the whole Allied left wing. But he saw that under any circumstances he would have to meet the threat to his rear. His tactics in the next few days showed

that he expected to turn back with his main force and crush Maunoury, screening his southern front with cavalry and depending on his left wing divisions, acting with Bülow and Hausen, to keep the Fifth and Ninth French armies occupied.

Kluck started his infantry north from Coulommiers on September 6th, just at the time when Maunoury's attack began to develop. Maunoury had a great advantage in numbers in the beginning, and forced the single German reserve corps back toward the Ourcq River. But Kluck's right wing and centre presently furnished supports and the battle of the Ourcq, extending to the north to Nanteuil and Betz, continued uncertainly all through September 7th and 8th. Kluck had almost turned Maunoury's left wing and thrown it back on Paris, when he suddenly interrupted the battle on September 9th and retreated toward the Aisne.

The British Expeditionary Army and the Fifth French Army had begun a forward movement on September 6th. They had in front of them only Marwitz's cavalry. But their progress was not rapid enough to affect the course of Maunoury's battle before September 9th. On that day the British were east and north-east of La Ferté-sous-Jouarre, in the rear of Kluck's battle-line, and Kluck's army had been split into two sections, the one facing west and fighting Maunoury, the other attached to the right wing of Bülow's army and facing south. The connection between the two was maintained by cavalry only. It was a situation not to the taste of the German High Command, which probably decided on September 9th to break off the battle, in spite of the apparent progress which Bülow and Hausen were making against the Allied left centre.

Foch's Ninth Army had borne the brunt of the German eleventh-hour effort to convert the Schlieffen envelopment—which had failed—into a breaking through operation after the Napoleonic manner. Bülow's left and centre and the greater part of Hausen's army were used in pounding Foch, who had to give way all along his line. His left was driven below the Marshes of St. Gond on September 7th. On the 8th his centre was pushed back from La Fère-Champenoise. Foch had to move his headquarters to the south.

But the situation was already clearing. Kluck's retirement had been pulling Bülow more and more to the west, and had also so lightened d'Esperey's task that he could lend Foch an army corps. On September 9th the drag to the right had forced Bülow to leave a gap in his line between La Fère-Champenoise and the Marshes of St. Gond. Into this gap Foch sent his *élite* Forty-Second Division—between five and six o'clock in the afternoon. It smashed the exposed flank of Bülow's left wing and compelled an immediate German retreat in the centre. But several hours before that Kluck had started north.

Technically the Marne represented an Allied counter-offensive. But throughout most of the fighting the Allies stood on the defensive. Undoubtedly by September 9th the Germans were ready to draw out because they saw that their strategical position had become highly unfavourable. They retreated in good order, losing few prisoners and little *matériel*. And they were able to hold their own as soon as they settled down in new positions from twenty to forty miles back.

Joffre had saved Paris and restored Allied morale by a brilliant victory. And Allied success between Verdun and Paris was supplemented by another clean-

cut victory on the Nancy front, where de Castelnau and Dubail defeated the German Sixth and Seventh armies much more decisively than they had themselves been defeated a couple of weeks earlier at Saarebourg and Morhange. And this was in spite of the fact that the Second and First armies had been weakened to reinforce the French left.

The results of Joffre's flanking operation against Kluck's army were disappointing, however. Kluck faced about too quickly, and the British army and the Fifth French Army were held back too long by Marwitz's cavalry screen. Yet all these imperfections in execution were forgotten in the emotional exaltation which swept France, Great Britain, and most of the neutral countries, when it became known that the German invasion had been halted and the supposedly invincible German armies were in retreat. The French Government came back to Paris, never to leave it again.

The Marne was hailed as "a miracle" by millions who only vaguely understood what had happened. It wasn't that. It was a battle thrown away by recklessness and self-deception on the part of the German High Command. It was a retrieval by Joffre, through coolness and resolution, of grievous errors of judgment made by him in the first weeks of the war.

CHAPTER IV

"THE RACE FOR THE SEA"—SEPTEMBER 15, 1914-
DECEMBER 1, 1914

THE battle of the Marne raised great expectations. In their reaction from something akin to despair the Allied publics imagined for a time that Moltke's repulse would lead speedily to a German retirement from France. This was an illusion. The German armies had been turned back from Paris. But they still retained a grip on Northern France which could not be shaken loose. Before the year 1914 ended they were to enlarge and strengthen their hold.

The German High Command ignored the battle of the Marne. No mention of it was made in the German military *communiqués*. Many months later, a pro-German Swiss critic, Stegemann, wrote a treatise in which the German defeat was neatly explained away. It had a limited circulation in Germany. But in 1916 a German book on the same subject was suppressed by the government. It was not until 1917 that German writers were allowed to discuss the causes of the failure of Schlieffen's double envelopment plan.

By the middle of September, 1914, the German High Command in France recovered its balance sufficiently to try to justify the assumption that the Marne was only an incident, compelling a slight readjustment of German offensive strategy. The two westernmost

German armies had halted on the north bank of the Aisne. Kluck's right rested on Noyon. Bülow was north of Rheims. The other armies stretched east across Champagne and the Argonne to the neighbourhood of Verdun. The Allied armies, confidently advancing north, were checked on the Aisne after September 13th. Then the Germans resumed the offensive themselves, making progress north of Soissons and Rheims and in the Argonne sector.

A force sent from Metz also reached the Meuse at St. Mihiel, reduced Fort Troyon, south of Verdun, to ruins, and captured Fort Camp des Romains. Verdun was nearly encircled, and its railroad communications west and south were cut. The St. Mihiel salient, created in the last week of September, 1914, remained in German hands until September, 1918, when it was wiped out of existence in a day by an American-French offensive.

But these stirrings of the now moribund idea of pinning down and enveloping the Allied armies to the east of Paris came to nothing. Joffre had a counter-plan to which German strategy was quickly obliged to conform. This was to extend the Maunoury flanking operation, which had failed on the Ourcq, to the region of the Somme and then toward Arras. The German left wing was still "in the air." Joffre decided to try to overlap it and thus squeeze the German forces in the north back against the Belgian border.

There were other advantages in a movement of this sort. It was highly desirable for the Allies to recover possession of the industrial section of northern France, abandoned in the retreat to the Marne. It was essential to secure the Channel ports, which were the most convenient British bases in France. And it was high

time to try to extricate the Belgian army, penned up in Antwerp. So Joffre began, in the latter half of September, what is known as "the race for the sea."

French troops at first penetrated the region east and south-east of Amiens. They reoccupied Lassigny, Roye, and Péronne. But they were soon ejected, following a prolongation north of Kluck's front. Bapaume, north of the Somme, was also seized by the Germans. Joffre brought de Castelnau's Second Army around from Lorraine to Picardy. A new army, under Maud'huy, was hurried to Arras. Foch was sent north to take general command, and the British Expeditionary Army was transferred from the Aisne front to Flanders. By the end of September the French had pushed their left wing as far north as Béthune, carrying the Allied line to within forty miles of the Belgian coast.

The German line was extended north with equal rapidity. Bülow was moved from before Rheims to the Arras sector and the Crown Prince of Bavaria's Sixth Army was shifted from German Lorraine to the Somme sector, and later to Belgium. Two months of campaigning had rectified the misapprehensions on which the French over-concentration on the eastern border were based. Alsace and Lorraine were practically abandoned as operative fronts.

The relief of Antwerp may have been one of Joffre's remoter objectives. The Germans in Belgium had turned south at the end of August, leaving Antwerp under observation by two or three reserve corps. They had occupied Brussels and covered their communications with the armies east of Paris. But they had not penetrated north and west of the Scheldt. The way was open from Antwerp west to Bruges and Ostend. The German High Command had not troops enough

available in August both to invest Antwerp from the south and to cut it off on the west. King Albert had annoyed the Germans by making a sortie while the Marne campaign was in progress. It was decided by Moltke, after the Marne failure, to get rid of a troublesome enemy, entrenched close to the vital German arteries of communication through Liège to Aix-la-Chapelle.

Antwerp was rated as one of the strongest fortresses in Europe. It was defended by an outer girdle of cupola forts, built to withstand the artillery attack of its period. But these forts had now become only man traps. The Belgian army held a sally-port at Malines. This city was reduced on September 27th. The next day the German and Austrian giant howitzers opened fire on the outer Antwerp forts. Two were destroyed on September 29th. The Germans hardly needed to use infantry. They brought the big guns up to the breaches made in the outer circle of defences and soon had the city itself under fire.

The Belgian field army was helpless. It could easily have made good its escape in the first days of October. But evacuation was delayed until October 9th, by which time the Germans were able to harass the retreat west and to force across the Dutch boundary a portion of the Belgian army and a unit of British naval reserves, sent by Winston Churchill to help defend Antwerp. The main body of the Belgian forces was extricated, however, by the help of a British infantry division, a British cavalry division, and two French infantry divisions, under General Rawlinson.

The British army began to leave the Aisne front on October 2d, the cavalry and the Second Infantry Corps starting first. The Second Corps detrained at Abbé-

ville on October 8th and moved north-east toward Béthune, connecting there with the left of Maud'huy's French army. The Third British corps reached St. Omer on October 10th, and moved east toward Hazebrouck.

The Lys Valley was held at that time by German cavalry, whose outposts were as far west as Bailleul and Meteren. The plan agreed upon by Sir John French and General Foch, who was in command of the French troops north of Noyon, was that the British army should pivot on Béthune, marching north-east and clearing the Lys region as far as Armentières and Ypres. If this movement was successful, the British and French were to advance east, Lille being the dividing point between the two Allies.

The transfer of the British Expeditionary Army was completed on October 19th, the last units of the First Corps, under Sir Douglas Haig, arriving then and detraining at St. Omer. But on October 11th and 12th General Allenby, commanding the cavalry corps, had come in contact with the German cavalry to the north-west of Béthune, driving them from the hills north-east of Hazebrouck. The Second and Third Infantry Corps pushed up the Lys Valley and occupied the line from La Bassée north to Armentières. On October 16th the Belgian army, with Rawlinson's forces and French supports, went into position east and north of Ypres, the line extending to the North Sea. The Seventh Division and the Third Cavalry Division, which had been with Rawlinson in Belgium, were now constituted the Fourth Corps, another new division from England, the Eighth, to be added later. Haig's First Corps was used to fill in a gap about Ypres. By orders issued by Field Marshal French on October 19th it

was directed to move toward Bruges and drive the enemy, if possible, back on Ghent. But the German concentration in Belgium was now nearly finished and Haig's progress was blocked by greatly superior forces.

Having failed at the Marne either to destroy the Allied armies or to take Paris, the German High Command had turned feverishly, but belatedly, to an alternative scheme. This was to capture Dunkirk and Calais, deprive England of her shortest Channel route to France, and utilize the Belgian and northern French coast as the base for an intensive submarine warfare on British shipping. After the fall of Antwerp the Germans had taken possession of Bruges, an admirable submarine haven, with its twin canals to Zeebrugge and Ostend. They had followed the retreating Belgians to the Yser River and were gathering in huge masses for a drive through Ypres and Hazebrouck to the Channel coast.

The German High Command now had large reinforcements at its disposal. The secondary mobilization was completed. The new formations, including many volunteers, were somewhat lacking in training, but were filled with martial spirit. They were rushed into Flanders, where it was thought the weight of their numbers would easily wear down a greatly inferior enemy.

On October 21st the Allied line from La Bassée to the sea was constituted, from south to north, as follows: The British Second Corps, under Smith-Dorrien, holding a difficult six-mile front; Conneau's French Cavalry Corps, filling a gap of one mile; the British Third Army Corps, under Pulteney, with the Nineteenth Brigade added, holding a twelve-mile line; the British Cavalry Corps, under Allenby, holding a four-mile

line; the Fourth British Corps, under Rawlinson, occupying a six-mile front; the First British Corps, under Haig, occupying a seven-mile front; French Territorial divisions, de Mitry's French cavalry corps, French marines, and the Belgian army, occupying a twenty-mile front ending at Nieuport. Some units of the Lahore Indian division were with Allenby. The Ninth French Corps arrived a day or two later, and on October 27th was put in north-east of Ypres on Haig's left, thus allowing him to shorten his front a little. Later Rawlinson's small Fourth Corps was temporarily merged with the First Corps.

There had been constant fighting in the Lys Valley region since October 15th. The first phase of the struggle for the Channel ports ended with the extrication of the Belgian army and the establishment by the Allies of a continuous line north from La Bassée to the coast. The second phase opened with the enemy's determined efforts to break that line. Had Moltke turned north more quickly, he could undoubtedly have driven a wedge between the Belgians and Rawlinson's relief force, on the one side, and the transferred Expeditionary Army, on the other. He could have compelled the former to escape by sea and have seized Dunkirk, Calais, and Dieppe. Now he had to sever a front which had been at least loosely welded together, if he wanted to reach the Channel ports.

The first powerful German effort was made on the sector nearest the sea. Here the Belgians and French defended the line of the Yser. The town of Dixmude, on this stream, was one of the main centres of resistance. After it was finally taken by the Germans the Allies flooded the swampy area to the west of the Yser, blocking any further German advance in that direction for

the rest of the war. In the Nieuport sector, on the seacoast, the Allied line was protected by the fire of British monitors and other light draft warships.

Farther south the brunt of the attack fell on the sector which included the Ypres salient and the line down to Armentières. Here seven British infantry divisions and three cavalry divisions were assailed by German forces nearly double their strength; for on the whole northern front there were twelve German corps against seven Allied corps. The Germans also had an enormous superiority in artillery. The offensive against Ypres began on October 28th. Its crisis was reached on October 31st and November 1st.

On October 29th the Germans advanced in dense masses on both sides of the road from Menin to Ypres, centring their effort about Gheluvelt. The First and Seventh Divisions of the First Corps were driven back some distance, but later in the day more than recovered the ground they had lost. On October 30th the enemy's attack shifted a little farther south, falling chiefly on the British Cavalry Corps, about Hollebeke. Hollebeke was captured and, still farther down, the Germans got a foothold in Messines village, on the south-eastern side of Messines Ridge. The British line here was reinforced by a brigade detached from Smith-Dorrien's Second Corps.

On October 31st the Germans renewed the assault on the Gheluvelt front. Shortly after noon of that day the line of the First Division of the First Corps was broken. Big guns, trains, and troops cluttered the road back toward Ypres. Field Marshal French tells in *1914* how he had to abandon his motor car east of Ypres and go on foot to Sir Douglas Haig's headquarters at the château of Hooge. There he found Haig and his

Chief of Staff "poring over maps and evidently much disconcerted." The situation was critical, because British reserves were lacking and a retreat to Ypres under the pressure of the vastly superior numbers of the enemy would be extremely difficult and costly.

"It was a dramatic half-hour, the worst I ever spent," says the Field Marshal. But the aspect of things suddenly altered. News came at 3 P.M. that the First Division had rallied and recovered Gheluvelt. This brilliant counter-blow had been organized by Brigadier-General FitzClarence of the First Guards Brigade. He counter-attacked from the north of Gheluvelt and stopped the German advance. He was killed in battle east of Ypres about two weeks later. By dark the British front in the Menin road sector was re-established.

During the night of October 31st–November 1st the Germans broke through the positions held by the British cavalry at Messines. Messines Ridge was seized early in the morning. So was Wytschaete village. By 10 A.M. the exhausted Second Cavalry Division, which had been in the front line many days, was retiring on Mount Kemmel. But the day was saved by the timely arrival of the Sixteenth French Army Corps, loaned by Foch. It established a new line running through the western edge of Wytschaete village.

Field Marshal French says that the period of the greatest danger in the whole Ypres campaign was between 2 A.M. and 11 A.M. on November 1st. Had the Sixteenth French Corps been an hour later, the Allied troops, north of an east and west line running through Mount Kemmel, would have been isolated and hemmed in against the coast. On the 4th and 5th of November the Twentieth French Corps arrived at

Ypres, and the distressing shortage of Allied reserves was somewhat alleviated.

The final phase of the battle of Ypres came on November 11th and 12th.

The Prussian Guard was moved north from Arras to stiffen the new formations which Moltke had been using. Another assault was made about Gheluvelt. But this time no break was effected in Haig's line. The Germans were repulsed with heavy losses. They also failed completely against the French on Haig's left. But on Haig's right, about Hollebeke, they got across the Ypres-Comines canal.

On the 12th repeated violent attacks on both flanks of the British First Corps were brought to a dead stop. The fighting then relaxed. Foch arranged to relieve the hard-trying British divisions. By November 21st he had taken over with French troops the entire Ypres salient.

The British losses in the operations from October 15th to November 20th were 2264 officers and 18,610 men. This refutes the rhetorical exaggeration that the British Expeditionary Army "died in its tracks" in Flanders. Its losses were probably not heavier than twenty per cent.

After the middle of November, the failure of the German campaign for the Channel ports became apparent. The British were reinforced by another East Indian division, by English and Scotch Territorial formations, and by the first Canadian units. Trench lines had been consolidated on the entire Western Front from Nieuport to the Swiss border. The long period of trench deadlock began.

Fighting died away completely in Flanders after December 1st. The "race for the sea" had ended in

a draw. The German drive for the Channel ports had fallen short of its objectives. Even Ypres was not taken. Yet the net result of the Flanders campaign showed a certain balance in favour of the Germans. They had conquered Belgium, except for the narrow strip west of the Yser. They had largely increased their holdings in Northern France. At the close of the battle of the Marne, Noyon, Lassigny, Roye, Chaulnes, Péronne, Bapaume, Arras, Douai, Cambrai, Lens, and Lille were in "No Man's Land." Now they were in German hands, except Arras, which still lay between the lines. This part of France constituted the backbone of French industry. With it lost, the French armies were tied down to a slow war of liberation.

In this territory the Germans systematically destroyed what they couldn't carry away. France was deprived of its manufacturing output, its coal, its harvests, and the services of its inhabitants. And when she recovered it she found its productiveness crippled for years to come.

Belgium suffered the same fate. Her population was impressed to do war work for Germany. Many able-bodied Belgians were deported across the Rhine. The whole kingdom was subjected to the tyranny of satraps like Bissing and Falkenhausen.

Belgium offered a possibility of political assimilation if German policy had been conciliatory, or even humane. The Flemings were of Teutonic stock and had a racial grievance. They had been agitating for recognition of their language. There was a sharp line of antagonism between them and the Walloons. It had doubtless been the German idea, originally, to widen this breach and to create inside Belgium a distinct Flemish state. But the terrorism practised by the military

authorities in the first months of the war blasted whatever hope there was of erecting a pro-German Flemish dependency in Belgian territory.

The Belgian atrocities were committed with the sanction of military leaders who recognized no other rule than calculated severity in dealing with conquered populations. They slew and maimed civilians and burned towns in order to drive fear into the hearts of those on whom they intended to impose the burdens of military occupation. They were impartial. They committed the same crimes in France, in Poland, in Russia, in Rumania, and in Serbia.

But in Belgium they not only earned the execration of the civilized world, but they also defeated their own political ends. When they got ready to set up their independent Flemish state, no Flemings, outside a limited circle of venal place-holders, would accept that odious shadow of independence. Belgium remained a millstone about Germany's neck. It was, to the end of the war, an insuperable bar to any reconciliation between the moral sense of the world and the brutal manifestations of German *Kultur*.

CHAPTER V

OPERATIONS ON THE RUSSIAN FRONT. AUGUST 1, 1914-
DECEMBER 31, 1914

AFTER war was declared William II denounced Nicholas II in unmeasured terms. They had been accustomed to address each other as "Willy" and "Nicky." But "Willy's" affection suddenly turned to violent personal rancour. Since Germany had deliberately planned to make war on Russia, this exasperation seemed unnatural. Yet it was genuine enough. It was accounted for by the fact that Russia, rightly interpreting the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum to Serbia, had taken the precaution to begin her mobilization as early as July 27th. (The mobilization order was published on July 29th.)

Thus Russia, whose concentration would be normally very slow, had obtained a three or four days' start on Germany. This was what irritated the Kaiser. Germany's war plans contemplated a considerable delay in Russian mobilization, which would allow time for the German armies to crush France before having to turn east to meet the Russian menace. The French also had misgivings about Russia's ability to get into the war promptly. But Russia did get in more rapidly than any one had expected.

As things turned out, German calculations were not greatly disturbed by the premature Russian inva-

sion of East Prussia. The invaders were routed at Tannenberg before the battle of the Marne had begun. But Russian forehandedness played havoc with Austria-Hungary's military plans. And Austro-Hungarian reverses in the fall of 1914 compelled Germany to turn to the East Front early in 1915, without having accomplished the main purpose of her offensive against France.

Up to May, 1915, Russia's successes were the great surprise of the war on the Allied side. The Russian armies overran thirty-five thousand square miles of Austrian territory and took more than three hundred thousand prisoners. These achievements were due to the fact that the Russians had profited from the lessons of the Japanese War, and were able to put in the field at the outset large bodies of troops, well equipped, amply munitioned, and led, for the most part, by generals of more experience and capacity than any Austria-Hungary possessed.

Russia's victories were won, moreover, in spite of the handicaps imposed by a defective strategical frontier. Poland, jutting out into Teuton territory, formed a salient extremely difficult to defend. It was surrounded on three sides by Prussia and Austria, and was especially open to attack on the southern side. The true strategical frontier, and the actual Russian zone of mobilization, lay east of the eastern border of Poland. It ran north and south through Brest-Litovsk. It was covered, in the centre, by the Bug River and, farther north, by the Niemen.

In order to protect Poland the Russians had constructed an outpost line based on the Vistula. It ran from Ivangorod, in the south, north to Warsaw and thence north-west to the fortress of Novogeorgievsk,

also on the Vistula. Thence it turned north-east, through Ostrolenka, Ossowiec, and Augustovo, to Kovno, on the Niemen. This line was strong on the northern end. But it could easily be turned on the southern end by an Austro-Hungarian advance in the region east of the Vistula, bringing the invaders well to the rear of Ivangorod and Warsaw.

The original military agreement between France and Russia contemplated the employment of the bulk of the Russian forces against Germany, the "principal enemy," while Austria-Hungary, "the secondary enemy," was being contained in Galicia. But this agreement could not be lived up to. In the first place, Russia was unequal to a sustained offensive against Germany. Germany outclassed her in military organization, in training and efficiency, and in technical equipment. In the second place, Russia's position in Poland could not be made secure until she had cleared Galicia as far west as Cracow.

In response, however, to the original understanding she rushed two armies into East Prussia early in August. This province was lightly held by the Germans, who had thought that the Russians would not be ready to fight within a month or six weeks following the declaration of war. One army, under Rennenkampf, coming from Kovno, crossed the eastern boundary of Prussia, defeated the Germans at Gumbinnen on August 16th, and advanced west along the railroad leading to Königsberg. This force reached Insterburg, the Germans retiring before it into the Königsberg fortified zone.

A second army, under Samsonoff, advanced from the Narew line in Poland into the southern part of East Prussia, aiming at the railroad west of Allenstein, where Samsonoff expected to make a junction with

Rennenkampf—the latter coming south-west from Insterburg. Samsonoff defeated a small German force on his front and assumed that he was dealing merely with covering troops. The invasion of East Prussia had nearly caused a panic in Berlin. Reserves were gathered and two army corps were sent east from Belgium. These reinforcements were put under the command of Hindenburg, hastily summoned from the retired list. He had an intimate knowledge of the terrain and used it in baiting a trap for Samsonoff.

The latter had lost touch with his wings and was occupied in driving ahead with his centre, which encountered little opposition. Hindenburg's operation, which lasted from August 27th to August 30th, followed the classical Cannæ model. He concentrated his strength on Samsonoff's flanks, and enveloped the Russian right completely, by marching from Allenstein south to Ortelsburg. The Russian left was also encircled west of Tannenberg. In the Tannenberg pine woods the main body of Samsonoff's army was surrounded and captured, Hindenburg reporting seventy thousand prisoners. Samsonoff died alone in the scrub forest, trying to escape at night. The remnants of his forces straggled back into Poland.

Rennenkampf thereupon retreated to the line of the Niemen. Hindenburg followed, on September 7th, reaching the Niemen on September 21st. After a week spent in trying vainly to break the Niemen line, the Germans retreated into East Prussia.

The Russian campaign which ended with Tannenberg proved that Russia would never be able to take the northern route to Berlin. East Prussia was a hopeless field to operate in, both because of the difficulties of the terrain and because of the broad barrier of

the Vistula, behind which lay a network of German strategical railroads. Russia was to make another offensive bid later, along the west bank of the Vistula toward Posen. But, at her best, she was no match for Germany, except on the defensive. Her true theatre of operations, while her initial superiority in manpower lasted, was in the south, where Francis Joseph's generals had undertaken a task much beyond their capacity.

The Austro-Hungarian General Staff had planned to open the war with an ambitious offensive. This was strategically sound in conception. But it undervalued the enemy. The Austrians had two armies in Galicia. One, under Dankl, undertook to invade Poland and turn the Ivangorod-Warsaw line. The other, under Auffenberg, covered Dankl's right and defended Lemberg.

Dankl started north on August 11th, with Lublin, on the Warsaw-Brest-Litovsk railroad, as his objective. He encountered inferior Russian forces and won the battle of Krasnik on August 23d-26th. But he never got much farther than Krasnik. Three Russian armies had been formed on the Brest-Litovsk line. The northernmost, under Ivanoff, pushed west to cover Lublin. The middle one, under Russky, advanced from the north-east and east on Lemberg, while the southernmost, under Brusiloff, approached Lemberg from the south-east. This joint forward movement began on August 14th.

Brusiloff turned Auffenberg's line at its southern end, when he forced the crossings of the Zlota Lipa and the Gnila Lipa and captured Halicz. The Austro-Hungarians evacuated Lemberg on September 2d, and fell back to the line of the Grodek Lakes. But this line was quickly turned at its northern end by

Russky's army, which broke through at Rawa Russka, at the point where Auffenberg's left wing connected with Dankl's right.

Auffenberg fell back in great confusion toward the Carpathian Mountains. Dankl's flank was now uncovered. Ivanoff was attacking his front, while Russky threatened his rear. He retreated rapidly toward the San River. Being unable to make a stand there, because Auffenberg had already sought shelter on the south side of the Carpathian range, he abandoned Jaroslav, left a garrison in Przemyśl and then withdrew into Western Galicia.

Austria-Hungary was not capable in 1914 of conducting campaigns on both the Serbian and the Russian fronts. She had at least 400,000 men on the Danube. She had to keep some observation corps on the Italian frontier and also on the Rumanian frontier. She could not have had more than 800,000 men in Galicia and Poland, while Russia probably had well over 1,000,000. The secondary Austro-Hungarian mobilization was slow. It was not until the winter months of 1915 that the Austrian military establishment, reorganized by the German General Staff, could compete on even terms with the Russian.

The Austrian High Command spent September reorganizing its armies behind the Carpathian barrier and before Cracow. The Russians occupied Bukovina and Eastern and Middle Galicia, carrying their west front forward to the Vistula, from Ivangorod up to a point north of Tarnow, and then across Galicia to the western Carpathian passes. Thus the weak southern face of the Polish salient was covered and Warsaw was safeguarded from the south as well as the north.

It was important, from the German point-of-view, that the new Russian lines protecting Poland should not be consolidated. Hindenburg, therefore, shifted the bulk of his army from East Prussia to Silesia and began, about October 1st, an offensive against Ivan-gorod and Warsaw. A German army moved east from Kalisz and an Austro-Hungarian army moved north-east from the neighbourhood of Cracow. The purpose of this operation was obscure. After its failure the Germans described it as a mere reconnoissance in force.

There were few Russian troops in Western Poland, and Hindenburg got close up to Warsaw, practically unopposed. On October 14th he was on the western outskirts of the city, near enough for his field artillery to shell it. The Grand Duke Nicholas, the Russian Commander-in-Chief, called up reinforcements from the south. These held the enemy before Warsaw and Ivangorod for several days. Then both the German and Austrian armies retreated, under a threat of envelopment. The Russians followed them to the western frontier of Poland.

In order to save Warsaw, Nicholas had stripped the Galician front. The Russian armies there withdrew from the Carpathians and recrossed the San. The siege of Przemyśl was raised for a few days. But Hindenburg's recoil involved a similar recoil in Galicia. The Austro-Hungarian forces again retreated quickly to the Carpathian ridges and toward Cracow. Hoetzen-dorff, the Chief of Staff, committed once more the error of leaving a large garrison in Przemyśl, where it was eventually to be starved into a surrender. Przemyśl was Austria's prize fortress. The Russians had no siege artillery with which to reduce it as the Germans had reduced Liège, Namur, Maubeuge, and Antwerp.

But it was certain to fall to them if they could hold Middle Galicia. Hoetzendorff had the absurd idea that by clinging to Przemyśl he would materially hamper Russian operations. He sacrificed to that idea a first line army of 130,000 men.

In November the Russians pushed west to within eight miles of Cracow and almost to the border of Silesia and Posen. This was the extreme development of the Russian approach to Berlin by the southern route. It was nipped by another Hindenburg offensive, just as the approach by the northern route had been nipped at Tannenberg. While the Russian armies were spread out on a long front in Western Poland, Hindenburg concentrated his forces in the region about Thorn and moved south-east with the intention of breaking through the Russian line and interposing between the southern Russian armies and Warsaw. Mackensen, Hindenburg's lieutenant, effected a partial break-through in the neighbourhood of Lodz. But before this operation was completed a Russian force, under Rennenkampf, moved south from the Vistula River, below Novogeorgievsk, and got on Mackensen's left flank. A great deal of confused fighting followed, lasting into December. Rennenkampf failed to envelop Mackensen's left wing and on December 6th Hindenburg entered Lodz.

Encouraged by this success he continued, all through December, his pounding tactics on the Warsaw front. Here he repeated the costly frontal assaults which had marked the futile German effort in the West to break through in Flanders. The Russians yielded gradually, giving up Lowicz and Skierniewice. But when they reached the Bzura and Rawa rivers, twenty miles west of the Vistula, they held fast. Though he tried

again and again, Hindenburg was never able to shake this line, which the Russians held until August, 1915, when the collapse of the armies in Galicia and the Teuton advance to Lemberg compelled the evacuation of Warsaw.

On the whole, Russia met the first tests of the war with surprising credit. She had successfully readjusted her military frontier. Her armies had advanced from the line of the Bug to the line of the Vistula. She had defeated Austria-Hungary with ease. Her offensives against Germany had failed. But she had held her own against Germany on the defensive. Her troops were better adapted to trench warfare than they were to open or semi-open warfare. And trench warfare had now become the rule on the Eastern as well as the Western Front.

But Russia was drawing rapidly on her capital as a military power. Industrially she was unequal to the demands of modern war. Her transportation system was poor. She could not supply herself with guns and munitions. She had no heavy field guns, such as the Germans were using. She had no siege howitzers. She had to depend on her allies and on neutrals for war supplies. And her communications with Western Europe were round-about and precarious.

The wastage of the campaigns of 1914 was negligible so far as raw man-power was concerned. But the loss in officers was irreparable. The material from which regimental subalterns, or even good non-commissioned officers, could be recruited, was limited. Universal service, too, produced conscripts of great unevenness of quality. Worst of all, the supply of ammunition for the artillery had begun to run low. Satisfactory as the military situation appeared on the surface at

the end of 1914, those behind the scenes knew that Russia had passed the peak of her effort. Germany was gathering strength for an offensive in the East and aid from the Western Entente nations was indispensable, if Russia was to be put in condition to meet that attack. On January 2, 1915, the Russian Government appealed to Great Britain to make a demonstration against Constantinople, with a view to opening the Dardanelles. Germany, operating on interior lines, could strike on either front at will. In order to neutralize that advantage and to save Russia, it had become absolutely necessary for the Allies to link up their Eastern and Western fronts.

CHAPTER VI

AUSTRIA'S FAILURES IN SERBIA. AUGUST 12, 1914—
DECEMBER 14, 1914

AUSTRIA-HUNGARY's determination to send a "punitive expedition" into Serbia started the world war. But the Austrian High Command had miscalculated the difficulties of such an expedition. Serbia possessed a veteran army and had emerged victorious from two successive Balkan wars. It was beyond Austria-Hungary's strength to hold the Russians on one front and to discipline the Serbs on another. Serbia was not conquered until Germany sent Mackensen's army south in September, 1915, and Bulgaria joined the Teuton Alliance.

Vienna was committed, however, in August, 1914, to a Serbian offensive. About 400,000 Austro-Hungarians had been mobilized on the Danube and in Bosnia. Serbia is protected on the north and west by three rivers. The Danube is the northern boundary line east of Belgrade. West of that city the Save separates Serbia from Slavonia. The Drina, which flows north into the Save, divides Serbia from Bosnia. But because Northern Serbia formed a salient projecting into Austro-Hungarian territory, it was always difficult for the Serbs to defend it against superior numbers.

On the Danube front the Austrian High Command contented itself with bombarding Belgrade from across the river. The Serbian Government abandoned the

capital, so dangerously exposed, and retired south to Kraguievatz, and then to Nish. But the serious Austrian attack was to come, not from the north, but from the west and north-west. On August 12, 1914, strong Austrian forces were pushed across the Drina River, at three different points—Liubovia, Zvornik, and Losnitza—and across the Save at Shabatz. The Austrian columns were to move east and south-east, converging on Valievo, the main Serbian military supply base. If they reached Valievo, they would compel an evacuation of the whole Belgrade sector.

Field Marshal Putnik, the experienced and brilliant Serbian Commander-in-Chief, hurried his army west to break up this converging movement. From August 16th to August 23d was fought the battle of the Jadar, in the angle formed by the Save and the Drina. It was the first large scale engagement of the war. Putnik was entirely successful. He defeated the separated Austrian columns in detail and drove them back into Bosnia and Slavonia. The Austro-Hungarians lost about forty thousand men, forty-six guns, and large quantities of military stores. The Serbian losses were less than twenty thousand.

The battle of the Jadar disclosed the weakness of the Austrian military organization. It forecast the defeats which the Dual Monarchy was to suffer in Poland and Galicia at the hands of the Russians. Austria came back to the attack in the second week of September, again crossing the Drina. But the offensive made little progress and was soon called off because of the critical condition of the armies in the Carpathians. The Serbians, meanwhile, had crossed the Danube into Hungary and taken Semlin, holding it for a brief period.

After Hindenburg's October offensive against Warsaw had relieved the situation in the north, a second invasion of Serbia was undertaken. This came again from the west. The Serbians were greatly outnumbered and had to retreat rapidly. They abandoned Valievo. The Austrian left wing enveloped Belgrade, which fell on December 2d. The right wing reached Ushitza, and the centre pressed east toward Kraguievatz, the chief Serbian arsenal, threatening to cut the Belgrade-Nish-Constantinople trunk line.

But at the end of November, the Russians were again pushing through the Carpathian passes and approaching Cracow. The Austrian advance in Serbia halted. Troops were sent north. Putnik grasped the situation and began an offensive of his own. Taking the hesitating Austro-Hungarians by surprise, he broke through their centre and right, recovering Ushitza and Valievo, and captured twenty thousand prisoners. The Austrian right and centre retreated in disorder into Bosnia, where they were further cut up by a Montenegrin army in an engagement at Vishegrad. By December 14th Serbian territory was completely cleared by the enemy and Belgrade was reoccupied.

Hostilities in this theatre now practically ceased until the fall of 1915. But Serbia was left isolated and at the mercy of the Central Powers, whenever they should choose to fall upon her. The Allies weakly entrusted her protection to their Foreign Offices, which were wholly unable to cope with the complexities of the Near Eastern situation. Within a year Serbia was to fall a victim to the abject failure of Allied diplomacy in the Balkans.

CHAPTER VII

TURKEY ENTERS THE WAR. OCTOBER 29, 1914-
DECEMBER 31, 1914

TURKEY was the first recruit to the Teuton Alliance. Her accession was reluctant, so far as the ruling house and the great majority of the Turkish population were concerned. It was accelerated through the ascendancy which Germany had gained in the councils of the little group of Young Turk leaders who ruled the Empire. The truculent Enver Pasha, almost a dictator in Constantinople, was an extreme pro-German and a willing tool of Wangenheim, the German Ambassador. He and Talaat Pasha were German agents first and Turkish statesmen afterwards.

Yet there were other and impersonal reasons for Turkey's choice. The Porte had gradually drifted into close political relations with Germany. While Great Britain had maintained an isolated position in Europe, Turkey had looked to her as a protector. The policy of Palmerston and Disraeli had been to oppose Russia; and Russia was Turkey's century-old enemy. But when Great Britain was drawn into the Entente and began to cultivate friendly relations with Russia, Turkey became distrustful. Great Britain and France had encouraged Italy to seize Tripoli. Germany alone among the major European Powers had sympathized with the Osmanli. Germany, too,

had never taken a foot of territory belonging to the Porte or under its suzerainty. Russian designs on Constantinople were well known, and in a European war in which Great Britain, France, and Russia were ranged against Germany, Turkish policy would naturally incline toward dependence on the friendship of Berlin.

At the outbreak of the war Turkey declared her neutrality. But the *Goeben* and *Breslau* incident soon proved how benevolently inclined toward Germany Turkish neutrality was. The Young Turk government was under treaty obligations to deny those war vessels, fleeing from an Allied squadron, passage through the Dardanelles. But Enver and Talaat accepted nominal title to them, thus assuring their safety and also acquiring the means to over-awe Constantinople.

On September 10th the Turkish Government annulled the Capitulations, which had conferred special privileges on the nationals of foreign powers. On September 28th the Dardanelles were closed to all merchantmen, thus cutting off communications between the Western Allies and Russia. It was apparent that the Young Turk dictators were only awaiting the word from Berlin to throw off the mask of neutrality. The signal was given by Berlin late in October. On October 29th the *Breslau* bombarded the Black Sea port of Theodosia, and Turkish war vessels destroyed some Russian merchantmen and a Russian gunboat lying off the harbour of Odessa. Russia accepted this raid as an act of war, although the Turkish Cabinet tried to explain that hostilities were begun without its sanction by German officers serving in the Turkish navy. Great Britain and France declared war on Turkey on November 5th. Great Britain at once an-

nexed Cyprus and announced the complete independence of Egypt.

Turkey's entrance into the war was of enormous benefit to the Teuton Allies, because it promised to isolate Russia. The primary objective of Entente strategy was to connect the Eastern and Western fronts. Now Turkey interposed a barrier to the use of the warm water route through the Dardanelles. So long as that barrier held Russian food supplies, which the Western Allies needed, could not come out and guns and munitions, which Russia needed, could not go in.

In another way Turkey was expected to be of great value to Germany and Austria-Hungary. Constantinople was the seat of the Sheik-ul-Islam, the head of the Moslem faith. Conforming to political instructions this dignitary proclaimed a "Holy War" against unbelievers. The logic of this document was impaired by the fact that it was obliged to distinguish between German and Austro-Hungarian unbelievers, as well as neutral unbelievers, and the unbelievers who were subjects of the Entente Powers. It effected this discrimination rather lamely by stating: "Know ye that the state [the Moslem State] is at war with Russia, England, France, and their allies, and that these are the enemies of Islam."

The obvious political character of the "Holy War" weakened the appeal made to Moslem fanaticism. It did not stir to revolt the populations of India, Egypt, Tripoli, Tunis, Algeria, and Morocco. As a matter of fact, the non-Turkish part of Islam ignored it. Arabia, a Turkish province, containing the Holy Cities of Medina and Mecca, allied herself with the infidels and presently expelled the Turkish garrisons and helped to conquer Syria.

Yet Turkey's appearance as a belligerent greatly increased the Entente's military burdens. Russia had now an enemy to fight on the Caucasus front and in Persia. Great Britain was obliged to defend India and her southern Persian oil territory by undertaking an expedition up the Tigris. She had also to protect Egypt. These new tasks strained Allied resources and relieved Germany.

Turkey at once began to gather an army in Palestine with which to threaten the Suez Canal. Enver Pasha set off for the Caucasus, with the intention of recapturing Batum and Kars, overrunning Georgia and occupying north-western Persia. The Russians, with somewhat inferior forces, had anticipated the Turkish offensive. On November 30th their left wing crossed the Turkish border and took the town of Bayazid, near the Persian line. Farther north-west they approached Lake Van. In the centre they advanced from Kars and took Koprukeui, on the road to Erzerum. But in a few days they were driven back toward the Russian frontier.

The Turkish offensive developed first in the Batum sector. After some hard fighting the left wing, on November 19th, reached a point only thirteen miles south of Batum. On the extreme right the Turks invaded the north-eastern corner of Persia and turned the Russian positions on the Araxes River, on the Caspian side of the Ararat range. The Russians, on November 14th, retired toward the Koura River. Then the Turkish right turned south and occupied the borders of Lake Urumiah in Persia.

The way was now cleared for Enver's attack on the Russian centre, east of Erzerum. His plan was the familiar Cannæ one (German model); for Enver had

been a military student in Berlin. He attempted to envelop the Russian forces defending Kars by encircling them on both flanks, while standing fast in the centre. On November 20th the Turks invaded the Olty Valley, north-west of Kars, defeated the Russians, and advanced toward Ardahan, on the Koura, south-east of Batum and north-east of Kars. They also won a victory at Sarykamitch, to the south-east of Kars.

Enver had turned the Russian flanks. But the operation was too complicated for the rugged terrain and the weather conditions at that season of the year. A blizzard came on, and the Turks suffered severely in their flanking marches through the mountains. The Russians, in the nick of time, began a counter-offensive. This resulted, on January 2, 1915, in a double victory, near Ardahan, on the north, and at Sarykamitch, at the south. The Turkish Ninth Corps was badly cut up and what was left of it surrendered. The battle of Kara-Ourgan completed the rout of Enver's forces, which retreated on Erzerum. The Turkish loss was about fifty thousand.

The British seized Basra, near the mouth of the Tigris, on November 22, 1914. On April 11, 1915, they took Kurna, at the junction of the Tigris and the Euphrates, thus paving the way for the expedition to Bagdad.

CHAPTER VIII

GERMANY LOSES HER COLONIES. AUGUST 25, 1914-
DECEMBER 31, 1914

THE German colonial system, like the German navy, was an outgrowth of William II's illusory fiat: "Germany's future lies on the sea." The Germany of Bismarck and William I grew great without a navy and without colonies. Bismarck, realizing the natural limitations of Germany's geographical position and military policy, scoffed at overseas possessions. He knew that Germany's true future lay on the continent of Europe.

William II reversed the normal processes of empire building. Empire follows power. Germany's power was on land. Colonies are the fruit of long-developed sea power. Yet Germany started in to create a colonial system at the same time that she was creating a navy. Thus she only enlarged her military liabilities. For her adventure was a challenge to Great Britain, and if she should start a war in which Great Britain should be involved on the opposite side, she could neither hold her colonies nor send her fleet to sea.

The folly of the great adventure of William II and Tirpitz was demonstrated as soon as the world war began. The German colonial edifice fell to pieces. The German flag was driven from the ocean. The German home fleet interned itself in the Kiel Canal and at Wilhelmshaven.

Tsingtau was the most valuable German colony in a military sense, since it provided a strong naval base in Eastern Asia. It was acquired in 1897 from China, along with the Kiao-chau concessions on the Shantung peninsula, as reparation for the murder of two German missionaries. It lay across the Yellow Sea from Korea. Japan had long regarded Germany as an unwelcome neighbour. Her own interests, as well as her obligations under her treaty of alliance with Great Britain, made her jump at the chance to expel Germany from China.

On August 15, 1914 the Tokio Government submitted an ultimatum to Berlin, requiring the delivery of the leased territory of Kiao-chau into Japanese custody before September 15th. Eight days were allowed for a reply. Receiving none, Japan, on August 23d, declared war on Germany. Her treaty arrangements with Great Britain pledged her to police the East and protect Great Britain's Asiatic interests, if her ally became engaged in war elsewhere. German activities in the Far East were a menace to the peace of that region. So Japan undertook, as a part of her police duty, to reduce Tsingtau and to occupy the German islands in the Pacific which lay north of the equator.

On September 2d 10,000 Japanese troops were landed on Shantung peninsula, outside the German leased territory. This force was soon increased to 21,000 men. An East Indian contingent of 1360 men was contributed by Great Britain. On September 27th the Japanese began operations against the Tsingtau fortress. The siege lasted until November 7th, when the garrison of 4000 men capitulated. The losses of the assailants were about 1600.

The Japanese navy seized the Caroline Archipelago, the Marshall Islands and the Marianne Islands in October. German Samoa was captured by a New Zealand expedition on August 29th. An Australian expedition took over the Bismarck Archipelago and Solomon Islands on September 11th, and Kaiser Wilhelmsland (a part of New Guinea) on September 24th.

Togo, the German African colony on the north shore of the Gulf of Guinea, surrendered to French and British forces on August 25th. Kamerun, on the west African coast, north of the Congo, was invaded, at the end of August, by two British columns, coming from British Nigeria. These were both repulsed by the German forces, and the enemy crossed the British Nigerian border at one or two places, seizing British stations. On September 27th, however, British and French contingents occupied Duala, the principal Kamerun port. The fight for the possession of this colony continued through 1915. The Germans were not finally expelled from it until February, 1916.

Two other colonies remained—German South-west Africa and German East Africa. The Union of South Africa assumed the burden of reducing these. Union forces entered South-west Africa and captured Luderitz Bay on September 19th. But the invasion was suddenly halted by a Boer uprising at home. The Germans in South-west Africa had maintained secret relations with the more irreconcilable Boer elements. The determination of the Union government to conquer South-west Africa aroused these malcontents to revolt.

Early in October, Lieutenant-Colonel Maritz started an insurrection along the southern border of the South-west African colony. He was driven across into enemy territory. But General Christian de Wet, one of the

heroes of the Boer War, and General Christian T. Beyers, a former Transvaal leader and, until a few weeks before, Commander-in-Chief of the Union of South Africa forces, soon joined the rebellion. They operated in the Transvaal and the Orange Free State and didn't try to make a junction with the Germans.

General Botha, however, held the majority of the Boers in line. He proceeded vigorously against the rebels, who, during November, were defeated in many small engagements. De Wet was taken prisoner on December 1st. Beyers was killed a few days later. By the end of December the revolt was practically crushed. Of the ring-leaders only Maritz remained at large; and he had retired into the interior of South-west Africa. The invasion of that colony was resumed in 1915.

German East Africa, a region extremely difficult to operate in, was not cleared of German forces until near the end of the war.

CHAPTER IX

NAVAL OPERATIONS IN 1914. AUGUST 5, 1914- DECEMBER 31, 1914

GERMANY spent billions of marks creating a navy, which, in 1914, ranked second only to Great Britain's. But ranking second in naval power was of little benefit to Germany, once Great Britain had entered the war. The French fleet, concentrated in the Mediterranean, was much superior to the Austro-Hungarian fleet. So neither of the Teuton allies was in a position to dispute the Entente's mastery of the seas. The German marine, naval and merchant, was a precarious investment, so long as German policy contemplated the possibility of a war in which Great Britain might become the ally of France and Russia. Germany's violation of Belgium's neutrality presented a *casus belli*, which Great Britain couldn't ignore. But the Kaiser and Tirpitz had already made Great Britain a potential belligerent by their efforts to challenge British supremacy on the ocean.

At the outbreak of the war German merchantmen everywhere ran for shelter. Those which didn't fall into the hands of the Allies took refuge in neutral harbours. Vessels of more than one million tonnage were interned in this way. Shipping laid up in the ports of Italy, the United States, Brazil, Peru, Cuba, and China

was transferred to Allied service after those countries entered the war. The High Sea Fleet clung to its home stations and avoided battle. For purposes of commerce raiding the Germans turned to the submarine.

Naval operations in 1914 consisted chiefly in rounding up the few German warships which were on distant service and unable to make for home. The most important of these was the battle cruiser *Goeben*, which was in the Mediterranean, with the cruiser *Breslau*, when the war broke out. They bombarded two Algerian ports in the hope of interrupting the transportation of Algerian troops to France. Then they ran for Messina, coaling there on August 5th. On the evening of August 6th, they started east. A British squadron was awaiting them in the Straits of Otranto, its commander thinking that they would try to reach Pola, the Austro-Hungarian naval base.

But the German Government had no idea of using these ships merely to reinforce the Austro-Hungarian fleet. They had another mission, of much greater consequence. That was to run for Constantinople, where they would aid Ambassador Wangenheim and his Young Turk confederates in forcing Turkey into the war on Germany's side.

The *Goeben* and the *Breslau* were both faster than any corresponding Allied warships in the Mediterranean. They made good their escape to the east and steamed leisurely for the Dardanelles, which they entered on August 10th. Under the provisions of the Treaty of Paris of 1856 and of the Treaty of London of 1871, warships were not allowed to use the Dardanelles except in time of peace. But Wangenheim got around all difficulties by announcing a transfer of title to Turkey. The *Goeben* and the *Breslau* remained in

the hands of their German officers, dominated Constantinople and presently, with the connivance of Enver Pasha and Talaat Pasha, engaged in the Black Sea raid which brought Turkey into collision with Russia. The escape of these two vessels was therefore the most fruitful exploit of the German surface navy. It had a far-reaching effect on the course and progress of the war.

The first naval battle, which was little more than a skirmish, took place on August 28, 1914, off Heligoland Bight. Vice-Admiral Sir David Beatty commanded the British forces. He sent three submarines close in to Heligoland in order to tempt the German destroyers and light cruisers stationed there into giving pursuit. With the first battle-cruiser squadron and the first light-cruiser squadron he lay some distance to the rear. Two light cruisers, the *Arethusa* and the *Fearless*, were assigned to cut in behind the German light warships after they got some distance out to sea.

Beatty's ruse worked successfully. German destroyers, supported by the light cruisers *Ariadne* and *Strassburg*, gave chase to the decoys. The two cruisers sighted the *Arethusa* and *Fearless* and attacked them, damaging the *Arethusa*. Then the *Ariadne* was crippled and she and her consort withdrew. Later the *Köln* and *Mainz* reinforced the *Strassburg*. The British lighter ships were now hard-pressed. But Beatty hurried up with the battle cruisers *Lion* and *Queen Mary* and ended the battle. The *Köln* and the *Mainz* were sunk, as was also the crippled *Ariadne*. The *Strassburg* was badly damaged. The British lost no ship, but the *Arethusa* and several destroyers were just able to limp home.

The largest group of German warships in foreign

waters when the war began was Admiral Spee's Asiatic squadron. It was stationed at Kiao-chau, the German naval base in China. Spee had with him the armoured cruisers *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau*, and four light cruisers, the *Leipsic*, *Nürnberg*, *Karlsruhe*, and *Emden*. He sent the *Emden* south into the Indian Ocean, to prey on Allied commerce. The *Karlsruhe* finally made her way across into the South Atlantic, where she disappeared from sight mysteriously many months later.

Spee started east across the South Pacific with the other four, meeting the light cruiser *Dresden* on the American side. He encountered on November 1st, off the coast of Chile, a British squadron, under Admiral Sir Christopher Craddock. The latter's force consisted of the old battleship *Canopus*, the armoured cruisers *Good Hope* and *Monmouth*, and the light cruiser *Glasgow*. The *Canopus* was much slower than the others and at the time of the engagement was 250 miles to the south of them. The German squadron was therefore somewhat superior in power. It also had the advantage of being better able to fight in a rough seaway, its heavier guns being mounted higher than those of the *Good Hope* and *Monmouth*.

Omitting the *Canopus*, which didn't figure in the action off Cape Coronel, Craddock had one armoured cruiser (the *Good Hope*) of 14,100 tons displacement, carrying two 9.2-inch guns and sixteen 6-inch guns, and another (the *Monmouth*) of 9800 tons displacement, carrying fourteen 6-inch guns. Spee had the twin armoured cruisers, the *Gneisenau* and the *Scharnhorst*, each of 11,600 tons displacement, and carrying eight 8.2-inch guns and six 6-inch guns. The British armoured cruisers were half a knot faster than the German.

Craddock was supported by the scout cruiser *Glasgow* of 4800 tons, carrying two 6-inch guns and ten 4-inch guns, and the transport *Otranto*, which was dispatched south for safety before the battle started. Spee's two scout cruisers, the *Nürnberg* and *Dresden*, and his protected cruiser, the *Leipsic*, ranged in tonnage from 3250 to 3600. Each carried ten 4-inch guns. But the *Glasgow* was two and a half knots faster than the *Nürnberg* and *Dresden* and three and a half knots faster than the *Leipsic*.

The British Admiral was not obliged to fight. He could easily have drawn away to the south and made a junction with the *Canopus*, which carried 12-inch guns. But without counting the risks of engagement with an opponent slightly superior in tonnage and gun power, he sent a wireless to the *Canopus*: "I am going to attack the enemy now."

The battle began about 6.20 P.M. The German squadron was inshore and had the advantage of firing at targets outlined against the western sky. Its gunnery was effective from the start. The *Good Hope* and the *Monmouth* were quickly disabled. The former sank at 7.23 P.M., following an explosion. The latter, put completely out of action about the same time, was dispatched by the *Nürnberg* at 8.58 P.M. The *Glasgow* escaped in the dark. The Germans had only two men slightly wounded.

The news of Craddock's defeat caused great chagrin in Great Britain. A strong naval detachment, including battle cruisers, was at once hurried into the South Atlantic to dispose of the victorious German squadron. Spee knew nothing of this, though he should have suspected it. He passed leisurely into the Atlantic himself, with the intention of destroying the British wireless

and coaling station at the Falkland Islands. On the morning of December 8th he confidently approached the islands, taking no precautions whatever. But sheltered within the harbour of Port Stanley lay Admiral Sturdee's powerful squadron, consisting of two battle cruisers, the *Invincible* and *Inflexible*, with eight 12-inch guns apiece; three armoured cruisers, the *Carnarvon*, *Cornwall*, and *Kent*; the scout cruiser *Bristol*, the *Glasgow*, and the *Canopus*. The British ships had a tonnage of 87,000, the German ships a tonnage of 35,500. The weight of the British broadside was nearly five times that of the German. The two British battle cruisers were three knots faster than the *Scharnhorst* and the *Gneisenau*. The British ships had arrived on December 7th and needed coal; so that if Spee had quickened his schedule a little he could probably have destroyed the station, in spite of the *Canopus* and the *Glasgow*, and still had plenty of time to get away in safety.

The *Kent* lay at the entrance of the harbour and the *Canopus* was visible inside. The *Gneisenau* and *Nürnberg* closed in to attack. Then, grasping the situation, they turned away to the east. The British squadron got under way at 9.45 A.M. Travelling in close formation, it could not gain on the Germans. Sturdee decided at 11.20 A.M. to press the pursuit with the two fast battle cruisers and the *Glasgow*, all with a speed of 26½ knots. He had closed in by 12.55 P.M. and opened fire. The three German light cruisers now turned to the south-west, while the *Gneisenau* and *Scharnhorst* continued east-south-east. The *Cornwall* and the *Kent*, joined by the *Glasgow*, pursued the lighter enemy vessels. The battle cruisers and the *Carnarvon* kept on after the heavier ones. The *Gneisenau* and the *Scharnhorst* had no chance. Their batteries were outranged and the

Invincible and *Inflexible* easily outpointed them and crossed their course. The *Scharnhorst* was sunk at 4.17 P.M. and the *Gneisenau* at 6.00 P.M. The *Nürnberg* and the *Leipsic* were sunk later in the evening. The *Dresden* escaped and cruised back into the Pacific. She was discovered on March 14, 1915, at anchor off Juan Fernandez (Robinson Crusoe's) Island and was destroyed by the *Kent* and the *Glasgow*. Great Britain afterwards apologized to Chile for an apparent violation of Chilean territorial waters. The British lost nine men killed and nine wounded in the action of the Falkland Islands.

The *Emden* had an adventurous career in the Indian Ocean. She was at large for three months, destroyed twenty-five or more vessels and cost the Allies a monetary loss of over twenty-five million dollars. At one time there were nineteen Allied warships searching for her. Her captain, Müller, showed great daring and strictly observed the rules of war. One of the *Emden's* exploits was to run into the harbour of Penang and destroy the small Russian cruiser *Jemtchug* and the French destroyer *Mousquet*. She cruised in the Bay of Bengal, around Ceylon and in the Malay Archipelago.

Her end came on November 9th, when she attempted to destroy the wireless station on South Keeling Island. The wireless called for help and the Australian cruiser *Sydney*, employed in convoying Australian troops to Egypt, turned aside to engage her. The *Sydney* had heavier guns and was faster. The *Emden* was soon driven in a wrecked condition on a reef off North Keeling Island. The party which had landed on South Keeling Island to destroy the station seized the schooner *Ayesha* and sailed for Arabia, landing there safely and making their way overland to Constantinople.

The German light cruiser *Königsberg* destroyed the British cruiser *Pegasus* in Zanzibar harbour on September 20th. Later she took refuge in Rufiji River, in German East Africa, where she was sunk on July 11, 1915. The North German Lloyd liner, *Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse*, fitted up as a commerce destroyer and operating in the Atlantic, was sunk in September.

One of the most sensational incidents of the first phase of German submarine warfare was the sinking of the three British cruisers, the *Aboukir*, the *Hogue*, and the *Cressy*, by Captain-Lieutenant Otto Weddigen of the *U-9*. They were destroyed in succession, within an hour, while patrolling the coast of Holland early in the morning of September 22, 1914. It was the first startling demonstration of the power of the submarine. The British Admiralty censured the commanders of the *Hogue* and the *Cressy* for standing by after the *Aboukir* had been hit. But great laxity had been shown in sending three large cruisers out on patrol duty without a screen of destroyers.

On November 27, 1914, the *Audacious*, one of Great Britain's newest superdreadnaughts, was sunk in Lough Swilly, off the north coast of Ireland. But her loss was apparently due to a floating mine.

Naval operations in 1914 were largely tentative. The British Grand Fleet had sought a base to the north of Scotland, at Scapa Flow, where it could be protected from submarine attack and whence it could issue to meet the German High Sea Fleet if the latter should come out. But the German High Sea Fleet was not ready to come out. German naval policy was defensive. It preferred to wait and to develop the submarine.

CHAPTER X

THE RUSSIAN WINTER CAMPAIGN. JANUARY 1, 1915-
MAY 1, 1915

THE first winter of the war brought operations to a standstill on the Western Front, in Serbia, and in the Caucasus. It didn't interrupt them on the Eastern European Front, where Germany had now definitely resolved to break the power of Russia.

German policy required a continuation of the fighting in the East despite weather conditions. Russia was under-developed industrially. Her munitions supplies were depleted. To give her a three months' respite would enable her to stock up again with the aid of shipments from Japan, and possibly from Great Britain and France. Austria-Hungary was also pressing for relief. The Russian armies in Bukowina were up the eastern slopes of the Carpathians, and Cossacks had made occasional raids into Hungary. The Austrian High Command was anxious to quiet Transylvania, and to overawe Rumania, where public opinion had been affected by the westward sweep of the Russians. It was also eager to raise the siege of Przemyśl, where a large army, foolishly left behind to hold that fortress, was being slowly starved into submission.

On January 1, 1915, the Russians occupied a line about nine hundred miles long, stretching from the

Baltic Sea to southern Bukowina. In Bukowina a Russian army, under Alexieff, held the Kirlibaba Pass and had pushed down to the Rumanian border at Kimpolung. A second army, under Brusiloff, was stationed along the Carpathians, to the south-west and south of Przemysl. A reserve army, under Selivanoff, was besieging that fortress. Radko Dimitrieff's army faced west toward Cracow, along the Dunajec. Evert's army was on the line of the Nida, in south-western Poland. The Russian centre, under Russky, covered the Vistula, up to Novogeorgievsk, and then extended north to the East Prussian border, at Mława. Thence the right, also under Russky, ran north-east behind the Mazurian Lakes region to the Niemen River.

Hindenburg commanded in person the German armies in East Prussia and Poland. He had also assumed general direction of all the Teuton forces on the Eastern Front. On his extreme left, in the Courland sector, was an army under Below. Next to it, in the region of the Mazurian Lakes, was the Tenth Army, under Eichhorn. The Eighth Army, under Scholz, occupied the line between Łomża and Płock. In the Bzura sector was the Ninth Army, under Mackensen. On Mackensen's right, stretching south to the Carpathians, were two Austro-Hungarian armies—the First, under Dankl, in the Pilica and Nida sector, and the Fourth, under the Archduke Joseph Ferdinand, in the Dunajec sector. The Second Austro-Hungarian Army, under Borojevic, defended the Carpathian passes. Another army, under Prince Eugene, extended the Teuton line down along the western border of Bukowina to the Rumanian frontier. Kusmanek's army was shut up in Przemysl.

Hindenburg still clung to the idea that Warsaw could be taken from the west, or, at least, that a demonstration against Warsaw would raise the siege of Przemyśl, as it had done in the preceding October. On February 1st he sent Mackensen against the Russian centre. The attack came on a seven-mile front, about Bolimov. It was made in a heavy snowstorm, which masked the assailants. The Germans, in dense mass formations, broke through the first Russian trench line on the Rawa River. On February 2d they took the second and third trench lines, and advanced in the next two days five miles toward Warsaw. But Russky brought up reinforcements on February 4th and by February 8th he was back on the Rawa.

In January the Russians had pushed forward into East Prussia in the district north of the Mazurian Lakes and south of the Niemen. They seized the line of the Angerapp River and threatened to outflank the four German corps standing on the defensive west of the Mazurian Lakes. Hindenburg felt called on to check this movement. He reinforced Eichhorn heavily and brought a part of Below's army south from the Courland front. German forces, marching east from Tilsit along the south bank of the Niemen, broke the connection between the two northernmost corps of the Russian invading army, commanded by Baron Sievers. The more southerly corps was then attacked on the flank and in the rear, and was driven in disorder across the Russian border. Hindenburg claimed forty thousand prisoners. The isolated northern corps retreated to Kovno. The German army under Below, on Eichhorn's right, attacked and defeated the Russians east of the Mazurian Lakes and pursued them toward Grodno and Ossowietz.

East Prussia was again cleared. Eichhorn crossed the Niemen, north of Grodno, on February 20th, and reached a point only ten miles from the Warsaw-Petrograd railway. Below made an attempt on the fortress of Ossowietz. But these operations came to nothing. Early in March the German forces engaged in them withdrew behind their own frontier.

Still Hindenburg would not give up the idea of a break-through in the north. He tried next to get to the rear of the Polish capital and cut its railroad communications east by striking south from East Prussia at the Russian line between Lomza and Plock. Here again the Warsaw-Petrograd railroad was his objective. While Below was trying to invest Ossowietz, Scholz's Eighth Army attacked all along the line from the fortress of Lomza south-west to the Vistula. Plock, on the Vistula, north-west of Novogeorgievsk, was taken on February 18th, and progress was made from Mlawka toward Prasnyz. On the German left, north of Lomza, the offensive was quickly checked. Scholz renewed it in the centre. On February 24th, Prasnyz was taken by assault.

The Grand Duke Nicholas had, however, prepared a strategic reserve for use in this sector. He hurried up reinforcements toward Prasnyz, south-west of which city a single Russian division had stubbornly held on and prevented a break-through. On February 26th the Russians were in Prasnyz. Scholz tried to retake it the next day. But he was now threatened with envelopment and hurriedly retreated, losing ten thousand prisoners. The Germans then retired on the entire front of forty miles from Plock east. In March Scholz made a third attempt to capture Prasnyz, getting within three miles of it on March 11th. But he was again repulsed.

The most substantial success of the winter campaign on the Teuton side was the recapture of most of Bukowina. The northern half of this Austrian crownland was overrun by the Russians in the fall of 1914. Early in January, 1915, General Alexieff's left wing pushed south to the Rumanian border, and west through the Kirlibaba Pass, leading across the Carpathians into Hungary. The loss of this pass caused great excitement in Budapest. Germany was appealed to to quiet popular alarm.

The German General Staff sent several German divisions into Hungary—and supervised a general regrouping of the Austro-Hungarian armies. The southernmost, under Prince Eugene, moved east through Transylvania and retook Kirlibaba Pass on January 22d. Then it swept on through Bukowina to Czernowitz, which was captured on February 18th. Having cleared the province, Prince Eugene turned north into Galicia, by way of Kolomea. He captured Stanislau, seventy miles south-east of Lemberg, and held it until March 4th. Then he was driven back to Kolomea.

The Austro-Hungarian push into Galicia was part of the Teuton plan to relieve Przemyśl. On Prince Eugene's left a newly constituted German army, under Linsingen, had moved north-east from Munkacs against the Wyzkow Pass, to the south-east of Przemyśl. It cleared this passageway, but was held in the foothills on the northern side of the Carpathian range. Farther west the Second Austro-Hungarian Army, now under Boehm-Ermolli, vainly tried to free the Dukla and Lupkow passes, directly south of Przemyśl. It got part of the way through Lupkow, but was blocked at Dukla.

The field army left in Przemyśl was now beyond help.

The Russians lacked the siege guns to reduce the circle of forts. They simply sat down and contained the garrison. Sorties were futile, for the besieged army had no other base than Przemyśl, and it would have been obliged, in order to escape, to cut its way not only through the lines of the besiegers, but also through those of the Russian armies on the Carpathian front. General Kusmanek had used up his food supplies by the middle of March. On March 18th he made a half-hearted sortie. On March 22d he surrendered his garrison of from 120,000 to 130,000 men.

The southern Austro-German campaign thus failed of its main objective. A secondary objective, the recovery of Bukowina, had been attained. Przemyśl was the most spectacular of Russia's successes in the earlier period of the war, although the strategical results of the campaign for Lemberg were far more important. The capture of the fortress cost the Russians practically nothing. The Austrian attempt to hold it was an inexcusable blunder. Yet for the Russians the circumstances of the capitulation were ominous. General Gourko testifies in his book, *War and Revolution in Russia*, that the Russians had no guns of heavier calibre than 6-inch until the spring of 1916. All through 1915 the supply of shells was painfully low. Yet the Germans and Austrians had already begun to use 12-inch guns in field operations.

Reinforced by the army released by the surrender of Przemyśl, the Grand Duke Nicholas resumed the offensive on the Carpathian front. He made some progress at the southern end of Dukla Pass. He strengthened his hold on Lupkow Pass and captured Rostok Pass, between Lupkow and Uszok.

But he was driven out of Uszok Pass, and farther

to the south-east the enemy was everywhere on the Galician side of the range.

Fighting died down about the middle of April. By May 1st the tide of battle was to begin to flow back through Galicia and Poland, wiping out all the sensational gains which Russia, astonishing herself as well as her allies, had made since September 1, 1914.

CHAPTER XI

THE DARDANELLES-GALLIPOLI CAMPAIGN. FEBRUARY
19, 1915-DECEMBER 31, 1915

EXCLUDING Foch's Victory Offensive, the Dardanelles-Gallipoli campaign was the one bold and aggressive conception of Entente strategy. It failed not because it was not eminently sound in theory, but because it was faultily executed.

The Allies were fighting on isolated fronts. They had to operate on exterior lines, their forces scattered around the circumference of a vast circle. Their efforts could be only feebly co-ordinated. Their great need was to join up the western and southern European front with the Russian front, so that Russia could be supplied with guns and munitions and her overplus of man power could be utilized to the best possible advantage.

To force a passage through the Dardanelles would create a direct contact between Russia and the Western Allies. It would do much more. It would isolate Turkey, driving her government and armies into Asia, where they would be comparatively harmless. It would also solve the troublesome Balkan problem by bringing all the Balkan states into the war on the side of the Entente. Germany and Austria-Hungary would then be closely beleaguered in Central Europe.

As early as November 25, 1914, the British War Council had discussed the advisability of an attempt on the Dardanelles. Such an operation was clearly

in line with British policy, since Egypt and India could be protected by carrying the war to the gates of Constantinople. On January 2, 1915, the Russian Government, then alarmed by the situation in the Caucasus, asked Great Britain to make a demonstration against Turkey. Opinion in the British Council originally favoured a joint military and naval operation. It was estimated that 150,000 men would be needed to support the fleet. Had that number been available at the time the ships attacked, the chances are that the straits would have been cleared and Constantinople taken.

The obstacles in the way of supplying 150,000 men immediately led to consideration of the alternative plan of a purely naval attack. On January 3d a telegram was sent to Vice-Admiral Carden, commanding the British naval forces in the Mediterranean, asking him whether it was practicable to force the Dardanelles by the use of ships alone. He answered that he didn't think that the Straits could be "rushed," but that they "might be forced by extended operations with a large number of ships." On January 11th he outlined four successive operations:

- (1) The reduction of the entrance forts.
- (2) Clearing the Straits up to the Narrows.
- (3) Destruction of the defences at the Narrows.
- (4) Passage through the mine field up to the Sea of Marmora.

It was estimated that these four operations would cover a month. On January 15th Lord Fisher, the chief of the Naval War Staff, submitted a memorandum, concurring generally in Carden's plans. He suggested, however, that unless experience gained in the first two operations justified further action, the last two operations should be abandoned.

On February 16th, the Turkish attack on the Suez Canal having failed, it was decided to mass troops in the Mediterranean for the Dardanelles campaign. The Twenty-ninth Division (regulars) was to be sent from England to Lemnos and a considerable force was to be transferred from Egypt. The sailing of the Twenty-ninth Division was fixed for February 22d. But Lord Kitchener countermanded this order on his own responsibility and without notice to the War Council. The Twenty-ninth's start was thus delayed three weeks.

Preparations were meanwhile made for the naval offensive. The new superdreadnaught *Queen Elizabeth*, armed with 15-inch guns, was sent to the Ægean. So was the battle cruiser *Inflexible*, just back from the battle of the Falkland Islands. The British navy contributed eight pre-dreadnaught battleships, the *Agamemnon*, *Irresistible*, *Vengeance*, *Triumph*, *Albion*, *Lord Nelson*, *Ocean*, and *Majestic*. The French navy supplied four pre-dreadnaughts—the *Charlemagne*, *Suffren*, *Gaulois*, and *Bouvet*. An auxiliary fleet of light cruisers, destroyers, submarines, and mine sweepers was also provided. The islands of Tenedos, Lemnos, and Mudros were occupied as naval and military bases.

The Dardanelles passageway is about forty miles long. At the Ægean end it is about two miles wide. The entrance was defended by four obsolete forts—Kum Kale and Orkanieh, on the Asiatic side, and Cape Helles battery and Sedd-el-Bahr, on the European. The first real defences were encountered about eleven miles up, where the passage begins to contract. Here the Dardanos Battery had been constructed on the Asiatic side, facing south-west and commanding the whole lower section of the Straits. On the Narrows

proper, three to four miles farther up, where the passage is only three quarters of a mile wide, were the fortifications known as Kilid Bahr, on the European shore, and Anadolu Hamidieh battery, on the Asiatic. Kilid Bahr was of little value.

Anadolu Hamidieh battery was armed with Krupp guns of the model of 1885. They had an extreme range of about nine miles. The only other relatively modern guns were at Dardanos—Krupps of the 1905 model and some naval pieces taken from the *Goeben*. The channel below the Narrows was covered by a mine field.

The entrance forts were bombarded on February 19th and partially silenced. On February 25th they were completely destroyed. The lower strait was entered on February 26th and Dardanos was bombarded at long range. Attacks were made again on March 6th and 7th. Then operations were suspended, pending the arrival of the Allied land forces. The British troops, to be assembled at Mudros, together with a French contingent, which had mobilized at Bizerta, were expected to number about one hundred thousand men.

By this time, the Allied fleet had also been materially strengthened. Eight British pre-dreadnaughts were added: the *Swiftsure*, *Cornwallis*, *Queen*, *Implacable*, *London*, *Goliath*, *Canopus* (which also had taken part in the battle of the Falkland Islands), and *Prince George*. The French sent three more old-type battleships: the *St. Louis*, *Henri IV*, and *Jauréguiberry*. A British monitor, the *Humber*, arrived, as did the *Askold*, a Russian cruiser, and some additional British and French cruisers. General Sir Ian Hamilton was designated to command the land forces. He reached Lemnos on March 17th.

Meanwhile the British Admiralty kept urging an attack on the forts in the Straits. Admiral Carden suggested on March 11th that military operations on a large scale should also be undertaken at once. Carden now resigned because of ill health and Vice-Admiral de Robeck took his place. A conference was held at Lemnos on March 17th, attended by Admiral de Robeck, Rear-Admiral Gueprette, commanding the French squadron; General Hamilton, and General d'Amade, in command of the French land contingent.

General Hamilton deprecated immediate co-operation on the part of the land forces, because he had discovered that the British transports were improperly loaded for quick debarkation of materials. He preferred to send them back to Egypt to be reloaded. This decision, which was concurred in by Kitchener, proved disastrous, for it gave the Turks a month's time to prepare a defence of the Gallipoli peninsula.

De Robeck decided to go it alone. On March 18th, for the first time, the Allied fleet approached within moderate range of the Dardanos battery and the forts higher up in the Narrows. At 10.45 A.M., the *Queen Elizabeth*, *Inflexible*, *Agamemnon*, *Lord Nelson*, *Triumph*, and *Prince George* engaged the Turkish works. Shortly after noon the *Suffern*, *Gaulois*, *Charlemagne*, and *Bouvet* steamed closer in. By 1.25 P.M. the forts had ceased firing. They were not silenced, however, and renewed firing later.

All the attacking ships had been hit, but none was seriously injured.

The *Vengeance*, *Irresistible*, *Albion*, *Ocean*, *Swiftsure*, and *Majestic* now appeared to relieve the French battleships, which, with the *Triumph* and *Prince George*, started back for the lower Straits. The *Bouvet* struck

a mine going out and sank in three minutes. Nearly all her crew went down with her. Late in the afternoon the *Irresistible* and the *Ocean* fell victims to floating mines, though few of the men on them were lost. The *Gaulois*, injured by gun fire, but able to move out under her own steam, had to be beached on the little island of Drepano. The *Inflexible*, also damaged by shells, had to be beached at Tenedos. After these losses the battle was broken off.

Vice-Admiral de Robeck was not discouraged by the results of the attack. He reported to London on the evening of the 18th:

The power of the fleet to dominate the fortresses by superiority of fire seems to be established. Various other dangers and difficulties will have to be encountered, but nothing has happened which justifies the belief that the cost of the undertaking will exceed what always has been expected and provided for.

General Golz, the German supervisor of the Turkish military establishment, had told Wangenheim, the German Ambassador, that the British could force the Straits by sacrificing ten ships. Wangenheim shared this belief and so did most of the high Turkish officials. De Robeck telegraphed to London on March 19th that he purposed renewing the assault and received word to go ahead if he thought fit to do so. But General Hamilton evidently dissuaded him. For, on March 26th, after several conferences with the latter, who strongly urged delay until the land forces could co-operate, de Robeck telegraphed the Admiralty:

The check on the 18th is not, in my opinion, decisive, but on the 22d of March I met General

Hamilton and heard his views, and I now think that, to obtain important results and to achieve the object of the campaign, a combined operation will be essential.

What Hamilton and de Robeck did not take sufficiently into account was the strong probability that the forts in the Narrows were short of ammunition. That fact was disclosed later by Ambassador Morgenthau, who visited the Turkish defences just before the battle, and by Mr. George A. Schreiner, the correspondent of the American Associated Press, who was an eyewitness of the action of March 18th. Mr. Schreiner says that General Mertens, the chief technical officer at the Straits, advised him to get up early on the morning of March 19th and take to the Anatolian hills, adding: "We expect the British will come back early tomorrow morning, and if they do, we may be able to hold out for a few hours."

Mr. Morgenthau, in his book of reminiscences, makes the unqualified statement that on the evening of March 18th the Anadolu Hamidieh battery, the most powerful of the defences on the Asiatic side, had only seventeen armour-piercing shells left, and Fort Kilid Bahr, the main defence on the European side, only ten. If these forts had been abandoned, Constantinople would have fallen to the Allied fleet and the whole face of the war would have been changed.

The naval offensive having been dropped, Great Britain became committed to a far more difficult and costly venture—that of reducing Constantinople by land. General Hamilton went to Egypt to oversee the reloading of the transports. He wasn't ready to begin operations until April 25th. This long delay

enabled the Turks to make the most of the unusual defensive possibilities of the Gallipoli terrain.

The peninsula is about forty-five miles long and from three to ten miles wide. It consists of a tangle of hills and gulches, with few roads and no pronounced valleys, either north and south, or east and west. Worst of all, the beaches are shallow and exposed. Landings could be made only under observation and galling fire. General Hamilton had available on April 25th about eighty thousand men, including two Anzac divisions, a Royal Naval Division, the Twenty-ninth Regular Division, recently arrived from England, and a French division, 15,000 strong, composed mostly of colonials and foreign legionaries. An East Indian brigade arrived from Egypt on May 1st. The British Forty-second Territorial Division, also from Egypt, began to debark on May 4th.

Hamilton's objective was the high ground commanding the defences of the Narrows. He could reach it either by pushing north-east from the tip of the peninsula or by driving across it from the Ægean shore, either above or below Kilid Bahr. Or an army could be landed on the Bulair Isthmus, to take the Turks in the rear and cut off their land communications with Constantinople.

The British commander chose a combination of two plans. On the night of April 24th-25th he landed troops at five points about the toe of the peninsula, with the intention of working northward to Krithia village and Achi Baba peak. At the same time he disembarked the Anzacs on the Ægean side, north of Gaba Tepe, facing the rugged elevation known as Sari Bahr. A French force of three thousand went ashore at Kum Kale, on the Asiatic side. This operation was merely

a demonstration to cover the landings on the opposite bank, north of Sedd-el-Bahr. The French troops on the Asiatic shore were transferred on April 26th to the Gallipoli peninsula, where the united French contingent thereafter constituted the extreme right of General Hamilton's Krithia front.

Hamilton had expected to march forward to Achi Baba, seize it, press on to the neighbourhood of Gaba Tepe, join the Anzacs there and then cut across the peninsula to Maidos, above the Narrows. It was an ambitious plan, far beyond his resources. His greatest disability was a lamentable shortage in guns and munitions with which to prepare infantry attacks. By April 28th his entire army was on shore and the tip of the Gallipoli boot had been cleared three miles up the *Ægean* coast and about two miles up inside the Straits.

The landings were made at heavy cost, the one at V Beach failing entirely on the first trial. By May 1st the Allied forces on the tip of the peninsula had advanced close to Krithia. On that day the Turks counter-attacked fiercely. The first battle of Krithia followed, lasting until May 5th. It was a stand-off. Up to May 5th, Hamilton's losses were 13,979. A second battle was fought on May 6th-8th. It represented a desperate Allied effort to alter a situation which was fast hardening into deadlock. But the Twenty-ninth Division, which was in line here, made in all a gain of only about one thousand yards.

The fighting at Krithia, in fact, quickly degenerated into the most rigid form of positional warfare. It differed in no way from the fighting in Flanders and Artois, except that there was far less artillery preparation, and the first line enemy trenches were never smothered. The Turks had dug in and couldn't be

dislodged. General Hamilton delivered a third attack on June 4th. It also failed. Only scattering efforts were made thereafter, up to July 15th, when the British commander realized that there was no longer any prospect of reaching the Narrows forts by the Krithia-Achi Baba route.

The power of the Allied offensive was materially weakened, toward the end of May, by the withdrawal of the major part of the fleet. On May 12th the British battleship *Goliath* was torpedoed inside the Straits by a Turkish destroyer. The battleship *Triumph* was sunk by a German submarine on May 25th, off Anzac Cove. The *Majestic* suffered a similar fate on May 27th. The *Queen Elizabeth* and the newer battleships had to seek shelter at Mudros. The joint naval and land offensive had practically come to an end.

During the severe struggles at the tip of the peninsula the Anzac divisions, north of Gaba Tepe, had maintained and slightly strengthened their shore positions. In front of them, and a short distance inland, lay the massif of Sari Bahr, from the culminating points of which, Chunuk Bahr and Hill 305, the Narrows were in plain sight. After discussing other plans—including an operation on the Asiatic side, which the French had always stood out for—General Hamilton decided in favour of a frontal attack on Sari Bahr. It was to be supplemented by a turning movement, undertaken by a new force, landed a little distance above the Anzac positions, at Suvla Bay. This was a far more promising venture than the Krithia one. But it called for an exact co-ordination in action which was somewhat beyond the capabilities of General Hamilton's staff and of some of his subordinate commanders.

The Suvla Bay contingent, consisting of the newly arrived Tenth and Eleventh British divisions, was to go ashore on the evening of August 6th and push across the open beaches of that sector to the Anafarta ridge, rush it and then turn south to the flank and rear of the Sari-Bahr positions, which the Anzacs would be preparing to storm.

The Anzacs gloriously carried out their part of the programme. The offensive began on August 7th, with an assault along the whole Anzac Bay front. Feinting at the southern end, the Australians took and held Lone Pine Hill. They also contained the bulk of the Turkish forces in the centre by an attack on Baby 700. The operation to the north was the serious one. Here, on the night of August 6th, General Johnston penetrated the Turkish front and by the evening of August 7th had arrived at the foot of Chunuk Bahr. Through August 8th and 9th Anzac, East Indian, and British troops held the slopes of Chunuk and Hill 305 and even reached the crests, from which they could look down on the Narrows.

The story of the Dardanelles-Gallipoli campaign is one long series of tragic mishaps. Success was many times within easy reach. Then some fault in organization intervened, to make useless extraordinary sacrifices and heroism. During the night of August 8th-9th a part of General Cox's column, the left of General Godley's assaulting force (the right column being commanded by General Johnston), pushed up the steep sides of the Chunuk ridge, between Chunuk Bahr proper and "Hill 2." At dawn of August 9th the Sixth Gurkhas and two companies of the Sixth South Lancashires stormed the summit and drove the Turks down the eastern side.

In his admirable book, *The Dardanelles Campaign*,

Mr. Henry W. Nevinson, an eye-witness of much of the later fighting on Gallipoli, gives this vivid picture of the scene:

For a moment Major Allanson and his men paused to draw breath. They were standing on the saddle between Chunuk Bahr and "Hill 2." The dead lay thick around them. But below, straight in front, lit by the rising sun, like a white serpent sliding between the purple shores, ran the sea, the Narrows, the Dardanelles, the aim of all these battles and sudden deaths. Never since Xenophon's Ten Thousand cried "The sea! The sea!" had sight been more welcome to a soldier's eyes. There were the ships. There were the transports bringing new troops over from Asia. There ran the road to Maidos, though the town of Maidos was just hidden by the hill before it. There was the Krithia road. Motor lorries moved along it carrying shells and supplies to Achi Baba. So Sir Ian had been right. General Birdwood (who planned the Chunuk offensive) had been right. This was the path to victory. Only hold that summit and victory is ours.

The Gurkhas and Lancashire men ran down the farther slope after the Turks. But they had gone hardly a hundred yards when five or six heavy shells, apparently from the direction of the Ægean, fell among them and exploded. There is still a dispute as to where these shells came from. The common belief is that they were fired by the British naval vessels which had bombarded the summit just before the assault. But since they fell on a reverse slope, Mr. Nevinson holds that they could hardly have been discharged from low

trajectory naval guns. He suggests that they came from British howitzers on land, which had been ordered to bombard the reverse side of the ridge, on the theory that the Turks would be rallying there for a counter-attack.

At any rate the Gurkhas and Lancastrians were dumbfounded. They stumbled back to the crest and over it. The Turks saw them retreat and again seized the summit. Meanwhile the brigade under General Baldwin, assigned to support the assault on the ridge, lay at the foot of it, on the Ægean side. Baldwin had lost his way during the night and had missed the chance of ascending while the top was cleared of Turks.

To the right, the Sixth Lancashires occupied a position near the top of Rhododendron Ridge. But they were driven from it by a Turkish counter-offensive on August 10th, the Turks being enabled to concentrate heavily on this front because of the failure of the Suvla Bay operation.

The Anzac army lost 12,000 men in the Sari Bahr fighting, from August 6th to August 10th. The Thirteenth (New Army) British Division, supporting the Anzacs, lost 6,000 men. A great deal of ground was gained, the area of the Anzac sector being enlarged from three hundred acres to eight square miles. But the summits of Sari Bahr were still in the hands of the enemy.

The object of the Suvla Bay operation was to seize the ridges north of Sari Bahr and to turn the Turkish position on "Hill 2" by emerging into the plain in its rear, about the town on Biyuk Anafarta. Lieutenant General Sir Frederick Stopford employed for this purpose the major part of his own corps, the Ninth. One division (the Thirteenth) and one brigade of it

had been assigned to the Anzac front. He, therefore, was left with the Eleventh Division and two brigades of the Tenth. All his men belonged to the New Army and had never been in action before. He should have had 112 guns. But only twelve guns were brought along and landed.

Stopford, however, took the Turks completely by surprise. He had an easy, flat coast to land on. He had from 25,000 to 28,000 men, and the Turks had only about four thousand. The landing was almost unopposed. Yet after getting ashore during the night of August 6th-7th, the commands became entangled and fatal delays ensued. Instead of advancing early on August 7th to seize the first line of hills, while the Turkish defence was still unorganized, Stopford did not take the nearest eminence—Chocolate Hill—until sunset. The next day was wasted in inaction. Sir Ian Hamilton was worried and went to Suvla himself. He couldn't arouse General Stopford out of his state of complacent lethargy and took the unusual step of dealing directly with the division commanders. Failure of the arrangements to distribute water had demoralized the troops to some extent. But one of the battalions of the Thirty-second Brigade had pushed east during the day, of its own motion, and occupied Scimitar Hill, one of the key points of the ridge which the Turks had abandoned.

This fact was not known at division headquarters and the division commander designated the battalion on Scimitar Hill as one of those to be used in a movement farther to the north, suggested by Hamilton. Scimitar Hill was accordingly evacuated.

The movement which Sir Ian had ordered for the evening of August 8th, toward Tekke Tepe, was not

undertaken until the morning of August 9th. It failed because the Turks had rushed up reinforcements and reoccupied the crests from which they had fled on August 7th. On August 9th an effort was made to capture Scimitar Hill and Hill W, south of it, which it commanded. But this came to nothing.

In the night of August 10th-11th the Fifty-fourth Division was sent to support Stopford. He made no use of it for several days. The great opportunity of August 8th-9th had been frittered away. By August 10th the Sari Bahr assault on the Anzac front had broken down. Any help given from Suvla would now come too late. Fighting continued on the Suvla front until August 15th. But it had only a local importance. General Stopford was removed from command on the evening of August 15th, Major General De Lisle replacing him.

Hamilton's losses during the second week of August were about thirty thousand on his three fronts. The British War Office became discouraged at the paucity of the results attained at Gallipoli, and perhaps distrustful of Hamilton's leadership. It had sent him one hundred thousand men since July 1st. When he asked, on August 15th for forty-five thousand replacements and fifty thousand additional troops, his request was refused. The War Office sent him only one division from Egypt, the Second Mounted, about five thousand strong. The Second Australian Division arrived, however, early in September.

The Suvla Bay fiasco was practically the last act of the Gallipoli tragedy. General De Lisle attempted, on August 21st, to take Scimitar Hill and Hill W, but was repulsed, with a loss of five thousand men. That was the last engagement of consequence on Gallipoli.

By the middle of September the Allied situation in

the Balkans had become painful. Serbia was threatened with invasion. Bulgaria was on the point of joining the Teuton alliance. Greece was drifting away. France was finally aroused to the necessity of military action in the Near East. Under her agreements with Great Britain she was to have command of any Mediterranean expedition—a right she waived at the Dardanelles because she wanted to keep her armies in France intact.

Now—when it was too late—an Army of the Orient was organized. It was put under the command of General Sarrail, and destined for use in Macedonia and Serbia. On October 6th a large part of the French division was recalled from Cape Helles for service at Salonica. On October 11th Lord Kitchener asked General Hamilton what losses an evacuation of the peninsula would entail. Hamilton replied that an evacuation was “unthinkable.” He believed that the loss entailed would be fifty per cent. A few days later he was replaced by General Sir Charles C. Monro. Kitchener visited Gallipoli in November to talk over the details of the retirement. At that time, with Serbia lost and Bulgaria allied with Germany and Turkey, there was no strategical justification for holding on in Gallipoli. The withdrawal began on December 21st and was completed, practically without interference, on January 8, 1916.

The British losses were shocking, considering the results achieved. The casualties were 112,308. Nearly one hundred thousand men had also been incapacitated at one time or another by sickness. Gallipoli became a synonym for vain and misused effort. It cost Great Britain enormous sacrifices in men and prestige. Yet it also shattered the Turkish army. For Turkey's military power declined rapidly after the end of 1915.

CHAPTER XII

THE RUSSIAN RETREAT. MAY 1, 1915—OCTOBER 1, 1915

THE Russian defeats in Poland and Galicia in 1915 were due primarily to Russian inferiority in guns and munitions. General Gourko says in his illuminating book, *War and Revolution in Russia*, that for months in that year "batteries in action daily did not receive more than four shells per gun per day." He also testifies: "An army corps would receive no more than one thousand shells at one delivery and would not know the date when another delivery would be made."

A second cause was the rapidity with which German strength on the Eastern Front was increased, once the German High Command decided to make its main effort against Russia.

The German winter campaign of 1915 had been marked by ineffectual efforts to break through the Russian lines in Poland. The old mass methods of attack had been used and had proved futile. The German General Staff now sought a more vulnerable front and introduced new offensive tactics.

A breaking-through operation east of Cracow was entrusted to Mackensen. He depended for success on the greatest artillery concentration the war had seen up to that time and on a special follow-up infantry formation which came to be known as the Mackensen phalanx.

Mackensen had directed the winter assaults on the Russian lines west of Warsaw. He was now put in command of a new army, the Eleventh, on the Dunajec sector, facing Gorlice. The Russian front, which had been drawn back some distance from the direction of Cracow, ran on May 1st from the Carpathians, west of Dukla Pass, north along the Biala River to the latter's junction with the Dunajec, near Tarnow, and thence up the Dunajec, to the Vistula. Mackensen's army of two hundred thousand men was stationed opposite the southern section of the Biala line. An Austrian army, the Sixth, under the Archduke Joseph-Ferdinand, stood opposite the northern section, facing Tarnow. The Third Russian Army, under the Bulgarian general, Radko Dimitrieff, the victor of Lule Burgas, confronted the two Teuton armies. In southern Poland the Ninth German Army, under Woyrsch, adjoined the Archduke Joseph-Ferdinand. On its left was the First Austrian Army, under Dankl. On Mackensen's right, forming a connection between him and Linsingen, was an army or group of armies, variously described as under the command of Boroewic, Boehm-Ermolli, and Marwitz. To the south-east of Linsingen lay Pflanzer's army, formerly Prince Eugene's. In northern Poland and East Prussia were the Twelfth, Eighth, and Tenth German armies and additional forces under Below, which were about to undertake a raid into Courland.

Mackensen began his attack on May 1st by concentrating the fire of two thousand heavy guns on a front a few miles east of Gorlice. The unexampled severity of this bombardment dumbfounded the Russians. Their trench lines disappeared. The German shock infantry advanced after the artillery preparation and

encountered little resistance. Dimitrieff had not prepared secondary lines on the Wisloka River, a few miles back, or on the Wistok, still farther east. His disorganized troops could not prevent Mackensen from driving ahead. On May 6th the Germans took Jaslow and Zmigrod and cut the road north out of the Dukla Pass.

Brusiloff's Eighth Russian Army found its right flank and rear uncovered by Dimitrieff's retreat. It was obliged to retire hastily toward the San, followed by Boroëvic. A division of this army, under Korniloff, was enveloped north of Dukla Pass, and captured. Linsingen's army advanced, farther east, on Sambor, to the south-east of Przemyśl. The Archduke Joseph-Ferdinand had taken Tarnow on May 6th and about May 10th he crossed the Wistok at Frysriak. In ten days the whole Dunajec salient had been flattened out and the Russians thrown back to the line of the San, with the loss of about one hundred thousand prisoners. A Russian success at this juncture on the extreme southern front did little to alleviate the situation.

Could the retreating Russians hold the line of the San? If they couldn't, the entire Polish salient would again be threatened on its weak southern face. Przemyśl was now Mackensen's immediate objective. While the Austrian army on his left was being held up on the San, north of Jaroslav, he forced a passage on that stream between Jaroslav and Przemyśl. On the same day, May 25th, he occupied Jaroslav and then moved south-east with the idea of enveloping Przemyśl. He was halted only five miles north-east of the city.

Meanwhile Boroëvic had been approaching the fortress from the south. On May 27th he was within seven miles of it. On May 31st three of the half

demolished northern forts were stormed by Bavarian troops. On June 3d, fearing to be surrounded, the Russians evacuated the place, escaping to the south-east. Its fall cleared the upper San front, the Russians falling back to the Grodek Lakes line, which covered Lemberg.

The Grodek Lakes positions were formidable in the centre and on the southern end, but weak at the north. Mackensen therefore struck north-east for Rawa-Russka, reversing the manoeuvre by which Russky had taken Lemberg in September, 1914. On June 19th he delivered a powerful attack on the Russians barring the way to his objective. Their front was broken through. The Russian line was now outflanked on the north and Lemberg had become untenable. It was evacuated on June 22d. All Galicia had been lost, except a narrow strip along the Russian frontier. And there was no sign of stabilization anywhere.

With the fall of Lemberg the German campaign entered its second and major phase. Mackensen had broken the Russian left centre and had uncovered the southern side of the Warsaw salient. That salient could now be attacked on three sides. The Russian armies in it were threatened with envelopment. An opportunity was offered to the German General Staff to work out on a grand scale Count Schieffen's favourite Cannæ theory.

The Russians were back in nearly the same awkward situation in which they were when their mobilization began in August, 1914. Poland jutted out again dangerously into enemy territory. Then the Warsaw bulge was menaced from the south by only two Austro-Hungarian armies. Now it was under pressure on the south, west, and north from two Austro-Hungarian

and seven German armies. German strategy contemplated a break-through on either the southern or the northern side, or on both, and the closing of the mouth of the sack on the Russian forces retreating from the Vistula.

A slight rearrangement of the Teuton forces was effected at the end of June. Hindenburg retained command of the northern group of armies—Below's, the Tenth, the Eighth, and the Twelfth. Prince Leopold of Bavaria brought a new army east, which replaced Dankl's, transferred to the Italian front. He also assumed command of Woyrsch's Ninth Army, facing the Vistula, from Warsaw up to Sandomir. Mackensen continued in command of his own Eleventh Army and of the Fourth Austrian Army, operating between the Vistula and the Bug. The Second Austro-Hungarian Army protected Mackensen's right and Linsingen and Pflanzer prolonged the line south into Bukowina. Hindenburg's task in the north was to force the Niemen and Narew rivers and cut the connections of the Warsaw salient with Petrograd. Mackensen was to move north-east, cutting Warsaw's connections with Kiev, and Brest-Litovsk.

The Archduke Joseph-Ferdinand, following Dankl's trail of August, 1914, moved forward on July 5th to Krasnik, aiming at Lublin. He was checked there for a time. Mackensen, on his right, started for Cholm. Slow progress was made at first. But on July 18th the Russians were beaten at Krasnotow and the whole southern Polish front recoiled. The Archduke entered Lublin on July 30th. Mackensen reached Cholm on July 31st.

Mackensen, however, had delayed too long. In Northern Poland the Eighth and Twelfth German

armies forced a passage of the Narew on July 19th, above and below Ostrolenka. The Russians retired south-east to the Bug. The German Ninth Army, on the Vistula front, took Radom, south-west of Ivangorod on July 20th. On July 29th it crossed the Vistula. The Russians evacuated Ivangorod on August 2d. This was the signal for the evacuation of Warsaw, which Prince Leopold entered on August 5th.

The Russian armies in Poland now fell back rapidly toward the line running north and south through Brest-Litovsk, on which they had mobilized. Meanwhile Hindenburg had sent Below into Courland. The latter advanced rapidly, defeated the Russians at Schadow on July 21st and occupied Mitau on July 30th. The Tenth Army advanced at the same time on the line between Kovno and Ossowietz.

The German centre was held up for a week or two by the resistance of the fortress of Novogeorgievsk. on the Vistula north of Warsaw. This stronghold fell on August 19th. Mackensen was still struggling to reach his objective of Brest-Litovsk. But he didn't arrive there until August 25th, when the Russian armies of the centre had made good their retreat toward Pinsk. Kovel, south-east of Brest-Litovsk, was captured a few days later. But long before this the hope of an envelopment on the southern front had vanished.

A chance still remained on the northern front. After the war General Hoffmann, one of Ludendorff's ablest lieutenants, severely criticized Falkenhayn for letting it slip through his fingers. Hoffmann held that a real envelopment, involving the destruction of the Russian armies, could have been obtained in 1916 by directing the main attack against Kovno, instead of trying to

envelop Warsaw from the south. Kovno was the key to the northern Russian front. Below's operation in Courland showed how easily it could have been turned from that direction. Even when Hindenburg began to press his belated attack in the north, he nearly entrapped a Russian army in Vilna.

Ossowietz, a bulwark of the northern line, fell on August 22d. Kovno had been surrendered, under suspicious circumstances, on August 17th. Only Grodno remained of the strongholds on the Russian secondary line of defence. This fortress was captured on September 20th. Then the Germans moved rapidly east of it as far as Nida, directly south of Vilna.

The Czar took personal command of the Russian Western armies on September 6th, relieving the Grand Duke Nicholas. His first impulse was to stop the retreat and to strike back. He was reluctant to abandon Vilna and the Russians waited on there until they were nearly surrounded on three sides and German cavalry had appeared in their rear.

Vilna was evacuated on September 18th. The retreating army dispersed the cavalry blocking its retreat and extricated itself from the trap, bringing up on the Pinsk-Dvina line, which now ran north and south from Riga to Czernowitz. In Volhynia the Russians lost Lutsk and Dubno—two of the three fortresses of the Lutsk-Dubno-Rovno triangle, protecting the approaches to Kiev. But by October 1st the battle on the East Front died down. The Czar had brought the Russian retreat to an end and infused a certain amount of new energy into the troops. On the other hand, the German High Command, realizing the failure of its grandiose Cannæ conception, yet measurably satisfied with the immense results attained, was ready to call a

halt on the Russian front in order to turn its attention to the Balkans.

Mackensen had started before the end of September for the Danube front. The Eleventh, Ninth, and Twelfth German armies were withdrawn entirely from Russia. So was the Fourth Austrian Army. The Second Austrian Army was reduced in size. So was Hindenburg's right wing, opposite Minsk. The Germans and Austro-Hungarians dug in everywhere in order to offset these reductions. Four army groups were established: one, under Hindenburg, from Riga to the Niemen; one, under Leopold of Bavaria, from the Niemen to Pinsk; one, under Linsingen, from Pinsk to Rovno; and one, under the Archduke Frederick, from Rovno to Bukowina. Two masses of manœuvre were established—one before Riga and the other on the Styr.

The great retreat of 1915 cost Russia approximately 350,000 killed and wounded and 1,250,000 prisoners. It was the beginning of the end for Russia as a military power. The Teuton losses were probably well under 300,000; for the German victories were won largely by superiority in artillery.

The German territorial gains were enormous. Thirty-five thousand square miles in Galicia were recovered. On October 1st the German lines included all of Poland, Courland, the Russian governments of Grodno, Kovno, and Vilna, and parts of the governments of Minsk and Volhynia. The Russians retained a small piece of eastern Galicia, below Tarnopol. The territory acquired by Germany aggregated more than one hundred thousand square miles. This was nearly half the area of the German Empire. The population of the conquered regions was over twenty millions, nearly one

third of Germany's population. The *Mittel-Europa* which the Pan-Germans had visualized had sprung into being, almost overnight, on the Galician and Polish battlefields.

CHAPTER XIII

ITALY ENTERS THE WAR. MAY 24, 1915—DECEMBER,
31, 1915

ITALY entered the war on May 24, 1915. In breaking away from an alliance with Austria-Hungary and Germany, which had lasted thirty-three years, and associating themselves with the Entente Powers, the Italian people obeyed a sound and deep-seated instinct. They returned to the normal policy of the statesmen who created modern Italy.

The Teuton alliance was an unnatural expedient. It was entered into in 1882 by Crispi at a time when Italy was incensed by the French annexation of Tunis. Bismarck had encouraged this move on France's part and knew how to profit by it. He promptly attached Italy to his Central European *bloc* and thereby made himself independent of Russia.

Italy's position in the early eighties had become highly uncomfortable. At odds with France, she was compelled to turn somewhere for support. Austria-Hungary was her ancient enemy and oppressor and her obvious rival in the Adriatic and the Balkans. After Solferino and Sadowa Francis Joseph had yielded up Lombardy and Venetia. But he still held on to the Trentino and Istria. Their Italian-speaking populations were treated with the severity which the Hapsburgs had always shown to subject races. Italy could

not wholly close her ears to the appeal of these two provinces for liberation.

In a military sense, too, Austria-Hungary retained the mastery of northern Italy. She held all the mountain passes. In the Trentino she possessed a bastion jutting down into the plains of Venetia and Lombardy. On the Adriatic she held all the available naval bases. The western coast of that sea is almost bare of harbours. The eastern coast, on the contrary, is bountifully supplied with them. At Pola, Austria was in a position to dominate the Adriatic.

Lacking a defensible military frontier, Italy was at the mercy of her powerful and at the same time unfriendly neighbour. The alliance with the Dual Monarchy, unpalatable as it was, had at least the merit, in Crispi's time, of safeguarding Italy on the north and giving her a chance to devote herself to internal development. Germany, growing more and more prosperous, was willing to contribute a large part of the capital needed for that development.

So Rome tried to forget *Italia Irredenta* and cultivated as amicable relations as she could with her mismatched Hapsburg ally. The Triple Alliance was renewed in 1887, 1891, 1903, and 1912. But even before 1912 Italy had begun to draw away in sympathy and policy from her associates. Rome accepted advances made to her by France and Great Britain. Prince Bülow, when he was German Imperial Chancellor, scandalized Berlin by referring to these manifestations of something more than platonic interest as "little spins taken by Italy with rival suitors." But there was more danger in the flirtation than he thought.

The Italian sense of nationality had been intensified. Italy was ambitious for territorial expansion. Austria-

Hungary's annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina annoyed her. She wanted to extend her influence in the Mediterranean and the Near East, and Vienna stood squarely in her way.

Her occupation of Tripoli, leading to war with Turkey, was a shock to her allies, since Germany had become Turkey's chief European backer and Austria-Hungary resented the prospect of any change in the balance of power in the eastern Mediterranean to Italy's profit. It was also evident that Italy had seized Tripoli with the full approval of Great Britain and France. The Balkan wars and the scramble for Albania had further estranged Italy and Austria-Hungary. The Dual Monarchy was anxious to attack Serbia in 1913, after the Bucharest partition, but Italy refused her assent.

When Austria-Hungary did attack Serbia in 1914, Italy was, therefore, a decidedly unsympathetic spectator. The Triple Alliance compact permitted her a great deal of latitude. She was not bound to go to the aid of her associates unless one of them, without provocation on its part, should be attacked by some outside Power. Austria-Hungary forced a quarrel on Serbia and then declared war. Germany forced a quarrel on Russia and France and also took the initiative in declaring war. Italy was, therefore, released from her bond. Neither Vienna nor Berlin claimed that she was not living up to her obligations. All that she was required to do under the circumstances was to maintain a "benevolent neutrality," toward her late partners.

But there were other complications in the Triple Alliance agreement. Italy and Austria-Hungary had pledged each other not to disturb the territorial *status*

quo in the Near East without consultation and provision for "reciprocal compensation." The text of Clause VII of the treaty read:

Should, however, the case arise that, in the course of events, the maintenance of the *status quo* in the territory of the Balkans, or of the Ottoman coasts and islands in the Adriatic, or the Ægean Sea, becomes impossible, and that, either in consequence of the action of a third Power, or for any other reason, Austria-Hungary or Italy should be obliged to change the *status quo* for their part by a temporary or permanent occupation, such occupation would take place only after *previous agreement* between the two Powers, which would have to be based upon the principle of a *reciprocal compensation* for all territorial or other advantages that either of them might acquire over and above the existing *status quo*, and would have to satisfy the interests and rightful claims of both parties.

This clause had been made use of by Austria-Hungary to limit Italy's operations against Turkey. It now became a weapon in Italy's hands. Austria-Hungary twice invaded Serbia and temporarily occupied Serbian territory, yet without previous agreement or hint of compensations. The Italian Government, on December 9, 1914, opened negotiations looking toward an understanding with Vienna on the compensation issue.

On November 1st Italian forces had occupied the harbour of Avlona, in Albania. Two weeks before that the Marquis di San Giuliano, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and inclined to a colourless foreign policy, had died and been succeeded in the Salandra Cabinet by Sydney Sonnino, an ardent and uncompromising nationalist.

Austria-Hungary did not dispute Italy's right to compensation. Neither did Germany. The latter undertook to act as mediator. Prince Bülow, a familiar figure in Roman society and connected by marriage with the Italian aristocracy, was chosen to put through a compromise which would insure the continuance of Italian neutrality. He made concessions which Germany considered liberal and which Vienna considered humiliating.

The Italian demands, as finally formulated, comprised the cession of the Trentino, including the towns of Rovereto, Trent, and Bozen; the extension of the Italian frontier in the Isonzo region so as to take in Gorizia, Tolmino, Gradisca, Monfalcone, and other towns; the conversion of Trieste into an independent state; the transfer of various Dalmatian islands, and the recognition of Italian sovereignty over Avlona.

Toward the end of the negotiations, in April, 1915, Vienna offered, through Bülow, the Trentino, the western bank of the Isonzo (in so far as the population was purely Italian), and Gradisca; sovereignty over Avlona, and special privileges to Italian nationals residing within the Dual Monarchy. Trieste was to be made an imperial free city and to have an Italian university.

These terms were rejected by Salandra and Sonnino as inadequate. Italian patriots of all groups now saw a chance to complete the unification of Italy, to obtain a genuine military frontier in the Alps and on the Adriatic, and to end for ever the Austrian menace. The government had been steadily preparing for war. It had entered into close relations with Great Britain, France, and Russia. It concluded on April 26th a secret compact, known as the Treaty of London, by which Italy was to obtain southern Tyrol, as well as the Tren-

tino, all of Istria, and part of Dalmatia. This treaty bound Italy to declare war within thirty days. On May 3d the treaty of alliance with Austria-Hungary was denounced.

One obstacle had yet to be overcome before Italy could enter the war unitedly. Giolitti, former Premier and the most powerful politician in Italy, controlled the lower branch of the legislature. He was a neutralist and on friendly terms with Bülow. He appeared in Rome on May 10th to protest against war with Austria-Hungary. His majority in the assembly seemed ready to back him up. Salandra resigned. But at this stage the masses took control of the situation. Popular demonstrations overawed the Giolittists. On May 15th the King asked Salandra to resume office, and on May 20th Giolitti's followers helped to pass a vote of confidence in the ministry, the count standing 407 to 72. Italy, recalling the long history of Austrian oppressions and imbued with hopes of complete nationalization, enthusiastically indorsed the war which the Salandra Cabinet had foreseen and prepared for. On May 23d notice was given of the existence of a state of war against Austria-Hungary. Diplomatic relations with Germany were broken off. But war with Germany was not declared until several months later.

Italy's political aims determined her military policy. She entered the war for a definite purpose and was not to be moved from that purpose. She committed herself to an effort to expel the Austro-Hungarians from the Trentino and Istria. She hoped to occupy southern Tyrol, to capture Trieste and Laibach, and to march victoriously on Vienna. But the handicaps imposed by her lack of a true military frontier were insuperable.

She was never able to force the northern mountain barrier. Eventually her own territory was invaded. When the armistice was signed, Austro-Hungarian armies were still in Venetia and Friuli.

Italy's participation in the war was of great value indirectly to the Entente. She contained Austro-Hungarian forces amounting on the average to about 750,000. As Ludendorff has pointed out, she prevented him from drawing heavily on Austria for reinforcements in 1918, after Russia had been disposed of. But, on the other hand, Italy's absorption in a military enterprise, local in character and without promise, accentuated the unfortunate lack of co-ordination in Allied strategy and contributed further to that uneconomic dispersion of energy which was the besetting sin of Allied military policy.

The Italian campaign began on May 25th. Troops crossed the northern boundary at many points. The main movement was toward Gorizia, on the Isonzo. A secondary effort was made in the Trentino section. From the offensive point of view the Isonzo campaign bulked larger. That way lay the road to Trieste and to Vienna. But from the defensive point of view possession of the Adige Valley, from Trent northward, was more essential, since as long as the Austrians controlled this highway they would be able to hold a dagger at the heart of northern Italy.

General Cadorna's idea was to seize some advantageous positions on the Adige front and in the Carnic Alps, in order to protect his flank and rear, while he forced the Austrian defences on the Isonzo. Italian mountain troops invaded the Trentino from the south and south-east, pushing up the Adige Valley to the neighbourhood of Rovereto. Others advanced, farther east, from the

Sette Comuni Plateau and occupied Borgo, in the Val Sugana, through which a branch railroad ran west to Trent. The Italian advance was halted there in June by Austrian counter-attacks and the difficulties of mountain warfare. It had not gone far enough to make the Trentino front secure, as was demonstrated the following spring by Hoetzendorff's offensive in this region.

On the Isonzo front Cadorna had some encouraging successes at first. Here the bridgehead opposite Gorizia was the chief obstacle. The Italian Commander-in-Chief sought to turn it from the south, and also from the north. Early in the summer he broke through the enemy line to the north of Gorizia and captured Monte Nero. Tolmino and Plava, south of Monte Nero, were also captured. Below Gorizia, Monfalcone was taken on June 10th. But the bridgehead held out. The envelopment movement on the south was halted by the natural fortress of the Carso. That from the north flattened out against the equally strong defences of Monte Santo, an outlying spur of the Bainsizza Plateau. The Italians were reduced to siege operations against the bridgehead, which was not stormed until August, 1916.

In October, 1915, Cadorna made a fresh and costly effort to get a foothold on the Carso. It yielded slight gains. But the Carso was virtually impregnable. This curious plateau, furnished by nature with pitted surfaces, underground passages, hidden gun platforms, shelter caves for troops and munitions, had been fortified with extreme ingenuity by Austrian engineers. It was a bomb-proof labyrinth in which an army could hide and fight, and at the same time live in comfort. The Italian armies beat against it again and again.

But it always performed its mission. So long as the Austrians held it Trieste was safe.

The Italian campaign of 1915 was conducted with admirable energy and courage. But its results were meagre. That was because Italy had to fight nature as well as the Austrians. And, of the two, nature was the more formidable antagonist.

CHAPTER XIV

THE CONQUEST OF SERBIA. OCTOBER 4, 1915-DECEMBER 25, 1915

ALLIED strategy failed signally in the Near East when it didn't push home the opportunity offered it to force the Dardanelles and seize Constantinople. The naval attack on the Straits was within a hair's breadth of success when it was abandoned. The Gallipoli expedition could have reached its goal, if it had been properly planned and directed.

But if Allied strategy failed, Allied diplomacy pitifully aggravated the failure. Its obtuseness and overconfidence were unpardonable. They produced tragic results. In the spring of 1915, when the Russians were on the crests of the Carpathians, and Turkey was fighting for existence on the Gallipoli peninsula, the way seemed cleared for a re-constitution of the Balkan Alliance and its entry into the war on the side of the Entente.

Serbia and Montenegro were already belligerents. Greece was pro-Ally and was bound by treaty to aid Serbia, if the latter were attacked by any other Balkan state. Rumania had broken away entirely from her old association with the Central Powers, and was looking forward to acquiring Transylvania—the Rumanian *Irredenta*. Only Bulgaria remained aloof. And though she still cherished a bitter grudge against Serbia, Greece, and Rumania, it was a fair assumption that

her cynical and wily Czar—Ferdinand the Auctioneer—would swallow his revenge if he were made to see that it was profitable to do so. According to the Entente programme both Turkey and Austria-Hungary were to be partitioned. Those partitions would guarantee ample territorial compensations for all.

The Allies lacked unity of military command. They had also failed to achieve unity in the field of diplomacy. Each Foreign Office pursued its own policy and was governed by its own prepossessions. Great Britain was pro-Bulgar. France was pro-Greek. Italy was anti-Greek. Russia was cold toward Rumania.

Greece, under Venizelos, her greatest statesman of the modern period, had shown every disposition to aid the Allies. Venizelos allowed them to use Greek islands as bases for the attack on the Dardanelles. He invited them later to occupy Salonica and the territory in Macedonia which they needed to create an intrenched camp.

King Constantine, a brother-in-law of William II, and a Hohenzollern by predilection, did not venture in the spring of 1915 to oppose Venizelos's programme. He secretly hoped to bargain his services in return for Constantinople—a hope which Ferdinand of Bulgaria may also have entertained. But when the Allies indiscreetly proclaimed the existence of a compact by which Constantinople was to go to Russia, Greece, Bulgaria, and Rumania were all chagrined. They became more critical of Allied suggestions and Constantine and Ferdinand, at least, began to look toward Berlin for counter terms.

Owing to her geographical position and exposed coast line, Greece could not well enter the war on Germany's side, whatever Constantine's wishes. But

Bulgaria could. Allied diplomacy, therefore, centred its attentions on Bulgaria. By her agreement with the other members of the First Balkan League, Bulgaria was to receive, after the victory over Turkey, a large section of Macedonia. The London Conference upset the Balkan League compact, forcing Serbia to surrender the Adriatic territory allotted to her and to claim part of Macedonia instead. Bulgaria contested the claim, attacked Serbia and Greece, and was defeated. The Treaty of Bucharest divided Macedonia between Serbia and Greece. Bulgaria, the Allied diplomats thought, might be appeased by an offer to return certain portions of Macedonia, thus purchasing her adherence at the expense of Greece and Serbia—mostly at the expense of the latter.

It was a cruel sacrifice to impose on the Serbians. But they couldn't well resist the pressure of the greater Powers. On August 24th the Assembly at Nish reluctantly voted to alienate a part of the Serbian kingdom to the hated Bulgars. As for Greece, although Venizelos magnanimously recommended yielding Kavala, Seres, and Drama, King Constantine vetoed the project. The Allied diplomats appeared in Sofia on September 14th with an offer of Serbian Macedonia and of what was left of Turkish Thrace outside Constantinople. But they were then many weeks too late. Ferdinand had made other arrangements.

The failure of the Gallipoli campaign and the great Russian retreat had completely changed the aspect of the diplomatic and military situation. German agents had been active in the Balkans. They obtained Turkey's consent to a rectification of the Bulgarian frontier, giving Bulgaria all the territory on the right bank of the Maritza River and direct access by railroad to

Dedeagatch, on the Ægean Sea. Berlin promised Ferdinand both Serbian Macedonia and a part of Old Serbia. These compensations were also to be immediate; for Mackensen was soon to invade Serbia from the north and west with an overwhelming force, and all Bulgaria would have to do would be to march in from the east and take possession.

Ferdinand duped the Allied diplomats completely. On September 20th M. Radoslavov submitted the German proposals to a secret meeting of the majority members of the Sobranje. They were enthusiastically approved. On September 21st the Turkish boundary agreement was published and mobilization was ordered. To soothe the credulous Allied representatives in Sofia, M. Radoslavov announced, on September 24th, that the Bulgarian mobilization was not a threat to anybody and that Bulgaria simply intended to maintain an attitude of armed neutrality.

Only Serbia seems to have grasped the real meaning of Ferdinand's manoeuvres. Her government asked permission to attack Bulgaria while the process of mobilization was still incomplete. That would have been a saving move for the Serbs, since it would have concentrated their forces in Middle Serbia, and thus kept open a way of communication south to Salonica. But the Allied chancelleries forbade this manoeuvre. They still had hopes of winning over Bulgaria.

On October 3d, however, the light began to break. The Allies united in an ultimatum to Bulgaria, requiring her to expel the German officers who were helping to conduct the mobilization. Ferdinand could afford to laugh at this. On October 4th diplomatic relations between the Allied Powers and Bulgaria were severed.

War was not declared on either side until October 13th, several days after hostilities had begun.

Meanwhile things had gone steadily against the Allies in Greece. Constantine had used the Entente's request that Greece cede Kavala, Seres, and Drama to Bulgaria, to damage Venizelos's prestige. The latter had resigned on March 6th, after a quarrel with the King over Greece's attitude toward the Entente. He was restored to power, however, by the June elections. When Bulgaria mobilized on September 21st, Venizelos held that his government's obligations to Serbia compelled a Greek mobilization. This was ordered on September 23d.

The military authorities in France and Great Britain had now begun to sense the crisis in the Balkans. They decided to create an Army of the Orient, under French command, and to use it to protect Serbia. The Allied Powers served notice at Athens, on October 2d, that an Anglo-French expedition would be landed at Salonica and would use, in traversing Macedonia, the railroad line reserved by treaty to Serbia, as an outlet to the Ægean. Venizelos was in sympathy with this project. But, in order to preserve appearances, he entered a formal protest against it.

On October 4th he made a speech in the lower house of Parliament, advocating a fulfilment of Greece's treaty pledges to Serbia. The lower house approved his policy by a vote of 142 to 102. But the next day Constantine dismissed him as Prime Minister, refused to sanction armed intervention in Serbia's favour, and appointed a neutralist and anti-Entente Cabinet, headed by Zaimis.

When Serbia was invaded, Zaimis, adopting the specious logic of Constantine, announced that Greece

would not help Serbia against Bulgaria, because the defensive alliance between the two countries had contemplated a war in which Balkan states alone should be engaged.

Entente diplomacy had made the mistake of dealing nonchalantly and condescendingly with the Balkan powers. Now it began to pay court to them. On October 22d, when the Serbian military situation had become highly critical, Great Britain offered to give Cyprus to Greece, if the latter would agree to intervene in Macedonia. Zaimis brusquely declined the offer. He was defeated in the lower house on November 4th and went out of office. But Constantine reorganized the ministry, making it still more neutralist. A week after Zaimis's fall the King dissolved the Parliament.

Irritated by the growing hostility of the government at Athens, Great Britain clapped down a partial blockade on Greek shipping. The new ministry then unwillingly gave guarantees for the security of the Salonica expedition. On December 19th a new lower house was elected, with a government majority, Venizelos and his followers having abstained from voting. Thus, within six months, through Constantine's malign activities, Greece had been converted from a pro-Ally into an anti-Ally state. German influence prevailed at the capital. The mobilized Greek army threatened the rear of the Allied forces at Salonica and contributed for nearly two years to render that army inactive. The tolerance shown Constantine by France, Great Britain, and Russia, the constitutional guardians of the Greek kingdom and people, is one of the enigmas of Allied policy. They had the power and the right to dethrone him. Why should they not have exercised

that option in the fall of 1915, instead of two years later?

Rumania, after the attack on Serbia developed, was left dangerously isolated. She shut herself up in her shell. Though still strongly pro-Ally, she wisely determined to remain neutral until, in her judgment, the tide of the war had turned.

The utter collapse of Entente diplomacy in the Balkans caused the retirement of Delcassé, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs. He resigned on October 13th. The Viviani Cabinet fell a few days later. Briand became Premier. France was no more to blame for the Balkan fiasco than any other of the major Allies. But she had, at least, the grace to make open acknowledgment of responsibility for a series of lamentable diplomatic blunders.

Serbia, which the Entente statesmen had intended to partition in order to satisfy Bulgarian demands, was now to be the victim of the shortsightedness and miscalculations of her Allies. This gallant little nation was left to face the concentric attack of German, Austrian, and Bulgarian armies, vastly superior to her own. Serbia had, at most, 250,000 soldiers. The Germans, Austro-Hungarians, and Bulgarians operating against her numbered more than five hundred thousand. The general plan of the enemy was to clear the railroad trunk line running from Belgrade to Nish and thence to Sofia and Constantinople. This was the main artery of communication between the Teuton Powers and Turkey. The Serbs were to be cut off from their natural path of retreat, south through Nish and Uskub to Salonica, and herded back into the mountainous interior, there to be enveloped or dispersed.

Mackensen was put in command of the Teuton

forces, which were to invade Serbia from the north and west. He was ready to start on October 6th. He had under him a German army, Gallwitz's, and an Austro-Hungarian army, Koevess's. The first comprised five divisions brought from the Russian front. It was concentrated on the Danube. The second was composed of two divisions from the Italian front, three from the Russian front, and the various elements which had been held in observation on the Serbian frontier since January, 1915. This army was concentrated in Bosnia and was to attack Serbia from the west. In reserve behind the two groups was a German corps, transferred from France. The strength of the Teuton contribution was nearly three hundred thousand. In artillery Mackensen completely outclassed the Serbians.

The Bulgarians put two armies in the field. The northern one, under Bojadeff, was to operate on the eastern border of Serbia, south of the Danube, and to effect a junction with the Germans coming down from Belgrade and the Iron Gates. The second, under Theodoroff, was to seize Uskub and the Vardar Valley, cutting Serbian communications down that valley with Salonica. A third army, in reserve, was stationed along the Rumanian frontier.

The Serbs divided their forces into five groups. One in the west, supported by the Montenegrins, held the line of the Drina. One faced north on the Danube. Two tried to hold the Bulgarian frontier. A fifth was in the extreme south, in the region of Monastir. The Anglo-French expeditionary army, intended to relieve Serbia, comprised one British and three French divisions, about sixty thousand men. It never got far enough north, however, to form a junction with any Serbian forces except those about Monastir.

Gallwitz's army crossed the Danube on October 6th, occupying Belgrade on October 8th, and Semendria on October 11th. The extreme left crossed at Orsova. Koevess crossed the Save and the Drina. His extreme right wing marched from Visegrad, in Southern Bosnia, south-east into the Sanjak of Novi-Bazar, which had been incorporated into Serbia after the Balkan wars. Gallwitz's centre pushed up the Morava Valley, following the line of the Belgrade-Constantinople railroad. Koevess carried the line of the Kolubara River after an obstinate defence by the Serbian First Army, under Michitch, and pressed on east to join Gallwitz in the Morava region. By the end of October one division of the northern Bulgarian army, operating in the Timok Valley sector, had reached Negotin, on the Danube, below Orsova, and there joined Gallwitz's left wing. The two columns then turned south-west and entered Nish on November 6th, thus cutting the Serbian line of retreat toward Macedonia. From Nish these forces marched north-west, down the Morava Valley to join the main body of Gallwitz's army.

The Serbs in the north were now forced to retreat through the mountains to the west of the Morava. Kraguievatz, the chief Serbian arsenal, half-way between Belgrade and Nish, was taken by Mackensen on November 1st. Paracin, farther south, fell on November 4th. Krushevats, north-west of Nish, fell on November 7th. The Serbs of the north had no avenue of escape left them except west through Montenegro and Albania to the Adriatic.

In the south things had gone even worse. The Bulgarian army, under Theodoroff, aiming at Uskub, had penetrated to the valley of the Vardar by October

19th. After hard fighting it occupied Kumanova and Vrania, north of Uskub; Uskub itself and Veles, farther down the Vardar. The Serbs recaptured Veles, but lost it again on October 30th. The Serbs now tried to hold Babuna Pass, in order to cover Prilep and Monastir. But on November 18th, the Bulgarians turned this pass from the west and entered Prilep. The Serbian forces in Monastir then withdrew into Greece. But the bulk of the Serbian Second Army had been thrust back into the Albanian mountains.

The Second Army covered the retreat across the inhospitable fastnesses of Albania. That terrible experience could not but disorganize troops even of as high quality as King Peter's. The Serbian forces which reached the coast—probably about one hundred thousand strong—were the shadow of an army. They were conveyed to the Island of Corfu for a long period of recuperation. The Bulgarians pursued the Serbian rear guards as far as Elbasan. There, on December 24th, the chase was broken off.

The Allied expedition from Salonica, under Sarrail, started too late. And it was too weak to accomplish anything. One French and one British division (both recalled from Gallipoli) moved north about the middle of October. On the 21st they invaded the southwestern corner of Bulgaria and seized Strumnitza. They then pushed up the Vardar Valley toward Veles and extended their left toward Prilep and Monastir. Two more French divisions arrived in Salonica at the end of October and were sent to the front. By the middle of November the British were holding the region about Lake Doiran and the French had crossed the Cerna River, to the west of the Vardar, in an effort to relieve the Serbians about Prilep and Monastir.

But on November 18th Prilep was lost and Monastir became untenable. The latter city fell to the Bulgarians on December 1st.

The Allied expedition was now left without any mission to perform. Moreover, it was exposed to attack by much stronger Bulgarian and Teuton forces. The French withdrew to the east of the Cerna on November 25th. Between December 6th and 13th, under constant enemy pressure, the Allies retired down the Vardar, into Greek territory. They had held a triangular position, with the apex at the confluence of the Cerna and the Vardar, the left leg extending south-west along the Cerna and the right leg running from the junction of the two rivers south-east to Lake Doiran. This was the scene of Franchet d'Esperey's victorious offensive in the fall of 1918. But the eastern side was weak and had yielded to Bulgarian attacks.

Sarrail's retreat was unmolested after the Greek border was reached. The Bulgarians hesitated to violate Greek neutrality, fearing the effect of such a challenge on the Greek people, who, whatever else they were, were strongly anti-Bulgar. Sarrail had exceptional talent and experience as a military engineer. He began at once to create the great entrenched camp of Salonica, in which an Allied army was to be immured almost up to the close of the war. The Teuton forces never disturbed him. It was essential that the Entente should maintain a foothold in the Balkans, if only to contain Bulgaria, save Greece, and leave the way open for military co-operation with Rumania, should the latter enter the war. Sarrail's work proved valueless in 1916, when Rumania came in. But it justified itself in the end.

Serbia, Montenegro, and Albania were now lost,

however. One Allied blunder had succeeded another. The Serbian situation might have been relieved a little, if King Peter's armies had hurriedly abandoned northern Serbia and made their fight against the Bulgarians in the Vardar Valley. Then the horrors of the Albanian retreat would have been avoided. But it would have been expecting much of a warlike people like the Serbians not to make at least a show of defending their homes.

German strategy in the Balkan campaign stood out brilliantly in contrast with Allied blunders and shortcomings. With very little effort Germany had opened up the corridor she needed to the Bosphorus and Asia Minor. She had incorporated Serbia, Montenegro, Albania, Bulgaria, and Turkey in that Middle Empire of which she expected to become master after the war. A six months' campaign on the Eastern Front had added over 100,000 square miles of enemy territory to its area and over 20,000,000 to its population. A three months' campaign in the Balkans added 94,000 square miles and 13,000,000 population, besides firmly attaching Turkey, with 700,000 square miles and 21,000,000 population, to the future German state. As a purely military operation the Serbian campaign was child's play to the German General Staff. But it represented a singularly effective combination of military skill with far-reaching political strategy.

CHAPTER XV

"NIBBLING" ON THE WESTERN FRONT. JANUARY 1,
1915-DECEMBER 31, 1915

WHILE a war of movement was in full swing on the Eastern Front all through 1915, and vast stretches of territory were overrun by the victorious German armies, war on the Western Front never escaped the limitations of trench deadlock. The reason for this was simple. On the Eastern Front Germany had an enormous superiority in artillery and technical equipment. Her armies could break through enemy positions and exploit the break-through strategically. In the West, where the Allies had assumed the offensive, they were somewhat superior to the Germans in numbers, but decidedly weaker in artillery. The Germans, moreover, had developed a defence of fixed positions which the Russians, with their shortage of guns, munitions, aircraft, and mechanical appliances, could not hope to equal.

On the Western Front in 1915 the Allies matched the splendid courage of their infantry against the strength of the German trench lines—living material against dead material. It was a costly and fruitless experiment. At the stage which positional warfare had reached in 1915 such tactics were inappropriate. Artillery had displaced infantry as the primary offensive arm. As General Mallterre has well said in his *Campaigns of*

1915, the warfare of attrition in rigidly fixed positions had developed a new formula: "The artillery conquers, the infantry occupies." Allied offensives in the West could have no real chance of success until an Allied superiority in artillery had been established.

Joffre aimed at break-throughs in France, just as Falkenhayn did in Galicia and Poland. But since the former never effected any, his method came to be described, somewhat disparagingly, as "nibbling." It amounted, at best, only to a grand scale series of ventures in what the French call the "war of usury."

The year 1915 began with the opposing armies grouped as follows on the long trench line from the Swiss border to Nieuport. The Belgian army and the Eighth French Army (the latter under d'Urbal) held the North Sea coast sector, south to Ypres. The Second and First British armies, under Field Marshal French, were stationed between Ypres and Lens. Smith-Dorrien commanded the Second, in the region of Armentières, and Haig the First, in the section about La Bassée. The Tenth French Army, under Maud'huy, held the Arras sector. The Second French Army, under de Castelnau, was in the Somme region. These northern armies, except the British and Belgian, were under the general direction of Foch.

The Sixth French Army, under Maunoury, was on the Aisne front; the Fifth, under Franchet d'Esperey, was on the Rheims front; the Fourth, under de Langle de Cary, was on the Champagne front, east of Rheims; the Third, under Sarraill, was in the Argonne. These armies were under direct control from general headquarters. Dubail commanded the eastern group, below Verdun. It comprised the First Army, under

Roques, and two detachments, under Humbert and Putz, the first in Lorraine and the second in Alsace.

On the German side the armies were from north to south: Fourth, under the Grand Duke of Württemberg; Sixth, under the Crown Prince Rupprecht of Bavaria; Second, under Bülow; First, under Kluck; Seventh, under Heeringen; Third, under Einem; Fifth, under the Crown Prince of Prussia. On the upper Meuse, in Lorraine and in Alsace, were three detachments under Stranz, Falkenhausen, and Gaede, respectively.

The first battle on the Western Front was that of Soissons, lasting from the 8th to the 15th of January. The French held the north bank of the Aisne from Soissons to Missy. In order to relieve the city from bombardment the French High Command ordered an advance toward Crouy, north-east of Soissons. This village was taken on January 12th. Then the Germans hurried up large reinforcements and began a counter-attack on the entire French line north of the river. On the 12th the Aisne rose and carried away the bridges east of Soissons. This gave Kluck an opportunity to push home his counter-attack. The French, cut off from support, held fast until January 14th, when they retreated to the river bank. Kluck had cleverly taken advantage of an accidental situation and won a substantial local success. He claimed to have taken three thousand prisoners and eight guns. On the Kaiser's birthday, January 27th, Kluck attacked and captured Hurtebise Farm, on the Craonne Plateau.

In February, Joffre launched a minor offensive in Champagne. The operation continued intermittently from February 15th until March 18th. An advance

of two miles was made on a front of about five miles, from Souain east to Beauséjour. The artillery preparation was insufficient to reduce the German defences and the infantry found progress difficult, after the first two days. The battle died down to local trench fighting, with severe losses on both sides. The French took over two thousand prisoners. But from the strategical point of view the effort was futile. A purely local operation in the Argonne—February 17th to March 6th—resulted in the capture of the fortified position of Vauquois, south of Varennes.

A more ambitious minor offensive in the Meuse sector, lasting from February 17th to April 12th, had for its object the squeezing out of the German salient at St. Mihiel. The French tried to force the north side of the salient by taking the strongly fortified hill known as Les Éparges, on the heights of the Meuse. Three attempts were made—one in February, one in March, and one in April. The first two were partially successful, the French gaining a foothold on the slopes. The last wrested the summit from the enemy. The First Army attacked the south side of the salient in April and gained a little ground. But St. Mihiel remained in German hands until September, 1918.

The French lost Hartmansweiler Kopf, a mountain in Alsace, north of Thann, in January, and recovered it by a series of operations, lasting from February 25th to March 26th.

The first British attempt to break through the German West Front barrier was made at Neuve Chapelle—March 10th to 12th. Neuve Chapelle lay about twelve miles west of Lille and about five miles north of La Bassée. Field Marshal Sir John French gathered three hundred heavy guns on a front of little over a mile

and subjected the German line to a "drum fire," unprecedented in severity. It was the beginning of the evolution which was to make artillery the predominant factor in fixed positional fighting. The German first line trenches were demolished and their occupants stunned. The British infantry occupied the village of Neuve Chapelle with little resistance. A narrow breach was made in the enemy front. But to the north of the village, where the Germans held the Aubers Ridge, one of the keys to Lille, the artillery preparation had not been equally effective. Endeavouring to open out the breach on that side, the British were checked.

Delays in sending up reserves and disappointing staff work, due in part to the destruction of telephone wires, paralysed the offensive. The Germans rallied and counter-attacked. After two days of disconnected fighting, French suspended the operation. He had lost thirteen thousand men for the sake of advancing a mile on a three-mile front. The British took three thousand prisoners. They also learned that their munitions supply was inadequate to meet the demands of the new style of positional warfare, and that the shrapnel with which they had been supplied would have to be replaced by high explosive shells, if trench systems were to be made thoroughly ripe for storming. Neuve Chapelle was a depressing failure. But it helped to dispel the military illusions which the British Government and public still cherished.

Germany had elected to stand on the defensive in France and Belgium. She made one notable departure from that policy in April, when the Grand Duke of Württemberg made a partially successful attempt to squeeze out the Allied salient east of Ypres. The

British Second Army had captured Hill 60, south-east of Ypres, on April 17th. German counter-attacks there failed and, as if in retaliation, the Grand Duke on April 22d, savagely assaulted the north-eastern face of the salient.

This operation is known as the Second Battle of Ypres. It attracted world-wide attention from the fact that the infantry attack was prepared not by artillery fire, but by the use of chlorine gas fumes. The Allied troops were taken completely by surprise when a greenish vapour was carried by the north wind across their trenches. It had an asphyxiating and torturing effect. The Colonial divisions of the French Eighth Army, holding the line east from Steenstraete to Langemarck, broke for safety. The German infantry, equipped with gas masks, seized the French front and extended their right wing across the Yser Canal to Lizerne, Zuydschoote, and Boesinghe.

The retreat of the French uncovered the left wing of a Canadian division, holding the line from Langemarck to the apex of the salient. The Canadians refused their left and continued to resist the German advance. The situation of the Allied forces east of Ypres became critical. For if the Germans pushed south along the Yser Canal to Ypres all these troops would be pocketed.

But on April 24th the French and Belgians recaptured Lizerne. The Canadian left was covered by British reinforcements and a new line was established west to the canal. The Germans tried their new gas weapon again, on the east face of the salient, and the Canadians and British were forced to surrender nearly half of the area which they occupied to the east of Ypres. After May 9th the battle died down, the Allied offensive in Artois having intervened.

On the German side the Second Battle of Ypres was probably intended only as a diversion. The gas attack succeeded beyond expectation. But when the front northeast of Ypres was cleared and an opportunity was offered to drive west toward Poperinghe and to envelop the British and Canadians in the apex of the salient, the Grand Duke of Württemberg had no reserves in readiness to exploit his surprise. Possibly the chief purpose of the operation was to try out the chlorine gas.

Joffre was now ready to put the "nibbling" policy to a sharper test. The idea behind his "nibbles" was always to make a breach in the German line, by widening out which a considerable enemy retirement would be necessitated. He confided the new venture to Foch, whose mission was to be to push the Germans off the heights to the west of Lens and then drive them across the Artois plain toward Douai.

Foch had assembled in the North a special "mass of manœuvre," consisting of ten divisions. These, with his other troops, were distributed on a semicircular front extending from a point west of Arras around toward Béthune. His first task was to eject the Germans from their powerful trench systems in the ridges covering Lens from the south and west, including Vimy Ridge and Nôtre Dame de Lorette. Seven army corps and three separate divisions (about 280,000 men) were used in the operation, which is known as the Battle of Artois and lasted from May 9th until June 19th.

After a violent bombardment the French troops dashed forward on May 9th and seized the enemy's first line trenches. The Thirty-third Corps, under General Pétain, specially distinguished itself in the initial assault. It conquered all the slopes of Nôtre

Dame de Lorette, to the west of Lens. The villages of Ablain-St. Nazaire and Neuville-St. Vaast, to the south-east of Nôtre Dame, were also taken. A real break-through seemed on the point of being accomplished. But no supports were at hand to follow up this success. Possibly Pétain's advance had outrun all calculations, just as Byng's did at Cambrai two years and a half later. At all events, the golden moments slipped away on the afternoon and evening of May 9th.

The breach was closed during the night by German reserves. They halted the French attack on May 10th and after that date reduced the Artois battle to an interminable siege operation. On May 12th the French took Carency. By June 1st they had conquered the Souchez sugar factory. To the south-west of Vimy lay a formidable network of trenches known as the Labyrinth. This was attacked on May 30th and was finally cleared, after an incessant struggle, on June 17th. Vimy Ridge still protected Lens from the south. It was not taken by the Allies until the spring of 1917. Foch captured five thousand prisoners in the first assault. But the battle, as a whole, was fruitless. It was the kind of attrition which got nowhere.

To support the operation about Lens the British First Army made an assault on May 9th on Aubers Ridge. It failed because of inadequate artillery preparation. A second assault was delivered on May 16th, at a point east of Festubert. The battle of Festubert lasted ten days. The British captured the German first line trenches on a front of 3200 yards and also some second line trenches. Marshal French reported a moderate local success. But the cost was disproportionate to the results.

Throughout the summer the French and British worked feverishly to enlarge their munitions stocks and to repair their shortage in large calibre artillery. "Nibbling" was not renewed until September, when Joffre started an attack in Champagne which had as its objective a break-through to Vouziers. Simultaneously another attempt—in the nature of a diversion—was made to recover Lens.

The Allied line had been reconstituted to some extent since January. The French Eighth Army had been withdrawn from Flanders. The British Second Army extended its left wing north to connect with the Belgians on the Yser. The newly created British Third Army, under General Allenby, replaced the French Second Army on the Somme front. The latter, now under Pétain, was shifted to Champagne. General Humbert had been appointed to command the Third Army, in the Argonne sector, succeeding Sarraill, who was ordered to Salonica. The French Seventh Army, under Maud'huy, was assigned to the extreme right in Alsace. The front of the French Sixth Army had been extended somewhat to the north in Picardy to connect with the British Third Army.

The Second Army, supported by the right wing of the Fourth, bore the burden of the attack in Champagne. It was made on a line running east from Moronvillers through Auberive-sur-Suippes, Souain, Perthes-les-Hurlus, and Mesnil-les-Hurlus to Massiges. The operating front was about sixteen miles long. The eastern half of it had been the scene of the Champagne offensive of February and March.

The artillery preparation lasted three days. The German first line defences were battered down. The infantry advanced rapidly on the morning of September

25th. By evening they had penetrated the German front to the depth of about two miles, where the second German defence line was reached. On the first day 25,000 prisoners were taken and 150 guns—these totals including the captures made in Artois.

On September 26th and 27th contact was established with the second German position and a halt was called until the heavy artillery could be brought up. On October 6th the second German line was broken at several points. But the Germans threw in reinforcements and French progress became exceedingly costly. The artillery was unable to destroy the defences of the third German line. The infantry assaults failed and the offensive had to be broken off. The French losses were estimated at about 120,000. The German loss was probably about the same. De Castelnau, who now commanded the central group of armies, had made a slight dent in the German positions. But he was still a long way from Vouziers, his objective. He hadn't even reached the lateral railroad behind the German front, running east and west through Somme-Py.

In Artois the French Tenth Army captured Souchez, west of Lens, on September 25th, and made progress toward the village of Vimy. But it could make no impression on Vimy Ridge. The British First Army attacked toward Loos, on the north side of the heights system covering Lens. Considerable gains were made on the first day. The German first trench line was carried from Grenay, north-west of Lens, to and beyond the Hohenzollern Redoubt—four miles farther north. The British took Loos and, advancing east, crossed the Lens-La Bassée road at Hulloch. The second German line was overrun. Hill 70 was captured and some British units penetrated as far as the third Ger-

man line. Lens was now almost enveloped from the north, and a little stronger push would have compelled its evacuation.

But, as at Neuve Chapelle, the attack was not promptly supported. The Germans counter-attacked on September 26th, retook Hill 70, and recrossed the Lens-La Bassée road. By September 27th they were nearly back in their old positions.

Field Marshal French took three thousand prisoners and twenty-five guns. But his own losses were about sixty thousand. His failure was bitterly criticized at home. On December 15th he was relieved and the command of the British armies in France was given to Sir Douglas Haig, who remained in charge of them until the end of the war. A few days before French's recall General Joffre was raised to the command of all the French armies—in the Near East as well as in the West—the forces in the colonies alone being excepted.

After the Champagne and Artois offensives fighting slackened in the West. The Allies had shown themselves powerless to break the deadlock of rigid positional (trench) warfare. The Germans had developed the trench system enormously, building everywhere elaborate second and third lines. The dugouts had been deepened into underground forts. The front was heavily manned everywhere and reserves were close at hand to repair any breach.

In *The Strategy of the Great War*, I have discussed at length the development of field tactics on the Western Front. Warfare ran in a cycle. First the vast increase in the range and power of gun fire drove the combatants underground. Then there was a sudden reversion to ancient hand-to-hand methods of fighting. The opposing battle lines ran within earshot of each

other. Warfare of movement disappeared. Artillery caused this recession. It alone could undo its own work. It was the mission of the artillery arm to make the deep permanent trench fortification untenable. So the destructive power of artillery was fabulously expanded. By the end of 1915 and the beginning of 1916 it had begun to master the field fortress. Deep, permanent, and strongly held fore-front works gradually had to be abandoned, because they had become traps. Then the rigid trench system gave way to the more elastic zone systems, in which the front lines were lightly held and the main defence was made in battle positions farther back. The "pill box" replaced the deep dugout in the forward zones. "Drum fire" was wasted on "pill boxes." Any line could now be broken through with a sufficient effort. Attacks which got through were met by counter-attacks. Finally the tank was developed as a "pill box" destroyer and the fixed positions of 1915 and 1916 became fluid. The trench deadlock ended definitely with the Battle of Cambrai, in November, 1917. Thereafter open or semi-open warfare became the rule.

This cycle of tactical development must be kept in mind in order to understand clearly the conditions of the offensives in the West from 1915 to 1918, so different in scope and results from the German offensives in Galicia, Poland, Serbia, and Rumania. In the West neither antagonist could hope for a strategical decision until the stalemate of rigid positional warfare had come to an end.

CHAPTER XVI

ASIATIC AND COLONIAL CAMPAIGNS. JANUARY 1,
1915-DECEMBER 31, 1915

FORMER Ambassador Morgenthau tells us, in his valuable book of reminiscences, that when Djemal Pasha, Turkish Minister of Marine and one of the Young Turk triumvirs, left Constantinople in November, 1914, to take command of the army in Syria, a remarkable demonstration occurred in his honour. At the railroad station, just before his train started, he said magniloquently: "I shall not return to Constantinople until I have conquered Egypt."

Djemal was a politician rather than a soldier. He didn't understand the difficulties presented by an invasion of Egypt. Egypt is cut off from Syria by the Desert of Sinai. On the one-hundred-mile land front between Port Said and Suez there is only one practicable route across the desert for an army of considerable size. That is the route, near the Mediterranean coast, from Gaza through El Arish and Katié to El Kantara. There are two caravan trails farther south, one ending at Ismalia, the midway point on the Suez Canal; the other, used by pilgrims going from Cairo to Mecca, crossing from Akaba to Suez. These trails, owing to scarcity of water, are fit only for reconnoissances.

The Turks lacked in 1915 the mechanical appliances

with which to transport an adequate force across the Sinai wastes. They could threaten the Suez Canal. But they could hardly hope to destroy that vital artery of communication between Great Britain and India. German policy, however, required an attempt on Egypt, which would, at least, compel Great Britain to maintain a large army of occupation there.

In November, 1914, a small Turkish column captured the fort of El Arish, just across the Egyptian boundary, defeated a native Egyptian force at Kartaba, and pushed west as far as El Kantara. Another small party, starting from Akaba, on the southernmost route, got half way across the desert toward Suez.

Turkish preparations for a descent on the canal continued through December and January. It was announced through Beirut on January 28th, that 48,000 Turks and Germans were concentrated at El Arish and 32,000 near Akaba. These figures were probably exaggerated. On February 3d, however, three Turkish columns appeared in the neighbourhood of the canal. One made a feint at El Kantara. Another, twelve miles farther south, bombarded Ismalia. The only serious attempt to cross the waterway was made at Toussoun, twelve miles below Ismalia.

About ten thousand Turks pushed up to the east bank and tried to lay pontoon bridges. Allied war-ships interfered with this operation. British troops crossed the water-way at Serapeum and came up on the left flank of the Turkish division. The engagement lasted twelve hours. Then the Turks retreated, losing five hundred prisoners. By February 10th the Sinai peninsula was cleared of the enemy. Djemal's enterprise was fantastic. There were 150,000 British, Australian, and East Indian troops in Egypt, beside

the native army. In March Great Britain decided to defend Egypt at Gallipoli. Djemal's best divisions were recalled to Constantinople and the Sinai front became inactive for more than a year.

In answer to Turkey's declaration of war, Great Britain had abolished Turkish suzerainty over Egypt (December 17, 1914), and declared a British protectorate. Late in 1915, Southern Arabia threw off the Turkish yoke. The Sheriff of Mecca, Hussein Ibn Ali, was encouraged by the British Government to set up the independent kingdom of Hedjaz. This chief occupied most of the territory south of Medina, the terminus of the Hedjaz railroad. Later he contributed substantial aid in the Palestine campaigns.

On the Caucasus front the Russians had won an important victory over Enver Pasha's army in the first weeks of January. The Turkish offensive for Kars and Batum was abandoned. The defence of Constantinople absorbed Turkish energies. The Russians consequently were able to dislodge the Turks from the Black Sea coast districts, south-west of Batum, which they had overrun in 1914. The Czar's forces captured Hoppa on March 2d and Archavi on March 15th. The Turks also evacuated Artivin, across the Caucasian border. They maintained their hold, however, through 1915, on the Olty Valley, north-west of Kars.

Greater activity was shown farther south—in the Lake Van region and in north-western Persia. The Turks occupied Tabriz on January 15th, but were driven out on January 28th. Their hold on this part of Persia, which they had invaded in the fall of 1914, was gradually broken. On May 2d Khabil Bey, the Turkish commander, was defeated near Lake Urumiah and on May 24th he withdrew into Kurdistan.

Another Russian column penetrated through the Ararat range into Southern Armenia. On May 20th it captured Van and pushed along the southern border of Lake Van toward Bitlis. The Turks began a counter-offensive in this region in the fall, but recovered very little ground.

The most spectacular operation on the Asian front was the British offensive up the Tigris toward Bagdad. This was conducted by General C. F. V. Townshend, with great boldness and energy. But the forces at his disposal were too small. He got to Ctesiphon, eighteen miles below Bagdad. But there he found himself facing a reinforced Turkish army, much stronger than his own. He then retreated, but not quickly enough to extricate himself. The pursuing Turks penned him up in Kut-el-Amara, where he was forced to capitulate on April 29, 1916.

In November, 1914, the British had seized Basra, below the confluence of the Tigris and the Euphrates. On April 11, 1915, they occupied Kurna, at the junction of the two rivers. The Tigris offered the only practicable route of invasion into Upper Mesopotamia, for it was navigable up as far as Bagdad, and the terrain on both banks was fit to march and fight over. The Euphrates, on the contrary, spread its waters over a marshy country and had no fixed and dependable channel. Before Townshend started north from Kurna he sent a British column east to the Persian border to dispose of a Turkish force which had gathered there. On May 19th this British-Indian contingent won a complete victory on the bank of the Kerkla River, an affluent of the Tigris, thus ending all danger of a Turkish flank attack from the east.

A similar operation was necessary to protect the

British left flank. Another column, under General Goringe, was dispatched up the Euphrates to scatter the Turks and nomad tribes who had established a base in that region. Goringe reached Sukesh Sheyuk, about seventy miles up the river, on July 4th. Then he advanced toward Nasiriyeh. Near that place he fought an indecisive battle on July 14th. A second battle, on July 24th, routed the enemy. Most of the Turkish guns and supplies were captured. The difficulties of navigation on the Euphrates prevented the Turks from re-establishing another base in this part of Mesopotamia.

The main Tigris expedition (about fifteen thousand men, mostly East Indians) left Kurna in May. On May 31st a battle was fought south of Amara. The Turks were defeated and retreated in haste. Amara was occupied by General Townshend on June 3d. The hot season intervened. Active campaigning is limited in Mesopotamia by climatic conditions to five months of the year—May, June, September, October, and November. Townshend resumed his advance in September and on the 25th of that month brought up against powerful Turkish positions, organized on both sides of the Tigris seven miles south of Kut-el-Amara.

The British commander made a demonstration on September 27th on the right bank. During the night the Turks transferred most of their forces to that side of the river. On the 28th the main British attack was delivered on the left bank. After hard fighting the Turkish positions were carried. On the 29th the Turks retreated beyond Kut.

A few weeks later the British advance was resumed. By slow stages Ctesiphon, within two days' march of Bagdad, was reached. Here the Turks stood and

fought on November 22d, but were again defeated. The failure of the Gallipoli campaign, however, had enabled the Turkish Government to send reinforcements to the Mesopotamian front. These were brought into line on November 25th and in a second engagement at Ctesiphon Townshend's progress was stopped. His losses compelled him to fall back toward his base; for he had outrun his supports. He retired to Kut, which he entered on December 3d. The Turks pursued him closely and with the aid of nomad Arabs succeeded, on December 7th, in cutting his line of retreat.

Townshend had now lost one third of his original force. He decided to try to hold Kut until a British relief expedition could arrive. The Turks fortified the banks of the Tigris below Kut and waited. The British and Indian governments sent an army to raise the siege. But it failed to disturb the Turkish investment. Kut and Townshend's army were left to their fate.

Forces of the Union of South Africa had undertaken the conquest of South-west Africa in the fall of 1914. The Boer revolt interrupted this operation. It was not resumed seriously until February, 1915. Two columns landed on the Atlantic coast, at Luderitz Bay and Walfisch Bay. A third advanced north from the Cape Colony border. General Louis Botha was in command of the expedition. The Germans were outnumbered and fell back under pressure. Windhoek, the capital of the colony, was reached on May 12th by the converging columns. The Germans retreated north, maintaining a hopeless fight. After losing several small engagements they capitulated on July 9th. The forces which surrendered included 204 officers and 3293 men.

Kamerun did not yield as easily as German South-

west Africa. In 1914 the Germans not only fairly held their own, but also occupied some stations in British Nigeria. In May and June, 1915, French and British contingents conquered the north-west section of the colony. The Germans, with about 3250 troops, successfully held the rest. In October, the Allies collected about ten thousand men—British, French, Belgians, and East Indian natives—and attacked Kamerun from all sides. Yaunde, the capital, capitulated on January 1, 1916. The governor and most of the German officers fled to Spanish New Guinea. On February 18, 1916, the last German post surrendered.

German East Africa held out much longer than any other of the German colonies. It was an immense region, difficult to penetrate, and was defended with skill by well-trained African troops. No progress toward reducing it was made in 1914. East Indian troops landed on the coast near Tanga in November, 1914, but were repulsed with heavy loss. In January, 1915, some Hindu units made a second landing and captured the fortified post of Jassin. But the garrison left behind at this post soon had to surrender to the Germans.

In the spring and summer there was some fighting in the Victoria-Nyanza and Tanganyika regions. Little progress was made by the Allies, however, in 1915. At the end of the year the Union of South Africa agreed to raise an army of twenty-five thousand men for use in German East Africa. It was only after the South Africans arrived that the German hold on the colony began to weaken.

CHAPTER XVII

NAVAL OPERATIONS, 1915

APART from the Allied attempt to force the Dardanelles (dealt with in Chapter XI, in connection with the Gallipoli campaign) naval operations in 1915 were of minor consequence. The only high sea encounter was that off Dogger Bank, on January 24th. Five British battle cruisers were engaged there with three German battle cruisers and one armoured cruiser. The German armoured cruiser, the *Blücher*, was sunk. Dogger Bank was the first real test of modern big gun ships in action. It threw little light, however, on the relative fighting power of the British and German navies, because the action was broken off too early.

In a spirit of bravado, the Germans had bombarded the undefended English east coast towns of Scarborough, Hartlepool, and Whitby, on December 16, 1914. The German public applauded this illegitimate method of punishing the English. So a second raid was planned for January 24th. The British navy was on the lookout for the raiders. Sir David Beatty's battle cruiser squadron was patrolling off the Dogger Bank, in company with four light cruisers. Three light cruisers and some destroyers were thrown out in advance. About daylight the *Aurora*, an outpost light cruiser, became

engaged with an enemy light cruiser. The five battle cruisers, coming up, found themselves in sight of the German raiding squadron, under Rear-Admiral Hipper. The Germans turned toward home and a stern chase ensued.

In tonnage the British squadron had a great advantage. The displacements of the ships were as follows: British: *Lion*, 26,350; *Tiger*, 28,000; *Princess Royal*, 26,350; *New Zealand*, 18,800; *Indomitable*, 17,250. German: *Derfflinger*, 28,000; *Seydlitz*, 24,640; *Moltke*, 22,640; *Blücher*, 15,550. Hipper was also outclassed in weight of metal. His best ship, the *Derfflinger*, carried eight 12-inch guns. The two smaller battle cruisers, the *Seydlitz* and the *Moltke*, carried ten 11-inch guns apiece. The *Blücher*, an old-style armoured cruiser, carried twelve 8.2-inch guns. Beatty's three best ships, the *Lion*, the *Tiger*, and the *Princess Royal*, were armed with eight 13.5-inch guns apiece. The two smaller battle cruisers, the *New Zealand* and the *Indomitable*, had batteries of eight 12-inch guns.

In speed the two squadrons were more evenly matched—29.2 knots for the *Seydlitz*, 28.4 for the *Moltke*, and 27 for the *Derfflinger*, against 28.5 for the *Lion* and the *Princess Royal*, and 28 for the *Tiger*. The *New Zealand*'s capacity was 25 knots and the *Indomitable*'s 26. The *Blücher*'s was 25.3. Hipper was handicapped by the fact that the *Blücher*, his smallest and slowest ship, was the last in the column and was bound to be overtaken in a runaway fight by the faster and stronger British units. The three German battle cruisers were more heavily armoured than their antagonists. The *Blücher*, on the contrary, had lighter armour than any other of the major units.

Hipper could escape only by sacrificing the *Blücher*.

This he did. His battle cruisers kept up a long range fight and drew off toward Heligoland. The *Blücher* was gradually overhauled. She was badly punished by shell fire from the British battle cruisers and fell out of line at 10.48 A.M. She was sunk by a torpedo at 12.37 P.M. The *Lion*, which had been leading the pursuit, was disabled at 11.03 A.M. and dropped out, Admiral Beatty transferring his flag to a destroyer. The British squadron ceased pursuit about noon, fearing a submarine attack. It was then about seventy miles from Heligoland.

The German fleet attempted in August, 1915, an operation somewhat similar to that of the Allied fleet at the Dardanelles. It tried to force an entrance into the Bay of Riga, which was defended not only by Russian warships but by fixed mines. Three cruisers and eight destroyers were lost on August 19th and 20th. The fleet retired on August 21st. On August 20th a British submarine operating in the Baltic damaged the battle cruiser *Moltke* and a little later another submarine injured the *Pommern*.

The Allied navies also suffered numerous losses from submarines or mines. The British pre-dreadnaught *Formidable* was sunk on January 2d. The French cruiser *Léon Gambetta* was torpedoed in the Adriatic, on April 26th. The Italian cruiser *Amalfi* was sunk in the Adriatic on July 7th. The Italian cruiser, *Giuseppe Garibaldi*, was destroyed off Cattaro on July 18th.

Two German commerce destroyers were forced to take refuge in American waters in the spring of 1915. On March 10th the *Prinz Eitel Friedrich* entered Newport News, and on April 11th, the *Kronprinz Wilhelm* entered the same port. Both were interned. After

the summer of 1915 only stray commerce raiders, escaping in disguise from German ports, were left to prey on Allied shipping beyond the range of the German submarines.

CHAPTER XVIII

NEUTRAL RIGHTS AT SEA. THE "LUSITANIA." AUGUST 3, 1914—DECEMBER 31, 1915

WHAT Germany could not accomplish through her surface navy or auxiliary commerce destroyers she began to think of accomplishing through her submarines. That thought was her undoing. The theory of submarine blockade which she developed became eventually the keystone of her naval and military policy. It clouded her vision and perverted her true military aims. It forced the United States into the war. More than anything else—more than everything else—it dragged Germany down to defeat.

Early in the war Great Britain proclaimed a blockade of the German coasts and disclosed an intention of cutting off the flow of foreign merchandise into Germany. The United States, as the neutral whose commerce would be most restricted by belligerent operations, asked the powers at war whether they would agree to respect the laws of naval warfare "as laid down by the Declaration of London of 1909." Germany and Austria-Hungary made a favourable response. Great Britain insisted on various modifications. The United States then withdrew its suggestion. Blockade and naval warfare were left to be conducted according to the rules of international law in force prior to the London Declaration.

These were elastic and capable of a wide expansion. The British Government, through Orders in Council, extended the principle of ultimate destination invoked by the United States in the Civil War. It established a long range "cruiser cordon" blockade of German North Sea and Baltic Sea ports. It also held that neutral commerce to neutral countries adjacent to Germany, like Holland, Norway, Denmark, and Sweden, should be subject to blockade and contraband regulation, if there was any reason to suspect transshipment across the German border. Foodstuffs were included among the articles which could not be delivered to neutral countries—even foodstuffs intended for the use of the civilian population. Under earlier practice foodstuffs were conditionally contraband, only if destined for the use of a government or its military forces. In modern war, however, such a distinction has become fanciful, since all food stocks are now pooled and disposed of under governmental regulation.

The Germans complained bitterly of the British ban on the importation of foodstuffs. They said it implied a purpose to starve Germany's non-combatant population. Attacking it as violation of international law, they claimed the right to retaliate by declaring a "war zone" about the British Isles and sinking at sight enemy merchantmen trying to leave or enter British harbours.

The famous German "war zone" order was issued on February 4, 1915. It not only gave notice that German submarines would sink enemy merchantmen found in the zone, even if it were found impossible to save passengers and crews, but also warned neutral merchantmen out of the "blockaded" waters because, owing to "the hazards of naval warfare, neutral vessels

cannot always be prevented from suffering from the attacks meant for enemy ships."

Up to the appearance of this proclamation the friction arising from the blockade operations had been almost exclusively between neutrals and the Allies. The United States Government had vigorously protested against the extreme doctrines asserted in the Orders in Council and against the hardships imposed by them on neutral commerce. Now Germany assumed Britain's burden. For if the British orders subjected neutral carriers to annoyance and loss, the German proclamation threatened them with destruction of life as well as property.

Germany never claimed that submarine warfare on merchantmen, carried to the point of sacrificing the lives of crews and passengers, was legal. She merely pleaded that as a violation of law it was excused by British violations of a different character. But this was an excuse which could hardly be accepted by neutral governments, disposed to stand on their rights to a lawful use of the high seas.

The American Government took notice of the German "war zone" order in a note, made public on February 10th. It was firm and to the point. Secretary Bryan asked the German Government to consider, before the order was carried into effect, "the critical situation which might arise were the German naval forces, in carrying out the policy foreshadowed in the Admiralty's proclamation, to destroy any merchant vessel of the United States or cause the death of American citizens." The Secretary then laid down two propositions:

- (1) If the commanders of German vessels of war . . . should destroy on the high seas an American

vessel or the lives of American citizens, it would be difficult for the Government of the United States to view the act in any other light than as an indefensible violation of neutral rights, which it would be very hard indeed to reconcile with the friendly relations now so happily subsisting between the two governments.

(2) If such a deplorable situation should arise . . . the Government of the United States would be constrained to hold the Imperial German Government to a strict accountability for such acts of their naval authorities and to take any steps it might be necessary to take to safeguard American lives and property and to secure to American citizens the full enjoyment of their acknowledged rights on the high seas.

The "war zone" proclamation went into effect on February 18th. Meantime Germany had hinted that she would withdraw it if Great Britain would agree to observe the Declaration of London, without modification, or the Treaty of Paris, under either of which it was permissible to ship food into Germany for the use of the civilian population.

On February 20th the United States Government addressed identical notes to Great Britain and Germany suggesting a compromise which would make the situation of neutrals more tolerable. It was proposed to prohibit the sowing of floating mines, to forbid submarines to attack merchantmen except in pursuance of the rules of visit and search, and to bar the use of neutral flags by belligerent merchant ships. Germany was asked to agree that all foodstuffs sent her from the United States should be distributed by agencies designated by the United States and in no case should

be requisitioned by the German Government. Great Britain was to agree that foodstuffs should not be made absolute contraband or detained, if consigned to American agencies in Germany.

Berlin responded favourably, in the main, to these proposals, which would have been highly advantageous to Germany. Great Britain, unwilling to forego the food blockade, was much less sympathetic. The effort to arrange a *modus vivendi* came to nothing.

A new Order in Council was issued on March 15th, absolutely stopping the sailing of merchant vessels to or from German ports and taking jurisdiction of all merchant vessels sailing to or from a neutral port, which carried goods with an enemy destination or of enemy origin, or goods classifiable as enemy property. This order was certain to evoke a spirited protest from the United States. But meanwhile causes of friction with Germany were arising which completely overshadowed American grievances against Great Britain and France.

On March 28th a German submarine torpedoed the *Falaba*, a British merchant ship bound for Africa. An American citizen, Leon Thrasher, who was a passenger on it, was lost. The German Government expressed regret at this incident, but tried to shift responsibility for it on the British policy of arming merchantmen, thus making it difficult for a submarine to approach them for purposes of search. On April 28th a German aeroplane dropped three bombs on the American steamer *Cushing*. One of them hit the mark. Nobody was killed. On May 1st the American oil steamship *Gulflight* was torpedoed off the Scilly Islands. The captain died from shock and ten of the crew, who jumped overboard, were drowned.

That same day an advertisement was inserted in various American newspapers warning Americans not to travel through the "war zone" on ships of Great Britain or her allies. It bore the signature of the Imperial German Embassy. The occasion of the warning was disclosed on May 7th when a German submarine sank the British passenger liner *Lusitania* off the south coast of Ireland. The *Lusitania* carried 1251 passengers and a crew of 667. Of these 1153 were drowned. The American passengers numbered 188. One hundred and fourteen of them, including women and children, lost their lives.

The reaction in the United States to this cold-blooded massacre was vehement and intense. It was Germany's answer to our Government's notification of February 10th that it would hold Germany to "strict accountability" for the destruction of "an American vessel or the lives of American citizens" and its further warning that it would "take any steps it might be necessary to take to safeguard American lives and property and to secure to American citizens the full enjoyment of their acknowledged rights on the high seas."

What steps were to be taken was gradually disclosed in the *Lusitania* correspondence, which continued until September 1st in the form of open exchanges and then lapsed, so far as the *Lusitania* case itself was concerned, into a silent deadlock. The first American note was made public on May 13th. Two days before the German Foreign Office had handed Ambassador Gerard a memorandum which apparently disposed of the issue raised by the *Cushing* and *Gulflight* cases. It characterized the attacks on the two vessels as "mistakes" and announced that if a neutral ship came to harm through German submarines or aircraft

in the zone of naval warfare, "the German Government would unreservedly recognize its responsibility therefor. In such a case it would express its regrets and afford damages without first instituting a prize court action." If there was any question whether or not the damage was done by a German U-boat or airship, recourse would be had to a commission appointed under the provisions of the Hague conventions.

This left open only the question of attacks on enemy merchantmen through which American passengers had lost their lives. The first American note, though mentioning the *Cushing* and the *Gulflight*, was really addressed to the *Falaba* and *Lusitania* cases. It emphasized the fact that Americans were entitled under the rules of international law to travel on the high seas in full confidence that their lives would "not be endangered by acts done in clear violation of universally acknowledged international obligations."

The satisfaction due to the United States was thus defined:

It confidently expects, therefore, that the Imperial German Government will *disavow* the acts of which the Government of the United States complains, that they will make reparation so far as reparation is possible for injuries without measure, and that they will take immediate steps to prevent the recurrence of anything so obviously subversive of the principles of warfare for which the Imperial German Government have in the past so wisely and so firmly contended.

On May 25th the American steamer *Nebraskan* had a hole blown in her bow off Fastnet Rock. The cap-

tain thought he was the victim of a submarine attack, though no submarine was seen. No lives were lost and the vessel reached port.

Jagow, the German Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, sent a reply to Washington on May 28th. It was published on May 31st. It repeated the assurances as to neutral vessels contained in his earlier memorandum of May 11th. It tried to exculpate the commander of the U-boat which sank the *Falaba*. But it justified the attack without warning on the *Lusitania* by imputing a semi-military character to that vessel. The answer was absolutely evasive.

Secretary Bryan had signed the note of February 10th and the first *Lusitania* note. But his ideas of holding Germany to "strict accountability" for the invasion of neutral rights were coloured by his ardent pacifistic predilections. He wanted to forbid Americans to take passage on the ships of belligerent nations or on neutral vessels, carrying cargoes of ammunition. He also wanted the *Lusitania* dispute referred to an international commission, telling Germany in advance that the United States would be bound by the principle of no warlike action within a year, contained in the arbitration treaties which our State Department had negotiated with various other countries.

In Mr. Bryan's philosophy "strict accountability" was a purely platonic phrase. He didn't want to seem to pretend that it was anything else. So he resigned on June 8th, on the eve of the transmission of the second *Lusitania* note. This refuted the German claims as to the semi-military character of the torpedoed liner and then "very earnestly and very solemnly" renewed the representations and demands of the first note.

The answer from Berlin, dated July 8th, was made

public on July 10th. It defended German naval policy and suggested that American passengers to Europe should use American liners or neutral liners under the American flag. These would receive a safe conduct through the German "war zone," provided they carried no contraband. As a further concession, Germany would allow four enemy liners to sail under the American flag and guarantee them similar protection. Nothing was said, naturally, about a disavowal of the *Lusitania* crime.

The third *Lusitania* note, dated July 21st, described Jagow's reply as "very unsatisfactory." The demand for disavowal was made for a third time in this language:

The Government of the United States cannot believe that the Imperial Government will longer refrain from disavowing the wanton act of its naval commander in sinking the *Lusitania* or from offering reparation for American lives lost, so far as reparation can be made for a needless destruction of human life by an illegal act.

This communication produced no formal reply. On July 12th the German Foreign Office delivered a memorandum to Ambassador Gerard admitting that the *Nebraskan* had been torpedoed by a German submarine, apologizing for the "unfortunate accident" and offering to pay damages. Other incidents continued to show Germany's slight regard for the American contentions. The *Orduna*, with twenty-one American passengers aboard, was attacked by a U-boat on July 9th. A torpedo narrowly missed her and she was then chased and shelled. The *Leelanaw*, an American freighter, was sunk on July 25th, off the Orkney Islands. She

carried a contraband foreign-owned cargo. But the destruction of the ship was, like the destruction of the *William P. Frye* in the Pacific Ocean on January 28, 1915, a violation of a still valid treaty of commerce and amity with Prussia.

The climax of German effrontery came on August 20th. The White Star liner *Arabic*, bound from Liverpool to New York, was sunk off the coast of Ireland. Forty-four passengers, of whom two were American citizens, lost their lives.

Ambassador Bernstorff made a public statement on August 24th, serving notice that he had asked the American Government to withhold judgment on this case. "If Americans should actually have lost their lives," he said, "this would naturally be contrary to our intentions."

The sinking of the *Arabic* raised a storm of indignation in the United States. It was partly allayed when Count Bernstorff appeared at the State Department and submitted a memorandum, conveying the information that his instructions in regard to the third *Lusitania* note contained this passage:

Liners will not be sunk by our submarines without warning and without safety of the lives of non-combatants, provided that the liners do not try to escape or offer resistance.

This was a partial recognition of the principle for which the United States was contending. In fact, the German Government seemed disposed to use the *Arabic* case as a means of squaring the *Lusitania* account. On September 7th the Foreign Office delivered a memorandum to Ambassador Gerard which said: "Accord-

ing to his instructions the commander was not allowed to attack the *Arabic* without warning and without saving lives, unless the ship attempted to escape or offered resistance." It argued, however, that the commander might not have exceeded his orders, since he was convinced that the *Arabic* intended to ram him. Regret was expressed for the loss of American lives and an offer was made to send the question of indemnity to The Hague tribunal. On October 5th, however, Count Bernstorff announced that his government admitted a departure from instructions and *disavowed* the act of the U-boat commander.

It refused, however, to disavow the act of the commander who sank the *Lusitania*. Secret negotiations for the settlement of the *Lusitania* case continued into 1916. Various evasive adjustments were discussed. But Germany would not yield on the essential point—the thrice-repeated American demand for a disavowal. After February, 1916, Germany remaining obdurate, the *Lusitania* controversy was allowed to lapse into oblivion.

Late in 1915 an issue arose with Austria-Hungary over the *Ancona* case. On November 7th this Italian liner was attacked in the Mediterranean by an Austro-Hungarian submarine. She tried to escape, and was halted. Later she was sunk and the boats to which the crew and passengers took were fired on. Nine American passengers were drowned. Ambassador Penfield was instructed to ask for an explanation. On November 14th the Austro-Hungarian Admiralty issued a statement exculpating itself. The United States was not satisfied with this *ex parte* justification and on December 6th demanded that the government of the Dual Monarchy "denounce the sinking

as an illegal and indefensible act," punish the U-boat commander, and offer reparation.

Vienna assumed a haughty tone at first, barely noticing the suggestions of the American note. On December 19th our State Department renewed its demands. Germany didn't want the submarine issue reopened in an aggravated form. She brought pressure to bear on her ally. The government at Vienna then reversed itself. On December 29th a note was sent to the United States, agreeing that the obligations of humanity must be lived up to, even in war; accepting the principle that "hostile private vessels, in so far as they do not flee or offer resistance, may not be destroyed without the persons on board having been placed in safety"; announcing the punishment of the U-boat commander, and promising reparation.

The year ended, therefore, with a partial renunciation by both Germany and Austria-Hungary of the illegal practices against which the United States had protested. This renunciation was insincere, however, and only temporary. Germany was building bigger U-boats and biding her time. She intended to repudiate all her promises to the United States when she got ready for a real campaign of submarine frightfulness.

CHAPTER XIX

VERDUN. FEBRUARY 21, 1916—DECEMBER 16, 1916

THROUGHOUT 1915 German strategy had been crowned with complete success. It had overthrown the military power of Russia and extinguished Serbia and Montenegro. It had created a Teuton Middle Europe, stretching from the Baltic to the Black Sea, and the Bosphorus. It had stripped Russia of Poland, Courland, Lithuania, and a part of Volhynia. It could have annexed Riga and Petrograd, Salonica and Athens, in 1916, if it had cared to do so.

On the Western Front it had conducted a wary and impenetrable defensive. Why did it drop its easy and profitable campaigns in the East and turn West in the winter and spring of 1916 to experiment with the disastrous offensive against Verdun?

Falkenhayn may have been unduly puffed up by his victories in Galicia, Poland, and the Balkans. These were won against opponents weak in artillery and technical appliances and inferior—at least so far as Russia was concerned—in fighting quality to the Allied forces on the Western Front. Did Falkenhayn think he could stage another Dunajec at Verdun? He reproduced there all the tactical features of Mackensen's triumph over Radko Dimitrieff. The French, too, were in a more hazardous position than Dimitrieff's

army was, for they had the gorge of the Meuse at their backs. But at Verdun Falkenhayn met an antagonist nearly as well supplied with artillery as he was. The picked German infantry encountered an infantry with an endurance and tenacity superior to its own.

Verdun was the most intensive battle of the war. It was fought on a narrowly restricted area, the struggle for minute portions of which was renewed again and again. It was a soldiers' battle—a pure test of individual grit and staying power. When it ended France had been glorified and the indefinable prestige of German arms—a legacy of Sedan and Sadowa—had been eclipsed.

Falkenhayn attempted a break-through on the Meuse front. Because he failed the German General Staff minimized his strategical objectives, saying that he merely wanted to destroy the French sally-port at Verdun and thus strengthen the German defensive positions in France. This was plainly an afterthought. No German commander-in-chief but Falkenhayn ever worried about the existence of the Verdun sally-port.

The battle of Verdun was fought on both sides of the Meuse, in the region north-east, north, and north-west of the fortress. Verdun lies in a bowl. The heights of the Meuse rise abruptly on the east and cut off the river from the plain of the Woëvre. On the opposite bank are hills and ridges which stretch west and north-west toward the Argonne. East of the Meuse the French line described a semicircle, running from Brabant, on the river, about eleven miles north of Verdun, eight miles east to Herbebois, where it bent to the south to reach the edge of the plain at Ornes. It then curved through the plain until it touched the Heights of the Meuse again to the south-

east of Verdun. The fighting on the east bank was all in the northern sector of the semicircle. The Germans carried their attack across the Meuse after their first check on the east bank. On the west side the fighting front extended from the mouth of Forges Brook, opposite Brabant, about ten miles south-west to Malancourt and Avocourt. All this area, on both sides of the river, had been converted into a powerful entrenched camp by General Sarraill while he had command of the French Third Army in the Meuse-Argonne sector.

The French High Command expected a German offensive in the spring of 1916. It guessed that Falkenhayn would try to repeat the younger Moltke's experiment, just as Ludendorff was to try to repeat it in 1918. The lure of Paris was too strong to be resisted by any of the German chiefs of staff except Hindenburg, who was the one consistent Easterner at German Grand Headquarters. So during the winter the Allied lines in France were reorganized to meet the anticipated German attack.

The front from Dixmude down to the Somme was assigned exclusively to the British armies, now increased in number to four. Above Dixmude, connecting with the right wing of the Belgian army, was one French corps, under General d'Oissel. South of the Somme the Sixth French Army, now under Fayolle, prolonged the British front. The northern French forces remained under Foch. The central group of armies stretched from the Oise to the Meuse. De Castelnau, on becoming Chief of Staff, had turned over the command of this group to de Langle de Cary. The armies were arranged from west to east in this order: the Fifth, under Micheler, about Compiègne; the Fourth, under

Mazel, from Soissons to Rheims; the Second, under Gouraud, in Champagne; the Third, under Humbert, in the Argonne. General Herr commanded the troops in the entrenched camp of Verdun.

Franchet d'Esperey had succeeded Dubail at the head of the Eastern group. This comprised the First Army, under Gérard, below Verdun; a detachment on the Nancy front, under Déprez; a detachment in the Vosges, under Villaret, and a detachment in the Belfort sector, under Demange.

But behind the first line a strategic reserve of picked troops had been collected. The celebrated Twentieth Corps, the "Iron Corps" of the French army, was held in camp at Mailly. An army of four corps, all shock units, was constituted under the command of Pétain and stationed at Beauvais. These forces awaited the development of the German offensive.

Falkenhayn decided early in the winter to make his main attempt at Verdun. He gathered there, during December and January, enormous parks of heavy artillery. His heavy pieces numbered over two thousand. They included guns of 210, 280, 305, 380, and 420 calibre (French measure). The front chosen for attack was the six-mile sector north of Verdun from the Meuse, at Brabant, east to Herbebois.

Here the offensive had obvious advantages. For while the line to be broken was short, permitting the massing of shock infantry, it was also subject to concentric artillery fire from a front of more than twenty-five miles. German batteries could enfilade it from the west side of the Meuse, as well as from Spincourt Forest, to the east and north-east of Herbebois. Although the Verdun camp was one of the strongest bastions of the Allied positions in France, its outer trench line,

north-east of the city, was as exposed a stretch as could be found anywhere from Switzerland to the North Sea.

The German attack began on February 21, 1916, with a stupendous artillery preparation, lasting twenty-four hours. The German shells razed woods and villages and ploughed up the surface of the whole sector under bombardment. The French trench systems were demolished. The troops who were unhurt remained under what cover they could find, dazed and stunned. But their resistance had not been broken. When the German shock waves advanced, on February 22d, expecting to find the front line deserted, they met stout opposition from units all along the front. Fortunately the French first line had not been heavily manned, General Herr having only a force of one hundred thousand with which to garrison the entire camp. The losses from the bombardment itself and from the follow-up infantry attack on the northern sector were therefore comparatively light. Falkenhayn had about three hundred thousand men. But he could not use a very large proportion of them on the extremely short operating front which he had selected.

On February 22d the German infantry occupied Haumont, in the centre of the French line; Ville Wood, a little farther east; a part of Herbebois and a part of the village of La Wavrille, at the southern edge of Ville Wood. On February 23d, they took Brabant; Samogneux, on the Meuse, about two miles south of Brabant; La Wavrille and Hill 344, the latter a mile south-east of Samogneux. This represented a considerable breakthrough in the sector along the Meuse. On February 24th, the French lost Caures Wood, east of Ville Wood, to which they had held on stubbornly for two days;

the Bois des Fosses, a mile south of Caures Wood; and the village of Ornes, on the edge of the Woëvre. To the south of Ornes the French advanced lines were withdrawn everywhere from the plain to the Heights of the Meuse.

The salient east of Verdun was shrinking rapidly. The French had the river behind them, whose crossings would be exposed to direct artillery fire, were the Germans to make a little more progress from the north and north-east. On the 25th the Germans were held up on the river sector at Champneuville, south of Samogneux. But in the centre, after a day of bitter hand-to-hand fighting, they reached the village of Douaumont and penetrated into the old Fort de Douaumont, one of the principal links in the girdle of fortifications on the Heights of the Meuse.

The fort had been evacuated by the French. It was occupied by a Brandenburg regiment, which soon found itself practically marooned there. But its capture was made the occasion of triumphant announcement by the Kaiser, that the corner-stone of the permanent defence system of Verdun had been shattered by his faithful Brandenburgers.

This telegram was a rash anticipation of a victory which never materialized. The situation looked dark for the French on the evening of February 24th. Up to that time the garrison on the right bank had been left to its own resources. It remains an open question whether or not General de Langle de Cary had or had not actually made preparations for abandoning Verdun and withdrawing all his forces to the left bank of the Meuse. However that may have been, a final decision to stay and fight it out on the east bank was reached by the 24th.

General de Castelnau, the French Chief of Staff, arrived in Verdun on February 25th. He brought with him much needed reinforcements. The Twentieth Corps left its camp at Maily on the 24th and on the 25th was thrown into the fight about Douaumont. A little later the First Army Corps, under General Guillaumat, arrived and was put in, on February 26th, on the left of the Twentieth Corps, barring the German advance in the sector between the Meuse and the Haudromont Farm, north-west of Douaumont. In the next two days there was a continuous struggle for footing on the Douaumont front. Every German attack was met by a French counter-attack. Neither side gained ground. The dismantled Fort de Douaumont was left in German hands. The village of Douaumont, west of the fort, was abandoned by both combatants.

De Castelnau had brought with him on February 25th General Pétain, who at once displaced General Herr as commander of the Verdun garrison. This extraordinary soldier infused new vigour into the defence. He introduced the policy of relentless counter-attack, under which the Germans were held down to local gains, made at a huge cost and, as a rule, quickly nullified. With his and de Castelnau's arrival the crisis of the first stage of the battle passed.

The Germans had gained considerable ground in the northern half of the Verdun salient, east of the Meuse. They had taken ten thousand prisoners and eighty guns. They had made a barren prize of Fort de Douaumont. But they were still far from their primary objective, which was the French second line of defence on the Heights of the Meuse. Pétain had stopped their first and most dangerous rush. It was now only a

question of wearing out an offensive which had lost its surprise character and its initial chance of success.

There was a lull in the fighting on February 29th and March 1st. On March 2d a new effort was made by the Germans on the front from Douaumont south-east to Vaux. The assaults were continued until March 4th and spread around to the west of Douaumont. But the results were barren. The offensive on the east bank of the Meuse had been definitely halted. Falkenhayn now decided to turn his attention to the west bank.

A German advance on that side was made necessary by the fact that the French artillery on Goose Hill and other elevations west of the Meuse was now able to enfilade the advanced German lines on the east side, thus seriously hindering operations against the Côte de Talou and Pepper Hill, which guarded the approaches to Douaumont from the north-west. On the west bank the original French position stretched west along Forges Brook to Béthincourt and then south-west to Malancourt, Avocourt, and the Forest of Hesse.

On March 2d the Germans began to bombard the French lines on the west bank of the river. The artillery preparation lasted four days. The infantry attack opened in a snow-storm, on the morning of March 6th. The French front line was lightly held and the troops could only hope to delay the progress of the heavy German storming columns. Two German divisions took Forges village and pushed south to seize Goose Hill Ridge. At the eastern end of the ridge Regnéville was captured. The Germans also penetrated to the Bois des Corbeaux (Crow Wood) before sundown on the 6th.

Hill 265, an outpost north of Goose Hill Ridge, was taken on the afternoon of March 7th. The Crow Wood and Cumières Wood were cleared later in the evening. Then Pétain resorted to his favourite method of counter-attack. Cumières Wood was retaken on March 8th, with a part of Crow Wood. The latter was recaptured in its entirety on March 9th. The next day the Germans re-ejected the French from Crow Wood and failed in an attack south of Béthincourt. Then the battle on the west bank died down. The Germans had pushed the French back west of the Meuse, so that their lines on both sides of the river now ran on the same level. Up to the end of this phase of the battle the German communiqués claimed the capture of about twenty-five thousand French prisoners.

Prudence would have counselled Falkenhayn to drop his offensive at this point. He had won a considerable local success—equal to the French success in Champagne in September and October, 1915. And he had nearly exhausted the possibilities of an operation against Verdun; for the French had concentrated ample reserves there and were nearly as strong in artillery as he was. But he had risked his personal reputation and his future as chief of the General Staff on a grandiose break-through like that at the Dunajec. He therefore decided to go on with a venture which, in a military sense, had lost its promise.

The battle of Verdun from March 11th on was a series of deadly local engagements for hills, woods, villages, and scraps of ground, where progress or recession was measured in yards. It marked a final stage in the warfare of mere attrition. It was a gruelling and ghastly test of morale in which the element of military science was reduced to a minimum. And

from that test, so cruel and so searching, Germany emerged an unqualified loser.

On the left bank of the Meuse the struggle spread farther and farther to the west. Unable to take Goose Ridge, Falkenhayn directed his attack on March 14th against Hill 265, south of Béthincourt. This was the northern crest of the famous Dead Man's Hill, the southern one being marked on the maps as 295. It fell. But 295 still commanded it. On March 20th the Germans, coming south-east from the direction of Montfaucon, penetrated the Avocourt Wood, trying to reach from the west Hill 304, which commanded Dead Man's Hill proper. The French then evacuated Malancourt, which was becoming isolated. Early in April the French lost Haucourt. But they held on to Hill 304. On April 9th, 10th, and 11th a general attack was delivered on the whole French front west of the Meuse, from Goose Hill to Avocourt. It failed with enormous losses.

On April 30th Pétain was promoted to command the central group of armies, replacing de Langle de Cary. General Nivelle assumed command in the Verdun sector.

In May the operations on the west bank reached their climax. Four separate assaults were made on the French positions—on May 7th–8th, May 20th, May 23d–May 25th, and May 29th. The net result of these was that the French lost Cumières Wood, Caurettes Wood, part of Hill 304, and all but the southern slope of Dead Man's Hill. Thereafter fighting on the west bank lapsed back to the customary inertia of trench warfare.

On the east bank Falkenhayn's efforts had been equally violent and, in the large sense, equally fruitless. Early in March, the Germans had extended the front

of their attack south-east from Douaumont to Vaux Village and Fort de Vaux. The village lay in a ravine, running east and west, and the fort on a hill to the south of it. They were a little more than a mile distant from Fort de Douaumont. On March 8th German infantry entered the village, but were expelled by a counter-attack. On March 10th they regained a footing in the village and tried vainly to storm the fort. Another unsuccessful attack was made on the fort on March 16th. On March 30th the Germans in great force drove past Vaux Village into and through Caillette Wood, which lies just south of Fort de Douaumont. They were expelled without delay by the French. On April 18th a formidable assault was launched against Pepper Ridge, at the other end of the line, close to the Meuse. It was repelled with great slaughter.

General Nivelle undertook his first counter-offensive on May 22d. It was preceded by a two days' bombardment of the Douaumont front. Six divisions participated in it. The infantry reached and penetrated Fort de Douaumont, but did not succeed in expelling all the garrison. After two days the Germans struck back and recovered the fort. Then the German offensive was resumed. Fort de Vaux was its objective. This work was cut off on the north and west by the recapture of Vaux Village and was approached from the south-east through the village of Damloup, taken early in June. On June 7th the garrison surrendered, after a magnificent defence.

Falkenhayn had now opened a breach in the main girdle of forts, north-east of Verdun. His next objective was Fort de Souville, two miles south-west of Fort de Vaux and about three miles directly south of Fort de Douaumont. The approach to it from the north

was through Thiaumont Redoubt and Fleury Village and from the north-east across Damloup Redoubt and Le Chenois and La Laufée Woods. Thiaumont Redoubt and Fleury were taken by the Germans in June but were subsequently lost again to the French. The fighting on this narrow sector continued through July and August, with changing fortunes. But with the beginning of the Battle of the Somme, on July 1st, all serious thought of pressing the campaign for Verdun was abandoned.

From February to July Falkenhayn had gained about 130 miles of nearly valueless territory. He had lost from 250,000 to 300,000 men, had failed utterly to break the French front, or even to close the "sally-port" of Verdun. He had made his own deposition as Chief of Staff inevitable.

The trifling value of the territorial gains he had put to his credit was soon to be demonstrated. On October 24th General Nivelle launched his second counter-offensive on the east bank of the Meuse. It was preceded by slight artillery preparation and was strikingly successful. Nivelle broke through the German lines on a four-mile front to a depth of two miles. He retook Douaumont village, Fort de Douaumont, Thiaumont Redoubt, and Haudromont quarries. Six thousand Germans were made prisoners. Fort de Vaux, which had been enveloped, was evacuated by the enemy. On November 5th Vaux and Damloup villages were retaken.

On December 11th Nivelle was appointed Commander-in-Chief of all the French armies on the Western Front. On December 15th-16th General Mangin, who succeeded to the command in the Verdun sector, enlarged Nivelle's success. After an intense artillery preparation he carried the German first-line trenches,

on a front of six miles and a quarter, advancing nearly two miles. Eighty guns were captured and 11,400 prisoners. Vacherauville, Louvemont, Bezonvaux, and a part of Caurières Wood were recovered and the Germans were pushed well back toward the French positions two days after the battle began. Later the old lines were restored in their entirety.

Long before this, however, Falkenhayn had paid the penalty of the colossal fiasco on the Meuse. On August 28, 1916, he was demoted as Chief of the German General Staff, Hindenburg taking his place.

CHAPTER XX

RUSSIA'S LAST REAL OFFENSIVE. JANUARY 1, 1916—
SEPTEMBER 1, 1916

RUSSIA never recovered from the defeats of 1915. They shattered the military power of the Empire. But their effects were for a long time hidden. Russia remained a factor in the war all through 1916. The armies seemed to recover their morale. The Russian military leaders had lost none of their zeal and confidence and continued to work in co-ordination—in the slight degree to which that was possible—with the general staffs of the Western Entente states.

In the winter months of 1916 the Grand Duke Nicholas won some notable victories in the Caucasus. The greater part of Armenia was wrested from Turkey. General Brusiloff's summer campaign repeated to some extent the successes achieved in 1914 against the Austro-Hungarians. But when these two operations were over Russia had shot her bolt.

The war had been brought closer to the people in 1915 and 1916. This was because the interior administration had broken down and war activities—the care of the wounded, the provisioning and clothing of the troops, and the direction of war industries—had to be taken over by volunteer organizations, and local political bodies, like the zemstvos. This democratiza-

tion of the war undermined the old imperial system. It aroused revolutionary sentiment. The Duma, hitherto a debating society, began to look ahead to assuming real power.

Nicholas II was personally strongly pro-Ally and pro-war. But he was not his own master in matters of domestic politics. His wife, a German princess by birth and intensely interested in the preservation of the Romanoff dynasty, saw safety for it only in the early conclusion of a separate peace with Germany. Her fears were played on by reactionary politicians and her superstitions made her an easy victim of mystical impostors like Rasputin, who was a tool of the reactionaries and the strong pro-German elements at the Russian court.

The Czarina was responsible for the appointment of Stürmer, the anti-Entente Premier, and of Protopopoff, an enemy of the Duma and of liberalism of any sort.

If Russia had been successful in the field, the monarchy could have maintained itself with the masses. But the great retreat of 1915 and the enormous losses of the armies had shaken its prestige. Russia was therefore drifting toward a crisis in domestic politics. And the imperial administration was becoming more and more associated in the public mind with a policy of internal repression and of peace at any price with Germany.

This attitude could not be long persisted in without destroying popular faith in the government and the dynasty and provoking revolution. Yet the military power of the Empire was wrapped up in the survival of the old régime. It was the only régime which could control the armies and maintain the Entente Alliance.

When the Empire fell the armies became at first demoralized and then uncontrollable. But even toward the end of 1916 the Russian military machine had begun to run down.

In January the Russian western front was reorganized. The Czar remained Commander-in-Chief, with General Alexieff as Chief of Staff. The armies were divided into three groups. Those on the northern sector, from Riga to Dvinsk, were put under Kuropatkin, Commander-in-Chief in the war with Japan. The second group, from Dvinsk to the Pripet, was entrusted to General Evert. The third, from the Pripet to the Dniester, was given to Brusiloff, perhaps the most aggressive of all the Russian commanders. An independent army, under Lechitsky, faced the Bukowina border.

The German forces were also divided into three groups: the northern, under Hindenburg; the central, under Prince Leopold of Bavaria, and the southern under the Archduke Joseph-Ferdinand. The last group alone contained Austro-Hungarian contingents.

On December 28, 1915, Lechitsky had begun an offensive against Czernowitz, the capital of Bukowina. He got within gun range of the city, but was held up there by the Austro-Hungarians. After three weeks of stubborn fighting, he broke off the attack. His losses amounted to sixty thousand men.

Another winter operation—more ambitious in scope—was attempted on the northern front in March. It was in the nature of a demonstration to relieve German pressure at Verdun.

General Gourko says that the Russians had available for artillery preparation not more than one hundred guns, mostly 6-inch types taken from the fortresses of Kovno

and Grodno. There were munitions enough for only a short day's bombardment. The sector chosen for the attack was on the left bank of the Dvina River, south of Dvinsk. In the region between Lake Driswiaty and Lake Naroch, Kuropatkin expended his ammunition on March 17th without destroying the German machine-gun shelters. The infantry advanced on the 18th and was cut to pieces. Other engagements were fought along the Dvina front, both above and below Dvinsk. The Germans were everywhere superior in artillery and machine guns and Kuropatkin paid excessively for immaterial territorial gains on a 100-mile line. An early thaw also interfered with his operations. On March 28th the offensive ended with a loss of about 140,000 men.

Undiscouraged by these early set-backs, the Russian General Staff went ahead with preparations for a summer offensive, to be opened about July 1st, conjointly with Anglo-French offensive on the Somme. The main attack was to be made on the Vilna sector, with secondary demonstrations on the northern and southern fronts. But in May, the Austro-Hungarian offensive in the Trentino seemed to be sweeping the Italians back into the plain of Venetia, and Italy urgently requested Russia to come to her rescue by making an attack on the Austro-Hungarian forces in Galicia and Bukowina. To meet this emergency appeal, the Russian General Staff recast its offensive plans. The date of the opening of the summer offensive was advanced a month and the projected Brusiloff demonstration on the south front was converted into a major offensive. Supplies concentrated behind Vilna had to be transferred to Volhynia and an army—that of Lesh—was shifted from Evert's group to Brusiloff's.

Brusiloff then had four armies directly under him—Lesh's, Kaledin's, Sakharoff's, and Scherbatcheff's—with Lechitsky's co-operating on the extreme left wing. These five armies were over one million strong, while Archduke Joseph-Ferdinand's armies numbered probably less than eight hundred thousand. The situation was almost an exact counterpart of that in August-September, 1914, before Lemberg.

Brusiloff's front stretched for two hundred and fifty miles south from the Pripet Marshes to the Pruth River, east of Czernowitz. He was moderately well supplied with munitions and had large reserves of men. He also profited enormously from the fact that the depleted Austro-Hungarian armies facing him were unprepared for an attack.

The offensive started on June 3d, with a preparatory bombardment. It had its greatest initial success in the Volhynian sector, west of Rovno. Rovno stood at the apex of the triangle of fortresses—Rovno, Dubno, and Lutsk—which guarded Kiev from an invasion coming north-east out of Galicia. The two western anchor points of the triangle had fallen to the Germans in the last days of the retreat of 1915. From Rovno a railroad ran south-west through Dubno to Lemberg. Another railroad, running north-west to Kovel and Brest-Litovsk, passed close to Lutsk. Kovel and Lemberg were Brusiloff's two objectives. They were joined by a north and south railroad which it was his purpose to cut.

The advance west from Kovno carried everything before it. Two Austro-Hungarian divisions, composed mostly of Czechs and other Slavic elements, were encountered on the enemy's first line. They cheerfully surrendered and a wide gap was opened through

which Kaledin's Eighth Army poured. On the first two days the advance covered twenty miles. On June 6th the Russians entered Lutsk, which the Archduke Joseph-Ferdinand had hastily abandoned, leaving behind him valuable stores and thousands of wounded soldiers. Dubno was now threatened with envelopment from the north. The Austrians evacuated it on June 10th.

The Russian armies spread out to the west of the triangle of fortresses. North-west of Rovno the town of Kolki, on the Styr River, was reached and, a little farther south and west, the town of Svidniki, on the Stokhod River, about fifteen miles south-east of Kovel. Directly west of Lutsk the Russians advanced twenty-five miles, to Zaturtsy, a little more than twenty miles from Vladimir-Volynski, on the Kovel-Lemberg railroad. Farther south they reached a point less than fifteen miles from the railway. These gains were made between June 17th and 23d. Pushing south-west from Dubno, Kaledin's troops covered thirty miles in six days, reaching the Galician frontier on June 16th. The Eighth Army had driven a wedge fifty miles deep into the Austrian lines and had captured seventy thousand prisoners and eighty-three guns.

Sakharoff's Eleventh Army, on Kaledin's left, was much less successful. It failed to break the lines held by the Bavarian army, under General Count Bothmer, west of Tarnopol. Scherbatcheff's Seventh Army, on Sakharoff's left, advanced into south-eastern Galicia, carried the Austrian positions, and on June 8th captured Buczacz, on the Strypa River.

To Lechitsky's Ninth Army, on the extreme left, was assigned the task of recovering Bukowina. This it accomplished in a brilliant manner. A passage of

the Dniester was forced on June 4th and the Austro-Hungarians were badly defeated on June 11th at Dobronovtse, between the Dniester and the Pruth, eighteen thousand prisoners being captured. Sniatyn fell on June 13th and on the same day Lechitsky arrived on the Pruth, opposite Czernowitz. On June 16th the Pruth was crossed. Czernowitz fell the next day. Lechitsky had captured up to that date 37,832 men and 49 guns.

The Austro-Hungarians in Bukowina were now in full retreat toward the Carpathian passes. Cossack cavalry overran the crownland between June 18th and 26th. On June 23d they reached Kimpolung, on the Rumanian border, and then spread west toward the Transylvanian passes.

Bukowina having been cleared, Lechitsky turned north-west into Galicia, aiming at the Jablonitsa Pass, through which a railroad runs from the Hungarian plain to Kolomea, and thence north to Lemberg. The retreating Austro-Hungarians tried to make a stand before Kolomea, but were routed, with a loss of 10,500 prisoners. The Russians entered Kolomea on June 28th. On July 8th Delatyn, in the foothills just north of the Jablonitsa Pass, was seized and the approaches from the Galician side were secured. This pass and the other Carpathian passes to the south were intended to be used by the Russians to invade Hungary and Transylvania in co-operation with the Rumanians, after Rumania should enter the war. Lechitsky now suspended operations. He had taken, since June 4th, 69,000 prisoners and sixty-seven guns.

The Brusiloff offensive was a staggering blow to Austria-Hungary. It compelled an abandonment of the campaign against Italy. Men and big guns began

to flow back from the Tyrol to Galicia. German aid was also summoned. Hindenburg sent several divisions down from the north and four were shifted to the Eastern Front from France. The Austrian High Command had made the mistake of thinking that Russia was incapable of another real offensive. It had stripped the Galician and Bukowina fronts in order to conquer Northern Italy. Now it had to pay in men, territory, and prestige for a glaring error of judgment.

Reinforcements in the Lutsk sector enabled the Germans to turn after June 16th and recover a few miles of territory. But on July 4th Lesh's army, on Kaledin's right, began a movement west toward the Stokhod River line. In three days it reached the river—an advance of thirty miles. There the Russians were held up by German troops and suffered heavy losses trying to clear the Stokhod barrier. Between June 28th and August 3d, Lesh, with Kaledin's assistance, got across the river at several points. But the German line held. Kovel, the main Russian objective in this region, was never seriously threatened.

South of Lutsk, however, Sakharoff's army got in motion again on July 16th. It stormed the Austro-Hungarian trenches at Shklin (eighteen miles southwest of Lutsk), capturing 13,000 prisoners. The Austro-Hungarians fell back to the Lipa River. There Sakharoff, on July 20th-22d, again defeated the disorganized enemy and took 12,000 prisoners. A third engagement gave him the town of Brody, and 14,000 prisoners. Turning south, the Eleventh Russian Army now brought up on the flank of Bothmer's Bavarians, who had been holding Scherbacheff in check, west of

Tarnopol. Bothmer was forced to retreat to the line up the Zlota-Lipa River.

About the same time Scherbatcheff and Lechitsky turned Bothmer's southern flank. Joining forces on August 7th they pushed north-west toward Stanislaw, which city was evacuated by the enemy on August 10th. Lechitsky then cleared all the district between Stanislaw and the Carpathians, while Scherbatcheff pushed north-west to Mariampol, which he occupied on August 13th. Up to that date he had captured 56,421 prisoners. In the first week of September he broke Bothmer's line on the Zlota-Lipa at Brzezany and almost reached Halicz. Early in August Hindenburg was put in charge of the Eastern Front from Riga down to Tarnopol. He borrowed several Turkish divisions and gave them to Bothmer. With these troops the latter began to counter-attack in Galicia. These counter-attacks marked the end of the last phase of the Brusiloff offensive.

The results of the drive had exceeded the most sanguine Allied expectations. The Teuton Eastern Front had been broken on a stretch of 310 miles, to a depth of from twenty to fifty miles. Bukowina and south-eastern Galicia had been reconquered. A connection with Rumania along the Carpathians had been established. Nearly four hundred thousand prisoners were taken and 405 guns. The Austro-Hungarian and German losses were probably in the neighbourhood of a million.

But the Russian losses were also enormous. The offensive stopped because Russia had nearly exhausted her munitions stocks and had worn down her best armies. She would never be capable again of an effort like Brusiloff's. Her intervention had saved

Italy. But it had disabled her from playing a similar rôle when Rumania entered the war in the fall of 1916 and found herself facing a fate like Serbia's. Russia had established a satisfactory contact with Rumania. But when the time came to join the Rumanians in an invasion of Hungary, Russian power to break through the Carpathian barrier had vanished.

CHAPTER XXI

THE SOMME. JULY 1, 1916–NOVEMBER 18, 1916

FRANCE, Great Britain, and Russia had agreed to start a two-front offensive on July 1, 1916. As has been noted, the opening date of the Russian offensive was advanced to June 1st, in order to help out the Italians. Germany had sought to derange the Franco-British plans by striking for Verdun. Nevertheless, when July 1st came, the French and British began their scheduled operation, which was to develop into the longest, stubbornest, and most sanguinary battle of the war.

Probably it would have taken a more definite character as an effort on a grand scale to break through and roll up the German positions in Northern France, if the French had not been obliged to commit themselves so deeply at Verdun. Joffre used only one army in the first stages of the Battle of the Somme. That was Fayolle's, the westernmost of the group in the sector from Soissons to Amiens, now under the command of General Foch. Micheler's army, formerly attached to the central group, was not employed until September. Humbert's did not take part in the battle, as it undoubtedly would have done, if the French effort had not been circumscribed by the drain of the long struggle on the Meuse. France needed to economize

on men and wisely adopted a policy of limited offensives in 1916 and 1917.

The British "New Army" had, however, rounded into battle form. It was now to bear the brunt of the western offensive, testing its training and quality against seasoned German troops. A Fourth Army had been organized and put under the command of Sir Henry Rawlinson. It was stationed on the right of the Third Army, organized in the summer of 1915. Its front extended south from Gommecourt nearly to the Somme. The arrival of the Third Army had enabled Joffre to transfer the Second French Army to Champagne, in September, 1915. The arrival of the Fourth had made possible the withdrawal from the northern sectors of many French divisions which were needed in the spring of 1916, at Verdun. For the Somme operation the strength of the Fourth Army was raised to five corps. Two of these were constituted a separate command under General Gough, operating on Rawlinson's left. Gough's left was supported by Allenby's Third Army.

Although the Allied commanders disclaimed any large strategical objective (preferring to say that the battle was fought for the purpose of wearing down the enemy and relieving his pressure at Verdun and on the Eastern fronts), it is evident that the underlying purpose of the Somme offensive was to compel the enemy to evacuate the huge Noyon salient, which he had held without serious molestation since the close of the First Marne campaign. The direction of the attack indicated such a purpose, however it might be disavowed. And the after-effect of the offensive was, in fact, to force such a withdrawal. The German positions in the salient, although still held in the main at the end of the battle, had become so exposed that Hindenburg

thought it prudent to evacuate them early in 1917. The Somme operation, therefore, attained a strategic result which the Allied High Commands were too cautious to claim for it when it had ended in an apparent relapse into deadlock.

The Noyon salient extended, roughly speaking, from Arras south and east to the neighbourhood of La Fère. The German line ran slightly south-west from Arras to Gommecourt, whence it turned south-east to Fricourt, a little east of Albert. Then it stretched directly east for about four miles and turned south again, crossing the Somme at Curlu. Thence it passed almost due south, west of Chaulnes and Roye, to a point near Lassigny, where it bent at a right angle east past Noyon, to the St. Gobain and Coucy forests, below La Fère.

The point of attack chosen by the British and French was midway in the western face of the salient, on both sides of the Somme. A successful drive there would have the effect of breaking the western part of the German salient into two smaller salients. The Arras sector would be separated by a broad wedge from the Chaulnes-Roye sector, and each remnant would become subject to hostile pressure in two directions. Bapaume was the objective of the British attack. Péronne was the objective of the French attack. If Bapaume and Péronne both fell, the Noyon salient would be no longer defensible.

The east-and-west portion of the German line just north of the Somme offered a tempting mark to an assailant. By changing their frontage from west to south the Germans had created a salient, east of Albert, which could be attacked simultaneously from the south and from the west. An opportunity was offered to the

British to work north-east, cut the Péronne-Bapaume high road and approach Bapaume from the rear. Meanwhile a French drive straight east would take Péronne and put the Allies in the rear of the German positions covering Chaulnes and Roye.

Artillery preparation began on June 24th and lasted a week. It was the heaviest "drum fire" the Allies had yet indulged in; for they now had an ample supply of munitions and heavy guns. The infantry moved forward at 7.30 A.M., July 1st. The main British front extended from Maricourt, about two miles north of the Somme, west to Fricourt, and then north along the west face of the salient to St. Pierre Divion, on the Ancre River. A subsidiary holding attack was made by the Third Army at Gommecourt.

The German positions in the region north of the Somme, covering Bapaume, were unusually formidable. A ridge crossing this sector in a south-east-north-west direction, from the Ancre River to the Tortille River, formed the backbone of the Teuton defence. The first line trenches lay on the southern slopes of this cross ridge. Nearly two years had been spent by the Germans in elaborating their main lines and communicating systems. In spite of the powerful artillery preparation the British therefore met with vigorous resistance all along the line. In the section below the Ancre River hardly any progress was made. But on the rest of the front the whole of the enemy's first line was carried in fighting which lasted until July 5th. The Germans were driven back a mile on a six mile sector, losing 5818 prisoners. Sir Douglas Haig now called a halt to reorganize an attack on the second German defence line.

The French attack on July 1st was made on a front

from Maricourt, north of the Somme, to a point west of Chaulnes. North of the river, Fayolle's army—the Sixth—took the villages of Curlu, Hem, and Hardecourt. South of it they broke completely through the German first and second lines, advancing six miles on a front of ten and a half miles. On July 9th the French carried the village of Biaches, directly across the Somme from Péronne. Farther south they had reached Belloy-en-Santerre on July 4th. Chaulnes was threatened with envelopment from the north, and Péronne seemed on the point of falling. Up to July 14th the French took 12,235 prisoners. But from that date on the German counter-attacks became persistent. The impetus of the offensive south of the Somme was lost. The French effort was suspended and was not renewed until September.

On July 14th Marshal Haig, having brought up his guns, delivered an assault on the second and main line of the German defences. It was made on a front of six thousand yards, from Longueval to Bazentin-le-Petit Wood. The British stole forward in the night to the foot of the southern crest of the cross-ridge and stormed the German trenches at early dawn. Four villages and three strongly fortified woods were captured and the enemy was pushed back about a mile. Counter-attacks were repelled and advanced British units came into touch with the third German defence line, on the northern and lower crest of the cross-ridge. Two thousand additional prisoners were captured from July 14th to July 16th.

This operation ended the first phase of the battle. The British were now established in the main German positions for a distance of more than three miles. But the centre had advanced much farther than the wings.

The Germans continued to hold the Tortille-Ancre plateau, west of Bazentin-le-Petit, where the British line bent to the south-west. They also held the powerful plateau positions, east and south-east of Delville Wood, extending beyond Combles. It was necessary to clear both flanks before the wedge in the centre could be driven farther in.

The German High Command now awakened to the fact that the Somme front was crumbling. It rushed up reserves and began to counter-attack savagely. The British and the French—the latter operating on the right in the direction of Combles—found their progress practically blocked during the seven weeks from July 18th to September 1st. On July 18th the Germans regained a part of Delville Wood and of the village of Longueval. On July 23d a general British assault from Guillemont, on the east, to Pozières, on the west, failed to produce any gains. Delville Wood and Longueval were recovered on July 30th. Early in August attempts to take Guillemont failed. On August 16th a joint French and British attack in the Combles sector yielded insignificant results.

The battle had not come to a standstill. But it had resumed the deadlock characteristics of the fixed positional warfare of 1915. It was immensely costly to both sides—more costly even than the fighting at Verdun had been, because the operating front on the Somme was wider and many more troops were constantly engaged.

The third phase of the Somme began in September. Micheler's army was brought up to the support of Fayolle's and the French assumed a larger rôle in the drive for Bapaume. Their immediate objective was Combles, which they now sought to envelop from the south and east.

South of the Somme Micheler opened a local offensive on September 4th, on a thirteen mile front, north and south of Chaulnes. South of that city Chilly was captured, on September 4th; north of it, Soyecourt, on September 4th; Berny-en-Santerre, September 17th, and Vermandovillers, September 17th. The French took seven thousand prisoners and thirty-six guns. On October 10th Micheler reached the outskirts of Ablaincourt. On November 7th Ablaincourt and Pressoire, two miles north-east of Chaulnes, were stormed. But the Germans clung successfully to Chaulnes, although it was nearly surrounded.

The Allied offensive north of the Somme was renewed with violence on September 3d. The British carried Guillemont on that day and pushed north to Ginchy, two miles north-west of Combles. Fayolle's army broke the German line below Combles, from Le Forest, south, to the Somme. The final struggle for the cross-ridge, all the way from Combles west to Thiepval, was now on. Tanks appeared in the fighting line for the first time on September 6th. The Germans put up a desperate resistance, but were slowly crowded off the ridge. Martinpuich and Courcellette, on the British left centre, and Flers, on the British right centre, fell on September 15th; Les Bœufs and Morval, on the British right, on September 25th. Below Combles Fayolle took Bouchavesnes, September 12th, Le Priez Farm, September 14th, Rancourt and Frégicourt, September 25th.

Combles was now practically surrounded. It was evacuated by the Germans on September 26th. Thiepval, at the opposite end of the line, was stormed by the British on the same day. On the right centre the British line was pushed north to Gueudecourt. In these

attacks the Allied armies took ten thousand more prisoners. Heavy rains now set in and slowed down the fighting. But the driving power of the offensive was also nearly gone. In October Fayolle several times captured Sailly and Saillisel, north of Combles, only to lose them again. They were finally occupied on November 12th, thus giving the Allies complete possession of the south-east-north-west ridge from the Tortille to Thiepval, for which they had been fighting for four months and a half. Between October 1st and 7th the British advanced their centre to within four miles of Bapaume by capturing Le Sars and Eaucourt l'Abbaye.

But though the Germans had been thrust out of all their original lines and were now standing on open ground, the Allies were unequal to the task of expelling them from Bapaume. The German High Command, in one of the volumes issued under its direction for the guidance of opinion in Germany, designated September 25th as the crisis of the battle. On that day it looked for a time as if the Allies were going to effect a real break-through on the Somme front. But the German lines steadied sufficiently to stave off that disaster.

The Allied advance toward Bapaume in September and October left the Germans who were holding the Ancre Valley, in a dangerous salient. It was open to attack both from the east and the west. The sector south of the Ancre was pinched off on November 13th, by an operation from the east. The sector to the north held out until the 18th against an assault from the west. Beaumont-Hamel fell on the 13th, Beaucourt-sur-Ancre on the 14th and part of Grandcourt on the 18th. The German loss in prisoners was 7200. This easily won success brought the Battle of the Somme to an end, although some supplementary operations were

undertaken in January and February, 1917, before the German retreat from the Noyon salient got fairly under way.

The German General Staff professed to regard the battle as a draw. It had apparently failed to accomplish anything in the larger strategical sense. There had been no break-through. And German operations on the Eastern Front had not been interfered with. While the Allies were advancing painfully toward Bapaume and Chaulnes, Mackensen and Falkenhayn were overrunning Rumania.

Appearances seemed to justify the German contention. But appearances were deceptive. Hindenburg had become chief of the German General Staff while the Battle of the Somme was in its intermediate stage. He produced the necessary reserves to check the critical attacks in September, without having to strip the Russian front or to halt the projected invasion of Rumania. But no one knew better than he in what precarious condition the German lines in France were left when the Battle of the Somme ended.

Field Marshal Haig published his official report of the battle on December 23, 1916. In it he modestly disclaimed having had any purpose of effecting a general readjustment of the Western Front. He said that the three objects he had in view were to relieve pressure on Verdun, to hold the main German forces in the West and to wear down the enemy's strength. If he had been less cautious, he might have suggested that the Somme operation was also intended to make the great Noyon salient untenable. For while he was giving his summary to the world Hindenburg was already preparing to acknowledge the dislocation of

his positions in Picardy by drawing back his armies to the newly constructed Hindenburg Line.

The Somme, terrible as it was as an experiment in attrition, marked the passing of the attrition theory. It opened the way to a return to the warfare of movement. It proved that the strongest fixed positions could be carried, with a reckless expenditure of manpower. But it also proved that man-power could be economized in carrying them. The increased power of the artillery now made it possible to do on a small scale in the West what had been done continuously in 1915 and 1916 in the East. The tank appeared at the Somme. So also in the last stages of the battle the defence was obliged to resort more and more to counter-attacks in order to maintain its positions.

The losses at the Somme were staggering. The British alone had 450,000 casualties. The French losses were not published. But they probably were between 200,000 and 250,000. The German loss has been estimated as high as 700,000. It was perhaps about 600,000, including more than 65,000 prisoners. This was the high water mark of the warfare of usury. But there were to be no more Sommes. After 1916 the character of warfare on the Western Front changed rapidly. Infantry was used less and less to do line breaking work, which could be better and more economically done by tanks and artillery.

CHAPTER XXII

THE TRENTINO AND GORIZIA. MAY 14, 1916–NOVEMBER
5, 1916

THE handicaps imposed on Italy by the lack of a true military frontier were disclosed to some extent by the Italian campaign of 1915 for Gorizia. They were strikingly emphasized by the Austro-Hungarian counter-offensive of 1916 on the Trentino front. The Trentino was a deep, rugged salient thrust into the northern Italian plain. An army moving out of it and crossing the shallow belt of Italian foothills would debouch only fifteen miles from Vicenza, on the main line of communications between the Italian forces on the Isonzo and their chief base at Milan.

In order to prosecute his campaign for Trieste in safety General Cadorna was obliged to protect the whole mountain front from Udine west to Verona. A break-through anywhere on that line would leave the Isonzo armies in a closed alley. This weakness in the Italian position was obvious to the Austrian and German High Commands. They tried to take advantage of it in 1916 and nearly succeeded. They took advantage of it in November, 1917, when the Caporetto disaster nearly put Italy out of the war.

The Austrian front in the Trentino was fed by the trunk railroad coming down the Adige Valley from

Bozen. Behind Trent the Austrian High Command could mass troops and guns entirely safe from observation. While Falkenhayn was preparing in the winter of 1915 to break the French line at Verdun, Hoetzendorff was also secretly planning an irruption toward Vicenza, Padua, and Venice. Owing to the snows he could not begin as early as February. But in March and April he assembled below Trent a powerful artillery park, greatly exceeding in calibre anything the Italians then had available. Among his 750 heavy pieces were 12-inch Skoda howitzers, 15-inch naval guns, and 17-inch German howitzers. He also had some 1600 lighter field guns. These 2350 cannon were massed on a front of about thirty miles, extending from Rovereto, on the Adige, below Trent, north-east to Borgo, in the Val Sugana, an east-and-west valley which stretches from Trent to Cison.

An army of from 350,000 to 400,000 men was collected under the nominal command of the Heir Apparent, the Archduke Karl. Hoetzendorff, however, was the real leader. Although Cadorna had inspected the Trentino front in April and made a change in the command of the First Army, replacing General Brusati with General Pecori-Giraldi, the Italians were poorly prepared to meet the exceedingly vigorous offensive which Hoetzendorff launched on May 14th.

The main attack was made in the centre, the Austrian columns converging toward the mountain towns of Arsiero and Asiago, which lie in a valley running from south-west to north-east through the district known as the Sette Comuni. These towns are about ten miles from the Venetian Plain and are separated from it only by the Alpine foothills.

The Austrian centre and left easily reached their

objectives. The centre moved down from its positions north-east of Rovereto, stormed Monte Maggio on May 18th, Monte Toraro and Col Santo on May 19th, and crossed into the upper Posina Valley, leading to Arsiero. The left wing, getting a start a little later, crossed the Val Sugana at Borgo, stormed Armentera Ridge, cleared the Italian frontier on May 26th, reached Monte Mosciagh, five miles south of the border, on May 27th, and captured Asiago on May 28th.

Cadorna had hastened to the Trentino front on May 20th and taken personal charge. He tried to hold up the Austro-Hungarian advance toward Arsiero. But the enemy pushed down the Posina Valley and took the little city. On May 29th Pria Farà, a commanding height two miles south of Arsiero, was abandoned by mistake and the Italian centre was obliged to make its final stand in the mountain section on a lower ridge, called Monte Ciove.

Cadorna's situation was critical. It was saved in part by the failure of the Austrian right wing to keep progress with the centre and left. This wing started from Rovereto up the valley of the little Leogra River. It encountered a heroic resistance at Zugna, Buole Pass, and Monte Pasubio, being held up from May 24th to May 30th. At Monte Pasubio the Austrians attacked again and again, but without results. The Leogra passage remained closed. If Hoetzendorff could have forced it, his right would have come out of the foothills at Schio, directly south of Arsiero, and taken Cadorna's line below Arsiero and Asiago in the rear.

As it was, Cadorna was able to hold on to the Ciove Ridge through the first two weeks of June. By that time Brusiloff's sensational victories on the Eastern

Front compelled Hoetzendorff to send guns and reserves back to Galicia. Though in sight of the Venetian Plain and only twenty miles from Vicenza, he was obliged to break off an offensive which, from June 1st to June 15th, seemed on the verge of a tremendous success. A local attack was made by the Austrian left wing on June 18th on the Italian positions south of Asiago. It failed with heavy losses. But even if it had succeeded, Hoetzendorff would hardly have been able to follow it up.

He had won in Italy by depleting the armies in Volhynia, Galicia, and Bukowina. He had staked success on Russian inactivity. His miscalculation was costly, for Austria lost on the Eastern Front ten times the guns and prisoners she had made in the Trentino. She was also to lose a part of the territorial gains she had made at Italy's expense. Realizing that Hoetzendorff's reserves were being rushed east, Cadorna himself assumed the offensive in the latter half of June. The Austro-Hungarians accordingly withdrew to a new line of defence. On June 26th the Italians reoccupied Asiago and, on June 27th, Arsiero and Posina. On July 23d they recaptured Monte Cimone. The enemy's positions extended from Rovereto south-east to a point just north of Arsiero, thence north-east, past Asiago, to the Italian frontier. The Italians never got as far north as Borgo again until the armistice was signed.

Having temporarily secured his rear and flank, Cadorna renewed the Isonzo offensive. For more than a year he had been held up by the Austrian bridge-head west of Gorizia. Now he was ready to storm it. On August 6th the entire Austro-Hungarian line was bombarded and an attack in the nature of a feint was made on the positions just east of Monfalcone, near

the shore of the Adriatic. On the same day the main attack was delivered on an eight-mile front west of Gorizia. Monte Podgora and Monte Calvario, on the west bank of the Isonzo, were carried on that day. So was Monte Sabotino, on the west bank, commanding Gorizia from the north. South of the city, on the east bank, Monte San Michele, was stormed. On August 7th the Italians cleared up the entire bridgehead. On the 8th they threw pontoons across the Isonzo. The Austro-Hungarians rapidly evacuated Gorizia, King Victor Emmanuel entering it on August 9th. From August 8th to August 15th Cadorna delivered a series of attacks on the western rim of the Carso, taking five outlying spurs. In the period from August 4th to August 15th the Austro-Hungarians lost 18,758 prisoners and thirty guns.

But the way was not open yet either to Trieste or Laibach. Boroëvic, the Austro-Hungarian commander, drew back to the Carso and Bainsizza plateaus, which flanked the eastern passage-way out of Gorizia. There he held on, though occasionally hard pressed, until the Caporetto counter-offensive of 1917.

In September Cadorna made a four-day assault above and below Gorizia, using 150,000 men. His gains were slight. He got possession of Plava, on the east bank of the river, at the northern edge of the Bainsizza Plateau, and advanced his lines a little east of Gorizia and on the Carso. Seven thousand more prisoners were taken. Again, in November, a five-day offensive yielded nine thousand prisoners, but did not materially improve the Italian position.

The Italian armies on the Isonzo had shown admirable courage and endurance. Between August 4th and November 4th they had taken forty thousand prisoners

—as many as the British had taken at the Somme. The fall of Gorizia had raised high hopes. Italy was persuaded and was anxious to persuade her Western Allies that the most promising road to Berlin lay through Laibach and Vienna. But Italy's confidence and her theory were alike based on a military illusion.

Whatever may have been the negative effects of the Isonzo campaign in the way of weakening Austria-Hungary, it could lead nowhere. It, too, was a costly experiment in attrition. Italy's strength was being employed lavishly and on the whole, unprofitably, in a strategically barren enterprise.

CHAPTER XXIII

THE SACRIFICE OF RUMANIA. AUGUST 28, 1916—
DECEMBER 31, 1916

THERE is a striking analogy between Rumania's situation in 1916 and Italy's in 1915. Italy was a member of the Triple Alliance, although her interests clashed violently with those of Austria-Hungary. Rumania was long a satellite of the Teuton Powers, looking to Berlin for protection against Russia, although generally on uncomfortable terms with Vienna.

Russia had taken Bessarabia away from Rumania after the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78, thus shabbily requiting the valuable assistance which the Rumanians gave the Russians at Plevna. A breach was created between the two countries which lasted for a generation. Rumania was thrown into an unnatural alliance through Russia's action—approved by Bismarck—just as Italy had been through the French occupation of Tunis, also promoted by the wily German Chancellor.

The Italo-Turkish war uncovered the real antagonisms existing between Italy and Austria-Hungary. The Balkan wars did the same service for Rumania. When the latter joined with Serbia and Greece to defeat Bulgaria in the Second Balkan War, she outraged Austro-Hungarian sensibilities and prejudices, for she was helping to create a stronger Serbia. Vienna

backed Bulgaria, and the Dual Monarchy was so chagrined when Bulgaria collapsed that it tried to get Italian consent in 1913 to attack Serbia.

In Rumania, as in Italy, nationalistic sentiment had been aroused by a successful war. Rumania, too, had an *Irredenta*. Transylvania was largely Rumanian in speech and blood and Hungary had repressed the Transylvanian Rumanians as systematically as Austria had repressed the Italians of the Trentino and Istria. The same appeal was made in both cases to the sense of racial brotherhood and solidarity.

Although King Carol was a Hohenzollern and strongly pro-German in sympathy, Rumania's participation in the war as an ally of Austria-Hungary was as completely foreclosed as Italy's. Berlin and Vienna both recognized that fact from the beginning and both would have been satisfied to see Italy and Rumania remain neutral.

Rumania had good reason to go slow in casting her lot with the Entente. Her whole northern border lay open to Teuton attacks. She was on friendly relations with Serbia and Greece. But she distrusted Bulgaria, from whom she had just taken the lower portion of the Dobrudja. Turkey and Bulgaria were possible enemies in her rear and Allied sea power was helpless to protect her, although it could readily protect Greece.

Until the Balkan situation cleared it would have been folly for Rumania to go in. But the Allies were unequal to mastering the Balkan situation. If the Gallipoli expedition had been successful, Greece and Bulgaria could have been brought into line in the summer of 1915 and Rumania's rear would have been secured. Then Greek, Bulgarian, Rumanian, Serbian, French, and British armies could have crossed the

Danube and connected up with the Russians in southern and eastern Hungary.

But the Dardanelles were never forced and Allied military failures and diplomatic bungling allowed Bulgaria to gravitate into the Teuton alliance and Serbia and Montenegro to be conquered. After the Serbian tragedy and the great Russian retreat of 1915, Rumania could easily have justified herself in sticking to a policy of neutrality. In 1916 she was surrounded by enemies on three sides and the only Allied support which could surely reach her must come from Russia, already long past the peak of her military strength.

As 1916 wore on, however, the Rumanian Government and people became more and more eager to enter the war. The colossal German failure at Verdun impressed them. So did the Brusiloff's advance through Bukowina and Galicia to the Carpathians. Bukowina and Transylvania had been promised to the Rumanians. But if the Russians could conquer Bukowina and, moving through the Carpathian passes, overrun Transylvania, the offer to Rumania might become outlawed. The Western Allies now came forward with a proposition to secure Rumania's rear by an offensive from Salonica, which would fully occupy Bulgaria.

Hesitating and uneasy, more than half convinced that belligerency would be less costly than continued neutrality, and greatly overvaluing the possibilities of an Allied campaign from Salonica, the Rumanian Government decided in August, 1916, to risk a declaration of war against Austria-Hungary. On the 17th of that month a treaty was signed between Rumania, on the one hand, and France, Great Britain, Italy, and Russia, on the other. This defined the territorial

compensations to which Rumania should be entitled at the close of the war. They included Bukowina, Transylvania, the Banat, and some small portions of Hungary proper. Rumania was to attack Austria-Hungary on August 28th. The Allied offensive from Salonica was to begin on August 20th. Russia was to co-operate on the Bukowina front and to send one cavalry and two infantry divisions to the Dobrudja.

Unaware of the provisions of this secret compact and at a loss to account for the disaster which so quickly overwhelmed Rumania, military writers have spread the impression that Rumania acted solely in her own interest and disregarded Allied advice in employing her main forces in a rash invasion of Hungary. This theory is imaginary and does Rumania a great injustice. The military convention annexed to the treaty provided explicitly that "the principal object [objective?] of Rumanian action will be in the direction of Budapest through Transylvania." The Allied staffs approved the Transylvanian campaign, if they didn't originate it. Responsibility for the Rumanian fiasco rests with them rather than with the Rumanian High Command.

Rumania's declaration of war on August 27 took the Teuton Powers somewhat by surprise. Austria-Hungary was not prepared to defend the Transylvanian border. Eastern Transylvania forms a salient projecting between Wallachia and Moldavia, the two grand divisions of the Rumanian kingdom. It was, therefore, open to invasion on two sides—from the east out of Moldavia and from the south out of Wallachia. Rumania had an army of about six hundred thousand men. Probably two thirds of her active forces were employed in the irruption into Transylvania.

Rapid progress was made at all points during the first two weeks of September. From the Moldavian side Rumanian columns crossed the Carpathians through Tölgyes, Bekas, Gyimes, and Ojtoz passes. They reached the valley of the upper Maros, on the north, and the valley of the upper Alt, on the south. By the end of September they had penetrated Transylvania to a depth of fifty miles. But this advance, made against inferior enemy forces, had little effect on the general strategical situation. The Rumanians in this region remained out of touch with the Russians farther north, although there was at one time the prospect of a real junction near Bistritz, in eastern Hungary.

The armies marching north from Wallachia also met with little opposition. On the extreme left, one column, passing the "Iron Gates" of the Danube, captured Orsova and advanced to Mehadia, on the Orsova-Temesvar railroad. A second column, more to the east, crossed the Transylvanian Alps through the Vulcan and Szurduk passes, took Petroseny, a mining centre, and pushed on as far as Hatzeg, twenty-five miles north of the frontier. A third detachment, using the Red Tower Pass, seized the important town of Hermannstadt, about twenty miles from the border. A fourth detachment, operating farther east, captured Fogaras, and penetrated Transylvania to a distance of nearly fifty miles. Finally a fifth detachment took Kronstadt, seventy miles east of Hermannstadt.

The Rumanians had now overrun about a quarter of the area of Transylvania. They had made a good start in the direction of Budapest. But their easy successes on the Hungarian front were neutralized by the failure of the Salonica offensive to make any head-

way into Bulgaria. Rumania could not pursue an offensive in Hungary and at the same time defend herself on the Danube and in the Dobrudja, unless Sarraill kept the Bulgarians fully occupied.

This he never did. Sarraill's strength was probably greatly exaggerated. He was credited in 1916 with having at his disposal an army of 700,000 men. General Zurlinden, formerly French Minister of War, says in his book, *La Guerre de Libération*, that Sarraill had only 80,000 French, 80,000 British, 100,000 Serbs, and some Italian and Russian contingents—about 300,000 men in all. Moreover, his rear was threatened by the Greek army, which Constantine had concentrated in Thessaly. He was in no condition to attempt a large-scale invasion of Bulgaria and, apparently, the Bulgarians and Germans knew that as well as he did.

The offensive of August 20th, promised by the Allies in the treaty of alliance with Rumania, was a military fiction. A French war office bulletin, issued on August 21st, announced that on August 20th (according to schedule) "the Allied forces at Salonica took the offensive on the entire front."

What happened was that the Bulgars anticipated Sarraill's attack and made one themselves. The Allied left wing was driven back at Florina, in northern Greece; at Kastoria, farther west, and at Koritza, just across the Albanian border. These actions occurred between August 18th and August 23d. On Sarraill's extreme right the Bulgarians advanced in the region of Drama and Seres, between August 20th and 25th, and occupied the Greek port of Kavala on September 12th.

The Sarraill offensive never got going at all on the right and central sections of the Salonica front. On

the left, where the reorganized Serbian army was stationed, it did get under way about September 15th. Florina was outflanked on the east by the Serbians and was evacuated by the Bulgars on September 18th. Then the Serbs, supported on their left by French and Russian detachments, started on their two months drive for Monastir. But this was an operation designed primarily to recover a foothold on Serbian territory and only incidentally to relieve Teuton pressure on Rumania.

Having shown its contempt for the Salonica offensive, the Teuton High Command in Bulgaria turned north to attack Rumania on the Danube. Field Marshal Mackensen, who was in general charge in the Balkans, gathered together Bulgarian, German, and Turkish divisions and hurled them against the weak enemy line in the Dobrudja. Mackensen showed remarkable expedition and vigour. Bulgaria, Germany, and Turkey declared war on Rumania on August 29th. On September 2d Mackensen invaded southern Dobrudja at three points. His easternmost column, operating near the Black Sea, took the fortress of Bajardjik, on the 8th, and also occupied the seaports of Baltchik and Kavarna. Mangalia, another seaport, half-way up to Constanza, fell on September 10th.

The central column marched against the fortress of Silistria, on the right bank of the Danube, directly south of Bucharest. Silistria surrendered on September 9th. The westernmost column, on September 6th, took by storm the fortress of Turkutai, on the Danube, thirty miles west of Silistria. Twenty-five thousand Rumanians were captured. By September 15th, Mackensen had cleared the Dobrudja to a depth of fifty miles—up to within ten miles of the Bucharest-

Constanza railroad. The whole southern Rumanian front had begun to crumble.

The Rumanian armies in Transylvania now found themselves in a dangerous position. Their offensive had been suddenly superseded by a Teuton offensive far more formidable, because it was to be conducted simultaneously on three fronts. Hindenburg's plan was to envelop Wallachia from the north, west, and south, and squeeze out a highly vulnerable salient. The northern and western operations were entrusted to Falkenhayn, who was, however, subordinated to Mackensen before the campaign was over. The two German commanders had about six hundred thousand seasoned troops and enjoyed a vast superiority in artillery.

Falkenhayn began the counter-offensive about the middle of September. He struck first at the Rumanian column north of Vulcan Pass and drove it out of Petroseny and back into the mountains. This movement began on September 19th and ended on September 23d. On September 26th-29th he enveloped the Rumanian forces at Hermannstadt and completely routed them. That reverse uncovered the flank of the Rumanian army in the Kronstadt region. It retreated hurriedly on October 8th. The forces farther north, which had come from Moldavia through the Carpathian passes, were left "in the air" and also hastily retired. By October 16th Transylvania had been completely evacuated and the Rumanians on the northern front were trying to hold the passes into Wallachia.

The jaws of the German trap were now beginning to close on Rumania. On the Danube side Mackensen had brought up his heavy guns and was ready to break the Rumanian-Russian line covering the Bucharest-

Constanza railroad. Russia had sent three cavalry divisions to the Dobrudja, instead of the one she promised to send. But this reinforcement was insufficient. Between October 19th and October 22d Mackensen penetrated the Russo-Rumanian line at several points and won a decisive victory at Mejidia, half-way between Constanza and Chernavoda. The latter town, the southern terminus of the great Danube bridge, was abandoned. So was the port of Constanza, which the Bulgars entered on October 22d.

Mackensen had now accomplished his main strategic purpose south of the Danube. He had cleared the entire southern bank, east to Chernavoda, and penned the enemy on that bank into the angle just below the Danube Delta. He could now safely turn west and help Falkenhayn pinch out the Wallachian salient. The Russian High Command sent General Sakharoff into the Dobrudja with fresh troops. But all they could do was to push Mackensen's advanced guards back to within fifteen miles of the Chernavoda-Constanza railway.

On the Transylvanian front Falkenhayn's Ninth German Army captured Vulcan Pass, on October 25th. Moving south, it won a two-day battle (November 15-17) at Turgu-Jiu, twenty miles below the pass. The Rumanian resistance in this sector was broken. Falkenhayn reached the Orsova-Craiova railroad, fifty miles south of the pass, on November 19th, and the city of Craiova, on November 21st. This city is the key to Western, or Little, Wallachia, being the junction point of all the railroads in that section. The Germans were now far in the rear of the Rumanian column which had entered Hungary at Orsova. This force was completely cut off, fled into the mountains, and presently surrendered.

Avarescu, the Rumanian Commander-in-Chief, now tried to form a new north-and-south line along the Alt River, east of Craiova. But this line was exposed to turning movements at both ends. Another German force came south through the Rothenthurm and Törzburg passes, and got in Avarescu's rear. Mackensen crossed the Danube at two points east of the mouth of the Alt and on November 25th reached Alexandria, about fifty miles south-west of Bucharest.

The Rumanians retreated hurriedly to the line of the Argesu River, ten miles west of Bucharest. Falkenhayn struck north-east with his Ninth Army from Craiova and made a junction with the German columns which had marched through Rothenthurm and Törzburg passes, at Titu, north-east of Bucharest and in the rear of the Argesu line. Mackensen at the same time crossed the Argesu south of Bucharest. There was nothing for Avarescu to do but to abandon the capital. If he had tried to defend it he would have lost his army as well as the city.

Mackensen entered Bucharest on December 6th. On the same day the Germans captured Ploesti, an important railroad centre thirty miles north of Bucharest, commanding the line north through the mountains to Kronstadt. From this point the Ninth Army moved eastward to Mizil and thence to Buzeu. Buzeu was reached on December 15th. Ten thousand prisoners were taken on the way. Bulgarian forces now crossed the Danube from the Dobrudja and cleared the northern bank of the river. Sakharoff evacuated the northern angle of the Dobrudja and joined the Rumanian and Russian forces holding the line from Braila, past Fokshani, across to the Transylvanian Alps. Operations slackened after Christmas, the Rumanians

constructing positions which they were able to hold, in the main, through 1917 and up to the time of the conclusion of the Treaty of Bucharest.

Mackensen and Falkenhayn had fought a sensationally successful campaign. They had conquered for Germany a rich granary and another valuable centre of oil production. They had captured nearly one hundred thousand prisoners and almost put Rumania out of the war. They had opened new lines of communication with Constantinople and in four months had reduced the length of the Teuton eastern front by about seven hundred miles. This, in itself, was a great gain, for Germany needed more troops in the West and could now afford to use units of inferior quality to guard her eastern lines. But, on the other hand, the German operation, brilliant as it was, had failed to produce the envelopment aimed at. It squeezed out the Rumanian salient. But the Rumanians had escaped through the open end.

The Salonica offensive, which was to have joined up the Allied armies in Macedonia with those in the Dobrudja, ended just before Mackensen made his entry into Bucharest. French cavalry, supporting the Serbian army, occupied Monastir on November 19th. A tiny strip of Serbian soil had been reclaimed while the Teuton allies were overrunning Wallachia. Italy reinforced her Albanian army in the summer and fall of 1916. Italian detachments occupied all of southern Albania and extended their lines east to the Greek border, completing a junction with Sarrail's forces on October 25th. This extension helped to secure Sarrail against hostilities on the part of Greece. But it came too late to put any real vitality into the Salonica offensive.

Allied relations with Greece continued unsatisfactory through 1916. In May the Bulgars seized Fort Rupel and several other Greek posts north-east of Salonica, outside the Allied sphere of operations. But Constantine ignored this affront and made no protest against the transfer of the garrisons to Germany as "prisoners." He was equally indifferent when the Bulgars captured the port of Kavala in September. After the Fort Rupel incident the Allies imposed a blockade on Greece, seized Greek ships, and took other measures to root out pro-German activities and compel a demobilization of the Greek army. On June 21st the British, French, and Russian ministers presented a joint note to Constantine's government, demanding demobilization, dismissal of the Skouloudis Ministry, dissolution of the anti-Ally Chamber of Deputies, and the removal of pro-German police officials. Two days later Constantine promised compliance with these demands. He appointed Zaimis as Premier and dissolved the Chamber; but he persistently delayed demobilization. Venizelos went to Crete and organized a rival provisional government, controlling the Greek Islands and a part of Macedonia. This government, with a seat at Salonica, was recognized by the Allies. It then declared war on Bulgaria.

Lambros succeeded Zaimis as Premier in October. He surrendered the Greek navy to the Allies. British and French marines were landed at Piræus and sent to Athens. Constantine was forced to transfer his still undemobilized forces to the Peloponnesus and to turn over a part of his artillery and munitions.

On December 1st and 2d small Allied detachments in Athens were attacked by partisans of Constantine. Three officers and twelve men were killed and these

units would probably have been massacred, except for the fact that the Allied warships at Piræus began to fire shells into the city. The Allies now made new demands for reparations and guarantees, which Constantine acceded to with reluctance.

The Allied procedure in Greece was lamentably feeble and hesitating. Great Britain, France, and Russia, being the guardians of the Greek State, had the right, under the treaty of 1863, to intervene to prevent the overthrow of constitutional government. It was easy enough to make out a case against Constantine and dethrone him, as the Allies finally did in 1917. Greece was at heart pro-Ally, but she had been allowed to drift toward pro-Germanism under Constantine's malign influence. Military as well as political considerations demanded his expulsion. But diplomatic indecision left him for two years in a post where he could do the Allied cause immense injury. The temporizing Greek policy of the Entente was one of the least pardonable political blunders of the war.

CHAPTER XXIV

ASIATIC AND COLONIAL CAMPAIGNS. JANUARY 11,
1916-DECEMBER 31, 1916

ON the Asiatic front in 1916 the outstanding events were the Russian conquest of Armenia and the British surrender at Kut-el-Amara.

On being relieved of the command of the armies on the Russian west front (September 6, 1915), the Grand Duke Nicholas was ordered to the Caucasus. His military talents soon began to make themselves felt in this region. The Turks had attempted a winter campaign west and north of Kars in December, 1914, and January, 1915, and had suffered disaster. The Grand Duke decided to make one in January and February, 1916, with Erzerum as his objective. The Turks had reduced their forces in Armenia in order to defend the Gallipoli peninsula and were not prepared to resist a vigorous Russian offensive. They were also taken by surprise by Nicholas's daring tactics.

A Russian army about 170,000 strong, under General Yudenitch, crossed the Turkish frontier west of Kars on January 11th and made its way in three columns across the snow-covered mountains. The northern column encountered a Turkish detachment north-east of Erzerum and pushed it off in the direction of the Olty valley. The southern column cut off the extreme

Turkish right wing and drove it toward Kurdistan. The Russian centre met the main Turkish force at Kuprikeui, thirty-three miles east of Erzerum, on January 16th, and defeated it in a three days' battle. The Turks retreated in disorder, losing many guns.

Yudenitch advanced rapidly to the outer defences of Erzerum and stormed them without much difficulty. There was still an inner circle of forts to be battered down. But the Turks were cowed. They fled from the city before it had been actually invested. The Russians entered it on February 16th, capturing only a rear-guard of thirteen thousand men. More than three hundred heavy guns and large quantities of supplies were abandoned to the victors.

Erzerum was the key to Armenia. Its loss compelled the Turks to retreat west to a new base at Erzingan and to relax their hold on the region between Erzerum and the Black Sea. Russian forces now cleared the coast line west to Trebizond, which fell on April 18th. Its capture gave the Grand Duke a coast base as well as an interior one, and enabled him to complete the occupation of Armenia. His right wing reached Platana on May 11th. The left, or southern, wing had made rapid progress after the fall of Erzerum. It reached Mush on February 18th and Bitlis on March 2d, the latter town lying to the west of Lake Van.

There was an interruption of the offensive between May and July. In the latter month the Russian centre pushed the Turks back steadily from the neighbourhood of Erzerum one hundred miles west to Erzingan, which was occupied on July 25th. Armenia was now practically cleared, except on the south. With the capture of Erzingan the Russian advance west toward Anatolia was suspended. Turkish reinforcements, re-

leased by the evacuation of Gallipoli, began to arrive after April on the Armenian-Kurdistan front. But they were used mainly in protecting Turkish communications with Bagdad. These communications the Russians were never able to disturb.

In order to relieve Kut, Russia had sent an expedition, early in the winter of 1915-16, against the Bagdad railway. It came through Persia and crossed the Turkish frontier about 150 miles north-east of Bagdad. There it halted until summer, when it was attacked by the reinforced Turks and driven back some distance into Persia, beyond Hamadan. Another expedition, aiming at Mosul, crossed the frontier at Rewanduz, one hundred miles east of its objective. It was turned back in July. From Mush and Bitlis, in the Lake Van region, the Grand Duke Nicholas's left wing made a demonstration in August against Diarbekr, on the Bagdad railway, two hundred miles north-west of Mosul. This movement was halted by the Turks west of Bitlis. The Russians, retreating, evacuated both Bitlis and Mush, but regained Mush a little later. From the fall of 1916 on there was little fighting of importance on the Armenian and Kurdistan fronts.

General Townshend's British army was surrounded in Kut-el-Amara on December 7, 1915. Kut lies in a loop of the Tigris. The narrow neck of land on the north was strongly fortified. The Turks tried to storm it on December 23, 1915, but failed. Then they sat down to starve the garrison out. The main body of the Turkish army occupied positions on both sides of the river several miles below Kut, where it was engaged in holding off a British expedition, under General Sir Percy Lake, sent to Townshend's relief.

Lake had thirty thousand Indian troops, two mixed Anglo-Indian divisions, and the communications units of Townshend's army, about ninety thousand men in all.

This force started north on January 6, 1916, and defeated the Turkish advance guard at Sheik Saad on January 8th. It arrived on January 22d at Umm-el-Henneh and Felhaie, the strong Turkish positions east of Kut. Rains and floods interfered with the British operations. On March 7th an unsuccessful assault was made on the Dujailah Redoubt, on the enemy's right. On April 4th the Umm-el-Henneh position was taken. On April 8th an attack on Sanna-i-Yat failed. Another failed on April 20th-21st.

Townshend was only sixteen miles away. But his supplies were exhausted, and on April 28th he surrendered. The siege had lasted 147 days. The Turks claimed thirteen thousand prisoners. According to the British statements, Townshend had left only 2970 British and 6000 Indian troops. Lake lost 23,000 men attempting to raise the siege.

The surrender of Kut, with a relief force pounding at its gates, was a painful blow to British prestige in the East. A parliamentary commission was appointed to inquire into the conditions which made Townshend's failure possible. It brought in a report, published on June 26, 1917, which described the Bagdad campaign as "an offensive movement based on political and military miscalculations and attempted with tired and insufficient forces and inadequate preparation." The chief responsibility was fixed on General Sir John Nixon, who was accused of "confident optimism." He was especially blamed for not providing adequate river transport and proper medical and hospital service.

The Viceroy of India (Lord Hardinge) and other Indian military officials, the Secretary of State for India (Austen Chamberlain), and the War Committee of the British Cabinet were also censured. Mr. Chamberlain resigned. Lord Hardinge resigned, but the government refused to accept his resignation, and that decision was approved by the House of Commons.

Late in May the British captured the Dujailah Redoubt and approached nearer to Kut, which no longer had any particular value. In August, Lake was succeeded by General Sir Frederick Stanley Maude, who reorganized the Mesopotamian army and spent the rest of the year in preparing an advance on Bagdad which would have something more behind it than "confident optimism."

In May a small detachment of Cossacks reached the British lines below Kut. This was the only junction ever effected on the Asiatic front between the British and the Russians.

German East Africa was conquered in large part by the Allies in 1916. It was defended by a well-trained and organized negro army of thirty thousand men, under German officers. This force had practically held its own in 1914 and 1915. In the spring of 1916 an army, furnished by the Union of South Africa, was transported to British East Africa and employed in an invasion of German East Africa from the north. General Smith-Dorrien had been sent from Europe to command this expedition. He fell sick and resigned in favour of General Jan C. Smuts, the former Boer leader. Smuts crossed the Kilimanjaro Mountains and seized the railway running up from Tanga, on the Indian Ocean coast. Then he worked his way south to within twenty-five miles of the main east-

and-west railroad, running from Dar-Es-Salaam to Ujiji.

Another British column, coming from the north, reached Kilimatinde, on the main cross line. A Belgian detachment, coming south-east from the Belgian Congo, captured Tabora, farther west on the main railroad. Ujiji was also occupied by the Belgians. A British column moved north into German East Africa from Nyassaland, and Portuguese troops crossed the border from Portuguese East Africa. Dar-es-Salaam was captured by naval forces on September 3d and by the end of the year all the coast towns were in hands of the Allies. The German forces were driven into the mountainous sector south of the central east-and-west railroad, where they held out until late in 1917.

Portugal had nominally entered the war in 1914 under the terms of her treaty of alliance with Great Britain. She was bound to furnish Great Britain with ten thousand troops, if called on. No call of any sort was made until February, 1916, when the British Government asked Portugal to commandeer forty German and Austro-Hungarian ships, interned in Portuguese harbours. This was done and on March 9th Germany declared war on Portugal. Austro-Hungary issued a similar declaration on March 15th. Portugal had, however, previously engaged in hostilities with German troops on the Angola-German South-west Africa border.

CHAPTER XXV

THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND—OTHER NAVAL OPERATIONS OF 1916

THE battle of Jutland (May 31–June 1, 1916) was the only fleet engagement of the war. It was the first full test of the new modes and appliances of warfare at sea. The dreadnaught, the super-dreadnaught, the battle cruiser, the submarine, the enlarged destroyer, the long-range torpedo, the scouting seaplane, and the Zeppelin had all come in since the battle between the Russian and Japanese fleets in the Sea of Japan. In tonnage, armour, speed, and weight of broadside the two armadas which fought off Horn Reef were incomparably the most formidable ever assembled.

Yet Jutland will never rank as one of the crowning naval battles of history. It was indecisive. It ended in confusion. The superior British fleet drew off on June 1st, not knowing whether it had won a victory, fought a draw, or suffered a reverse. The inferior German fleet claimed a victory. But it never sought an action again.

Possibly when it left its bases it did not expect to fight. The collision was accidental. While Admiral Scheer was cruising along the Danish coast, the British Grand Fleet happened to be making one of its periodical sweeps through the North Sea. It had left Scapa

Flow on May 30th and was coming south in the usual formation, with the battle cruiser squadron, accompanied by scouts, about fifty miles ahead of the battle fleet.

Sir David Beatty was in command of this advanced force, to which was also attached the fifth battle squadron. He didn't anticipate meeting the enemy and had orders, when he reached latitude $56^{\circ} 40'$, to turn north again and get into visual contact with the main fleet. At 2 P.M. on May 31st he had turned north. At 2.20 P.M. the light cruiser *Galatea* sighted to the east two enemy vessels, apparently holding up a neutral merchant steamer. Fifteen minutes later, smoke, indicating the presence of an enemy squadron, was observed in the same direction. Beatty steered east and at 3.31 P.M. made out five German battle cruisers, accompanied by destroyers and light cruisers.

The first phase of the battle was a running fight between this German battle cruiser squadron, under Admiral Hipper, and the British battle cruiser squadron and fifth battle squadron. Beatty was much stronger than Hipper. He had six battle cruisers, four of the *Lion* class and two of the *Indefatigable* class. The former were rated at 28.5 knots, and carried eight 13.5-inch guns. The latter were rated at 25 knots and carried eight 12-inch guns. The fifth battle squadron consisted of four dreadnaughts of the *Queen Elizabeth* class, rated at 25 knots and carrying eight 15-inch guns.

Hipper's squadron was composed of three ships of the *Derfflinger* class, of 27 knots' speed and carrying eight 12-inch guns, and two of the *Moltke* class, of 28 knots' speed and carrying ten 11-inch guns.

The fighting began at 3.48 P.M., at a range of 18,500 yards. The German squadron had turned south so as to draw the British toward the main High Sea Fleet.

Shortly after 4 P.M. the *Indefatigable* was hit by a German salvo. Her magazine exploded and she sank in a few minutes. The range now increased and the fighting slackened. Both sides began to develop a torpedo attack. In this the British destroyers *Nestor* and *Nomad* were crippled and then lost. At 4.26 P.M. the *Queen Mary* was struck by a salvo and exploded as the *Indefatigable* had done.

About ten minutes later the German battle fleet was sighted and Admiral Beatty swung his ships around and started back north. The German battle cruiser squadron turned and followed, the main German fleet bringing up the rear.

The next phase of the battle was the running fight north toward the British main fleet. This lasted until 6.15 P.M., when the German battle cruiser squadron was again in approximately the position in which it was when the fighting began. The British battle cruiser fleet was north of the German and the main British fleet, under Admiral Jellicoe, was approaching on a course which would carry it head on against the van of the enemy. During the northward run the weather thickened, the British battle cruisers ceasing firing for thirty minutes. The fifth battle squadron brought up the rear of the battle cruiser squadron and engaged the German battle fleet at long range. Little damage was done, however, on either side in this return movement.

The crisis of the engagement was now at hand. Beatty had decoyed Scherr north into a position in which he would find it difficult to avoid engaging the entire British fleet. It was a situation which he could not have relished, for he was at a great disadvantage in speed, tonnage, and gun power. In the

main fleet, which was approaching him, were twenty-four modern battleships, nine older battleships, and three battle cruisers. He had himself only sixteen modern battleships and five battle cruisers. Of Beatty's squadron four battle cruisers and four battleships remained available.

In his admirable book, *The British Navy in Battle*, Mr. Arthur H. Pollen makes this succinct comparison between the German strength at Jutland and the British strength:

Against sixteen modern battleships he himself [Admiral Jellicoe] commanded twenty-four, a superiority of three to two. His gun power, measured by the weight and striking energy of his broadsides, must have been nearly twice that of the enemy; measured by the striking energy and the destructive power of its heavier shells, it was greater still. Opposed to the enemy's five battle cruisers there were four under the command of Sir David Beatty, and three led by Rear-Admiral Hood. Against the six 18-knot pre-dreadnaughts that formed the rear of the German fleet, with their twenty-four 11-inch guns, firing a 700-pound shell, there were Rear-Admiral Evan Thomas's four 25-knot ships, carrying thirty-two 15-inch guns, whose shells were three times as heavy and must have been nine times as destructive. This force, vastly superior, if it could be concentrated for its purpose, had to be deployed for a blow which, if simultaneously delivered at the range at which the guns would hit, must be final in a very brief period.

Scherr had no guns of heavier calibre than 12-inch and the average speed of his fleet was three or four

knots less than that of the British fleet. He was 150 miles from his mine fields and 200 miles from his bases. To turn and run precipitately would be to court a great disaster. To advance farther north would also be fatal, since the British would then envelop his van. Nothing apparently could save him but good luck and shrewd seamanship.

Before he had learned of Jellicoe's approach he had begun to steer off to the east. After he discovered what was ahead of him he decided to seize the first opportunity to turn to the south-west and run toward home.

The battle cruiser squadron under Beatty was reinforced, about 6.10 P.M., by the Third Battle Cruiser Squadron, under Rear-Admiral Hood, which had been with the main fleet. It formed ahead of the *Lion*, Beatty's flagship, and closed in on the German battle cruisers to a range of 8600 yards. In this brief attack Hood's flagship, the *Invincible*, was hit by a shell which caused the explosion of her magazine. His other two battle cruisers, the *Inflexible* and *Indomitable*, then fell to the rear of Beatty's squadron, which was moving east-north-east and trying to get across the bow of the German battle cruiser squadron.

The British Grand Fleet arrived from the north-west at a little after six o'clock. It came up in six columns and found the van of the German fleet on its starboard side. Admiral Jellicoe had now to decide whether to deploy to starboard or to port. Deploying to starboard would bring him into close quarters with the enemy, and subject him to the risk not only of damage during the deployment but also of torpedo attack. He says, in his book, *The Grand Fleet, 1914-1916*:

My first and natural impulse was to form on the starboard wing column in order to bring the fleet into action at the earliest possible moment, but it became increasingly apparent, both from the sound of gun-fire and the reports from the *Lion* and the *Barham*, that the High Sea Fleet was in such close proximity and on such a bearing as to create obvious disadvantages in such a movement. I assumed that the German destroyers would be ahead of their Battle Fleet, and it was clear that, owing to the mist, the operations of the destroyers attacking from such a commanding position in the van would be much facilitated; it would be suicidal to place the Battle Fleet in a position where it would be open to attack by destroyers during such a deployment, as such an event would throw the fleet into confusion at a critical moment.

Jellicoe, therefore, ordered a deployment on the port column, farthest from the enemy. After deploying, he laid a course to the east parallel to Beatty's, but some distance to the north. This manœuvre gave Scherr his chance. He utilized smoke screens, as far as possible, to conceal his course and at 6.45 P.M. launched a torpedo attack. This had the effect of opening the range between himself and Jellicoe. Thereupon he turned his fleet from an easterly to a south-westerly course.

The last phase of the battle now began. The Grand Fleet changed its course to the south at 7.33 P.M. The battle cruiser squadron, which had passed away to the north-east and out of touch with the enemy, hauled around and pursued, crossing the track of the main fleet. In the mist it was difficult to maintain

contact with the enemy. There were several brief encounters, between isolated ships, but the Germans succeeded in evading a renewal of the battle. The *Lion* finally lost track of the enemy at 7.45 P.M. The last ship to report contact was the *Falmouth*, which sighted one German vessel at 8.38 P.M.

Both fleets spent the night somewhere about eighty miles west of Horn Reef. There was a good deal of sniping by light craft in the darkness. At dawn there was a visibility of only four miles. The Grand Fleet remained in the vicinity of the field of battle until 11 A.M. on June 1st, and then cruised north, collecting the scattered units. At 1.15 P.M. a course was laid for Scotland.

The German fleet limped home unmolested. The German Admiralty claimed a victory on the basis of relative losses. The showing made by German reports was impressive. The British admitted the loss of three battle cruisers, the *Indefatigable*, the *Queen Mary*, and the *Invincible*; of three armoured cruisers, the *Defence*, the *Black Prince*, and the *Warrior*; and of eight destroyers, the *Tipperary*, *Turbulent*, *Fortune*, *Sparrow Hawk*, *Ardent*, *Nomad*, *Nestor*, and *Shark*.

The Germans acknowledged the loss of one battle cruiser, the *Lützow*; one pre-dreadnaught, the *Pommern*; four light cruisers, the *Rostock*, *Frauenlob*, *Elbing*, and *Wiesbaden*; and five destroyers. The tonnage lost was, according to these announcements: British, 117,510; German, 60,720. The British lost 6105 men; the Germans, 2414. But the High Sea Fleet was badly battered up. The German vessels had heavier armour than the British had and many of them were thus enabled to make port, although seriously damaged. The battle cruiser *Seydlitz* was saved by beaching.

After the armistice Captain Persius, the foremost German naval critic, admitted in the *Berliner Tageblatt* that the German fleet's losses were "severe." He also said: "On June 1, 1916, it was clear to every thinking person that this battle must be the last one."

For Great Britain the result of the engagement was disappointing. Failure to crush the inferior German fleet deprived the Allies of the chance to enforce a close blockade of the German naval bases and thus reduce submarine warfare to a minimum. Another Trafalgar would probably have saved, within the following two years, seven or eight million tons of Allied and neutral merchant shipping. But, on the other hand, a Trafalgar, in 1916, would have kept the United States out of the war. And it is an open question whether the Entente Powers could ever have won the war on land without the assistance of the United States. The escape of the German fleet was, therefore, in the end a dubious piece of luck for Germany.

Admiral Jellicoe has been severely criticized for his failure to close in on the German fleet on the evening of May 31st. But he pursued a policy reflecting the fixed views of the British Admiralty. He says in his book, defending his own caution:

A third consideration that was present in my mind was the necessity for *not leaving anything to chance in a fleet action, because our fleet was the one and only factor that was vital to the existence of the Empire, as, indeed, to the Allied cause.* We had no reserve outside the Battle Fleet which could in any way have taken its place, should disaster befall it, or even should its margin of superiority over the enemy be eliminated.

This echoes the principle laid down by Lord Fisher in 1915 in his memorandum on the Dardanelles expedition, in which a protest was made against risking even obsolete pre-dreadnaughts. Lord Fisher wrote to Premier Asquith:

As long as the German High Sea Fleet possesses its present strength and splendid gunnery efficiency, so long it is imperative that no operation be undertaken by the British Fleet calculated to impair its superiority, which is none too great, in view of the heavy losses already experienced in ships and men, which latter cannot be filled in the period of the war, in which the navy differs materially from the army. Even the older ships should not be risked, for they cannot be lost without losing men and they form the only reserve behind the Great Fleet.

It is probable that a different policy, producing different results, would have been followed, if the aggressive Beatty had commanded at Jutland, instead of the conservative Jellicoe.

On August 19th a part of the German fleet came out again. Its scouting forces encountered British scouting forces. In the fighting which followed the British cruisers *Falmouth* and *Nottingham* were sunk by torpedoes. The German battleship *Westfalen*, of 18,600 tons, was damaged by a torpedo, but did not sink.

The British battleship *King Edward VII* was sunk by a mine off the east coast of England on January 9th. On February 2d the light cruiser *Arethusa* was lost in a similar manner. On April 23d-24th British monitors, cruisers, destroyers, and aircraft bombarded the German base at Zeebrugge and German batteries

in its neighbourhood. On April 25th a German raiding squadron bombarded Lowestoft and Great Yarmouth, on the east coast of England. The British armoured cruiser *Hampshire* struck a mine near Scapa Flow on June 6th and sank in a few minutes. Earl Kitchener, who was on his way to Russia on a military mission, went down with the ship.

In July the German merchant submarine *Deutschland* made a trip to the United States, arriving at the port of Baltimore. She returned in August. In October the German *U-53* entered the harbour of Newport, R. I. Leaving in haste, she cruised for a few days off Nantucket Island, destroying several merchant vessels, two of them neutrals.

The disguised commerce destroyer *Moewe* escaped from a German port in January and returned safely on March 5th. On her cruise she destroyed one French, one Belgian, and twelve British merchantmen. The British battleship *Russell* was sunk in the Mediterranean on April 27th.

The French lost by submarine attack or mines, during 1916, the cruiser *Admiral Charner* (February 13th), the transport *Provence*, with 3100 men (February 27th), the destroyer *Renaudin* (March 18th), and the battleship *Suffren*, with 700 men (December 8th).

The Italian transport *Principe Umberto* was sunk on June 9th and the super-dreadnaught *Leonardo da Vinci* on August 2d. The Russian battleship *Imperatritsa Maria* was destroyed, probably by an explosion, on October 20th. The Allies reported the destruction by submarines of a German light cruiser of the *Kolberg* class and a battleship of the *Nassau* class.

From August 1, 1914, to June 30, 1916, German submarines sank about 690 enemy merchant ships, with a tonnage of about 1,600,000, and 218 neutrals, with a tonnage of about 370,000.

CHAPTER XXVI

AMERICA DRIFTS TOWARD WAR. JANUARY 1, 1916-
DECEMBER 31, 1916

FRICTION between the United States and Germany over the illegal use of the submarine continued through 1916. The *Lusitania* case passed into oblivion, unsettled. Other cases arose which challenged the sincerity of the pledge with regard to the treatment of "liners," which Germany and Austria-Hungary had given the United States after the sinking of the *Arabic* and the *Ancona*.

The passenger steamer *Persia* was destroyed in the eastern Mediterranean on January 2d, one of the passengers lost being an American consul. No satisfactory evidence was obtained, however, that the vessel had been torpedoed by a submarine. But on March 24th the passenger steamer *Sussex* was sunk in the English Channel. Twenty-five of the passengers were American citizens. Four other steamers on which Americans were travelling were torpedoed about the same time: the *Englishman*, the *Manchester Engineer*, the *Berwindale*, and the *Eagle*. Three of these four, the German Foreign Office said, had attempted to escape. About the other it professed a lack of information. It also flatly denied responsibility for the fate of the *Sussex*. A German submarine had sunk a vessel in

the English Channel on March 24th, it was admitted, but the commander was sure that it was a war vessel or a mine layer, and not the *Sussex*.

The American Government easily determined the fact that the *Sussex* was sunk by a German U-boat, for pieces of a German torpedo were found in the wreck. The State Department, thereupon, on April 18th, sent a note to Berlin citing the frequent instances of Germany's disregard of her pledge not to attack "liners" (passenger vessels) without warning and without providing for the safety of those on board. Secretary Lansing gave notice that the United States would sever diplomatic relations with Germany "unless the Imperial Government should now immediately declare and effect an abandonment of its present methods of submarine warfare against passenger and freight-carrying vessels."

The note, in fact, demanded an extension of the German guarantee in the *Arabic* case so as to include freighters as well as "liners."

Germany was reluctant, in the spring of 1916, to drive the United States into war. Jagow, therefore, began to hedge. He replied on May 4th that perhaps the German U-boat commander was mistaken about the *Sussex*. As to the other vessels the German Government had given no promise not to attack freighters. Nevertheless, Germany had no desire to raise an issue "threatening the maintenance of peace between the two nations." He accordingly renewed and enlarged the *Arabic* guarantee by informing the United States that the following orders had been given to the German naval forces:

In accordance with the general principle of visit and search and destruction of merchant vessels,

recognized by international law, such vessels, both within and without the area declared as a naval war zone, shall not be sunk without warning and without saving human lives, unless those ships attempt to escape or offer resistance.

The observance of this pledge was made conditional, however, on an insistence by the United States that Great Britain should forthwith observe the rules of international law as laid down in the American notes to Great Britain of December 28, 1914, and November 5, 1915, which had protested against the stringencies and irregularities of the Allied blockade. If this insistence produced no effect, Germany would reserve to herself "complete liberty of decision." The State Department replied, on May 8th, accepting the German assurance, but rejecting the theory that the settlement of questions in dispute between the United States and Germany could be made dependent on the outcome of negotiations between this country and other belligerents. On the same day Jagow admitted German responsibility for the sinking of the *Sussex* and offered reparation.

Another complication, with reverberations in domestic politics, occurred over the question of arming Allied merchantmen. On February 10th the German and Austro-Hungarian representatives in Washington announced that after February 29th their governments would treat armed merchantmen as auxiliary cruisers. Secretary Lansing had sent a note, on January 18th, to the Entente ambassadors, urging that their governments agree to disarm merchantmen. He ended by saying:

I may add that my government is impressed with the reasonableness of the argument that a merchant

vessel carrying an armament of any sort, in view of the character of submarine warfare and the defensive character of under-sea craft, should be held to be an auxiliary cruiser, and so treated by a neutral as well as by a belligerent government, and is seriously considering instructing its officials accordingly.

This came dangerously near accepting the German argument in favour of a modification of the rules of sea warfare, in order to lift the disabilities imposed on the submarine as a commerce destroyer. Was the United States suddenly going to weaken in its demand for a strict observance of the existing international code? But suddenly, on February 15th, the Administration reversed itself and announced that it would make no change in existing rules of warfare at sea without the consent of all the belligerents.

The pacifist elements in Congress now grew excited, fearing that a new cause of conflict with Germany had been found. They introduced resolutions forbidding Americans to travel on armed merchantmen and forbidding such merchantmen the use of American ports.

A sharp controversy ensued between the President and the pacifist leaders—most of them of his own party. But the President had public opinion behind him in his stand. The pacifist resolutions were shelved. Then on February 29th the President wrote a letter to Mr. Pou, of the House Committee on Rules, asking that the Committee report out the resolutions in question for the purpose of affording "full public discussion and action upon them."

Both houses of Congress shrank from such a test. To avoid it they went through the barren parliamentary ceremony of laying on the table the propositions carry-

ing the names of Senator Gore and Representative McLemore, thus suppressing "full public discussion and action." The Senate, having little knowledge of what it was doing, actually laid on the table a resolution upholding the President and saying that "the sinking by a German submarine, without notice or warning, of an armed merchant vessel of her public enemy, resulting in the death of a citizen of the United States, would constitute a just and sufficient cause of war between the United States and the German Empire."

That is what, in the end, constituted the "just and sufficient cause" of our declaration of war against Germany. But neither the Administration nor Congress was as yet willing to visualize war as the inevitable outcome of the American "war zone" note of February 10, 1915. All through 1915 the President deprecated military preparation. Early in 1916 he made some preparedness speeches. But no adequate preparedness measure appeared. The Naval Appropriation act of 1916 contained provisions for a material increase of the navy. But the Hay Army Reorganization act of 1916 was a shabby makeshift. Secretary Garrison resigned from the Cabinet on February 10th as a protest against the Administration's acquiescence in the anæmic military programme which finally took shape in the Hay law.

The summer passed without any further diplomatic clashes with Germany. On the contrary, there were some differences with the Allies. The latter protested against the extension of merchantman rights to the submarine *Deutschland*, which had arrived at Baltimore with a cargo on July 8th. But our government refused to intern the U-boat or to admit that submarines

ought to be exempted from the rules applying to surface ships.

On July 18th Great Britain published a blacklist of eighty-three firms and individuals of enemy nationality, or associations, resident in the United States. Some of the proscribed firms were American. The State Department made a vigorous protest at this novel extension of the right of blockade. Nothing came of the negotiations which followed except the removal of seven names from the British list.

The German Government had its gaze fixed on the European battlefields. When the Russian offensive in Galicia and Bukowina died down, the Franco-British attack on the Somme was checked, and Rumania was invaded by Mackensen and Falkenhayn, the fit of caution which had inspired the *Sussex* note was over. The submarine commanders again grew reckless. The British steamer *Marina* was sunk off the coast of Ireland on November 1st, and six American passengers were drowned. A few days earlier the *Rowanmore*, with American passengers aboard, was torpedoed. Then the British steamer *Arabia*, with one American passenger, was sunk off Malta and the American steamer *Columbian* was destroyed off the Mediterranean coast of Spain. On December 4th the Italian steamer *Palermo*, with twenty-five Americans aboard, was torpedoed in the Mediterranean on her way from New York to Genoa.

The German Government gave evasive excuses in all these cases. Feeling confident that the war was going Germany's way, Berlin on December 12th patronizingly invited the Allies to enter into peace negotiations. President Wilson was invited to transmit the offer to France and Great Britain. This he did.

He went farther. In a note addressed to all the belligerents on December 18th he asked them to state the terms on which, in their view, the war could be brought to an end.

In explaining his purpose in making this suggestion Mr. Wilson said:

He [the President] takes the liberty of calling attention to the fact that the objects which the statesmen of the belligerents on both sides have in mind in this war are virtually the same, as stated in general terms to their own people and to the world. Each side desires to make the rights and privileges of weak peoples and small states as secure against aggression or denial in the future as the rights of the great and powerful states now at war.

In a recent volume, *The Peace President: a Brief Appreciation*, Mr. William Archer remarks: "Surely the irony of this passage ought to have been understood from the first." Irony is easily misunderstood in the heat of a great war. The country was greatly puzzled by the President's request for terms and at a loss to understand the motives for it. Secretary Lansing may have let out the truth in a blunt statement which he made about the note. He said:

More and more our own rights are becoming involved by the belligerents on both sides, so that the situation is becoming critical. I mean by that that we are drawing nearer the verge of war ourselves, and, therefore, we are entitled to know exactly what each belligerent seeks in order that we may negotiate our conduct in the future. . . . The sending of

this note will indicate the possibility of our being forced into war. . . . Neither the President nor myself regards the note as a peace note.

This apparently indiscreet admission was recalled a few hours later. Mr. Lansing reversed himself by announcing that he "did not intend to intimate that the government was considering any change in its policy of neutrality." But the preservation of the policy of neutrality was no longer a matter within the control of the American Government. So long as the note of February 10, 1915, remained uncanceled and the correspondence in the *Sussex* case remained unmodified, the power to draw the United States into war or keep her out of it rested with Germany. And Germany was about to make her decision.

CHAPTER XXVII

GERMANY DEFIES AMERICA. JANUARY 31, 1917-
JUNE 30, 1917

THE winter months of 1917 marked the turning-point of the war. Mittel-Europa was a reality. On the face of the war map Germany had assured her continental position. She had defeated Russia, seized Poland, the Baltic Provinces, Lithuania, and parts of White Russia, conquered the Balkans and annexed Turkey in Asia. She held practically all of Belgium and a large area in Northern France. Russia was about to collapse and become a prey to revolution. All the Germans needed to do was to tire out the remaining Allies by maintaining the deadlock on the Western Front.

But German military policy remained emotional and confused. The old illusion of overseas and world power still haunted the Kaiser and the clique which controlled him. This clique now found in Ludendorff, a "plunger" in strategy and politics, the agent whom it needed. Hindenburg was too conservative and unimaginative to suit the Pan-German extremists. Besides, he was an Easterner by instinct and conviction. So they displaced him in the supreme command (though not outwardly) by his junior associate, who was willing to try to conquer France and bring Great

Britain to her knees, whatever risks might be involved in such an enterprise.

Great Britain could be attacked only through the submarine. An unrestricted use of the U-boat would mean war with the United States. But Ludendorff, with the narrow vision imbued into the German General Staff by years of self-worship, held America's military power as cheaply as the Kaiser had held Great Britain's in 1914. He therefore cheerfully paid the price of the military dictatorship offered him by supporting the demand for a withdrawal of the *Sussex* pledges and a renewal of indiscriminate submarine warfare. Once installed in the dictatorship, he forced the removal of Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg, who was dispassionate enough to see that Germany had vastly more to lose than to gain by running amuck with her U-boats and thus forcing war with the United States.

The German peace offer of December 12, 1916, was probably intended in part as a flourish with which to cover the decision, already reached, to extend and intensify the U-boat "blockade." The Allied answer to the German proposal, delivered in Berlin on January 4, 1917, was what might have been expected. The Entente refused to consider the German offer because it was "empty and insincere." Germany and Austria-Hungary answered President Wilson's request for terms, made on December 18, 1916, by again suggesting the calling of a peace conference. The Entente Powers replied on January 12th, giving a general outline of their war aims, which included restoration of conquered Allied territory, reparation, the reorganization of Europe, the dismemberment of Austria-Hungary, and the partition of Turkey.

On January 18th President Wilson delivered before

the Senate his "peace without victory" address. Taking the communications from the two sets of belligerents as a groundwork to build on, he outlined his own views of a proper peace and of the terms on which our government would enter any "Concert of Powers" or "League for Peace," to be established at the close of the war. Among the conditions which he emphasized were the freedom of the seas, an independent Poland, reduction of armaments, equality of nations, and security of life, worship, and industrial development everywhere. But the peace must first of all be "a peace without victory."

The purpose of this address was mystifying, since neither set of belligerents had asked the United States for a peace formula. If it was intended to mollify Germany and secure a postponement of the renewal of submarine warfare, now known to be imminent, it failed of its object. For on January 31st, Count Bernstorff presented a note announcing that from the following day all ships, enemy as well as neutral, would be sunk inside zones drawn about the British Isles and France, and in the Mediterranean, a narrow area east of Spain excepted. Germany added insult to injury by offering to guarantee the safety of one American passenger steamer a week each way from Falmouth, England, if the United States would give it highly distinctive markings and forbid it to carry contraband.

This cancellation of the *Sussex* pledges was defended on the ground that the Entente Powers had refused to entertain Germany's peace offer. Since the American Government, on April 19, 1916, had threatened to break off diplomatic relations with Germany unless the latter should renounce illegal submarine warfare, the document transmitted through Bernstorff was

a brusque notice that Berlin didn't care how soon relations were severed.

The rupture came on February 3d, when passports were sent to Bernstorff. By greatly enlarging her war zones and threatening destruction to all vessels entering them, Germany virtually established a partial blockade of American ports. American merchantmen were not armed to resist illegal attack. The President on February 26th asked Congress for authority to arm them and "to employ other instrumentalities or methods" necessary to protect Americans in their rightful pursuits on the sea. A bill granting this authority passed the House of Representatives on March 1st, although it had encountered considerable opposition at first both from the pacifists and from those who thought the President's policy of "armed neutrality" a weak substitute for war. Its passage in the Senate was prevented by a pacifist filibuster which lasted until noon of March 4th.

Meanwhile Germany continued to commit constructive acts of war. On February 25th the Cunard liner *Laconia* was torpedoed without warning in the Irish Sea. Three American passengers, two of them women, perished of exposure after taking to the boats. On March 17th an American ship, the *City of Memphis*, homeward bound from Cardiff, in ballast, was destroyed by a submarine. On March 19th the *Illinois* and the *Vigilancia* were sunk without warning in British waters. The overt challenge was unmistakable. It had to be met by the United States.

The President had called an extra session of the new Congress for April 16th. On March 21st he advanced the date of assembling to April 2d. On the evening of that day the President delivered a message advising

Congress to declare war against Germany. War had come on the specific issue of Germany's invasion of American rights at sea by the illegitimate use of the submarine. But in the message the reasons for making war on Germany were greatly broadened. Said the President:

We shall fight for the things which we have always carried nearest our hearts—for democracy, for the right of those who submit to authority to have a voice in their own government, for the rights and liberties of small nations, for a universal dominion of right by such a concert of free peoples as shall bring peace and safety to all nations and make the world itself at last free.

These justifications and causes of war against Germany had existed since August, 1914, when Germany violated the neutrality of Belgium. They were equally justifications and causes of war against Austria-Hungary, Turkey, and Bulgaria. But the President did not recommend a declaration of war against Austria-Hungary until December, 1917, and to the end he restrained Congress from declaring war against Turkey or Bulgaria.

A resolution declaring the existence of a state of war with Germany was passed by the Senate on April 3d, and by the House of Representatives on the legislative day of April 5th, actually early in the morning of April 6th. It merely recited that recent acts of Germany were acts of war and that a state of war had been thrust by those acts upon the United States. No reference was made in it to the existence of other war aims and causes. Legally, and on the face of a

record extending from the drafting of the "war zone" note of February 10, 1915, to the sinking without warning of the *Vigilancia* on March 19, 1917, the United States went to war with Germany as a matter of self-defence and for the purpose of protecting national interests. The war arose out of a controversy over sea rights, paralleling the controversy with Great Britain which preceded the war of 1812. When, in his oral message to Congress on April 2d, he came to deal with the allies of Germany, the President himself admitted the limited and nationalistic character of American war aims. He remarked:

I have said nothing of the governments allied with the Imperial Government of Germany, because they have not made war upon us or challenged us to defend our right and our honour. . . . We enter this war only when we are clearly forced into it, because there are no other means of defending our rights.

And when war was declared against Austria-Hungary, on December 7, 1917, Congress again based its action exclusively on the fact that the Austro-Hungarian Government had "committed repeated acts of war against the government and people of the United States."

The existence of a state of war against Germany having been proclaimed by the President on April 6th, the country found itself compelled to take up hurriedly, in April, 1917, the work of military preparation the necessity for which had been obvious from the day in May, 1915, when the *Lusitania* was sunk. For those two years of neglect the United States and the world were now to pay an enormous penalty. Had America armed in 1915, she could either have kept out of the

war (Germany recognizing the folly of driving us in) or she could have begun to make war in 1917 with an energy which would have minimized costs and losses. Had we been able to send a trained expeditionary force of 1,500,000 men to France in the spring and summer of 1917, the war might easily have been brought to an end that year.

Unready as they were, the American people entered the war with a sense of relief. They were clearer-sighted than their government. Under the pressure of public sentiment a conscription act, which the Secretary of War had refused to recommend or support up to March 4, 1917, was passed by Congress and signed on May 18th. It was carried swiftly into effect by the volunteer labours of local boards. No war in which the United States had ever engaged so solidified the nation as did the war with Germany. The Great General Staff at Berlin had put the United States as a belligerent into the same class with Rumania, Serbia, Belgium, or Portugal. It conceded the ability of the Allies to draw upon America's economic resources, whether she became a belligerent or remained a neutral. But it smiled at the idea of American troops turning the scale on the battlefields of France.

That was Germany's fatal error of judgment. She had practically disposed of the Russian colossus. But she had taken on a new enemy many times more dangerous than Russia. For America was in the war to stay and her military power, when developed, would overtop German military power.

More than that, the entry of the United States into the war was certain to draw in other American nations. Brazil severed diplomatic relations with Germany on April 11th and seized forty-six interned German ships.

She declared war on October 26, 1917. Cuba and Panama declared war on April 7th. Other Latin American states severed diplomatic relations with Germany: Bolivia, on April 14th; Guatemala, on April 27th; Honduras, on May 17th; Nicaragua, on May 18th; Haiti, on June 17th; Costa Rica, on September 21st; Peru, on October 6th; Uruguay, on October 7th. War was declared by Guatemala, on April 21, 1918; by Nicaragua, on May 6, 1918; by Costa Rica, on May 23, 1918; by Haiti, on July 12, 1918; and by Honduras, on July 19, 1918. Liberia declared war against Germany on August 4, 1917.

After the United States entered the struggle practically all the shipping of the world passed under Allied control. The material resources of America, Asia, Africa, and the most of Europe were put at the disposal of the anti-Teuton Powers.

In the latter part of April, British and French missions visited the United States. The British mission was headed by Arthur J. Balfour, the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. Heading the French mission were Marshal Joffre and former Prime Minister Viviani. Under Marshal Joffre's urgings the military plans of the government were modified. It had not been intended to send American troops to France on any considerable scale before the end of 1918. But Joffre advised training them in France, instead of at home. His suggestion was sound. It started that small but steady flow of American reinforcements to France which materially heartened the French in the period of depression which set in in the summer of 1917. It also produced, eventually, the strategic reserve which enabled Foch to end the war in the autumn of 1918.

CHAPTER XXVIII

RUSSIA IN REVOLUTION. MARCH 11, 1917—DECEMBER 31,
1917

IN two senses Russia took herself out of the war before the United States got in. The Russian Revolution antedated our declaration of April 6th and the Russian armies ceased to fight long before our first troops reached the front lines in France.

The revolution came suddenly, almost unpremeditatedly. The body of Rasputin, the monk who had obtained a sort of hypnotic control over the Czarina and who was in league with the extreme reactionary and pro-German elements in the government, was found in the Neva River on New Year's Day, 1917. His murder was a symptom of the general revulsion against the court and its policies. But the royal family and Protopopoff, its spokesman in the administration, remained blind to the signs of the times. In his book, *Russian Revolution Aspects*, Mr. Robert Crozier Long tells of an interview which he had with Protopopoff in March, 1917, in the fortress of St. Peter and St. Paul. Protopopoff was a prisoner there, undergoing examination by a revolutionary prosecutor. In the presence of the latter he said to his American visitor: "I am guilty of the most awful crime that a man can commit, the crime of failing to understand the spirit of my age."

He, the Czar, the Czarina, and the imperial coterie were all guilty of the same crime.

Protopopoff wanted to make peace with Germany in order to save the dynasty and absolutism. He took little trouble to conceal his purpose to get rid of the Duma. He brought about a food shortage in Petrograd so as to incite riots and thus create an excuse for prologuing indefinitely the body which had come to stand in the public mind for a larger measure of popular government. The assembling of the Duma was postponed from January 25th to February 27th. On the day the session opened, one hundred thousand workingmen in Petrograd went on strike as a protest against the repressive measures of the government. Early in March, food riots began and the Duma tried to have the regulation of the food supply transferred to the city authorities. On March 11th the Czar issued a ukase dissolving the Duma.

But the Duma refused to dissolve. Finding itself backed up by the population of the capital and a large part of the garrison, the Duma constituted itself a provisional government and sent representatives to meet the Czar, who was returning to Petrograd from general staff headquarters. They were to demand his abdication. At Pskov, on March 15th, he yielded to this ultimatum and signed a manifesto renouncing his rights and those of his son in favour of his brother, the Grand Duke Michael. The latter declined to accept the throne. The members of the imperial family and of the former government were then put under arrest. The provisional Duma revolutionary committee gave way to a coalition cabinet, elected jointly by the Duma and a newly formed committee representing the workmen and soldiers. Prince Lvoff

was chosen head of the Cabinet. The workmen and soldiers were represented in it by Alexander Kerensky, the Minister of Justice.

The major Allied Powers recognized the new government on March 23d. The United States had already recognized it on March 22d. But the new government was only a political fiction. It had no power of its own. Power in Petrograd had already passed into the hands of the Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates. Control of the army and navy was assumed by local councils of soldiers and sailors, loosely associated with the Petrograd Council.

The Lvoff Cabinet was loyal to the Entente Alliance. But its foreign policy and war policy were both subject to reversal by the radical socialistic elements which were becoming more and more active in the Workmen's and Soldiers' organization. The latter favoured peace on the basis of "no annexations and no indemnities." They renounced the idea of acquiring Constantinople and were insistent that the Entente should revise the war aims to which Russia had subscribed in the answer to Germany's recent peace offer. They also favoured the calling of an international Socialist conference, at which the representatives of the proletariats of all the belligerent nations could get together and discuss peace terms.

When the provisional government informed the other Allied nations, on May 2d, that Russia would continue the war to a complete victory, it obtained a vote of confidence from the Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates. But when the Minister of Foreign Affairs, M. Milyukoff, expressed himself on May 9th as still desirous of obtaining Constantinople, a crisis arose which ended with his ejection from the Cabinet

and the transfer of Kerensky, the spokesman of the radicals, to the more important post of Minister of War.

Kerensky was now the sole prop of the Lvoff régime. He was against a separate peace with Germany and wanted to continue the war and recover the Russian territory seized by Germany. Yet at the same time he wanted to make a peace which would not penalize Germany. He carried the Council of Workmen and Soldiers with him for a time in spite of the attacks of the Maximalist faction, headed by Lenine. But in order to hold his ground in the Council he was obliged to disembarass himself of Lvoff and the other moderates, who had originally taken charge of the revolution. The Duma was abolished in June and on July 22d Lvoff resigned as Prime Minister of the provisional government. Kerensky took his place.

The Kerensky government lasted until November 7th. After September 16th it became a dictatorship, with all power lodged in Kerensky's hands. But the latter pursued a suicidal policy. Disorganization in the army, started by his own orders, destroying discipline, became more and more flagrant. It was impossible to continue the war against Germany without a dependable army. Kerensky, essentially a talker and trimmer, vacillated between measures for restoring discipline and order with a strong hand, and counter measures which quickly alienated the support of those elements in the army and the nation which might have enabled him to continue as a pro-war dictator.

His most dangerous enemies were the Bolshevists, whose chief leaders were anti-war, anti-Nationalist, anti-Slav, and more or less openly pro-German. He could never compete with them in bidding for the support of the extremists who favoured class war and

anarchy. Kerensky seemed, at one time, to be aiming at setting up a strong, nationalistic government with the aid of General Korniloff, who had some of the qualifications of a Carnot. But after encouraging Korniloff he quarrelled with him and precipitated the fiasco of the Korniloff revolt.

Korniloff, Commander-in-Chief of the armies by Kerensky's appointment, marched on Petrograd, intending to oust the Kerensky government. His forces got to within thirty miles of the city and then disbanded. Korniloff surrendered to General Alexieff, his successor in the chief command. But Korniloff's failure cut the ground from under Kerensky's feet. He was left at the mercy of the Bolsheviks, who accused him of having encouraged a military counter-revolution.

Lenine and Trotzky organized a revolt of their own on November 7th, acting through the Military Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates. Kerensky fled for safety and his government vanished overnight. Lenine nominated himself Prime Minister and Trotzky Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Russia now ceased to be either a belligerent or a nation. Lenine was determined to make a peace at any price with Germany. He didn't care what outlying portions of the ancient Romanoff Empire the Germans might appropriate, so long as they left him the heart of it in which to set up his Soviet state and to work out his formulas of terrorism and absolutism. He besought Germany for a truce, which was granted by Ludendorff. An armistice was signed at Brest-Litovsk on December 14th and the ground was cleared for the dismemberment of Russia in the grotesque "peace negotiations" which were to follow.

The revolution destroyed the Russian armies by

Sovietizing them. The Petrograd Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates controlled the revolutionary government and was strong for introducing its own system of self-regulation everywhere. Kerensky was in favour of fighting Germany to the end. But one of his first acts as Minister of Justice under the Lvoff régime was to abolish capital punishment, the only means of maintaining discipline in the field. A little later, as minister of war, he issued a Declaration of Soldiers' Rights, by which the administration of regiments and warships was placed in the hands of elected committees, four fifths of the members of which were to belong to the rank and file.

General Gourko relates many amusing incidents which occurred in the first weeks of the new military dispensation. The armies took their privileges of "self-determination" in a fairly sober spirit at the outset. But the position of the officers became ridiculous, and then tragic. Insubordination got the upper hand nearly everywhere. It could not be otherwise when the ultimate authority rested with the soldiers and their agents in the military Soviets.

In January, 1917, the Russian General Staff ordered a second winter offensive on the Dvina front, south-west of Riga. It merely duplicated the unsuccessful effort made the year before by General Kuropatkin. The Russians gained ground at first along the Dvina in the neighbourhood of Dvinsk. But they were quickly thrown back to their original lines by a German counter-offensive. For some months after the revolution, both sides remained inactive. The Russian armies were experimenting with their new liberties and were not in a mood to fight. The Germans looked to the revolution to do their work for them at little

cost. It was more economical to foment Bolshevism than to seize Riga and Petrograd by force. Moreover, a German offensive would have operated to keep alive that national feeling which the more radical revolutionists were eager to extinguish.

The Duma Provisional Government advocated a continuation of the war, but lacked the power and energy to continue it. The generals in the field were also too much upset by the new conditions to recommend action. After Kerensky became Minister of War in Lvoff's Cabinet he visited all the fronts, haranguing the troops and urging them to drive the enemy from Russian soil. At the same time he was unwilling to restore authority to the generals or to revive discipline.

He committed himself, however, to a summer offensive on the easiest of the fronts—that held by the Austro-Hungarians in Galicia. General Brusiloff had been made Commander-in-Chief of the western armies. The offensive was entrusted to General Korniloff, noted before the war for his revolutionary sentiments. Under him were some Cossack and Siberian troops who had retained their military organization. It was thought that the other units would accept his leadership because he was a Cossack and a man who had made his way to the top by his own ability and exertions.

Korniloff was well supplied with munitions, for it was only in 1917, as General Gourko says, that "the different armies were made happy by being able to reckon on having several tens of thousands of shells for the 6-inch guns and about one hundred thousand 4.8-inch trench mortar bombs." His attack opened auspiciously. He struck first in the upper valley of the Zlota Lipa River, at the enemy line guarding Lem-

berg. On July 1st he captured the village of Koniuchy and took ten thousand prisoners. Failing to break through the main lines farther back, he shifted the assault south to Brzezany and then south-west to the neighbourhood of Stanislaw. Here the enemy front was broken and the town of Kalucz was occupied. The Russians then pushed west toward Stryj. Farther east, along the Dniester River, the city of Halicz was stormed. Up to this time Korniloff had taken fifty thousand prisoners and driven a wedge twenty miles wide and ten miles deep into the Austro-German positions.

The weakened discipline of the revolutionary régime now began to tell. Many units refused to fight any longer and made for the rear. German reinforcements, coming from the north, had little trouble in regaining all the ground lost. After July 19th the whole Russian line was forced back in disorder. German and Austro-Hungarian troops recovered Stanislaw, Kolomea, Czernewitz, and Tarnopol. Galicia and Bukowina were cleared, and the Russians were thrust again beyond their own border.

In August, Kerensky removed Brusiloff from the chief command because he failed to meet the dictator's car at the railroad station at grand headquarters. Korniloff succeeded and retained the post until his attempted *coup d'état*, when Alexieff was nominated. But with the failure of the Korniloff revolt the possibility of saving the army from dissolution vanished.

Meanwhile Ludendorff decided to occupy Riga and make a demonstration toward Petrograd. The advance began on August 22d. On September 2d a crossing of the Dvina River was effected at Uxkul, ten miles south-east of Riga. General Lechitsky, commanding

on the northern front, immediately withdrew toward the east and German outposts entered the city. Pushing after the Russians, who made an unexpectedly stiff defence, the Germans captured Jacobstadt.

In October the German navy, co-operating with a military expedition, seized the Oesel, Dagö, and Moon islands, at the mouth of the Gulf of Riga. The Russian garrisons fled to the mainland. The Russian Baltic fleet came near being trapped in Moon Sound but escaped north after losing the battleship *Slava* and several smaller units.

Possession of the islands and a base opposite them on the mainland brought the Germans close to Reval, the Russian naval station on the south shore of the Gulf of Finland, and made a march to Petrograd practicable. But the Kerensky government fell early in November and the Germans saw no advantage in making war on Lenine. They drew in their lines to the east of Riga. Ludendorff needed troops elsewhere and transferred General Otto Below's Fourteenth Army from the Baltic to Italy.

On the central and southern fronts an informal truce had existed for several months. By asking for an armistice Lenine merely proclaimed in a formal way that Russia was out of the war. She had been practically out of it ever since the first weeks of the revolution.

Finland declared her independence in the summer of 1917. The Ukraine also set up a government of its own. After Lenine came into power, Siberia separated from Russia and General Kaledin, the Hetman of the Don Cossacks, declared war on the Bolshevik régime. By the end of the year what was left of Russia was ripe for reduction to the status of a German dependency.

CHAPTER XXIX

WEST FRONT OPERATIONS, 1917. JANUARY 5, 1917-
DECEMBER 5, 1917

WHEN Hindenburg displaced Falkenhayn, on August 28, 1916, he wisely elected to follow a strictly defensive policy on the Western Front. Results justified his judgment. The complete German defeat at Verdun was followed by a drawn battle on the Somme and a brilliant triumph in Rumania. Hindenburg fell into the background, however, in the winter of 1917, when Ludendorff made his bargain with the U-boat extremists, challenged the United States to enter the war, and thus introduced a new and dangerously disturbing factor into Germany's military problem.

If the U-boat failed and America sent to France the armies she was capable of raising, then Germany's greatest need might be to dispose of France and Great Britain before the American reinforcement arrived. But the German High Command shut its eyes to that contingency. It preferred to think that the U-boats would starve out Great Britain and that America could not make her power felt on the battlefield within three years—if ever. Ludendorff therefore decided to watch events on the Eastern Front, where Russia was in dissolution, and to continue Hindenburg's waiting policy in the West—at least through 1917. Acceptance of the defensive in France for a long period in-

volved a rectification of the German position there, made insecure by the results of the Battle of the Somme. In the winter of 1916-17 the German High Command made preparations for drawing out of the weakened Noyon salient and establishing the armies on the newly constructed Hindenburg Line.

This retirement was planned for the early spring and was probably hastened a little by a reopening of the Battle of the Somme. When Field Marshal Haig broke off the Somme operations on November 18, 1916, he had forced the enemy into a pronounced salient in the area north of the Ancre River. The German positions between Arras and Bapaume formed the base and one leg of an isosceles triangle, the other leg being the high road from Bapaume to Arras. The British had enveloped the triangle on its western and southern sides. If they should take Bapaume they would roll up its third side.

The south-western corner of the triangle was open to converging attack and the British Commander-in-Chief determined to utilize the winter months in pinching the Germans out of it. These operations, lasting from the first week of January to the second week in March, were entirely successful. The original German line to the west of Bapaume, running from the Ancre north-east to Arras, was gradually taken in the rear and had to be abandoned. By March 13th the whole area west of Bapaume was cleared, and the city was brought under short-range artillery fire from the west and north-west, as well as from the south-west and south. But by March 15th the German retirement was already under way. In its last stages the German defence west of Bapaume was only a cover for Hindenburg's "strategic" retreat.

In the fighting on the Ancre the Germans used for the first time a new form of defensive tactics. This consisted in a marked thinning out of the front line and the substitution of scattered centres of resistance for the continuous, strongly held trench. In the later stages of the Battle of the Somme the enemy had suffered heavy losses in prisoners trapped in their dug-outs by artillery barrages. The German High Command therefore developed the "pill-box" first line and established the main line of defence, or battle front, a mile or two farther back.

The "pill boxes," small concrete forts level with the surface and holding garrisons armed with machine guns, were hardly worth a "drum fire" bombardment. As targets they were too tiny and too dispersed. Their function was to retard an attack and throw it into confusion. If the assailants penetrated toward the battle position, they were to be met with a vigorous counter-attack. This latter manœuvre was not emphasized in the British winter operation west of Bapaume, because Hindenburg had decided to yield all his advanced positions in Picardy. But it became prominent in the battle of Arras and in all the succeeding battles on the Western Front during 1917. It succeeded in preventing an Allied break-through on anything but a local scale. But it also imposed a new burden on the defensive and thus led rapidly to the equalization of the offensive and the defensive and constituted the first stage of a return to semi-open warfare.

Early in the winter the British had extended their line south of the Somme as far as Roye. It fell to them, therefore, to occupy Bapaume, Péronne, and Chaulnes—the three objectives of the Somme battle—when Hindenburg drew back out of the Noyon salient. The

retirement began about March 15th. On March 17th Bapaume and Chaulnes were evacuated. Péronne was delivered on March 18th. On that day the French reached Noyon. Only rear-guard actions were fought while the Germans were retiring and settling into their new positions. The greatest depth of the retirement was about twenty-five miles, from Chaulnes and Roye east to the Oise Valley, between St. Quentin and La Fère. Above Péronne the Germans retreated about ten miles; above Bapaume only about five or six miles.

The Hindenburg Line or Zone joined the old German line, on the south, along the Ailette River. It ran north to La Fère and up the Oise Valley to Moy. Thence it turned north-west toward St. Quentin, which was enveloped on the south and south-east by the French. From St. Quentin it passed north and north-west, skirting Le Catelet, leaving Cambrai about five miles in the rear, and connecting with the old German line just below Arras.

The territory evacuated contained about one thousand square miles and, before the war, had supported a population of about two hundred thousand. It was systematically and brutally devastated. Cities and towns were razed, roads and bridges destroyed, trees cut down, farms ruined, and houses pillaged. Hindenburg made the salient he abandoned a desolate waste, not alone for military reasons but as a manifestation of the German policy of cold-blooded malice and terrorism.

The German communiqués described the retreat as a purely voluntary one, planned with a definite strategic object in view and conducted with masterly precision. It was voluntary, however, only in the sense of anticipating the inevitable. Hindenburg could not have

held the Noyon salient any longer, without running useless risks. It had become a trap. If he had not withdrawn from it without a fight in March, he would have been obliged to evacuate it in April as a consequence of the British advance east of Arras.

The British offensive east of Arras was part of a joint operation, projected, in co-operation with the French, as far back as November, 1916. Having shaken the hold of the Germans on the apex of the Noyon salient, it was agreed by the two high commands to attack next at the two extremities—at Arras, on the north, and on the Aisne, above Soissons and Rheims, on the south. The Hindenburg retreat did not interfere with Franco-British plans except in so far as it limited their strategic scope, their original object—that of compelling a German recoil on a large scale—having already been attained.

The British opened the Arras offensive on April 9th. The battle line was forty-five miles long, extending from Lens down to St. Quentin. But the main effort was made at the northern end, on a thirteen-mile front from Hénin-sur-Cojeul, south-east of Arras, to Givenchy-en-Gohelle, a short distance south-west of Lens. The artillery preparation had lasted four days and pulverized the old-style German front-trench system. On the first day the Canadian divisions of the First Army took Vimy Ridge, which had defied Foch in the two battles of Artois in 1915. Vimy Ridge was the strongest position in Northern France. Its possession was of enormous value to the British a year later, when Ludendorff's first great drive overran the Noyon salient once more and gravely threatened Amiens. Ludendorff would probably have reached Amiens if he had been able to batter down the British bastion about Arras.

But the British First Army held fast there, thus saving the day for the retreating Third and Fifth armies.

On April 9th the British broke through the German positions in the Arras-Lens sector for a gain of between two and three miles, and took six thousand prisoners. On April 10th they enlarged their gains east of Arras, reaching the edge of Monchy-le-Preux, and taking five thousand more prisoners. The next day they captured Monchy, and on April 12th Wancourt and Héninel, north-east of Hénin. On April 13th they struck on a twelve-mile front, north and south of Lens, and gained a mile. Liévin, a suburb of Lens to the south-west, was entered, as was Cité St. Pierre, to the north-west. But Lens remained unconquerable. Although pocketed for a year and a half, it was not abandoned by the Germans until the final retreat from France began.

On the line from Quéant down to St. Quentin little progress was made, although the British captured Fayet, just north of St. Quentin, which was now closely enveloped on three sides. Between April 9th and 15th Haig's armies took fifteen thousand prisoners and about two hundred guns.

The battle now passed into the second stage. Hindenburg brought up reserves and used them lavishly in counter-attacks. The old German trench line of 1914-17 east of Arras had been broken. The northernmost sector of the new Hindenburg Line had also been shattered. But behind those lines others had been constructed. The Oppy line ran north and south behind the original German positions and still farther back was the Quéant-Drocourt line, cutting north from the Hindenburg Line at Quéant and ending south-east of Lens.

Field-Marshal Haig made a desperate effort, after April 23d, to break through the Oppy line. In six days of extremely bloody fighting he did break it, the British taking Roeux, Oppy, and Arleux-en-Gohelle. Then the new German method of persistent counter-attack was employed to bring on a deadlock somewhat similar to the old deadlock of rigid positional warfare. From April 30th to June 1st there was continuous semi-open fighting on the Oppy front—between Quéant and Fresnoy. Gradually the fierceness of the German counter-assaults wore down the British offensive. The Germans retook all the villages on the Oppy line—Fresnoy, Oppy, Roeux, Pelves, and Chérisy. The British retained Bullecourt, west of Quéant.

The battle ended in a stand-off. Haig had had a brilliant initial success, but was unable to exploit it. He had been turned back on the Oppy line. Both sides suffered enormous losses. But the German losses were probably greater, because of the costly burden of local counter-attacks which had now been thrust on armies maintaining the defensive. Haig had, moreover, made territorial gains of considerable value. And to the Germans, the loss of Vimy Ridge was a genuine disaster. The British now turned away from Artois and Picardy to experiment with a series of local offensives in Flanders.

The French operation on the Aisne sector began on April 16th, a week later than Haig's east and north of Arras. The battle line ran for twenty-five miles from a point north of Soissons to a point north of Rheims. In this region there had been no fighting on a large scale since the fall of 1914. The attack, carried out under the direction of General Nivelle, opened vigorously. All the German first line and a part of

the second line were carried. Ten thousand Germans were captured on the first day.

Hindenburg pursued here also his new policy of tremendous counter-attacks. These held the French up after a time. But, on April 17th, a new gain was made east of Rheims, where the village of Auberive was captured, with 2500 prisoners. On the 18th an attack was launched on the whole line from Soissons to Auberive. Vailly, on the Aisne, was taken, with several other villages. Hindenburg countered again with violence, but could only stop the French momentarily. By the end of April, Nivelle had captured 175 guns and 21,000 prisoners.

The French were now approaching the famous Chemin des Dames, the highway built by Louis XV as a promenade for his daughters. On May 4th they stormed Craonne, at the eastern end of the highway. The next day they made progress at its western end and also seized the eastern portion of the ridge along which the Chemin des Dames runs, giving them command of the part of the Ailette Valley extending toward Laon. Five thousand more prisoners were taken. But at this moment Nivelle's offensive was broken off. It had been much too costly. M. Painlevé, Minister of War at the time, admitted in 1919 that the French loss in killed, up to April 26, was 34,000.

In order to quiet unpleasant criticism, General Pétain had been named on April 29th Chief of Staff and attached to the Ministry of War. His appointment foreshadowed Nivelle's retirement, which was accomplished, on May 15th, by the nomination of Pétain to the command of the armies in Northern France and of Foch as Pétain's successor as Chief of Staff and adviser to the War Ministry.

The period following Nivelle's offensive on the Aisne was one of singular depression in France, both in the armies and among the civilian population. There was a marked reaction from the fervour of 1914, 1915, and 1916. Verdun and the Somme had imposed terrible sacrifices, the extent of which was just beginning to be felt. The reaction was psychological, in the main. It was not based on the economic or the military situation, for, now that Germany had forced the United States into the war, France's financial worries were banished and a military victory for the Entente seemed assured. Whatever the reasons, French morale suffered a decline. General Zurlinden, in his *La Guerre de Libération*, speaking of the situation after Pétain's appointment, says:

Unfortunately General Pétain had to face at once serious difficulties in the way of discipline. Some of our troops—though a very small number—showed weariness, discouragement, and even insubordination. At Soissons, toward the end of May, two regiments, displaying the red flag, marched on the railroad station, with the intention of seizing trains and going to Paris to make a protest to the Chamber of Deputies. The manifestation was stopped in time. The leaders were arrested and received exemplary punishment. The regiments were disbanded, and the men scattered throughout the army. Good order was rapidly established, thanks to the excellent measures, displaying both tact and authority, which were taken by General Pétain, who knew how to talk to the men in a language full of cordiality, virility, and clarity, and to reawaken in their hearts confidence, enthusiasm, and the will to conquer.

The year 1917 was one of instability in government in France and of injurious defeatist intrigues. On March 14th, General Lyautey, the Minister of War, came into collision with the Chamber of Deputies by declaring that answers to interpellations were a source of danger to the national defence, even when they were made in secret session. As a result of violent protest from the Deputies he offered his resignation. The Briand Ministry thereupon fell. Alexandre Ribot formed a new ministry on March 19th. This ministry succumbed on September 10th, after many of its members had indicated their unwillingness to serve longer under M. Ribot. M. Painlevé, the Minister of War, then assumed the Premiership, retaining Ribot as Minister of Foreign Affairs. But dissatisfaction and factionalism continued. The defeatist scandal had become flagrant and M. Painlevé showed weakness in dealing with it. His ministry fell on November 13th. Clemenceau then came forward with a programme of drastic punishment for all pacifist, defeatist, and pro-German propagandists. He became Premier on November 16th. His virile personality put new force into the government and reunited the country. His policy was condensed into a single sentence: "I make war."

The defeatist agitation, which aimed at a peace of surrender with Germany, was conducted, on the one side, by the extreme Socialists, who wished to restore the power of the Socialist international organization by working in harmony with the Russian and German groups, and, on the other, by politicians who expected to come into control in a "peace-without-victory" government.

M. Malvy, who had been Minister of the Interior

in the Ribot and preceding ministries, was charged with having tolerated and encouraged commerce with the enemy, and with having had relations with the managers of the *Bonnet Rouge*, a defeatist newspaper, supposed to have been supported by German funds. Malvy's subordinate, M. Leymarie, was implicated in an attempt to hush up the fact that Duval, the manager of the *Bonnet Rouge*, had been caught returning from Switzerland with a check for 125,000 francs in his possession. Almereyda, the editor of the paper, was arrested and either committed suicide or was murdered in prison.

The most unblushing trafficker with Germany was Bolo Pasha. He received large sums from the German Government to be used in getting control of the French press. He furnished Senator Humbert with part of the money with which the latter bought *Le Journal*. But behind Malvy and behind the group which expected to turn defeat to political account was the sinister figure of Joseph Caillaux. He had long been recognized as friendly to Germany and opposed to the alliance with Great Britain, and he apparently held himself in reserve as the one man available to form a ministry when France should again, as in 1871, seek terms from a victorious enemy.

Caillaux had great influence in the Chamber of Deputies. But when Clemenceau came into power the government resolutely uncovered all the defeatist scandals and prosecuted those involved in them. France cleaned house and turned with fresh energy to the prosecution of the war.

The German High Command was, of course, fully aware of the propaganda carried on to break down the French fighting spirit. It began, early in May, a

series of violent counter-attacks on the French positions north-east of Soissons, and continued them through June, July, and August. But all of these broke down with insignificant gains. Germany challenged France once more to a duel of attrition, something like that at Verdun in 1916. The result was the same. According to French figures Ludendorff used up forty-nine divisions on the Chemin des Dames front alone. But at the end of August the lines on that front were practically unchanged.

On August 20th Pétain launched an offensive at Verdun, on both sides of the Meuse. In four days the French recovered all the ground they had lost on the west bank the year before. They re-took Dead Man's Hill, Corbeaux, and Cumières Woods, Goose Hill, Régnécourt, and Hill 304, and reached Forges Brook. On the east side of the river Talou Hill, Champneuville, Hills 344 and 240, and Samogneux were stormed. Early in September Caurières Wood was retaken and the line of February 21, 1916, on the east bank was nearly re-established. More than ten thousand prisoners were captured.

Pétain, who was wisely building up the armies under him for the critical tests of 1918, ended the campaign of 1917 with one more brilliant but carefully limited offensive. This began on October 23d, on a six-mile front north-east of Soissons. It was preceded by a heavy four-day bombardment and achieved its objectives with surprising ease. The attack, made by the army of General Maître, extended from Laffaux, near Vauxaillon, to Fort de la Malmaison. The German fore positions were penetrated all along the line and Fort de la Malmaison was captured. The enemy's hold on the Chemin des Dames now became precarious

and he withdrew to the north side of the Ailette River. In this operation the French captured nearly twelve thousand prisoners and two hundred guns, their own losses being very moderate. About forty square miles of French territory were liberated.

After the battle of Arras and until November the British High Command devoted itself to an ambitious and stubborn effort to shatter the German line in Flanders and compel a German retirement from the Belgian coast. Field-Marshal Haig carried through a number of carefully prepared attacks, with limited objectives. But the larger aim behind all of them was to reach Menin and Roulers and turn the German positions from Dixmude to Nieuport, which covered the enemy's sea bases at Ostend and Zeebrugge.

As a preliminary step it was necessary to eject the Germans from Messines Ridge, south of Ypres. This ridge commanded the city and a large part of the Ypres salient, as reduced after the successful German attack of April, 1915. The Flanders sector was held by the British Second Army, under General Sir Herbert C. O. Plumer. He had been planning an attack on Messines Ridge for many months and his sappers had mined the range at many points. On the morning of June 7, 1917, the mines were set off. The German defences were blown to pieces and the British infantry swept forward in a few minutes over the wreckage of the first line. Within three hours the top of the ridge was cleared and later in the afternoon the German rear lines along the southern base were stormed. The battle lasted only one day, and was a clean-cut British victory. Seven thousand prisoners were captured. The German casualties were about thirty thousand. Plumer's were about ten thousand.

On June 11th the Germans attacked some exposed British front positions east of the Yser River, near the Belgian coast. The bridges across the river were destroyed by artillery fire and the trenches were rushed. The British lost about three thousand men, twelve hundred of whom were taken prisoners.

The capture of Messines Ridge opened the way for a vigorous Allied offensive in the Ypres sector. The immediate objective was the Passchendaele Ridge, the name given to a series of heights stretching north-east and south-west, at a distance of two or three miles east of Ypres. The ultimate objectives were Menin and Roulers and the railroad lines from Lille north to Bruges.

Three armies were concentrated on an eighteen-mile front from Dixmude down to the neighbourhood of Warneton. On the left was a French army, under General Antoine; in the centre, the British Second Army, under Plumer; on the right, the newly created British Fifth Army, under Gough. In a part of this operation the Belgian army, north of Antoine's, was also engaged.

The attack began on July 31st, after a tremendous artillery preparation. The British and French infantry carried the first and second German lines, and, in some cases, the third line. An average advance of about two miles was made and five thousand prisoners were captured. A two-day rain intervened. When the ground had dried out the assault was resumed. On August 10th the British took Westhoek village, three miles east of Ypres, and the French stormed Bixschoote. On the 17th the British entered Langemarck, on the extreme left of their line, and the French seized the bridgehead of Drie Grachten. More heavy rains now turned Flanders into a marsh.

Between September 20th and October 14th the Allied armies delivered five successive assaults east and north-east of Ypres. That of September 20th was made on an eight-mile front, north and south of the Ypres-Menin highroad. It resulted in the capture of Glen-course Wood, Inverness Cope, Nonne Boshen, Gallipoli, Iberian Farm, and Potsdam Vampire, names invented by the British "Tommies" and unknown to the maps. In the centre Veldhoek, on the Ypres-Menin road, was taken, with part of Polygon Wood. In the second drive, on September 6th, Tower Hamlet crest, the rest of Polygon Wood, and Zonnebeke, near the Ypres-Roulers railroad, fell to the British.

On October 4th the attack shifted farther to the north. The Broodseinde crest of Passchendaele Ridge was occupied. Forty-five hundred Germans were made prisoners. On the 9th Plumer and Antoine conducted a joint operation still farther north. The British took Poelcapelle and advanced toward Passchendaele village and the Forest of Houthulst. The French carried several villages and brought up on the southern edge of the forest.

Without giving the enemy a breathing space, Plumer struck again on the 12th, in a driving rain, on a six-mile line between the Ypres-Roulers railroad and Houthulst. He got to within five hundred yards of Passchendaele. On the 22d the French occupied the southern part of Houthulst Forest, the British gained ground toward Passchendaele, and the Belgian army captured the Merckem peninsula, south of Dixmude. The British got into Passchendaele village on October 30th, but were driven out again. A Canadian division, however, recaptured it on November 7th and stormed the German defences eight hundred yards east of it.

With that brilliant success the second battle of Flanders ended.

It, too, like the battle of Arras, had degenerated into a deadlock of attrition. The losses on both sides were severe, the Germans suffering more than the Allies. But the strategical results of the Allied offensive were disappointing. Haig had failed to reach the plain east of the Passchendaele heights, although his guns now commanded Roulers and Menin. He had not broken the German grip on the Belgian coast, or on Lille.

The positions he had won were of some local value, but they were dearly bought. They had all to be abandoned, without a fight, in the spring of 1918, when Ludendorff's second great drive—up the Lys Valley—threatened the envelopment of Ypres from the south and south-west. Even Messines Ridge could not hold out, as Vimy Ridge had held out against the first Ludendorff drive. Yet the Flanders operation had shown that the offensive, under the changed conditions of warfare, had got beyond the capacity of the defence to stop it dead within certain limits. The only question now was to develop an offensive which would eventually become unstoppable.

The battle of Cambrai proved that such an offensive was already taking form. It resulted in the first complete break-through of a deep trench system effected on the Western Front. It was notable for two things—a complete absence of artillery preparation and the use of tanks on a large scale and as the principal arm of attack. With Cambrai the era of rigid positional warfare vanished and the era of semi-open and nearly open warfare arrived.

Cambrai was in every sense a surprise operation.

It took the Germans unawares. On the other hand, its success was so far beyond reasonable anticipations that no adequate provision had been made for following it up.

The task of breaking the formidable Hindenburg Line in one of its vital sectors was entrusted by Field-Marshal Haig to the British Third Army, in command of which General Allenby had been replaced by General Sir Julian H. G. Byng. Allenby was sent to Palestine, where he was to win later one of the completest victories of the war. Byng's objective was Cambrai, one of the principal anchors of the German defence system in Northern France. The British got to within two miles of that important railroad centre and military base. But lack of reserves prevented them from advancing farther, or even holding the ground they had gained.

The battle line extended for thirty-five miles, from the Scarpe River, on the north-west, to St. Quentin, on the south-east. But the main and successful thrust occurred on a front of about six miles, south-west of Cambrai, between the Cambrai-Bapaume and Cambrai-Péronne highroads. The north-western end of this front was at Hermies and the south-eastern at Gonnellieu.

The engagement began at sunrise on November 20th, when four hundred tanks crawled forward in the haze towards the front positions of the Hindenburg Zone. The British also used screening smoke clouds. But they were hardly needed, since the visibility was extremely low. Within a few minutes the tanks, followed by infantry, were through the obstructions and over the first line, the troops holding it surrendering without a fight. The tanks pushed on for the German second and third lines and crossed them both. The German

front was lightly held, owing to the diversion of many troops to Flanders. The defenders hastily retired toward Cambrai and the valley of the Scheldt River. The maximum British advance on November 20th was five miles. Ten thousand prisoners were taken.

The British left pushed north-east to the Cambrai-Bapaume highroad and reached the neighbourhood of Mœuvres and Bourlon Wood, the latter overlooking Cambrai. The centre crossed the Scheldt Canal at Marcoing and Masnières. The right drove still farther east toward Crèvecœur, on the Scheldt, due south of Cambrai, from which side Field-Marshal Haig had hoped to strike at the German railroad connections centring in the city.

On November 21st the advance was resumed. The British left wing took Mœuvres, to the north of the Cambrai-Bapaume road, and progressed to the southern edge of Bourlon Wood. Farther east, Cantaing, two miles south-west of Cambrai, was captured. Between Bourlon Wood and Cantaing, the village of Fontaine-Nôtre Dame was stormed. South of Cambrai and south-east of Marcoing the offensive was held up a short distance east of Crèvecœur, the apex of the salient which Byng had driven through and behind the Hindenburg Line.

The idea of getting across the Scheldt and turning Cambrai from the south was now abandoned in favour of an attempt to seize and hold Bourlon Wood. On November 23d Welsh troops, who had been specially trained in wood fighting, carried the whole of the wood, about six hundred acres in extent, and also reached the western edge of Bourlon village. For the next four or five days the British were violently counter-attacked on this front and hardly held their own, losing a part

of Bourlon Wood and the village of Fontaine-Nôtre Dame.

Ludendorff had gathered reserves from all directions. Since the British attack seemed spent, he decided to take the offensive himself. Byng's forces had not been materially strengthened and now held a vulnerable salient, which they were unable to widen out. On November 30th six German divisions tried to break the northern side of the British triangle and six more the eastern side. The attempt failed on the north. But on the east and south-east, where fighting had died away for a week, the British were taken by surprise and their whole line was pierced and crumpled up.

The southern attack was made on a ten-mile line from Masnières down to Vendhuille. Within a couple of hours the storming columns were three miles inside the British positions. At the extreme south they reached Gouzeaucourt, on the line from which Byng's offensive had started on November 20th. They were now on the flank and rear of the British in the apex of the salient towards Crèvecœur and Masnières. At Gouzeaucourt they nearly captured General de Lisle, commanding the 29th Division, and his staff; at Gonnelieu they just missed taking General Vincent, of the 37th Brigade of the 29th Division, who found himself cut off from his troops, fighting farther east.

The British right wing was badly smashed and retreated in disorder. But the centre about Masnières held on desperately. Masnières and Marcoing were not evacuated until December 2d, when the British withdrew out of the Masnières-Crèvecœur salient. On the north the British left wing lost a little ground, but administered a severe check to the enemy.

The southern line was re-established by December 3d,

following the surrender of about half the territory originally gained. The Germans captured one hundred guns and six thousand prisoners. But they had lost 145 guns and eleven thousand prisoners. They occupied a small sector of the original British line, between Vendhuille and Gonnelleu. On the other hand, the British retained a firm grip on eleven thousand yards of the original Hindenburg Line, and were still within striking distance of Cambrai.

Byng's offensive was not supported properly because Field-Marshal Haig's army was worn down by the long and bloody fighting in Flanders and because, in addition, Haig had been obliged to send several divisions to Italy to help stabilize the Piave front. But the Cambrai experiment was worth while. It showed that the Hindenburg Line could be broken and that infantry and tanks could go through the zones on which the defensive was now obliged to rely. It prefigured the new mode of warfare which was to play so dramatic a rôle in the decisive campaigns of 1918.

CHAPTER XXX

THE ISONZO-CAPORETTO. MAY 12, 1917--DECEMBER
31, 1917

THE Italian High Command continued through 1917 its patient and unavailing effort to break through the Isonzo barrier and reach Laibach and Trieste. A continuation of the Isonzo campaign was made more hazardous by the fact that Russia had virtually drawn out of the war and thus released large Austro-Hungarian forces from the Galician and Bukowinan front. But Italy still aimed at the recovery of her unredeemed districts, and it was only a choice of evils whether she should renew the offensive towards Trieste or engage in an equally unpromising offensive up the Adige or down the Val Sugano for Trent.

General Cadorna expected another Austro-Hungarian attack out of the Trentino in the early spring of 1917. He prepared to meet it; but it didn't come. So in May and June the Second and Third Italian armies renewed the exhausting warfare of the rigid positional type which they had been carrying on for two years past in the mountain strongholds about Gorizia.

The first operation began on May 12th, with a heavy artillery preparation, lasting two days. On May 14th the infantry advanced from Gorizia and Plava to establish a foothold on the rim of the Bainsizza Plateau, on

the east bank of the Isonzo. North of Gorizia, Monte Cucco and a part of Monte Santo, on the south-western side of the plateau, were stormed on the 14th and 15th. The Italians took 7113 prisoners.

On May 23d the Third Army attacked on the Carso front, the battle continuing until May 27th. Many local gains were made and 16,568 prisoners and twenty guns were captured. But on June 1st the Austro-Hungarians, strongly reinforced, started a counter-offensive on the sector from Gorizia to the Adriatic. It was partially successful and brought Cadorna's effort to an end.

From May 19th to May 22d the Austro-Hungarians made a feint at an offensive in the Adige sector. Cadorna retorted in June with minor attacks in the neighbourhood of Asiago. But this front remained tranquil, for the most part, until after Caporetto.

Cadorna made his final Isonzo campaign in the period between August and October. It was as spirited and stubborn as the others. But, like the others, it produced nothing substantial. The Austrians called this last effort somewhat derogatively "the Eleventh Battle of the Isonzo"; and in the same vein the German General Staff issued, after Caporetto, a pamphlet describing the great Italian defeat as "the Twelfth Battle of the Isonzo."

The Italian operation began on August 19th with great promise. After five days of bitter fighting the Second Army, under General Capello, cleared the northern part of the Bainsizza Plateau. On the 24th the rest of Monte Santo was stormed and the Austro-Hungarians retired to the eastern edge of the Bainsizza stronghold. At last the way toward Laibach seemed about to be opened.

By September, Capello had penetrated the plateau to a depth of seven and a half miles, on a front of eleven miles. On September 14th he occupied Monte San Gabriele, which dominated Monte San Daniele, still held by the Austrians, in the south-eastern section of Bainsizza. Beyond Bainsizza lay the Chiapovano Valley and beyond the valley the Ternovano Plateau, in many respects a duplicate of the Bainsizza and the Carso. But this plateau could be turned by way of the Chiapovano Valley on the north and the road to Laibach on the south.

Below Gorizia, however, the Duke of Aosta, commanding the Third Army, was less successful in the final thrust at the Carso. He tried to take Mount Hermada and to penetrate into the Vippaco Valley. But he made little progress, meeting powerful counter-attacks. By October the situation on the Russian front, disturbed in July by the Korniloff offensive, had simmered down to an informal truce, which freed Austria-Hungary of all apprehension. She now rushed eastern troops to the west and began to plan, with German aid, to put an end to the Italian menace to Trieste.

It was time. The defence of the Gorizia front had been arduous and costly. In the last battle of the Isonzo Austria had lost thirty thousand prisoners. Her total losses were well over one hundred thousand.

The German General Staff assumed direction of the great counter-stroke against Italy. Otto Below's Fourteenth Army was transferred from the Riga front and was used as the battering-ram with which to break through the Italian line on the upper Isonzo. The Teuton forces were grouped in this order, from west to east, on the Italian front: Hoetendorff, with one

army, in the Trentino; Krobatin, with one, in the Carnic Alps; then Below, above the Bainsizza Plateau; then the Archduke Eugene, with two armies, from Bainsizza down to Trieste.

Below had chosen the weakest spot in Cadorna's defence. From Tolmino north the Isonzo Valley makes a sharp bend to the north-west, so that a passage of the river in the neighbourhood of Caporetto would bring the enemy directly on the flank and rear of the Italian armies which were fighting in the mountains east of Gorizia. From Caporetto it was only a short march south-west to the Natisone Valley, which emerges from the Friuli foothills at Cividale, an important military base, only ten miles east of Italian Grand Headquarters at Udine.

The Tolmino-Plezzo line, on the east bank of the upper Isonzo, was held by the left wing of Capello's Second Army. But as there had been no active fighting on it since the beginning of the war, its defence was naturally assigned to the second class divisions. There were many charges after Caporetto that certain Italian units had become demoralized through communications with the enemy and pacifist propaganda conducted by Teuton agents. General Cadorna, in one of his communiqués, explicitly charged a part of the Second Army with cowardice. But this accusation was afterwards softened.

It was not necessary to offer excuses of that sort for the Italian defeat. Better troops would probably have been equally unable to stop Below's veterans. The true cause of the disaster was Cadorna's willingness to risk an offensive beyond the Isonzo while his flank was insufficiently protected against attacks coming out of the upper Julian Alps, the Carnic Alps, or

the Trentino. Below simply did what Hoetzendorff came near doing in 1916, when his Trentino offensive was cut short by Brusiloff's sensational successes in Volhynia, Bukowina, and Galicia.

Below's troops were secretly deployed on the Tolmino-Plezzo front. The offensive was set in advance for October 24th and began promptly on that day with a violent bombardment. This included the use of gas waves and liquid fire, which made a powerful impression on troops quite unaccustomed to them. The Italian line yielded at many points. German infantry crossed the Isonzo at Tolmino and also at Plezzo and converged toward Caporetto, thus isolating the Italians holding Monte Nero and other advanced points in the centre, to the east of the Isonzo.

By October 26th Below had reached the upper Natisone Valley. From Tolmino also he had pushed south-west beyond Ronzina, on the Isonzo, capturing many thousands of non-combatants attached to the services in the Italian rear. On the 27th the Fourteenth German Army took Monte Matajur, the chief defence of the upper Natisone Valley. The next day it reached Cividale. On October 30th it occupied Udine.

The break-through at Tolmino imperilled the centre and right of the Second Italian army, occupying the Bainsizza Plateau and the region east of Gorizia. It retreated in disorder, pressed by the Archduke Eugene. A temporary stand by its rear guards on Vippaco Ridge enabled it to get clear. The Third Army had ample time to retreat west in the coast region. It suffered relatively small losses.

But the rout of the Second Army had uncovered the right flank of the Fourth Army, guarding the line in the Carnic Alps. Krobatin pushed down the upper

valley of the Tagliamento River to Gemona and, farther west, down the little valleys of the streams which enter the Piave. Three Italian armies were thus retreating south and west toward a new defensive line, which should stretch north across the Venetian Plain and then bend west to link up with the First Army's positions facing the Trentino.

The first halting place was the Tagliamento River. By the time they got to it the Italians had lost 180,000 prisoners and 1500 guns. A line along the Tagliamento—at least along its middle course—had been partially prepared to cover a retreat. But it had the disadvantage of being open to a turning movement from the north. The much shorter line of the Livenza River was then chosen as a barrier. In the retreat to it, ending November 8th, the Italian loss in prisoners had mounted to 250,000 and in guns to 2300.

The Livenza line was also untenable on the north. It was occupied for a few days only while the Piave line, twenty miles farther back, was being prepared. Here the broken Italian armies rallied effectively in the middle of November. General Cadorna was transferred from the supreme command to a place on the new Inter-Allied War Council, and General Diaz was nominated as his successor. Diaz wisely decided to fight it out with the invaders on the Piave.

The Piave line was not inherently strong. It was not as well secured against a turning movement as was the line of the Adige. But a retreat to the Adige would have involved the surrender of Venice, Padua, and Vicenza and practically all of the province of Venetia. It would have been an exaggerated confession of Italian weakness. If Venetia was to be defended, the defence would have to be made on the Piave.

And the Piave line possessed certain obvious advantages. It could be flooded for a considerable distance in the Adriatic sector, thus sheltering Venice. It ran north-west to the mountains, instead of north, and from its upper course the Italian front could be easily extended west to the headwaters of the Brenta, thence to the Asiago-Arsiero region and on to the Adige. Such a readjustment compelled a retirement of the right wing of the First Army, which had been holding the district west of the Piave. It left the Italians clinging precariously to the last ridges of the Alps above the Venetian Plain. And it also transferred the shock of the Teuton attack from the east to the north.

From the middle of November till the end of December the Austro-German effort centred on the mountain line between the Piave and the Brenta and thence west across the Asiago Plateau. Hoetendorff and Krobatin threw masses of troops against the Italian positions from Monte Tomba, near the Piave, across to Monte Grappa and the Brenta, and from the Brenta west to the Astico. The Italian armies on this front were reinforced by three British divisions and a small French army under General Fayolle. It was able to hold its own, though pressed back close to the plain in the region west of the Brenta.

In an offensive lasting from December 5th to December 8th Hoetendorff captured fifteen thousand prisoners west of the Brenta. On December 15th Col Caprille was stormed and, on December 19th, Monte Assolone. Five thousand prisoners were taken in these two operations. The Austrians were now within four miles of the plain. But the Italians made a timely counter-attack and retook Monte Assolone.

In the last week of December, Hoetzendorff captured Col del Rosso and Monte Valbella, at the head of the Frenzela Valley, running north-west from the Brenta. Nine thousand prisoners were taken. But at last the winter snows intervened and operations ceased. Just before New Year's the French had a brilliant local success at Monte Tomba.

The Teuton offensive yielded in all 2700 guns and nearly 300,000 prisoners. About four thousand square miles of Italian territory were overrun. The Caporetto campaign was another terrific indictment of the feebleness of Allied strategy. An immediate outcome was the Rapallo Conference, at which the French, British, and Italian governments agreed to create an Inter-Allied General Staff, consisting of General Foch, General Wilson, and General Cadorna. This staff was to act as advisers to a supreme war council, composed of the Prime Minister and one other member of the government of each of the three Powers.

This was a step—but only a halting one—toward unity of military control. The Supreme War Council functioned without effect so far as introducing a centralized direction of the war was concerned. Another great Allied disaster—the defeat of the British Fifth Army west of St. Quentin—was needed to prod the Allied governments into selecting a generalissimo and entrusting him with command on all the fronts.

CHAPTER XXXI

BALKAN AND ASIATIC CAMPAIGNS OF 1917. JANUARY
1, 1917—DECEMBER 31, 1917

ON the Balkan front the war languished all through 1917. Early in the year the Germans completed their operations in Eastern Wallachia. The Dobrudja was cleared entirely and the Russian-Rumanian line from Braila to Fokshani was forced. Braila was captured on January 5th, the defenders retiring toward Galatz. After February 15th the Teuton line ran north-west from Braila across to the Carpathians. It became practically stationary. The Germans pursued the same policy toward Rumania as they did toward Russia. It wasn't necessary to fight, because the Russian revolution was steadily dragging both countries toward the brink of a peace at any price.

On the Macedonian front a long period of inaction set in after the capture of Monastir by the Allies in November, 1916. Only petty local operations were indulged in up to the fall of 1918. The Allied garrison in the Salonica entrenched camp constituted a threat against Bulgaria and Turkey and protected Greece. Otherwise it served no strategic purpose. In December, 1917, General Sarrail was recalled to France. General Guillaumat succeeded him in command of the Allied armies on the Salonica front.

The situation was greatly improved, however, by the tardy deposition of Constantine. What the Allies should have done in 1915—certainly in 1916—they plucked up courage to do on June 12, 1917. M. Jonnart, former Governor General of Algeria, was sent to Athens by the governments of France and Great Britain (Italy also giving her approval), to demand Constantine's abdication. The latter capitulated at once. He designated his second son, Prince Alexander, as his successor, and retired to Switzerland.

The new king summoned Venizelos to form a ministry. The Venizelos Assembly, which Constantine had illegally dissolved, was again called into being. Greece broke off diplomatic relations with Germany and prepared to enter the war on the side of the Allies. Her accession strengthened the army on the Macedonian front and made possible the success of the final attack on Bulgaria a year later.

The British Government had long hesitated to participate in the dethronement of Constantine, balking at coercion on the part of the three guardian Powers—France, Great Britain, and Russia. But coercion had at last to be resorted to, and by that time the Russian Government (Kerensky's), having fallen out of sympathy with the Western Powers, refused to concur in the intervention and even protested against it. Down to the day of his ejection, Constantine had never ceased to act as an enemy of the Entente and a friend of Germany.

British prestige on the Asiatic front was restored by the capture of Bagdad in May and of Jerusalem in December.

The Bagdad expedition, under General Sir Stanley Maude, was organized in the latter half of 1916. The

Turks were still defending Kut-el-Amara, whose fortified lines had proved too strong for the army under Lake, which had tried to relieve Townshend. General Maude began operations on January 6, 1917. It took him nearly two months to reduce the Turkish positions east of Kut. But late in February he cleared the southern bank of the Tigris and threw a bridge across the river to the northern bank, near Kut. At the same time he forced the formidable Sannaiyat lines, on the northern bank. The Turks retreated north on February 24th, pursued by the British cavalry on land and by the British flotilla in the river. The latter recaptured the vessels lost in the Townshend surrender and destroyed all the other Turkish river craft.

The pursuit was halted at Azizyeh, fifty miles from Kut and half way to Bagdad, in order to reorganize the communication lines. It was resumed on March 5th. The infantry advanced to Zeur, eighteen miles up the river, the cavalry going seven miles farther. On March 7th the British head columns came in contact with the Turks, who had abandoned Ctesiphon, on the line of the Diala River, eight miles below Bagdad. British troops were now transferred to the west bank of the river, to take the Diala positions in flank. They made rapid progress north and on March 10th engaged the Turks two or three miles south and west of Bagdad. The city was entered on March 11th. On the 10th the Diala lines, on the east bank, were forced. The next day General Marshall, commanding on that side, moved up to Bagdad, completing its occupation.

The Turks retired twenty miles up the Tigris Valley and entrenched themselves at Mushaidie Station, on the Bagdad-Mosul railroad. General Cobbe's column stormed these positions on March 14th. The Turks

then fled another twenty-five miles north toward Mosul. On March 14th, also, a British post was established on the Diala, thirty miles north-east of Bagdad. Five days later General Maude sent troops thirty-five miles west of the city to the Euphrates River, where they drove the Turkish garrison out of Feluja. This operation gave the British control of both the Euphrates and the Tigris and established their position securely in Upper Mesopotamia. From December 13, 1916, to March 31, 1917, General Maude's army took 7921 Turkish prisoners.

Operations were suspended for a time, awaiting the result of a Russian offensive out of Persia. This drove the Turks from Hamadan and across the Turkish frontier. But the Russian revolution intervened and ended all serious plans for military co-operation. The best the Russians could do was to capture Nereman in October. This town lies fifty miles north of Mosul. But Maude's army didn't reach Mosul until the closing days of the war. He was left therefore to depend on his own resources, in his campaign beyond Bagdad. On April 23d he took Samara, securing control of the railroad to that point. Then the summer heats interrupted active operations.

On September 30th the British, pushing up the Euphrates, captured Ramadie, with the whole of Ahmed Bey's small army in that sector. In the Tigris Valley they advanced to Tekrit, fifteen miles north of Samara. But dubious conditions on the Russian front made it advisable to limit progress toward Mosul. General Maude died on November 18th, and was succeeded in command of the Mesopotamian army by General Marshall.

General Allenby had been sent to Egypt in the

summer of 1917 to organize an advance into Palestine. The British had crossed the Sinai Peninsula in January and February, heading for Gaza and Beersheba. They were held up south of those two points all summer. In October Allenby took charge. He captured Beersheba on October 31st and Gaza on November 6th. He then advanced north, against unexpectedly feeble resistance, and cut the Jerusalem-Joppa (Jaffa) railroad at Ludd and El Ramle, a short distance from the Mediterranean coast. Joppa was then evacuated by the Turks.

Allenby now began an encircling movement directed at Jerusalem. He moved south-east along the railroad from Joppa and north along the railroad from Beersheba. The Turkish positions west, north, and south of the Holy City were carried. The Turks avoided envelopment by hurriedly retiring east toward the Jordan River. Jerusalem fell on December 10th—its redemption from Turkish rule sending a thrill through Christendom, Teuton Christendom excepted.

The British then extended their positions east of the city and secured their hold on Joppa by occupying high ground four miles to the north of that port. The Turks held the northern half of Palestine and also retained their grip on the Jordan Valley and the Hedjaz railroad, to the west of it, connecting Damascus with Medina.

The conquest of German East Africa was completed in 1917. The German forces were gradually broken up into small guerilla bands. On December 3d the British War Office announced that the last of the German colonies had passed into the possession of the Allies.

CHAPTER XXXII

SUBMARINE AND NAVAL OPERATIONS, 1917

GERMANY staked everything she had on the success of her U-boat campaign against Allied and neutral shipping. She forced the United States into the war by her reversion to the policy of unrestricted submarine warfare. If she couldn't blockade Great Britain and France and couldn't prevent the transportation of American troops to Europe, the man-power of America would eventually overwhelm her.

The submarine was a powerful weapon. But Germany never came near doing with it what she expected to do. Tirpitz's dream of German sea power could not be realized by German U-boats any more than it could be by German battle-ships and battle cruisers.

The German Government didn't proclaim its policy of unrestricted attack until February, 1917. But it had already begun to speed up its campaign against merchant shipping in the last months of 1916. In the fourth quarter of 1916 the tonnage sunk amounted to 1,159,343, which was nearly twice the total for the third quarter of 1916. Possibly this startling increase in destruction, generally under the restrictions laid down in the *Sussex* note, misled Tirpitz and Ludendorff into thinking that the rate could be easily tripled or quadrupled by warfare freed from such restrictions.

At the beginning of the war the world's ocean-going merchant tonnage (German and Austro-Hungarian excluded) was about 45,000,000. The Germans sank or interned in 1914 681,363 tons, according to British Admiralty figures. In 1915, they sank 1,724,720 tons, and in 1916 2,797,866 tons. All these deductions were practically neutralized by new construction. Germany's task in 1917 was therefore not only to offset new building, but to cut into the outstanding total at a rate which would soon drive shipping from the seas.

The German Admiralty seems to have set for the destructive activities of its U-boats a mark of something like 1,000,000 tons of shipping a month. That was a minimum, if Germany expected to make substantial inroads into the world's merchant fleet. For after the United States entered the war the world's capacity for new construction would be pretty certain to be increased to at least 5,000,000 tons annually. According to British figures, the Germans destroyed in 1917 shipping aggregating 7,613,623 tons. That was the maximum accomplishment of the U-boats. But it was not enough. Including the disastrous year 1917, when the submarine was at the peak of its destructive power, the world's loss in tonnage since August 1, 1914, was 11,827,572. But in those four years new construction had amounted to 6,606,275 tons and German tonnage of 2,589,000 had been taken into Allied service. The net loss for the four years was only 2,632,297 tons.

The unrestricted U-boat campaign, in fact, petered out quickly. It reached the height of its effectiveness in April, 1917. In February the tonnage sunk was 540,000; in March, 600,000; in April, 875,000. But in May it fell below 600,000. In June it was 690,000; in July 540,000; in August, 500,000. In September

it declined to 320,000. In October it was 450,000; in November, 300,000; in December, 390,000 and in January, 1918, 300,000.

By July, 1917, it was evident that the submarine had failed. The introduction of the depth bomb, the large increase in the force of destroyers and other submarine chasers, the arming of merchant vessels, and the use of convoys greatly restricted U-boat operations. More and more the submarine commanders were limited to the pursuit of smaller and slower vessels. They seldom ventured to attack convoyed ships. They let most of the American transports severely alone. Only one large steamer carrying American soldiers to Europe was torpedoed. And if the submarines could not interrupt the flow of American reinforcements to Europe, what were they really worth to Germany, in the broad military sense?

The naval operations of 1917 were of minor importance. There were no engagements between major vessels except in the Gulf of Riga, at the time of the German occupation of Oesel Island. (See Chapter XXVIII, "Russia in Revolution.") On January 9th the British battle-ship *Cornwallis* (14,000 tons) was torpedoed in the Mediterranean. In February the French dreadnaught *Danton* (18,000 tons) was torpedoed in the Mediterranean. Other major vessels lost by the Allies were the French armoured cruiser *Kleber*, sunk by a mine in the Atlantic; the British dreadnaught *Vanguard*, destroyed by an explosion while at anchor; and the French armoured cruiser *Château Renault*, torpedoed in the Ionian Sea.

The German raiding cruiser *Moewe* made another excursion in 1917, sinking twenty-two steamers and five sailing vessels, with a total tonnage of 123,000.

Another raider, the *Seeadler*, ran the blockade and operated in the South Atlantic and South Pacific. She sank sixteen vessels and was then wrecked on one of the Society Islands. On April 20th British and German destroyer squadrons had an engagement in the North Sea. Two German destroyers were sunk. On December 6th the American destroyer, *Jacob Jones*, was torpedoed in the Atlantic by a submarine and sixty lives were lost. On November 20th the American destroyer *Chauncey* was accidentally rammed and sunk by a merchantman which she was convoying. Twenty-one lives were lost.

The enforced inactivity of the German navy led to two mutinies—one at Kiel and one at Wilhelmshaven. They were suppressed, however, without great difficulty. Bad food, socialistic propaganda, and opposition to being drafted for submarine service were given as the causes of these outbreaks.

After the United States came into the war the naval strength of the Allies was so materially increased as to make further use of the German High Sea Fleet hopeless. American destroyers were sent to British waters in May and later an American battle-ship squadron joined the British Grand Fleet at Scapa Flow.

The American naval forces in European waters were under the command of Admiral William S. Sims.

CHAPTER XXXIII

THE DISMEMBERMENT OF RUSSIA. JANUARY 1, 1918-
DECEMBER 31, 1918

THE revolutionary government of Russia entered into peace negotiations with the Central Powers in the winter of 1917-18. The latter had announced through Count Czernin, the Austro-Hungarian Prime Minister, that peace would be made on the basis of "no annexations and no indemnities." The German Reichstag had also passed a resolution in the summer of 1917, favouring a peace "with no forcible annexations."

The peace conference met at Brest-Litovsk on December 23, 1917. Czernin had artfully suggested that the other Entente Powers participate in it along with Russia. When they declined to do so, he announced that the Teuton principle of "no annexations and no indemnities" was meant to apply only in case a general peace conference assembled. He had also commended the theory of "self-determination" of peoples, which at that time was popular with the Bolshevist régime. But he and the German conferees (all acting under instructions from Ludendorff through General Hoffmann) cynically interpreted this theory so as to detach from Russia all her western provinces, on the plea that the latter were entitled to seek "self-determination" under Teuton guardianship.

The negotiations were a travesty in which the tragic mingled with the grotesque. The Soviet delegates counted on the influence of the socialistic proletariats of Germany and Austria-Hungary to temper the conditions of peace. So far as Russian nationalistic and territorial claims were concerned, Lenine and Trotzky were disposed to make liberal concessions. They had recognized the independence of Finland. They were not opposed in principle to recognizing the independence of Poland, Lithuania, Courland, and the Ukraine. Under Bolshevist rule Russia had ceased to be a nation. Lenine and Trotzky were willing to squander the Russian patrimony for the sake of obtaining a free hand in working out, within narrower limits, their sinister experiment with Marxianism and terroism. But they expected the German diplomats to manifest a certain amount of gratitude for the service which the Bolshevists had done the Teuton Allies by taking Russia out of the war.

The Soviet delegates were, therefore, deeply chagrined when Kühlmann and Hoffmann abandoned their original attitude of friendly patronage and insisted on treating Russia as a conquered foe. The German demands amounted to practical annexation of Finland, the Baltic provinces, Poland, Lithuania, and the Ukraine, and economic control of what was left of Russia in Europe. Wrangling over these exorbitant terms continued until February 10th, when the Bolshevist representatives left Brest-Litovsk in disgust. With characteristic *naïveté* Lenine and Trotzky refused to sign a treaty of dismemberment. But at the same time they declared the war ended and issued orders demobilizing the Russian armies still in existence.

With a military power like Germany comedy of this

sort wouldn't work. Berlin terminated the truce and on February 18th German armies began an advance toward Petrograd. Trotzky favoured unorganized resistance. But Lenine overruled him. The latter held rightly that there was no fight left in the Russian Revolution, except against the bourgeoisie and the counter-revolutionists. He advocated unconditional surrender. He had his way.

The Soviet delegates returned to Brest-Litovsk and signed there, on March 3d, a treaty which Germany dictated. Kühlmann and Hoffmann had already concluded a treaty with Ukrania, establishing a Teuton protectorate over that still undefined state.

By the convention of March 3d Russia surrendered Courland, Poland, Finland, the territory which might hereafter be converted into a kingdom of Lithuania, the western halves of Livonia and Esthonia, and the Ukraine, the eastern boundary of which was left undrawn. She also ceded three Russian trans-Caucasian districts—Erivan, Batum, and Kars—to the Turks.

But the dismemberment didn't end with the stipulations written into the treaty. Under it Germany was also to occupy and police the eastern halves of Livonia and Esthonia. But without any warrant except that of force, her troops overran the Crimea and the northern shores of the Black Sea, as far east as the mouth of the Don. She seized the Russian Black Sea fleet, she compelled Lenine to cede Carelia to the Finns, and assumed authority to turn Bessarabia over to the Rumanians, as compensation for the loss of the Dobrudja. She set up a satrapy in Ukrania and established an ambassador in Moscow with almost pro-consular powers.

As a result of these aggressions the Lenine govern-

ment was coerced into signing early in August, three supplementary agreements with Germany. These provided for the payment to Germany of an indemnity of 6,000,000,000 marks (\$1,500,000,000); the renunciation of Russian rights in eastern Esthonia and Livonia; free trade with Germany; the recognition of the independence of the Georgian republic and the retention by Germany of the Black Sea fleet until the end of the war with the Entente. Maxim Gorky has calculated that by seeking and accepting peace from Germany Russia lost four per cent. of her area, twenty-six per cent. of her population, thirty-seven per cent. of her foodstuffs production, twenty-seven per cent. of her land normally cultivated, twenty-six per cent. of her railways, thirty-three per cent. of her manufacturing industries, seventy-five per cent. of her coal, and seventy three per cent. of her iron.

After Brest-Litovsk and up to the time of Ludendorff's reverses on the Western Front it looked as if Germany had entered upon a receivership of the former Muscovite Empire. She assumed a protectorate over the sounder parts. Finland was converted into an active ally and induced to elect a Hessian Grand Duke as king. Another German ruler was picked out for Lithuania, which Ludendorff intended to consolidate eventually with Courland, Esthonia, and Livonia. Berlin and Vienna were in deadlock for many months over the selection of a monarch for Poland, and the war ended before a choice was made.

In the Ukraine the situation was more unsatisfactory. Ukrania lacked a sense of national unity. Its people were only the raw materials of a state. Germany and Austria-Hungary promised to give them independence. But that independence was a shadowy fiction. The

Teuton Allies needed the Ukraine's food supplies and proceeded to seize them. This spoliation led to revolts against the patrons and liberators of the new state. General Eichhorn, the German military governor, ousted the government which had signed the Brest-Litovsk treaty and substituted military rule. He was assassinated in the summer of 1918. But long before that it was evident that German policy had failed to create in the Ukraine the groundwork for a relation of dependency such as had been created in Finland, Poland, and Lithuania.

In March and April, 1918, Germany had reached the height of her empire-building venture. She had completely consolidated her position in continental Europe and extended her power toward Central Asia. What was left of Russia west of the Urals had become economically as well as politically a helpless tributary state. The Black Sea was hers. Rumania was compelled to sue for peace when Russia sued for it. And the terms of the treaty of Bucharest were as harsh as those of the treaty of Brest-Litovsk. Rumania surrendered the Dobrudja. She also yielded up her economic independence. Germany took over her railroads, her oil and grain, and her port of Constanza.

At the opposite end of the Black Sea Batum had been awarded nominally to Turkey. But the Batum-Baku oil district lay open to German exploitation. And by way of the Caspian Germany could hope to penetrate into Turkestan, Persia, and Afghanistan. German eyes were now fixed on Bokhara, Teheran, and Herat.

Yet these enormous vistas of expansion opened too late. The Russia which survived, having ceased to be a nation, also ceased to be exploitable as a dependency, in either the economic or military sense. On

January 10th the Cossacks had seceded and proclaimed an anti-Bolshevist Republic of the Don, with General Kaledin, their hetman, as president. The Russian Constituent Assembly, elected in 1917, met in Petrograd on January 18, 1918. It was the only link left between the Russia of Lvoff and Kerensky and the Russia of Lenine and Trotzky. Lenine dissolved it by violence before it had a chance to organize. On March 9th the seat of the Soviet government was transferred to Moscow. It was there that a packed Congress of Soviets ratified the Brest-Litovsk treaty on March 14th.

But the Soviet régime was not powerful enough to impose its authority on the remnant of the empire. It had broken up the army and proscribed the officer class. One part of the army which had retained its discipline was the body of Czecho-Slovak prisoners of war, who had enlisted to fight Austria-Hungary. This numbered between 80,000 and 100,000 men. Lenine could not force it to return under the Brest-Litovsk convention, which bound Russia to surrender Teuton prisoners of war, while allowing Germany to keep Russian prisoners. The Czecho-Slovaks were anxious to go to France and report to the provisional government of Czecho-Slovakia established there. Since they were a menace to the weak Soviet power, Lenine readily agreed to give them transportation to Vladivostok.

The advance guard reached the Pacific unmolested. But German influence was exerted to hold up this Allied reinforcement. By Lenine's instructions Czecho-Slovak troop trains in Western Siberia were attacked by Red guards. The Czecho-Slovaks, who had nothing but rifles, were obliged to detrain and fight for their

lives. They disarmed the Red guards, seized the machine guns and artillery used against them, and quickly took possession of long stretches of the Siberian railroad. The Bolsheviks, whose main strength was in Eastern Siberia, where many released criminals and German, Austrian, and Hungarian ex-prisoners joined their ranks, held Irkutsk and the Lake Baikal region. The Czecho-Slovaks found themselves marooned in Western Siberia, where they had to improvise their own subsistence and war material.

Thus began the most romantic adventure of the war—the occupation of Siberia by an Allied force dropped down there, as if from the clouds. Western Siberia was, fortunately, little inclined to Bolshevism, having no industrial centres and no organized proletariat. The Czecho-Slovaks introduced order and refrained from interfering in the local concerns of the Siberians. They furnished, however, a powerful support to a Siberian anti-Bolshevist government, which was formed at Omsk and which declared Siberian independence. The Czecho-Slovak commands moved west as well as east along the railroad. They cleared the trans-continental line to the Urals and beyond them. They also worked east toward Irkutsk. Other republics, which repudiated the Moscow régime, were proclaimed in Turkestan and in the Caucasus. By the middle of the summer the Czecho-Slovaks had recrossed the Urals and constituted a front along the Volga River, well inside Great Russia.

The Allied Powers now recognized the state of Czecho-Slovakia as a co-belligerent. An expedition to relieve the forces cut off in Western Siberia was organized, after many hesitations and delays. Japan agreed to furnish the bulk of the Siberian force, which was to

land at Vladivostok. There were also small American, Canadian, British, French, and Italian detachments. The difficulties of a relief expedition had been greatly exaggerated. The Allied troops, about twenty-five thousand strong, landed in Vladivostok in August. Their task was to clear the Siberian railroad west to the Chinese border, and then to move north along the branch line following the Ussuri River to Khabarovsk, where a junction is made with the Amur River branch line, coming north-east through Blagoveschensk, the capital of the Amur Province. The Japanese contingent undertook the Amur operation. It reached Khabarovsk on September 6th and Blagoveschensk a few weeks later, extinguishing the Red government there and capturing many former Teuton and Hungarian prisoners.

Another Allied force, supported by anti-Bolshevist Russians, moved from the western border of Manchuria along the line of the Siberian railroad, toward Chita, east of Lake Baikal, where the Amur branch separates from the main stem. But before it reached its objective, Chita had been captured by the Czecho-Slovaks. After seizing Irkutsk, they had moved around the southern end of Lake Baikal, routed the Red guards, and passed beyond Chita. By the middle of November Siberia had been freed of Bolshevism and the Siberian railroad opened from Vladivostok to the Volga region.

In the course of the summer a small British expedition reached Bokhara, coming from India through Baluchistan and Persia. Another expeditionary force arrived at Baku, on the western shore of the Caspian Sea, which Turkish forces were trying to seize. This force was withdrawn, however, shortly before the end of the war and Baku was abandoned to the Turks.

Germany had aided the anti-Bolshevist forces in Finland to defeat and expel the Red Guards, who, with aid from Lenine, were trying to seize the government. In return for this service Berlin urged the conservative leaders to participate in a campaign for the capture of Kola, the Allied military base on the ice-free Arctic. Finland hesitated, however, to engage in war with the Allies. She passively supported the German project, which, however, came to nothing. After Ludendorff's defeat in the Marne salient the Finns lost all interest in the recovery of Lapland and the annexation of the Murman peninsula.

On August 2d, the danger of an attack on Kola having passed, Allied troops landed at Archangel, where a provisional anti-Bolshevist government was organized. These forces then moved south in two columns, one following the Dwina River, the other along the Archangel-Vologda railroad. The ultimate purpose of this expedition was to form a junction with the Omsk government armies coming west from the Volga. Its numbers were too small, however, to make headway against the Soviet forces in Northern Russia. It was held up a hundred miles or more south of Archangel and was forced to retreat by a Soviet offensive in the winter of 1918-19.

Germany extorted some partial payments on the 6,000,000,000-mark indemnity from the Lenine government and received numerous trade concessions. But under Lenine's savage and vindictive rule Russian industry was prostrated and German relations with Moscow became more and more profitless. Count Mirbach, the German Ambassador, was assassinated on July 6th, and his place was never filled.

By August 1st the whole structure of German

empire in Central and Eastern Europe had begun to totter. The Russian front was stripped of troops. All the newly acquired dependencies assumed an attitude of passive insubordination and commenced to plan for independent national existence. The Pan-German dream was over. Germany had sacrificed her grandiose conquests in the East by running amuck with the U-boat and thus throwing two million Americans into the balance against her on the Western Front.

CHAPTER XXXIV

LUDENDORFF'S CHANNEL PORT OFFENSIVES—ST.
QUENTIN, MARCH 21, 1918; LYS VALLEY,
APRIL 9, 1918

CAPORETTO was a warning to the Allies that Germany would try to make a finish campaign in 1918 on the Franco-Belgian front. Ludendorff's only chance to win the war lay in crushing the British and French armies before the main body of the American reinforcement arrived.

There was an alternative policy. That was to try for a draw in the West, ending the war in a stalemate of exhaustion. If Ludendorff had stood on the defensive through 1918, the French and British armies would probably have continued to operate under separate and independent commands. Foch would not have been chosen generalissimo in 1918. The American troop movement would not have been speeded up. The war in the West would probably have lagged in 1918, as it did in 1917, and Germany could have entered 1919 with her reserves unimpaired. This respite of a year would have allowed Ludendorff to experiment with any schemes he may have had in view for a military organization of the new Eastern dependencies—Finland, the Baltic provinces, Lithuania, Poland, and the Ukraine.

But Ludendorff had the gambler's temperament.

He wanted to push his luck. He preferred risking everything on a single throw. So he overbore the counsels of caution and the hesitations attributed (though, perhaps, mistakenly) to Hindenburg and the Kaiser, but undoubtedly advanced by a certain element in the General Staff.

The Allied leaders in France sensed the situation and prepared to shift from the offensive to the defensive. Field Marshal Haig says that these preparations began early in December, 1917. But they were far from adequate. The Inter-Allied Military Council had been organized. But no steps were taken to secure unity of command.

The British armies had suffered very heavy losses in 1917. Those losses were not made good. To cover the deficit the Army Council in London ordered the British divisions to be reduced in strength from thirteen battalions to ten battalions. Field Marshal Haig naturally opposed this change. He says that, apart from the reduction in fighting strength involved, the fighting efficiency of the units was reduced by new groupings and altered tactical methods.

Weakened as they were, the British armies were also required to extend their front. Negotiations for this extension had been under way since September, 1917. It was agreed finally that Haig should prolong his lines twenty-eight miles to the south, from the neighbourhood of St. Quentin to the village of Barisis. This village lies on the edge of the Forest of St. Gobain, a few miles south of La Fère.

The French thought that Ludendorff's primary objective would be Paris and that he would try to reach the capital by striking between Rheims and Soissons and pushing down to the Marne and the Ourcq. Most

of the French reserves were concentrated behind this front.

Ludendorff's original objective, however, was not Paris. It was Amiens. His idea was to break the connection between the British and French armies. If he could put the broad estuary of the lower Somme between the two Allied contingents, he could roll up the British right wing and drive Haig's forces back on the Channel ports. His attack was wisely directed at the weakest point of any Allied defence—that at which the jurisdiction of one command ends and the jurisdiction of another begins.

Reinforcements from the Eastern Front had brought Ludendorff's strength up to about 3,000,000 men. He is generally credited with having at the end of March 210 divisions of infantry, 110 in the front line and 100 in reserve, the latter forming what are known as masses of manœuvre. Field Marshal Haig, however, estimated the German strength at only 192 divisions.

Under Ludendorff's régime the armies on the active front—from the North Sea to Verdun—were separated into two main groups.

The northern one, extending as far down as the Oise, was under the command of the Crown Prince of Bavaria. The southern one, from the Oise to the Meuse, was commanded (nominally) by the Crown Prince of Prussia. As military dictator Ludendorff thus sheltered himself behind the heirs apparent of the two largest German states. East of Verdun General Gallwitz commanded a holding army. The Grand Duke of Württemberg commanded a similar force in southern Lorraine and Alsace.

To meet the German offensive the Allies had about 2,500,000 men—2,000,000 in the front line and 500,000

in reserve, as General Zurlinden states in his *La Guerre de Libération*. Field Marshal Haig had, on his front, from north to south, the Second, First, Third, and Fifth British armies. They were commanded by Plumer, Horne, Byng, and Gough, respectively. The French armies were disposed in three groups—under de Castelnau, Franchet d'Esperey, and Fayolle. Pétain was in supreme command, with General Antoine as his assistant.

The extension of the British lines was to have occurred in December, 1917. It was delayed, however, and the operation was not completed until the end of January, 1918. The British had adopted the German zone system of defence. On the front of the Third and Fifth armies three defensive belts were constructed, corresponding to the German fore zones, intermediate zones, and battle zones. Behind the Fifth Army a bridgehead, on the east bank of the Somme, was prepared against the eventuality of a forced retreat west of that river.

The German offensive west of St. Quentin on March 21st was a surprise only in the manner in which it was conducted. Its probability had been taken into account. And the Fifth Army front was held more lightly than the other parts of the British line, because, from the strategical point of view, Haig felt that he could better afford to lose ground there than elsewhere. Between St. Quentin and La Fère the British were farther east than on any other sector and more in advance of the positions in which they would have to stand in order to protect their main bases and the Channel ports. Behind them was the waste made by Hindenburg in the German "strategic retirement" of 1917. Haig would not have been greatly disturbed if the Germans had pushed him back to the Somme

line. The situation became dangerous only when the Somme line was lost and the enemy pressed on twenty miles farther to within easy gun range of Amiens.

The relative depletion of the Fifth Army front was therefore intentional. For ten miles, between Amigny-Rouy and Alaincourt, the marshes of the Oise offered a natural protection. The lines there were very thinly held. But it happened, unfortunately, that an exceptionally dry winter had made the marshes passable. So the enemy was enabled to employ large forces—at least six divisions—to break through the weak British positions north and south of La Fère.

The British Fifth Army consisted of fourteen infantry and three cavalry divisions. The three cavalry divisions and three of the infantry divisions were in reserve. This army occupied a front of forty-two miles from Barisis north to Gouzeaucourt. That made one division to 6750 yards of front. The Third Army, adjoining the Fifth on the left, consisted of fifteen divisions, eight in the first line and seven in reserve. It occupied a twenty-seven-mile stretch from Gouzeaucourt north-west to Gavrelle. One division was assigned to every 4700 yards of front.

The total British force available in the positions attacked on March 21st was therefore twenty-nine infantry divisions and three cavalry divisions. But Ludendorff employed on that day sixty-four divisions, giving him a superiority of two to one. In the following days, when the battle extended north and involved the right wing of the British First Army, seventy-three German divisions were engaged against thirty-seven British divisions.

On March 21st, at 5 A.M., a violent artillery fire broke out on the entire front held by the Fifth and Third

British armies; also on the French sector north-east of Rheims and on the British sectors from Lens north to Ypres. The infantry attack began about four hours later. By 9.45 A.M. it had developed on a battle front of fifty-four miles, from below the Oise River north to the valley of the Sensée.

Ludendorff had made some innovations in offensive tactics. He depended now, more than ever, on highly specialized shock formations trained in a wave method of assault, with which General Hutier had experimented in the fall of 1917 in the Riga campaign. By the wave method one series of units made a definite advance. It then halted and was passed through or over by a closely succeeding second series, so that fresh troops continually renewed the impetus of the attack. Provision was also made for the rapid movement of light guns to the fighting front. The Germans had few tanks. Almost until the end of the war they remained sceptical of the value of the tank, preferring to depend, for breaking an enemy line, on gas waves and shells and new variants of the old mass attack.

For his first offensive Ludendorff had created three picked armies. The northernmost, operating between Cambrai and the Sensée River, was under Otto Below, the victor of Caporetto. The central one, stationed between Cambrai and St. Quentin, was commanded by Marwitz, transferred from the Lorraine front. The southern one, between St. Quentin and La Fère, was under Hutier, who, like Below, had been a successful Eastern Front leader.

Ludendorff was favoured on March 21st by a thick fog which limited visibility to about fifty yards. The British front line was thus practically cut off from the supporting second line. Signals from the outposts

were not seen, and the machine guns and field guns, which had been disposed so as to cover the first zone with their fire, after its penetration by the Germans, had to be trained on an invisible enemy. German numbers were so enormous that the attacking mass couldn't well lose direction. So the British second zone was soon put in as great peril as the forezone by conditions which made infiltration unusually easy.

The fog didn't thin out until after 1 P.M. By that time the Germans had penetrated the second British defensive zone at various points. But both the Fifth and Third armies were holding, in the main, their battle positions, with units here and there still in advance of these. On the extreme left of the Fifth Army the most serious breach made was at Ronssoy, which the Germans captured about noon. But they were held in the rear of the battle positions by counter-attacks on the flanks, especially on the northern flank at Epéhy, the enemy being driven out of that village.

The more dangerous penetrations were made farther south, on the right centre and right of the Fifth Army's lines. Quessy, north-west of La Fère, was taken late in the afternoon. Benay, west of Moy, was also captured by evening and the Germans made considerable progress toward Savy and Roupy, south-west of St. Quentin, on the northern side of the St. Quentin-Ham highroad. Maissemy, north of St. Quentin, in the battle zone, was occupied by the enemy early on the 21st.

The most threatening wedge driven into the front of the Third Army, holding the line from Gouzeaucourt north-west to the Sensée River, was in the sector about Quéant. Here the Germans broke into the British battle positions, taking Lagnicourt, south of

Quéant, and, to the west, reaching the neighbourhood of Mory, St. Léger, and Croisilles. At this end, however, the British lines were more strongly held and reinforcements could easily be drawn from the First and Second armies. In the south, along the Oise, the right wing of the Fifth Army was far away from the British bases and the local reserves were insufficient.

General Gough drew back his right wing, on the night of the 21st, behind the Crozat and Somme canals. The bridges over these waterways were not completely destroyed, however. On the morning of the 22d the enemy made a crossing opposite Quessy and in the evening captured Tergnier, an important communications centre, four miles south-west of La Fère.

The real break-through, however, was effected on Gough's left, west and north-west of St. Quentin. Here Ludendorff exploited the substantial gains made on the 21st. The Germans took Le Verguier at 10 A.M. and threatened to roll up the British line north through Roisel to Epéhy. These towns were evacuated in the afternoon. A new line was formed in this sector, running north and south from Bernes to Boucly, about five miles east of Péronne, and thence to Nurlu and Equancourt.

The right of the Third Army was affected by the retirement of the left wing of the Fifth Army. It was now drawn back two or three miles, in order to preserve a junction with Gough's army at Equancourt. The Flesquières salient, south-west of Cambrai, created by Byng's Cambrai drive of November, 1917, had been evacuated in part on the 21st. It was now entirely abandoned. Farther west, the British were forced to retire on both sides of the Cambrai-Bapaume highroad. Above the Sensée River Byng's

left was thrust back to the road between Croisilles and Hénin-sur-Cojeul.

These losses of territory were not especially damaging. The disaster came on the left centre and centre of the Fifth Army, west of St. Quentin. Here the British were expelled from all their battle positions. Late in the afternoon, while fighting in the last defensive zone, the British Fiftieth Division, about Pœuilly, lost touch with the Sixty-first and Twentieth divisions, on its right. A gap was opened and the Germans poured through in dense masses, penetrating the British rear zone.

Gough had no reserves left with which to close the gap. He, therefore, on the night of the 22d, ordered a retreat to the line of the Somme. But once in retreat, with his line shattered, he was unable to stop at the Somme. His army was exhausted. The Somme bridgehead positions, east of Péronne, were only half constructed. And Gough saw that to try to hold them would involve him in another general engagement, to which his weakened divisions were not equal.

It was apparently a sound decision, made in conformity with Haig's general policy of defence. But it represented merely a choice of evils. To continue the retreat would necessarily increase the disorganization of the Fifth Army, compel a parallel retirement of the Third Army, and impose extraordinary burdens on the Allied High Commands, which were not prepared to organize a new defence line west of the Somme.

On the morning of March 23d Gough ordered the abandonment of the Péronne bridgehead. The retirement was made without serious interference in the Péronne sector. But on the evening of the 22d another gap had developed in the British line near Ham.

Taking advantage of it, the Germans entered Ham early on March 23d and crossed the Somme on both sides of that city, thus threatening the British still fighting, to the south-east, on the line of the Crozat Canal.

The Third Army held the enemy in check all through the 23d. But at the junction point of the Third and Fifth armies another gap in the line was opened—this time by a confusion of orders. The Fifth Corps of the Third Army, on Byng's right, had fallen back to the third British defence positions, about Ytres. The Seventh Corps of the Fifth Army, on Gough's left, had been directed to retire more in a south-westerly direction toward Moislains. The two corps lost contact and the Germans again took quick advantage of the opening offered them. The Fifth Corps was thrust off toward the north-west and the Seventh toward the south-west, across the Tortille River to Bouchavesnes. This additional mishap ended all chance of a stabilization of the British lines in the region south and west of the Somme.

Field Marshal Haig had made plans for checking a German drive west from the Oise to the Somme. But he had anticipated no such disaster as had overtaken the Fifth Army. He called on the French for assistance. At an interview with General Pétain, on March 23d, it was decided that the French should take over, as rapidly as possible, the whole front south of Péronne. French cavalry had already covered the retirement to the south of the British divisions west of La Fère. Now Pétain sent in the French Third Army—first under General Pellé, and then under General Humbert—to take over the southern side of the big wedge which the Germans were driving west toward

Montdidier and Amiens. This army was near at hand. But another army was needed in order to prolong the line around the apex of the new salient. The First Army, under General Debeney, was recalled from Lorraine and ordered to extend Humbert's left far enough to make a junction with what remained of the British Fifth Army, and with the British Third Army, in the region south-east of Amiens.

It would take several days for Debeney's reinforcement to arrive. Meanwhile Haig called on the British First and Second armies to supply reserves for the Somme front. Ten divisions were contributed by Generals Horne and Plumer, the majority of them by the latter, who received in return some of the broken divisions of the Fifth Army when they could be drawn out of the battle.

On March 24th, as a result of the snapping of the British line at the junction of the Third and Fifth armies, the Third Army's right and centre were forced westward to a line running north and south across the old Somme battlefield of 1916. Bapaume fell to the Germans, who had also passed to the west of Combles. Farther south, the wearied Fifth Army tried to prevent the enemy from crossing the Somme between Péronne and Ham. The Germans got over to the west bank at Pargny, about nine miles east of Chaulnes. In the Oise sector the British lost Chauny, retiring south on the French Third Army.

On March 25th the British Third Army lost ground very rapidly. The line it was trying to hold, west of Bapaume, was broken and a gap was widened out between the Fourth and Fifth corps. The Germans reached Courcellete in the afternoon and were close up to the Ancre River by evening. West of Bapaume

the British were almost on the line which they had occupied in 1916 before the battle of the Somme.

The Third Army was now farther west than the Fifth Army, whose position south of the Somme had become critical. General Byng took over the command of all the remnants of the Fifth Army north of the Somme. The other corps were directed to retreat west until they could be relieved by the French, who now assumed control of all the forces in the region south of the Somme. The situation of the British troops here was aggravated by the fact that no reserves were yet available. The only support Gough had for several days was an improvised force under General Grant, afterwards under General Carey, consisting of stragglers, details, school personnel, tunnelling companies, field-survey companies, and Canadian and American engineers. This was organized on the line of the old eastern defences of Amiens.

The chief enemy advance south of the Somme on March 26th was made by Hutier's army west of Nesle. Here the right of Gough's southernmost division was separated from the left of Humbert's supporting army and a gap was opened about Roye. That evening, however, contact was re-established with the French west of Roye and the worst of the retreat was over.

March 26th marked in another way the turn of the tide for the Allies. On that day Foch was appointed Allied generalissimo. In the shadow of another great German victory the Allies at last took that step which for nearly four years they had refused to take, thus defying the fundamental axioms of military science and prudence. An enormous handicap on the proper employment of Allied military strength was lifted. Ludendorff had tried to disjoin and sever the two

Allied armies in France. The net result of his effort was to unify them.

Assured of a free hand, Foch could stop the first Ludendorff offensive or any succeeding Ludendorff offensive. But he could not be certain of stopping any of them unless he had as complete control of the Allied forces in the field as his opponent had of the German.

Between March 26th and March 28th the British south of the Somme retired under pressure to and beyond the old line of the defences of Amiens. Gough had been ordered to hold, if possible, a line farther east, north and south through Rosières. From this front Amiens could not have been bombarded by the enemy. But the Third Army had retired four miles to the west of Bray, on the north side of the Somme, through which point the Rosières line would have run, if carried farther north. The Germans were, therefore, able to cross to the south side of the river and take the Rosières-Proyart positions in the rear. There was nothing to do but to extricate the troops on this line, bringing them back to the front covered by Carey's "scratch" division.

The enemy had now entered Montdidier, extending some ten miles to the west the apex of the old Noyon salient. He was hardly ten miles east of Amiens and, north of the Somme, had occupied Albert. But he needed more elbow room on the north, in the neighbourhood of Arras, where the British First Army had made only a very slight retirement in order to conform its right wing to the left wing of the Third Army.

Ludendorff therefore shifted his attack on March 28th to the Arras front. He expected to carry Vimy Ridge, Arras, and the strong positions to the west of that city. Eleven German divisions were engaged in

a battle which lasted all through the day. But no impression was made anywhere on the British lines. The assault, conducted with the same methods as were used on March 21st, was a complete failure. There was no covering fog, and the Hutier wave attacks broke down with enormous losses.

The first stage of the Amiens or St. Quentin offensive ended with this repulse. The German advance did not stop entirely until April 5th. Local gains were made after March 28th, in the Avre-Luce sector and about Moreuil. But the operation as a whole was terminated when General Fayolle, commanding the western French sector, got Debeney's First Army into position on this front and Haig's reinforcements from the Second and First armies prolonged the Allied line north across the Somme to the Ancre.

The results of the German offensive were imposing. Ludendorff had carried his front forward about thirty-seven miles—from Moy, on the Oise, to the junction of the Avre and Luce rivers. He had recovered more than all the territory lost in the battle of the Somme, in 1916, and the Hindenburg strategic retirement, in 1917. He was within easy gun range of Amiens, the chief anchor of the Allied positions in Northern France. He had nearly destroyed the British Fifth Army, capturing 1300 guns and nearly 100,000 prisoners.

Having fallen short of success in his drive for Amiens, Ludendorff decided to deliver an alternative blow farther north, with Dunkirk and Calais as his objectives. This second offensive was launched on a narrower front, not exceeding twenty miles. Its immediate purpose was to drive a wedge up the Lys Valley toward Hazebrouck. Ypres could then be enveloped from the south and west and an advance to the coast would

follow from Hazebrouck and Poperinghe. By widening out the salient on the south side, Béthune, an important coal-mining centre, would be enveloped and the British line south to Lens and Arras would be taken in reverse.

The offensive began on April 9th on a front extending north from La Bassée to a point east of Armentières. It was prolonged on the 10th to the Ypres-Comines Canal. Fortune again favoured the Germans. Two Portuguese divisions were stationed on the lower part of this line. They had been at the front for a long time and were to be relieved on April 10th. The line to the north of the Portuguese sector was held by five British divisions which had been withdrawn from the battle in Picardy and whose ranks had been refilled with drafts from England. The most southerly stretch of the front was defended by the left wing of Horne's First Army.

The attack was made in a dense fog, like that in the St. Quentin area on March 21st. The enemy's masses got almost unobserved into the first lines of the Second Portuguese Division. The onset was so powerful that it penetrated through the entire Portuguese zone. British reinforcements could not be rushed up in time to contest the rear positions. The enemy drove north-west to the Lawe and Lys rivers and crossed the Lys at two points south-west of Armentières. Fortunately, on the extreme right the Fifty-fifth Division of the First Army held fast about Festubert and extended its line north-west covering the approaches to Béthune.

On April 10th the Germans broadened their attack northward to the neighbourhood of Messines, occupying that village for a time and getting a hold on Ploegsteert Wood. They also pushed north of the Lys to

Steenwerck, thus almost isolating Armentières, which was evacuated by the British. On the 11th the German advance west reached Merville, about four miles west of Estaires. On the north side of the growing salient the British abandoned Nieppe and drew back to Wulverghem and Neuve Église.

The southern side of the salient was now sufficiently reinforced and the lines north of Béthune were stabilized. The main German effort was directed thereafter to extending the Lys Valley wedge to the north behind Ypres. On the 12th the Germans pushed as far toward Hazebrouck as Vieux Berquin. But the First Australian Division appeared in the afternoon and, taking position east of the Forest of Nieppe, ended all progress in that direction.

From the 12th to the 15th Arnim's army steadily enlarged the northern side of the salient. Neuve Église and Bailleul were taken. It was on the 12th that Field Marshal Haig issued the famous "backs to the wall" appeal to his tired troops in Flanders. A few days later General Maurice, then Director of Military Information, posed his famous query: "What is happening to Blücher?"

But aid arrived on April 16th, a French army corps, under General de Mitry, coming into line on the Mount Kemmel sector, the whole of which was taken over by the French on April 21st. Field Marshal Haig had also ordered the evacuation of the eastern part of the salient east of Ypres in order to shorten his lines.

Mount Kemmel now became Arnim's chief local objective. General Bernhardt, commanding on the south side, had failed completely on April 18th in an attack extending from Givenchy to Merville. This was the end of the German effort to reach Béthune.

Arnim had tried to envelop Kemmel on April 16th and 17th. He renewed his operation on April 25th, using nine divisions on a front extending from Kemmel Hill east to the Ypres-Comines Canal. Kemmel was surrounded and taken, and a French regiment, holding the summit, was cut off. Wytschaete was captured and the Allied line was pushed back a mile or more. Thereupon Haig evacuated another section of the salient east of Ypres, in order to facilitate the extrication of his forces, if Ypres should fall.

Ypres was gravely threatened. But it didn't fall. On April 29th Arnim made a general assault on the line south-west of the city and met with a bloody repulse. That reverse practically ended the second German offensive. Arnim and Bernhardt had driven a salient about nine miles deep up the Lys Valley. They had re-won all the ground lost in the summer of 1917 and had cleared a broad though uncomfortably exposed expanse of territory in the Lys Valley. But they had not taken Béthune, or Hazebrouck, or Ypres. They had not opened a road to the Channel ports. The gains of the operation hardly balanced its losses.

The British front had yielded, but it had not been dislocated. And the British, with the aid of the two French divisions under de Mitry, had fought against great odds. Ludendorff employed in the Lys Valley up to April 30th forty-two divisions, of which thirty-three were fresh and only nine had been used in the Picardy drive. Against these Haig had twenty-five divisions, of which eight were fresh and seventeen had fought in Picardy. According to the British Field Marshal's figures 109 German divisions had been engaged, between March 21st and April 30th, against fifty-five British infantry and three British cavalry divisions.

On April 23d a heavy attack was made on the British positions east of Amiens. Four German divisions participated in it. The village of Villers-Bretonneux was taken and the British front thrown back. That night, however, a counter-attack was made by one British and two Australian brigades. They recovered Villers-Bretonneux, and captured one thousand prisoners. This and Arnim's futile attack south-west of Ypres were the last flare-ups in the German effort to reach the Channel ports.

In his book, *My Thoughts and Actions*, published in the summer of 1919, Ludendorff indicates that he originally planned to make the more northern of his two Channel Port offensives the principal one. He intended, he says, to effect a break-through well to the north of the Somme, so that he could operate against the British armies in the unravaged territory west of the lines held by the Germans in 1916. In the first offensive the Seventeenth Army was expected to smash Byng's left centre and left, and then drive north-westward behind Arras. The Seventeenth Army failed signally, on March 21st, against the northern end of Byng's line, and failed again, on March 28th, opposite Arras, against Byng's left and Horne's right. Ludendorff attributes the defeat of March 21st to defective artillery preparation and bad tactics. Yet it is noteworthy that he used his best artillery expert, Colonel Bruchmüller, on Hutier's front, between St. Quentin and La Fère, where the real break-through was accomplished. And this break-through determined the line of the German advance toward Amiens, instead of Arras.

CHAPTER XXXV

LUDENDORFF'S PARIS OFFENSIVES. AISNE-MARNE, MAY
27, 1918. LASSIGNY, JUNE 9, 1918

HAVING failed to break the liaison between the British and French armies by seizing Amiens, and having failed again to turn the British left wing by capturing Dunkirk and Calais, Ludendorff decided to shift his objectives. His Third, Fourth, and Fifth offensives were directed at Paris. General Foch was apparently persuaded that Ludendorff would make another try for Amiens, since that was the chief danger spot from the Allied point of view. Most of the French reserves were massed toward the Picardy front, and extraordinary efforts were made to stop a third German effort on the general line of Arras-Amiens-Montdidier. Alarmed by the experiences of March and April, the British Government sent to France about 300,000 troops, which had been held in England since the beginning of the year. Arrangements were also made to speed up the transportation of American troops. The monthly average of American arrivals in France had been under fifty thousand. It was raised to two hundred thousand.

Ludendorff turned away, however, from Amiens. He chose an easier front, which Foch had left scantily defended. The third drive was prepared with great

secrecy. It came as a complete surprise. For it was directed at a sector—that north of the Aisne River, between Soissons and Rheims—on which Foch could still yield a good deal of ground without strategical embarrassment.

The line along the Ailette River, just north of the Chemin des Dames, had been held by the French Sixth Army. Early in May, General Foch transferred a large part of this army to the Amiens sector. By way of replacements he borrowed five British divisions, which were waiting for an assignment to some inactive section. Of these divisions three had taken part in both the St. Quentin battle and the Lys Valley battle. One had fought in the former operation, but not in the latter. All four had been badly battered up. Their depleted ranks were filled up with new levies. Two of them, the Twenty-first and Eighth, with the Fiftieth, which was fresh, were put in position on a fifteen-mile front north-west of Rheims. The rest of the Ailette line, west to Pinon Forest, was held by a single corps of the French Sixth Army.

These troops had no warning, until May 26th, of the imminence of a German attack. The next morning it broke with extraordinary violence on a thirty-five-mile line, from Pinon Forest, on the west, nearly to Berméricourt. Twenty-eight German divisions overpowered the five Allied divisions opposed to them. A gap was made in the centre and the Germans poured across the Chemin des Dames plateau, converging on the crossings of the Aisne. This river was crossed by the enemy at Vailly before nightfall. The British divisions, holding on their right, swung back on their left and centre to a position facing west and north-west between the Aisne and the Vesle. The French

Sixth Army Corps fell back to the Aisne, facing north-east and covering Soissons.

On May 28th the Germans pushed rapidly south, crossing the Vesle at Fismes, and also widening out their salient on both sides. On the west Soissons was captured. On the east the British withdrew across the Vesle and were then pressed back in a south-easterly direction in the region between the Vesle and the Ardre rivers. The two reserve divisions, the Twenty-fifth and Nineteenth, were brought up, and the German advance in the neighbourhood of Rheims slackened. Ludendorff preferred, for the moment, to develop his attack to the south and west, threatening Paris by working down to the Marne and the Ourcq, and then following the valleys of those rivers west and south-west, around the southern edge of the great bastion of the Forest of Villers-Cotterets.

Foch had no reserves at hand with which to stop the German advance south to the Marne. Nor was he particularly eager to stop it. For if the Germans were held on the west side of the Aisne-Marne salient which they were developing, they would find themselves inside a deep pocket, difficult to hold and uncomfortable to draw out of. Only a cavalry screen opposed the march of the enemy across the territory separating the Vesle from the Marne. Fère-en-Tardenois and Ville-en-Tardenois were abandoned, and on May 31st the German advance guards reached the borders of the latter river at Le Charmel, two miles north-west of Dormans.

The nominal character of the French defence between the Aisne and the Marne was emphasized by the rapid head-on progress of the Third Ludendorff drive. On May 27th a gain of five miles was made; on May 28th,

one of seven miles; on May 29th, one of seven miles; on May 30th, one of three miles; on May 31st, one of nine miles. On June 1st the enemy occupied the north bank of the Marne for a distance of fifteen miles, from Château-Thierry east to Verneuil. On this sector the French were reinforced by the Third and Twenty-eighth American divisions—the former of regulars, the latter of Pennsylvania National Guard troops. The Second Division, regulars, with a marine corps brigade, was thrown in on the line north-west of Château-Thierry.

Foch's reserves, coming from the west, were used sparingly to check the German advance on the west side of the salient, between Château-Thierry and the Aisne. Here the true direction of the Third offensive, now reaching its last stage, was made manifest. Violent German attacks were launched on June 1st and 2d all along the front north and south of the Ourcq River, the Germans trying to push down the Ourcq Valley to the rear of Villers-Cotterets Forest, and to infiltrate into the region along its northern border. Above Soissons equally violent attempts were made to break the French lines north and south of the Aisne, and to flatten out the apex of the French re-entrant angle with its apex above Carlepont Wood. In the Ourcq Valley region the Germans made an advance on June 1st and 2d of about six miles.

On June 3d the enemy again gained ground on the southern end of the western side of the Aisne-Marne salient, just north-west of Château-Thierry. Here they reached Bouresches and a line running north-west, below Torcy and Belleau Wood, to Bussières. On this line the American Second Division co-operated, on June 6th, in a brilliant counter-attack. It broke through

the German positions on a two-and-a-half-mile front for a gain of two miles. On the right, Bouresches was taken. On the left, Bussières and Torcy were stormed and Belleau Village was reached. In a subsequent operation the Second Division cleared out Belleau Wood. The Germans were thrown completely on the defensive in this region.

In fact, by June 6th the Aisne-Marne offensive was over. The lines were stabilized all the way round the elliptical salient from behind Soissons to a point just north-west of Rheims. Rheims lay at the apex of a small loop, almost encircled, but strongly defended on all sides. The east side of the salient had been slightly enlarged. But the Allied forces held all the approaches to the Forest of the Mountain of Rheims, the main bastion in the region south of the city. The five British divisions in this sector were now attached to the French Fifth Army.

The Germans had achieved a spectacular success south of the Aisne. It was of greater moral than material value, however. The German bulletins announced the capture of 45,000 prisoners and 400 guns. An area of 650 square miles was overrun. But from a broad strategical point of view Ludendorff had weakened rather than strengthened his position by committing himself to holding and exploiting the dangerous Aisne-Marne pocket.

It was now necessary for the Germans to reduce the inconvenient Allied re-entrant angle which projected northward, west of Soissons, almost to the Oise, in the neighbourhood of Noyon. In this angle were the great forests which protect Paris on the north-east—Compiègne, Villers-Cotterets, Laigue, and Ourscamp. Ludendorff had enveloped them on the east by pushing

down to the Ourcq and Marne valleys. Now he sought to envelop them on the west by driving down the west side of the Oise, with the city of Compiègne and the Oise crossings south of it as his objectives.

The Fourth German offensive of 1918 (the second against Paris) began on June 9th on a front of twenty-two or twenty-three miles, from a point just south of Noyon west to a point south of Montdidier. The armies under Hutier were engaged in it. It was the least successful test, up to that time, of the new Hutier offensive tactics.

The brunt of the attack fell on the French positions in the centre, south of Lassigny. The first line yielded and the Germans pushed through for two miles in a south-westerly direction. Following the Matz River valley they reached the town of Ressons-sur-Matz. A little farther east they reached Mareuil. The French right and left wings were driven in about a mile.

On the night of the 9th and on the 10th further progress was made in the centre. Hutier realized a three-mile gain to the south-west of Ressons-sur-Matz, and a two-mile gain to the south and south-east of that town. The following day the drive in the centre collapsed prematurely. The Germans in the morning advanced two more miles south, to the valley of the Aronde. But Foch was now ready to counter-attack. The German centre was thrust back and at the same time a counter-blow on the west side of the Matz salient threw the German right wing into disorder. This brilliant operation was directed by General Mangin. The German right wing retreated a mile or more and lost one thousand prisoners. On his left, however, below Noyon, Hutier gained a little more ground along the Oise.

The drive had been smothered in three days. That was because Foch had ample reserves in the section between Montdidier and the Oise, and had used a violent counter-offensive at the psychological moment as a stopper for the Hutier tactics. The French were obliged, however, to yield some territory east of the Oise as a result of the German penetration down the west bank of that river as far as Ribécourt and Bethancourt. In the night of June 11th they abandoned the tip of their salient pointing toward Noyon. Carlepont Wood was evacuated. So was Ourscamp Forest. The new French line ran east from the Oise River, in the space between the Ourscamp Forest and the Laigue Forest to Tracy-le-Val, and then joined the old line north-west of Soissons at Nampoeil.

The close connection between the Lassigny drive and the Aisne-Marne drive was emphasized by a renewal on June 11th of the German effort on the west side of the Aisne-Marne salient. This effort lasted three days and was directed at the French positions south-west of Soissons, covering the approaches to Villers-Cotterets Forest. The German front was pushed forward two miles in the region north of the forest, the Germans reaching Laversine, Cœuvres, and St. Pierre Aigle. The last named town is on the north-eastern edge of the big forest barrier. To the east and south of that barrier the gains made were inconsequential.

Ludendorff's fourth attempt to rupture the Allied front had resulted in slight local advances. But in any larger sense, it had been a conspicuous failure.

CHAPTER XXXVI

THE TURN OF THE TIDE. LUDENDORFF'S FIFTH OFFENSIVE, JULY 5, 1918. FOCH'S COUNTER- OFFENSIVE, JULY 18, 1918

COMMITTED, as he was, to a finish offensive, there was nothing for Ludendorff to do but to go ahead. Though his reserves were shrinking and Allied reserves were mounting with the arrival of every American troopship, he was bound to carry his gamble through. So he laboriously collected his strength for his Fifth and final offensive, consuming thirty-three precious days in doing so.

Foch had little difficulty in guessing where that offensive would break. The drive from Lassigny had shown where the French forces were concentrated. They were defending Paris and Amiens. Ludendorff's natural inclination would therefore be to attack farther east with the idea of breaking the connection between the French armies east of the Aisne-Marne salient and those west of it. Possession of the salient offered advantages for such an attack. Offensively it was an asset. Defensively it was a liability.

Foch made preparations both for meeting an attack east and west of Rheims and for attacking himself on that front, if Ludendorff should hold off beyond the middle of July. He withdrew the French forces in Flanders—eight divisions in all—for use in Champagne.

He requested Field Marshal Haig to send four British divisions to the Somme sector, so as to enable him to move four French divisions from that front to the sector east of Rheims. On July 13th he asked that these four replacement divisions on the Somme be put unreservedly at his disposal. Two of them were sent eventually to the east side of the Aisne-Marne salient, participating in the fighting there on and after July 20th. The other two were employed on the west side of the salient on and after July 23d. Two Italian divisions were put in line in the Rheims sector. The First American Division was brought down from Cantigny, on the Montdidier front, where it had distinguished itself, and was stationed on the west side of the salient. The American forces which had been in training in France were called on without stint. Altogether nine American divisions—the First, Second, Third, Fourth, Twenty-sixth, Twenty-eighth, Thirty-second, Forty-second, and Seventy-seventh—were engaged in repelling the Fifth Ludendorff offensive and in the Foch counter-offensive which merged into it.

In the interval between the Fourth and Fifth German offensives, Foch had conducted a succession of local operations on the front between Soissons and Château-Thierry. These should have awakened Ludendorff's suspicions. The French lines there were advanced at many points and the way was cleared for a general attack on the west side of the Aisne-Marne salient.

But Ludendorff remained absorbed in his own grandiose designs. He still thought that the Allies were too weak and too discouraged to strike back. His own plans involved an enlargement of the salient to the south and the east, and a drive on the front east of

Rheims, which would push the French there back to and beyond Châlons-sur-Marne, pinch out the Rheims loop, envelop the Forest of the Mountain of Rheims, clear the Marne Valley east through Épernay, and compel a general Allied withdrawal on the line east from Châlons to Verdun. Once the French front was bent back below the Marne, Ludendorff expected to turn west and envelop Paris, already under the fire of his "Big Bertha" super-guns.

The Fifth offensive began on the morning of July 15th on a winding front of fifty-five miles, running from Château-Thierry around the southern and eastern sides of the Aisne-Marne salient, encircling Rheims, and then stretching east through "Dusty" Champagne to the Main de Massiges, on the edge of the Argonne. Everywhere the Allies were ready for it. The main attack was east of Rheims. Here General Gouraud had drawn back his forces a couple of miles to battle-positions, drenching his outpost lines with gas after abandoning them. The Hutier wave system broke down before it got fairly started. The German impact made practically no impression.

On this front the offensive was smothered on the first day. West of Rheims and down to the Marne the Germans made a gain averaging about two miles on July 15th and continued to progress irregularly until July 18th, especially in the region near the Marne. Foch was willing to yield ground there and also below the Marne, since a German advance south of the river played into his hands. It would make the Aisne-Marne salient more difficult to draw out of in case its west side were broken through by a counter-offensive such as he had already organized.

General de Mitry commanded the French forces

south of the Marne—mostly divisions transferred from Flanders—with the Third American Division on his left. On July 15th he retired in the centre, between Dormans and Fossoy, the Germans crossing the Marne and pushing up the east side of the little Surmelin River about four miles, almost to Condé. The American Third Division, however, held fast on the river to the east of Château-Thierry. On the 16th and 17th General Boehn, who was in command of the German forces in the southern end of the salient, widened out the wedge below the Marne toward the east, crossing the river at Mareuil and working up the Marne Valley toward Épernay. In the meantime the Germans near Condé were pushed back toward the river.

On the east side of the Aisne-Marne salient, held by the Fourth French Army, under General Berthelot, reinforced by British, Italian, and American divisions, the German attack was intensified on July 16th and 17th. The pressure was strongest on the southern sector, between the Marne and Ardre. Here the Germans gained about two miles, approaching the Forest of the Mountain of Rheims on the east and south-east. They also gained a little ground on both sides of the Marne, toward Épernay. But the Allied positions remained practically intact after three days of fighting. The German offensive was dying away to a mere local advance in the south-eastern corner of the Aisne-Marne pocket. It would probably have stopped of itself, if Foch hadn't paralyzed it with his counter-offensive of July 18th.

The Allied commander-in-chief had brought two armies into line on the west side of the salient. General Mangin's—the Tenth—had been transferred from the Lassigny sector to the front opposite Soissons. Mangin

took position between the Aisne and the Ourcq. Another army, under Degoutte, occupied the front from the Ourcq down to Château-Thierry. The First and Second American divisions were with Mangin. The Twenty-sixth was with Degoutte. Twelve French divisions and three American—the latter equivalent to six French divisions—were lined up against nine German divisions.

Foch's concentration had been effected under the cover of the forests between the Soissons-Château-Thierry line and the Oise. The Germans were completely unaware of it. Their armies on the west side of the salient, also under Boehn's command, were caught off their guard when the Allied offense developed on the morning of July 18th. With almost no artillery preparation Mangin and Degoutte attacked on a thirty-mile front, north and south, from the Aisne to the Marne. The German lines broke everywhere at the first shock. The Allied forces advanced from three to nine miles, the greatest progress being made in the region west and north-west of Soissons. On July 18th and 19th the highroad from Soissons to Château-Thierry was reached and the railroad between those two cities was cut. Mangin and Degoutte, between them, captured 360 guns and seventeen thousand prisoners.

In the days following Boehn persistently counter-attacked on the upper half of the west side of the salient, holding the Allies away from Soissons. But he yielded ground in the southern half and in the south-western corner of the salient. Ludendorff had, in fact, begun to draw out of the sack. The German divisions below the Marne recrossed that river on July 19th and 20th. On July 21st, the Americans and

French, under de Mitry, followed them, entering Château-Thierry and occupying bridgeheads farther east. In the Ourcq sector the Allied forces advanced four miles, reaching the neighbourhood of Oulchy-le-Château, on the north bank of the Ourcq, two miles north-west of Nanteuil-Nôtre Dame. This town is the junction point of a railroad coming down from Fismes, on the Vesle, with the Soissons-Château-Thierry railroad.

Ludendorff's problem now was to extricate his armies from the quadrilateral, whose west side had been broken in, and whose east side was also under strong pressure. The salient he had driven to the Marne was no longer of any use to him. It had become a trap. But he was reluctant to confess defeat. For political and personal reasons he tried to camouflage the situation. The German communiqués of this period stoutly repudiated any intention of withdrawing, announced German victories, and said that Boehn would hold fast on a "new line" running across the lower half of the salient and based on the Ourcq River. The quadrangle was full of German troops and Boehn used them lavishly in counter-attacking on the Soissons front, on the Ourcq front, and even in the sector north of the Marne Valley.

From a strategical point of view, however, it was folly to think of making a real stand either in the lower half of the salient or across the middle of it. To do this successfully Fère-en-Tardenois would have to be held; and Fère-en-Tardenois was already in danger. It was the highroad centre for the middle and western sections of the quadrilateral. If it should fall, the German retreat would have to be made up the eastern side, where communications would be uncomfortably

congested. But Ludendorff tried to hold Fère-en-Tardenois and refused for many days to evacuate the south-eastern corner of the salient.

Stubborn fighting continued on the west front above the Ourcq, though the Germans gradually relaxed their grip on the district between the Ourcq and the Marne, north-east of Château-Thierry. Degoutte took Oulchy-le-Ville on July 23d. On July 24th he reached Armentières, a little over a mile west of Nanteuil-Nôtre Dame, and only seven and a half miles west of Fère-en-Tardenois. On July 25th, the Franco-American forces, under de Mitry, moving north from the Marne, arrived within six miles of Fère-en-Tardenois. On the 26th Oulchy-le-Château fell. Three days later Fère-en-Tardenois fell. French and American troops crossed the Ourcq from the south and the Ourcq line was a memory.

On the east side of the salient Berthelot's army had been gradually pushing the Germans back beyond the lines which they held prior to July 15th. This movement was accentuated when the western line yielded. Ville-en-Tardenois was occupied on August 1st, and more than half of the Vesle-Marne salient of July 18th was cleared of the enemy.

The German bulletins of the first days of August again assured the German public that Ludendorff would hold "new positions" to which he had voluntarily withdrawn, north of the Ourcq. But on August 1st and 2d Mangin's army began a new drive for Soissons. Strong positions which Boehn had organized in the angle south-west of Soissons were stormed. French and American forces crossed the Crise River on August 2d, enveloping Soissons from the south and south-east. Soissons was then evacu-

ated. On August 4th Fismes, on the Vesle, was taken by American troops and the German armies withdrew behind that river, except on a small sector east of Fismes.

Thereafter, the front became more or less stabilized. The Allied armies crossed the Vesle at many points and also crossed the Aisne to the north-east of Soissons. But the German retreat out of the Aisne-Marne salient and Foch's first counter-offensive were over. Ludendorff held most of the enclave between the Aisne and the Vesle until October. Foch now turned his attention to the elimination of the salients created by the other German offensives. In his first counter-blow he had taken forty thousand prisoners and several hundred guns. More than that, he had wrecked Ludendorff's over-blown reputation, and permanently recovered the offensive on the Western Front.

CHAPTER XXXVII

THE DECISION IN THE WEST. AUGUST 8, 1918-
NOVEMBER 11, 1918

FOCH was made a Marshal of France on August 6th. No French soldier had better deserved that honour. Yet Foch's Victory Offensive was just beginning. His next task was to pinch out the big Montdidier salient. This operation had been foreshadowed by a series of local "nibbles" on the west side of the Avre River. Debeney's army had made advances there similar to the advances made in the Villers-Cotterets region in the weeks preceding July 18th. Hutier had seemed to take alarm at these, for he voluntarily withdrew across the Avre, after having lost considerable ground on the west bank and nearly two thousand prisoners.

Yet the Allied offensive against the salient he was holding found him asleep. It began with a joint attack by Debeney's French First Army and Rawlinson's British Fourth Army (both under the command of Field Marshal Haig) on a front of twenty miles from Morlancourt, just north of the Somme, south to Braches, below Moreuil. North of the Somme and south of Moreuil the operation was of a holding character. The main lines of penetration were along the south bank of the Somme, up the Luce River valley, and north-eastward from Moreuil. In this area, where the Australian and the Canadian corps were

employed, there was a maximum advance on the first day of eight and a half miles—from the Villers-Bretton-eux plateau east to Framerville, which lies about two miles north-northeast of the important railroad junction of Rosières-en-Santerre.

The German lines crumpled up. Their defenders took to flight. One hundred guns and seven thousand prisoners were captured. Ludendorff said after the war that he lost hope of a military victory after the first day's fighting in the Montdidier salient, not because the German lines were broken (which was unavoidable), but because they were broken so easily. Yet his own policy of organizing shock divisions on a large scale for special offensive uses had greatly weakened the other divisions from which shock material had been sifted out.

The Allied advance continued on August 9th. The British progressed four miles east from Caix to a point beyond Rosières and only three miles west of Chaulnes. The French progressed the same distance along the highroad from Amiens to Roye. In these two days two hundred guns and seventeen thousand prisoners were taken. The Allies had already cut the railroad coming down from Albert through Bray to Montdidier. They were close up to the railroad coming down from Péronne to Chaulnes Junction and thence to Roye. North of the Somme, on August 9th, the American Thirty-third Division co-operated with British troops in an advance to the east of Chipilly and Morlancourt.

The wedge driven toward Roye put the Germans about Montdidier in a dangerous position. Hutier hurriedly evacuated that city on August 10th. On the same day the Allied attack was extended to the south-east, on a front of fifteen miles. The French

Third Army, under Humbert, advanced north-east, toward Roye, for a gain of six miles. The total of prisoners taken rose on August 11th to forty thousand, and the total of guns to three hundred. Humbert's army held the front around the bend of the Montdidier salient, east to the Oise River. Its task was to wipe out the small Lassigny salient, created by Ludendorff's fourth drive. To do so Humbert pushed forward his left wing so as to threaten Roye and to envelop Lassigny from the west, while reducing the difficult Lassigny massif with his centre, and working up the valley of the Oise toward Noyon, with his right. By August 14th he had recaptured Ribécourt, on the Oise, and had made considerable progress across the massif.

On August 12th and 13th the British Fourth Army and the French First Army reached, south of the Somme, the defences of the main line of the old Noyon salient, occupied by the Germans from the fall of 1914 until the Hindenburg retreat in the spring of 1917. These positions covered Chaulnes and Roye. The Germans had managed to keep them intact all through the Somme battle of 1916. Ludendorff decided to make a fight in them now, concentrating reserves behind them and holding up Allied progress by violent counter-attacks. In so doing he showed poor judgment, for his only real hope of maintaining a successful defensive lay in reaching the strongest defence line available—the Hindenburg Line—without involving his reserves too deeply. He needed all his reserves to maintain himself behind the great Hindenburg barrier.

As soon as the German defence on the Chaulnes-Roye front stiffened, Foch carried his attack elsewhere. His purpose was to spread the attack, not to concentrate

it. For by applying pressure on all parts of the line he could most easily wear down Ludendorff's resources, compelling the latter to shift his reserves again and again and always to fight at a disadvantage. About August 15th all the German armies in the Montdidier salient were put under the command of General Boehn.

On August 18th Foch began an offensive in the sector between the Oise River and Soissons. That evening, and on August 19th, 20th, and 21st, General Mangin's Tenth Army broke through the German lines on a front of sixteen miles, gaining about nine miles and bringing up on the Oise River, east of Noyon. Still farther east, it advanced to the neighbourhood of Coucy-le-Château. From this latter position Mangin threatened the flank of the Germans in the region south of the Chemin des Dames and in the strip between the Aisne and the Vesle. At the other end of the line he enveloped Noyon from the east and south-east, while Humbert threatened it from the south. Mangin captured two hundred guns and ten thousand prisoners. Humbert took Lassigny on the 21st, thus demolishing the southern anchor-hold of the Chaulnes-Roye line.

On the 21st, too, Haig began an attack north of the Somme, using Byng's Third Army. This blow was delivered on a nine-mile front, against Below's Seventeenth German Army, from Miraumont, on the Ancre River, north to Moyenville, about nine miles south of Arras. The objective was the railroad line from Arras to Albert. This was reached. Achiet-le-Grand, about three and a half miles north-west of Bapaume, was captured. The next day the left wing of the Fourth Army took Albert and advanced to the east of that city. Forty-five hundred prisoners were made in these two preliminary operations.

The main drive began on August 23d. It covered a front of thirty-three miles, from Lihons, west of Chaulnes, where the British and French lines joined, up to Mercatel, a few miles south-east of Arras. This offensive, which lasted about ten days, was everywhere successful. Twenty-three British divisions, by obstinate fighting, drove about thirty-five German divisions from one side of the old Somme battlefield to the other. Bapaume and Combles fell on August 29th; Péronne, on September 1st. The line of the Somme, south of Péronne, was turned. The Germans evacuated Roye on August 26th, Chaulnes on August 28th, and Noyon on August 29th. In the south Ludendorff was in full retreat toward the Hindenburg Line. He had lost to the British Fourth and Third armies, in the battle of Bapaume, 270 guns and 34,000 prisoners.

By August 25th conditions were ripe for an attack by the British First Army, east of Arras. This offensive lasted from August 26th to September 3d. It carried the right wing of the First Army forward, below the Scarpe River to the Quéant-Drocourt line. That line was broken on September 2d, about Quéant (where it joined the Hindenburg system), by two Canadian and four British divisions, three of the latter belonging to the Third Army. Farther north the First Army pushed forward three miles along the Arras-Cambrai highroad, bringing the troops well to the rear of the Quéant-Drocourt belt.

This great victory forced a general German retreat north of the Somme. By September 8th Ludendorff's armies in this section were back to a line running north from Vermand, through Epéhy, to Havrincourt, and thence north along the Canal du Nord toward Douai. Ten British divisions had defeated thirteen German

divisions in the battle of the Scarpe, taking two hundred guns and sixteen thousand prisoners. This result re-emphasized the failing morale of the German rank and file.

The battle of the Scarpe was followed on September 12th-17th by the battle of Havrincourt-Epéhy, in which the Germans were thrust back between those points to the edge of the Hindenburg zone. On September 18th and 19th an attack was made on a seventeen-mile front, from Holnon, west of St. Quentin, to Gouzeaucourt, above Epéhy. The Third and Fourth British armies and the French First Army took part in it. The Germans were pressed back into the Hindenburg positions. In this joint operation sixty guns and ten thousand prisoners were taken. The French enveloped St. Quentin on the south and reached the Oise Valley, occupying Vendeuil, about four miles north of La Fère. In the operations from September 12th to September 19th the British captured one hundred guns and twelve thousand prisoners.

The Aisne-Marne, Montdidier, and Lassigny salients had now been completely eliminated, except for a small area between the Vesle and the Chemin des Dames. Ludendorff meanwhile had chosen to abandon the Lys Valley salient without a fight. Its evacuation, carried on with little interference from the British, was completed on September 6th.

One ancient salient was left on the Meuse front—that of St. Mihiel, created in the fall of 1914. Foch now decided to reduce it. The operation was entrusted to an American force, under the direct command of General Pershing, a French force, under General Hirschauer, co-operating. The First American Army was organized on August 10th and on August 30th

took over a line stretching from Pont sur Seille, in the Nancy sector, west to St. Mihiel and then north to a point east of Verdun. This line was subsequently extended west across the Meuse to the western edge of the Argonne.

The two sides of the St. Mihiel salient—from Les Éparges south to the town of St. Mihiel and thence east across to the Moselle—constituted a front of about forty miles. The German positions were strongly fortified. The main attack was made on the southern face of the salient, with an auxiliary holding attack on the western face. Between the Moselle and Xivray the First and Fourth American Corps were massed on September 10th and 11th. They comprised the Second, Fifth, Eighty-second, and Ninetieth divisions (in the First Corps) and the First, Forty-second, and Eighty-ninth (in the Fourth). Major General Hunter Liggett commanded the First Corps and Major General Joseph T. Dickman the Fourth. The centre, on both sides of the apex of the salient, was held by the French Second Colonial Corps. On the western side the American Fifth Corps, under Major General George H. Cameron, reinforced by a French division and the American Twenty-sixth Division, was to take the three difficult positions of Les Éparges, Combres, and Amaranthe. Six American divisions—the Third, the Seventy-eighth, the Thirty-fifth, the Ninety-first, the Thirty-third, and the Eightieth—were in reserve.

After a four-hour artillery preparation the seven American divisions on the south face of the salient advanced at 5 A.M., September 12th. They were helped by a fog. The whole enemy front yielded. The First Corps, to the east, progressed to Thiaucourt. The Fourth Corps, on the left, pushed north-west

toward Vigneulles, in the middle of the salient. There it joined up on the morning of September 13th with units of the Fifth Corps, which had broken through the western side of the salient the day before. St. Mihiel was occupied by the French Colonials on September 12th. In twenty-four hours the pocket had been emptied. The American loss was seven thousand. But sixteen thousand Germans and Austro-Hungarians had been captured, with 443 guns.

A new line was formed running straight across from the Moselle through Thiaucourt and Vigneulles to Fresnes-en-Woëvre. Metz was brought under the fire of the Allied guns. The moral effect of this American victory was enormous. It proved that the new American armies were already fit to undertake large-scale offensives under American leadership.

With St. Mihiel gone, the Germans were back on their primary lines of defence in France and Belgium. Foch's problem was to oust them from these in such a manner as would make a retreat to the Rhine hazardous, if not impossible. He decided that immediately following the St. Mihiel operation these four offensives should be undertaken simultaneously by the Allied forces:

(1) By the Americans, west of the Meuse, in the direction of Mezières;

(2) By the French, west of the Argonne, in co-operation with the American attack and with the same general objective;

(3) By the British, on the St. Quentin-Cambrai front, in the direction of Maubeuge.

(4) By the Belgian and Allied forces in Flanders, in the direction of Ghent.

The purpose of the first three of these operations was

to push the German forces in the Argonne and in Champagne back upon the Ardennes, meanwhile cutting their direct lateral communications with the German forces in Flanders. The Flanders offensive aimed at clearing the Belgian seacoast.

German resources had been cut into severely by the fighting since July 15th. At the end of August the number of prisoners lost to the Allies was 128,302. The number of guns lost was 2069. By the end of September the toll of prisoners was 254,012 and of guns about 3700.

The Belgian operation, in charge of King Albert, was conducted by the Belgian army, a French army under General Degoutte, and portions of the British Second Army, under General Plumer. The front of the attack, which began on September 28th, ran from Dixmude to a point south-east of Ypres. The German forces on this line had been reduced to five or six divisions. They gave way rapidly. By the evening of October 1st, Plumer's army had cleared the left bank of the Lys River as far down as Comines and was close up to Menin. The Belgians had advanced to the neighbourhood of Roulers and the French, on their left, had taken Staden. The direct railroad route from Lille north to Ostend and Bruges was brought under Allied fire. Three hundred and fifty guns and 10,500 prisoners were captured. This advance to the east menaced the German positions in the Lens sector. Armentières and Lens were evacuated and the reorganized British Fifth Army, under General Birdwood, which had been interposed between the Second and First armies, advanced on this sector to within striking distance of Lille.

Field Marshal Haig's final assault on the Hindenburg

positions began on September 27th and ended on October 5th. The First, Third, and Fourth armies took part in it, striking on a front from the Sensée River south to St. Quentin. Below St. Quentin the French First Army was also drawn in. Two American divisions—the Twenty-seventh and Thirtieth, constituting the Second Army Corps, under Major General G. W. Read—were attached to the Fourth Army and helped to break the Hindenburg Line in the sector about Le Catelet.

The First and Third armies opened the offensive. The Canal du Nord was crossed that day in the neighbourhood of Mœuvres and then cleared for several miles to the north. The British advance by September 28th had passed the limits of Byng's movement in November, 1917, and was close in to Cambrai, on the west, south, and north. Two hundred guns and ten thousand prisoners were captured. On September 29th the Fourth Army assaulted the powerful sector of the Hindenburg zone below Cambrai. The line of battle extended twelve miles, from Holnon, just west of St. Quentin, on the south, to Vendhuille, above Le Catelet, on the north.

The Hindenburg zone was completely perforated, the Thirtieth American Division reaching Nauroy, well to its rear. On September 30th the gap was widened out. Directly back of the Hindenburg zone, about Le Catelet, lay the subsidiary Beaufort line. This was shattered between October 1st and October 5th and the British grip on Cambrai was tightened. Debeney's First Army entered St. Quentin on October 1st, the enemy retiring in the direction of Guise. In the operations above St. Quentin, in which thirty British and two American divisions were engaged with

thirty-nine German divisions, 36,000 prisoners and 380 guns were captured.

The Champagne and the Argonne offensives were launched on September 26th. Gouraud made an attack on a front of twenty-three miles, between Rheims and the Argonne. He advanced, up to September 29th, three and a half miles and took 16,000 prisoners. From October 2d to October 9th Berthelot's right wing and Gouraud's left wing, reinforced by the Second and Thirty-sixth American divisions, carried through a forward movement on both sides of Rheims. Here the Germans were still in positions which they had occupied since September, 1914. The troops holding them were swept north on a thirty-mile front, retiring to the Suippe and Arnes rivers and losing Berry-au-Bac and Condé-sur-Aisne. Mangin's Tenth Army continued all through September to make progress in the region of the Chemin des Dames.

The American offensive west of the Meuse opened on September 26th. Its first phase lasted until October 4th. The front from the Meuse west was organized as follows: Third Corps, from the river to Malancourt, made famous in the battle of Verdun; Fifth Corps, from Malancourt to Vauquois; First Corps, from Vauquois to Vienne-le-Château. The Third Corps comprised the Fourth, Thirty-third, and Eightieth divisions, in the line, with the Third Division in reserve. The Fifth Corps included the Seventy-ninth, Eighty-seventh, and Ninety-first divisions, in the line, with the Thirty-second in reserve. The First Corps included the Twenty-eighth, Thirty-fifth, and Seventy-seventh divisions, in the line, with the Ninety-second in reserve. The general reserve consisted of the First, Twenty-ninth, and Eighty-second divisions. These

fifteen divisions had a strength of about 450,000 men.

The attack caught the enemy napping. In the first three days an advance was made ranging from three to seven miles. The country north-west of Verdun was the roughest on the entire fighting line, embracing the Argonne Forest and the wooded ridges west of the Meuse. After Pershing's drive started the German High Command rushed its best troops to this sector, since an advance north here to Sedan and Mezières would practically break the German line into two parts. Up to September 28th the American forces took ten thousand prisoners. Then for five days they consolidated their lines in preparation for a further advance.

The second stage of Foch's final offensive was entered on early in October. It consisted of a continuation of the attacks in the four principal sectors.

In the north the British operation against Maubeuge was renewed first. On October 8th the British Third and Fourth armies began the second battle of Le Cateau. Field Marshal Haig's object was to envelop Cambrai by advancing to the east and south-east of it, and at the same time, in conjunction with the French First Army, to envelop Guise from the north. The attack was made on a front stretching from Sequehart south to St. Quentin. On the first day a gain of from three to four miles was made, and on the evening of October 9th the British were within two miles of Le Cateau. Cambrai was entered on the same day. On the 10th the British brought up against new German positions on the line of the Selle River.

In this fighting twenty British divisions and one American division (the Thirtieth) defeated twenty-four German divisions, capturing twelve thousand

prisoners and 250 guns. Farther north, the British First Army pressed forward toward Douai, reaching its western suburbs on October 13th, the day on which Laon fell.

The Belgian offensive was revived on October 14th, on the front from Comines north to Dixmude. Menin and Roulers were taken on the first day and Thourout on the second. Ostend fell on the 17th and by the 20th the left flank of the Allied armies rested on the Dutch frontier, the enemy hastily evacuating Zeebrugge and Bruges.

The advance to Menin and toward Courtrai threatened to cut off Lille from the north-east. The Germans abandoned Lille on the 18th. Douai had been given up on the 17th. The British Second, Fifth, and First armies pushed east after the retreating Germans and by the evening of October 22d reached the general line of the Scheldt River from Valenciennes north to a point east of Roubaix and Tourcoing. Two American divisions—the Thirty-seventh and the Ninety-first—were sent north from the Meuse, near the end of October, to assist in the Flanders offensive. They joined the French forces under Degoutte and engaged in the advance made by the Belgian and French forces, from October 31st to November 4th, to the Scheldt line about Audenarde. In the Belgian operations of October 14th–17th, twelve thousand prisoners and one hundred guns were captured.

After the fall of Lille and Douai Ludendorff tried to hold the line of the Scheldt from Ghent to below Valenciennes, and a line cutting across from the Scheldt to the Sambre, to the west of the Forest of Mormal. Haig's attack on these positions began with the battle of the Selle River. This lasted from October 17th to

October 25th. The life line of the German front in Northern France and Belgium was the railroad running from Valenciennes south-east to Hirson. It passed through the Forest of Mormal and intersected, at Aulnoye, the railroad running north-east from Le Cateau to Maubeuge. The Selle positions were stormed in four days, two American divisions—the Thirtieth and the Twenty-seventh—fighting with the British Fourth Army on the southern end of the line. In the next five days Haig succeeded in reaching the edge of Mormal Forest and enveloping Valenciennes from the south-east. In this battle twenty-four British and two American divisions worsted thirty-one German divisions and captured twenty thousand prisoners and 475 guns. German morale was running low and many units avoided fighting either by surrendering or by hurrying to the rear.

The final struggle on this front goes by the name of the battle of the Sambre. It covered the period from November 1st to November 11th. On November 1st-2d the British First and Third armies defeated the Germans to the south of Valenciennes. This city was captured on November 2d, by Canadian troops. Ludendorff drew back, pivoting on Le Quesnoy, about fifteen miles south-east of Valenciennes.

The decisive attack was now delivered on November 4th, on a thirty-mile front from the Sambre River north. In one day the German armies were routed. They lost to the British nineteen thousand prisoners and 450 guns, and to the French First Army, operating south of the Sambre, five thousand prisoners and sixty guns. Guise was captured on November 5th. On that day a German retreat began which ended only with the signing of the armistice. Bavai was reached

on November 7th; Maubeuge, on November 9th. On the morning of November 11th the Third Canadian Division stormed Mons.

Between August 8th and November 11th the British armies in France and Belgium captured 187,000 prisoners and 2850 guns. Fifty-nine divisions in all were engaged in these operations.

On the Aisne front Debeney and Mangin, aided by Berthelot, succeeded, about the middle of October, in reducing the great La Fère-Laon bastion. La Fère and Laon fell on October 13th. Farther east, Berthelot's army reached Sissonne and Gouraud captured Vouziers and got across the line of the Aisne at nearly every point except Rethel. In this sector the Germans next made a stand on the so-called Hunding Line. This was not broken until November 5th, Debeney, Mangin, and Guillaumat (the last-named having succeeded Berthelot) all contributing to the result.

Gouraud's army advanced meanwhile to west of the Argonne, in touch with the American offensive. This entered its second phase on October 4th. By the hardest kind of fighting, the three American corps forced their way through the Argonne and the woods on the west bank of the Meuse. By October 10th the Argonne was cleared of the enemy up to the neighbourhood of Grand Pré.

On October 9th the command of the American First Army was given to Major General Hunter Liggett. An American Second Army was created, under Major General Robert L. Bullard. The First Army had now reached the Kriemhilde Line, on which Ludendorff hoped to make a successful stand. A most trying period of warfare ensued. The enemy had to be worn down by constant pressure. On October 17th Grand

Pré was taken. On October 23d the Third and Fifth corps reached a line running east and west through Bantheville.

A week was now allowed for reorganization. On November 1st the First Army started on the last stage of its progress toward Sedan. On the 2d Busancy was taken. By the 3d an advance of twelve miles had been accomplished and the enemy was in headlong retreat. On November 6th a division of the First Corps reached a point on the Meuse opposite Sedan, twenty-five miles from the starting line. Between the 8th and the 11th American troops fought a final engagement on the east side of the Meuse.

Summarizing the Meuse offensive General Pershing said in his report of November 20, 1918:

In all forty enemy divisions had been used against us in the Meuse-Argonne battle. Between September 26th and November 6th we took 26,059 prisoners and 468 guns on this front. Our divisions engaged were the First, Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Twenty-sixth, Twenty-eighth, Twenty-ninth, Thirty-second, Thirty-third, Thirty-fifth, Thirty-seventh, Forty-second, Seventy-seventh, Seventy-eighth, Seventy-ninth, Eightieth, Eighty-second, Eighty-ninth, Ninetieth, and Ninety-first. Many of our divisions remained in line for a length of time that required nerves of steel, while others were sent in again after only a few days of rest. The First, Fifth, Twenty-sixth, Forty-second, Seventy-seventh, Eightieth, Eighty-ninth, and Ninetieth were in the line twice. Although some of the divisions were fighting their first battle, they soon became equal to the best.

Ludendorff and the German General Staff knew in September that the war was lost. They compelled the civil government to ask for terms and they fomented the German revolution, when it became necessary to stage an apparent repudiation of the autocracy and of Hohenzollernism. Prince Max of Baden was Ludendorff's decoy. The appeal to the United States, which resulted in Germany's offer to surrender and the Allied promise to make peace on the basis of President Wilson's Fourteen Points, only camouflaged the admission of complete defeat by the German High Command. By November 1, 1918, Germany was on the edge of a great military disaster. Her armies avoided it only by throwing down their arms.

CHAPTER XXXVIII

ITALY'S INSPIRING RECOVERY. JUNE 15, 1918—
NOVEMBER 5, 1918

ITALY'S fortunes were at their lowest point after Caporetto. Up to the time the winter snows ended active campaigning Diaz's armies had held on with the greatest difficulty to the Piave-Brenta line, covering Venetia. For a while it seemed probable that they would have to fall back to the line of the Adige.

But Italy rallied with splendid energy in the winter and spring of 1918. The armies were reorganized and refitted. The insidious defeatist propaganda of 1917 was checked. The northern defences were strengthened. All thought of a further retirement was put aside.

The reorganization involved the creation of two new armies—the Sixth and the Eighth—to take the place of the Second, practically disrupted after Caporetto. The First Army occupied the extreme left of the active Italian line, defending the Adige sector below Rovereto, from the Val d'Assa, on the east, to Lake Garda, on the west. The Sixth Army took position on the right of the First, its front running from Val d'Assa east to the Brenta. The Fourth Army held the line between the Brenta and the Piave. The Eighth covered the upper course of the Piave and the Third the lower course. The Seventh Army was stationed

along the western face of the Trentino salient. This army, however, took no share in the grand scale fighting in Northern Italy. Its function was almost exclusively one of observation.

The Italian High Command had planned in March an offensive which was to begin late in May. Its objective was to clear the Asiago Plateau and secure a hold on the Val Sugana, the enemy's main east and west line of communication between Trent and Feltre, the two chief Austro-Hungarian bases in the mountain region. But toward the end of May there were unmistakable signs of a renewal of the Austro-Hungarian offensive. Diaz therefore decided to wait and meet this threat. The preparations which he had made to attack stood him in good stead; for he was able to use his accumulations of reserves, guns, and material in a series of counter-attacks which quickly broke down the final Austro-Hungarian drive.

Austria-Hungary, in 1918, was becoming war-weary. There is little likelihood that the Emperor Karl would have risked another offensive in Italy, if he had been able to control the Empire's military policy. But Ludendorff now controlled it. He insisted that Austria should send him reinforcements for use in France, in case her armies in Italy remained inactive. As a choice of evils Vienna decided to make one more effort to break through into the northern Italian plain.

The Austro-Hungarian offensive was sandwiched in between Ludendorff's Fourth and Fifth offensives. It was conducted by Field Marshal Boroevic, a Croatian general, who had succeeded Hoetzendorff in supreme command. Boroevic used three armies—the Eleventh, under Scheuchenstuel, which formed the left wing of the Trentino group, under Hoetzendorff; and the

Sixth and the Fifth, both belonging to the Isonzo group, the former under General Wurm, and the latter under the Archduke Joseph. According to the Vienna bulletins, General Kuchbach commanded the six divisions of the Sixth Army which tried to break through the Upper Piave front by storming the massif of Montello. The Italian official reports credit Boroëvic with employing seventy-three divisions in his offensive—fifty-four in the front line and nineteen in reserve. They say that the Italian and Allied forces were somewhat below seventy-three divisions. Hoetendorff had another army—the Tenth—in the western Trent sector, but it did not come into action.

The Austro-Hungarian offensive started on June 15th. It was badly conceived in that the attack was not concentrated. Boroëvic's operative front was nearly one hundred miles in length, from the Astico to the Adriatic. The energy of the assault was necessarily dispersed and dissipated. The Austro-Hungarian armies were fighting on exterior lines, with insufficient lateral communications in their rear. The Italians were fighting on interior lines, with ample cross-communications. In such a situation an intensive attack should have been made on a short front, as at Caporetto. If Boroëvic could break through at a single point—either in the mountains or in the Piave Valley—his object would be attained; for the whole Italian position would have collapsed. But he pursued the unpromising policy of diffused pressure at all points on a vastly over-extended front.

The Austro-Hungarians made practically no gains in the mountain sector, where their effort was completely checked after two days. On the Upper and Lower Piave the gains were more considerable. The Lower

Piave was crossed by the Austro-Hungarian Fifth Army, and an advance of from four to six miles was effected in the coast region toward Venice. This did not seriously threaten the Italian positions. The danger point on that side was the elbow on the Upper Piave, where the Italian front turned west toward the Brenta. There a formidable plateau on the west bank of the river, called the Montello, was seized by Kuchbach's six divisions. If they could clear it, they would drive a wedge in behind the Italian positions from the Piave to the Brenta, and also break the Italian connections between Treviso and the northern front.

The severest fighting of the Piave campaign took place on the Montello. Kuchbach occupied the eastern and middle sections, but couldn't drive the Italians off the western slopes. By June 18th the Austrian offensive had reached its climax. The Italians now began to counter-attack fiercely on the Montello, in the Piave section, east of Treviso, where four and a half divisions of the Austro-Hungarian Sixth Army were operating, and in the lower Capo Sile sector. By June 20th the initiative had passed out of Boroëvic's hands and into Diaz's. In the first phase of the battle Vienna had claimed thirty thousand prisoners. By June 20th the Italian toll of prisoners had risen to eleven thousand.

Kuchbach's position on the Montello now became difficult. He couldn't advance; and a rise in the Piave, which swept away many pontoon bridges, prevented him from retreating. Pushed back to the river bank, the Austro-Hungarian forces struggled to maintain their bridgeheads. A hurried retirement began on June 23d. It ended on June 25th, when the whole west bank was cleared of the enemy. In the operations from June 15th to July 6th, Italian and other Allied

troops captured 24,500 prisoners and seventy guns. The total Italian losses were about ninety thousand. The enemy, according to the Italian official reports, lost more than eighty thousand in killed and prisoners alone.

On July 2d General Diaz conducted a local operation intended to drive the enemy out of the irregular quadrangle between the old Piave and the new Piave, from Santa Dona de Piave south to the sea. It lasted four days and was completely successful. But the Italian counter-attack was not carried beyond the line of the Piave.

The battle of the Piave was Italy's Gettysburg. It ended for ever the Austrian threat against Venetia. Diaz had destroyed the offensive power of the Austro-Hungarian armies. It was only a question of time when he would himself turn and overwhelm an enemy becoming, through internal demoralization, more and more incapable of resistance. The Italian Victory Offensive was delayed until October 24th, when the Dual Monarchy was in its death throes. Vienna was keen at that time for peace at any price and the Austro-Hungarian armies had no longer anything to fight for. They merely defended themselves with a certain stubbornness as they recoiled out of Italy.

Diaz had again reorganized his line. Three more armies were constituted—the Ninth, the Tenth, and the Twelfth. The Twelfth, put under the command of the French General Graziani, was interposed between the Fourth and the Eighth armies. It occupied a front from Pederobba, on the east, to Monte Grappa, on the west, in the sector between the Piave and the Brenta. The Tenth Army, commanded by a British General, the Earl of Cavan, was posted between the

Eighth and the Third armies, on the Piave front. The Ninth Army and the cavalry corps were stationed, in reserve, in the rear of the Fourth and Twelfth armies.

General Diaz employed in his main offensive the Fourth, Twelfth, Eighth, and Tenth armies. The Fourth was commanded by Lieutenant General Giardino, the Eighth by Lieutenant General Cavaglia. These four armies comprised twenty-two infantry divisions—one French, two British, and nineteen Italian. (The Italian army was represented on the front in France by three divisions, totalling 48,000 men.) Diaz had altogether fifty-one Italian, one Czecho-Slovak, two French, and three British divisions, and the 332d American infantry regiment. According to Italian figures, the Allied combatant forces in the Victory Offensive in Northern Italy numbered 912,000, with 8929 guns. The Italian General Staff estimated Boerovic's strength at sixty-three divisions and a half, with 1,070,000 combatants and 7000 guns.

Italian strategy aimed at breaking the enemy's line at the junction point of the Austro-Hungarian Fifth and Sixth armies, east of the Piave. The Sixth Army's lines of communications ran back along its left flank to Vittorio and Sacile. If Diaz could reach Vittorio, he would cut off the northern half of the Sixth Army, which stretched west from the Piave to the Alano basin, and disrupt the Austro-Hungarian forces in eastern Venetia.

He first attacked, on the morning of October 24th, in the Monte Grappa sector, thus misleading the enemy into thinking that the main blow would fall there. The Fourth Army and the left wing of the Twelfth Army fought through the 24th and 25th without making material gains. Another feint was made

by the Sixth Army, in the Asiago region. The decisive operation began on the 27th. The Eighth and the Tenth armies crossed the Piave, driving east-north-east at the communications of the Austro-Hungarian Sixth Army. The Twelfth Army, on the left wing, attacked in a northerly direction astride the Piave.

The enemy resisted stoutly. The Allied forces were unable to get a firm hold on the eastern bank of the Piave until the evening of the 28th. But on the 29th the break-through was completed. Italian advance guards entered Vittorio late that afternoon. The Eighth Army, swinging north and north-west, pushed toward Belluno, well in the rear of the Austro-Hungarian forces west of the Piave. The Twelfth Army, working north, enveloped from the east the Feltre basin positions, attacked from the south by the Fourth Army.

The Grappa front now collapsed, as well as the Piave front. The Third Army advanced along the coast and the Sixth Army in the Asiago region. By October 30th Boroëvic's forces were in full retreat all along the line from the Adige to the sea. The Italian pursuit quickened. The Livenza River was crossed on October 30th and the Tagliamento on November 2d. Udine and Trieste were occupied on November 3d. The same day the Italian First Army reached Trent.

Vienna had already sought an armistice, practically equivalent to unconditional surrender. It was granted on November 3d, and took effect on November 4th.

Revolutions broke out in Austria and Hungary. The latter state became an independent republic. Emperor Karl fled from the former. The Dual Monarchy was dissolved. Italy had fought in the last days against armies without a country.

Between October 25th and November 4th the Allied

forces in Italy took more than one hundred thousand prisoners and about twenty-five hundred guns. The Austro-Hungarian armies ceased to exist. Caporetto was avenged. Italy's century-long score against the Austrian oppressor was settled in full.

CHAPTER XXXIX

THE END IN THE BALKANS. JULY 7, 1918—SEPTEMBER
30, 1918

AFTER long delays and bitter disappointments the Allied policy of maintaining an army in the entrenched camp of Salonica vindicated itself. In September, 1918, this army came into play in Foch's general strategic scheme. Within two weeks thereafter Bulgaria was pleading for an armistice.

General Sarraill was recalled from Macedonia, in December, 1917. General Guillaumat succeeded him in command of the Allied forces there—called by the French the Army of the Orient. Guillaumat remained in charge until June 8, 1918, when he was summoned home and made Military Governor of Paris. Foch now selected Franchet d'Esperey, who had fought alongside him in the First Battle of the Marne and as a leader had survived all the tests of subsequent campaigns in France, to prepare a finishing blow at Bulgaria. The Allies had promised to deliver such a blow in the summer of 1916, when Rumania entered the war. But in 1916 the Army of the Orient was unequal to anything like a real offensive.

D'Esperey's campaign against the Bulgars was preceded by a demonstration on the Albanian front. Early in July Italian troops, supported on their right by French units, cleared the region north-east of

Valona. They were aiming at El Basan, on the Via Egnatia, the key to southern Albania. The drive started on July 7th. The Italians made rapid progress along the seacoast, reaching the Semeni River on July 10th. Farther east, they enveloped the mountain town of Berat, which the Austro-Hungarians evacuated on July 11th. Still farther east, French and Albanian troops advanced down the valley of the Devoli River, which empties into the Semeni. By July 15th, however, the offensive had come nearly to a halt. El Basan was not reached. The Austro-Hungarians organized a counter-offensive in August, recovered Berat, and drove the Allies back to their old lines.

General d'Esperey started in the last week in July to organize his operation in Macedonia. After mature consideration he had decided to attack on one of the most difficult of all the sectors there—that in the area between the Cerna and Vardar rivers. In the region east of Monastir the Cerna changes its course and flows north-east to join the Vardar at a point just south of Veles. The triangle between the two streams contains the rugged massif of Dobropolje. Its southern base was strongly fortified by the Bulgarians, who considered their mountain positions impregnable. Yet a break-through on this sector would yield decisive results, since an Allied army, emerging at the apex of the triangle, would cut the Bulgarian forces in two, severing the connection between the Second Bulgarian Army, east of the Vardar, and the First Bulgarian Army, west of the Cerna.

D'Esperey had on the Dobropolje front the reorganized Serbian army, reinforced by Jugo-Slav units. He also used for the initial assault two French divi-

sions, the One Hundred Twenty-second regular and the Seventeenth colonial. These troops were all under the command of Voivode Michitch, one of the Serbian field marshals. On September 15th the offensive opened with an assault on the Bulgarian positions from Sokol to Vetrenik. By evening a breach seven and a half miles wide had been made in the Bulgarian lines. This was widened out on the following day to sixteen miles.

The Allied troops now crossed to the left bank of the Cerna, threatening Prilep, to the north of Monastir. They also pushed rapidly north across the Dobropolje massif to the confluence of the Cerna and the Vardar. At Grodsko (fifteen miles south of Veles), which they reached on September 21st, they cut the Salonica-Nish railroad and also the branch railroad running southwest to Prilep. The retreat of the Second Bulgarian Army up the Vardar from the Lake Doiran region was now blocked. The First Army was also isolated, having no recourse but to try to retire over rough mountain roads north to Uskub.

The whole Bulgarian front immediately collapsed. Veles was captured on September 25th. Prilep was abandoned by the First Army. This army was thrust west toward the Albanian border by Italian forces, which had advanced north from Monastir. East of Veles Ishtip was occupied, cutting the highroad north from Strumnitza, over which the Second Army might have retreated.

The Allied front directly east and west of the Vardar was held by Greek, French, and British troops, under General Sir George Milne. General Milne had at least four British divisions—the Twenty-second, Twenty-sixth, Twenty-seventh, and Twenty-eighth. The at-

tack in this sector—a holding demonstration at first—was begun on September 18th, on both sides of Lake Doiran. Here, too, the Bulgarian positions were immensely strong. The assaults on the 18th and 19th won considerable ground, but did not break the enemy line. On the 21st, however, the Bulgarian Second Army began a precipitate retirement, its communications down the Vardar Valley having been cut at Grodsko.

Milne's forces followed, passing the Bulgarian border on September 25th. The next day Bulgaria asked for an armistice. Two days later plenipotentiaries came through the British lines on their way to treat with General d'Esperey at Salonica. Operations were suspended on September 30th by the signing of an armistice, which amounted to unconditional surrender on Bulgaria's part. Meanwhile the Allied forces under Milne had captured Strumnitza and, turning to the east, were on the point of seizing the Rupel Pass, in the Struma Valley, closing the main line of retreat for the Bulgarian troops still left on the eastern Macedonian front.

Before the armistice went into effect the Allied armies in the Vardar section had reached Uskub and regained complete control of southern Serbia.

Bulgaria took herself completely out of the war. The armies west of the Vardar surrendered. Those east of it were disarmed and demobilized. Czar Ferdinand abdicated. A new government, under Allied control, was established.

Only a few Austro-Hungarian divisions were left to contest the redemption of Serbia. Within a few weeks the Allied armies were on the Danube. Belgrade was reoccupied and Albania was evacuated by

the enemy. The southern Slav provinces rose in rebellion against Austria-Hungary.

D'Esperey's armies took one hundred thousand prisoners and two thousand guns in the final Balkan offensive.

CHAPTER XL

TURKEY GOES TO THE WALL. FEBRUARY 28, 1918—
OCTOBER 31, 1918

GENERAL ALLENBY took Jerusalem in December, 1917. In the following months he extended his front north of the city and east into the Jordan region. On February 28, 1918, Jericho was captured, and the Turks in that sector were forced to retire to the east bank of the Jordan. On May 1st an Anglo-Egyptian force raided Es Salt, about twenty miles north-east of Jericho and about the same distance north-west of Amman, the latter an important Turkish base on the Hedjaz Railroad. The British found it difficult, however, to operate against the railroad—the vital artery between Damascus and Medina—so long as the Turks controlled the upper crossings of the Jordan and could shift troops from the west bank to the east bank to harass the flank and rear of British columns advancing through the hills of the Land of Moab.

General Allenby, therefore, turned his attention early in the summer to another plan for breaking the Hedjaz line, rolling up the Turkish front, and opening the way to Damascus. In March he had attacked the enemy's positions directly north of Jerusalem, on both sides of the Jerusalem-Nablus highroad, and had found the terrain unsuited to a quick break-through. He decided eventually to try to effect his break-through

in the sector above Joppa, between the hills and the coast.

Practically all the Turkish forces west of the Jordan were concentrated in a rectangle forty-five miles wide and only about twelve miles deep. The southern side of it ran east from a point a little north of Joppa, passing Jerusalem on the north, to a point on the Jordan, north of Jericho. The northern side ran from Jisr ed Damieh, on the Jordan, west, through Nablus, to Tul Keram and thence to the Mediterranean. The Turkish communications from this rectangle to Damascus converged on El Afule and Beisan, twenty-five miles to the north, which were connected by a railroad with Deraa, east of the Jordan, on the Hedjaz Railroad. Allenby's plan—a bold and sound one—was to smash the enemy's line near the coast, rush cavalry north and cut the Turkish communications with El Afule and Beisan. Then by pushing with his centre north from Jerusalem and with his right up the Jordan Valley, he would completely envelop the Turkish armies west of the Jordan.

The Allied armies in Palestine largely outnumbered the Turkish armies. Allenby estimated that the Turks had on both sides the river, including the garrison of Maan, 104,000 men of all services—only 36,000 (4000 cavalry and 32,000 infantry), however, in the fighting line. He himself had 57,000 infantry and 12,000 cavalry, with a total strength in all services of about 200,000. He had 540 guns. The Turks had 400.

Allenby's marked superiority in cavalry contributed decisively to the success of his envelopment movement. He had two cavalry divisions and two mounted infantry divisions, while the Turks had only a single cavalry division. General Liman Sanders, the Teuton

Commander-in-Chief in Palestine and Syria, was in charge of three armies. The Fourth held the Jordan Valley, north of Jericho. It consisted of 6000 infantry and 2000 cavalry, with 74 guns. The Seventh held a twenty-mile line north of Jerusalem, on both sides of the Jerusalem-Nablus highroad. It mustered 7000 infantry, with 111 guns. The Eighth, with 10,000 infantry and 157 guns, occupied a front of about twenty-five miles, from Furkah to the coast.

Allenby commanded a variegated force, including seven infantry divisions, in addition to the four mounted divisions mentioned above, two separate brigades, and four separate battalions. In his army were Australians and New Zealanders, British, Egyptians, the Lahore and Meerut East Indian divisions, two British West Indian battalions, a French colonial brigade, two Jewish battalions, and an Armenian unit. Co-operating with him to the east of the Hedjaz Railroad was an Arab army from the new kingdom of Hedjaz.

The attack on the Turkish coast front was made by a force under Lieutenant General Sir Edward Bulfin. He had at his disposal five divisions, the French brigade, and an Australian light horse brigade. The Desert Mounted Corps, under Lieutenant General Sir Harry Chauvel, was concentrated in Bulfin's rear, ready to dash north through the first opening in the Turkish lines.

The infantry assault on the morning of September 19th (preceded by a fifteen-minute bombardment) was a complete success. The Turkish Eighth Army was taken unawares, and overwhelmed. Its remnants were driven east and north-east to the Samaritan hills. A clear path along the coast was offered to the Allied

horsemen. The Desert Mounted Corps rushed at full speed up the coastal plain. Before dark on September 19th it had reached El Afule, on the lateral railroad from Haifa to Deraa. A detachment swooped down on Liman Sanders's headquarters at Nazareth, still farther north. Sanders barely escaped; but some members of his staff were captured, together with two thousand other prisoners. The cavalry then pushed east from El Afule to Beisan, closing all the Turkish lines of retreat on the west side of the Jordan. A forced march of eighty miles had been accomplished in thirty-four hours.

The Seventh Turkish Army and the remains of the Eighth Army were now in a trap. They were surrounded on three sides. Allenby's right wing in the Jordan Valley pressed north to bar the lower crossing of the Jordan at Jisr ed Damieh. The cavalry, turning south from Beisan, barred the upper crossings. The Allied centre and left, converging on Nablus, drove the disorganized Turks into the arms of the cavalry divisions, waiting in their rear. All organized resistance ended on September 21st. By that time the Eighth and Seventh Turkish armies had ceased to exist.

The Fourth Army, east of the Jordan, and the garrison of Maan, east of the Dead Sea, remained to be dealt with. On September 23d the Fourth Army retreated toward Es Salt and Amman, pursued by the Australian and New Zealand Mounted Division, which was operating with Allenby's right wing. Amman was captured on September 25th. Then the enemy retreated north along the Hedjaz Railroad, after losing five thousand men and twenty-eight guns. A part of Allenby's right wing remained at Amman to intercept

the Second Turkish Army Corps which was retreating from Arabia. Maan had been evacuated on September 23d. The Turkish forces which abandoned it surrendered south of Amman, on September 29th.

Meanwhile, on the coastal sector, the Desert Mounted Corps had occupied Haifa, thus giving Allenby a new sea base and a railroad running east from it to Lake Tiberias and Deraa. Acre was captured along with Haifa.

Palestine was now freed. The next Allied objective was Damascus. Three cavalry divisions were on their way toward it by September 28th. The Arab army east of the Hedjaz Railroad had raided Deraa, September 16th-18th. It then lay in wait for the retreating Fourth Turkish Army. The Turkish columns were broken up north of Deraa and the Arabs then seized that important railroad centre and made a junction with the eastern wing of the Desert Mounted Corps. The Mounted Corps and the Arabs reached the outskirts of Damascus on September 30th and entered the city on October 1st. In this operation twenty thousand prisoners were taken. After that the Turkish forces left in Syria amounted to only seventeen thousand men, of whom only four thousand were effectives.

There was nothing to hinder a further advance to Aleppo. Beirut was occupied by the Allies on October 8th, thus opening another port and a lateral railroad line leading east to Damascus. The Desert Mounted Corps started from Damascus for Aleppo on October 5th. It reached Homs, on the Damascus-Aleppo railroad, on October 12th, and was joined there by a cavalry division coming from Beirut. This latter division, reinforced by armoured cars, continued on alone. But near Aleppo it was joined by another

cavalry brigade and by units of the Arab army. The city was entered by the Arabs on October 25th. North of Aleppo the British advance halted. On October 31st the armistice which Turkey, following Bulgaria's example, had solicited, went into effect.

Between September 19th and October 26th Allenby had driven the enemy back more than three hundred miles. His fifth cavalry division had covered five hundred miles and taken 11,000 prisoners and fifty-two guns. In all 75,000 prisoners were captured. Of these 200 officers and 3500 of other ranks were Germans or Austrians. The Turks lost 360 guns and the transport and equipment of three armies. Allenby's was the most completely successful envelopment operation of the war.

On the Mesopotamian front General Marshall made a spring campaign up the Euphrates, taking Hit on March 10th and Khan-Bagdadi on March 26th. He also continued to make progress up the Tigris toward Mosul. A final offensive against that city was begun in October. It was on the point of succeeding when, on October 30th, the Turkish army on the Tigris—seven thousand strong—capitulated.

The Turkish Government survived the armistice. There was no revolution against the Sultan, who had, in fact, never been much in sympathy with the Young Turk triumvirate. Enver Pasha, Talaat Pasha, and Djemal Pasha fled and the Sultan, restored to a semblance of authority, threw himself and his people on the mercy of the Allies.

CHAPTER XLI

NAVAL OPERATIONS, 1918. GERMAN NAVAL LOSSES

THE most striking naval operation of 1918 was the attempt of a British raiding party to block the exits of the ship canals at Zeebrugge and Ostend. These two ports were connected by waterways with Bruges, the chief base of German U-boat operations in the English Channel region.

The expedition was in charge of Vice-Admiral Sir Roger Keyes. On the night of April 26th, six obsolete British cruisers approached the mole at Zeebrugge. One of them, the *Vindictive*, carried storming parties directed to land on the mole. The other five—the *Brilliant*, *Iphigenia*, *Sirius*, *Intrepid*, and *Thetis*—were filled with concrete and were to be sunk across the channel inside the mole. Monitors and fast small craft accompanied the cruisers.

The storming parties on the *Vindictive* made a landing on the mole, but found it deserted. The Germans had withdrawn to the shore end and put up only a machine gun and artillery defence. In the confusion the *Iphigenia* and the *Intrepid* were sunk across the mouth of the canal, in a V-position. It was a daring and successful exploit, accomplished at relatively small cost.

The attempt on Ostend was a failure. But on the night of May 9th the *Vindictive* was sunk near the mouth of the Ostend canal, partially obstructing it.

The German submarine campaign against merchant shipping decreased in effectiveness during 1918. A mine barrage across the North Sea, from the Orkneys to Norway, was established by the Allied fleets (June 8th–October 26th). An American flotilla under Rear Admiral Joseph Strauss laid 56,611 mines. The British navy laid 13,652. By October the U-boat had ceased to be a serious military menace.

In the quarter ending March 31, 1918, German submarines destroyed 1,143,336 tons of Allied and neutral shipping. In the next quarter the tonnage sunk declined to 962,007. In the third quarter the total was 915,513. In October, 1918, only 177,534 tons were destroyed.

The complete failure of the German submarine campaign as the decisive offensive factor in the war (and German military policy after January, 1917, was based on the assumption that it could be made such a factor) is demonstrated by a comparison of the world's steam ocean-going tonnage in existence on August 1, 1914, and the world's steam ocean-going tonnage in existence on November 11, 1918. Tonnage at the beginning of the war was 42,146,000. Losses amounted to 18,286,000. Replacements, including interned German tonnage taken over by the Allies, amounted to 15,049,000 tons. The net loss was 3,237,000 tons. Great Britain was the greatest sufferer. Her gross loss was 8,785,000 and her net loss 3,885,000. The United States made a net gain in tonnage of 3,400,000.

The former German cruiser *Breslau*, under the Turkish flag, was sunk by a mine, at the entrance to the Dardanelles, on January 20th. The former German battle cruiser *Goeben* was beached on the same day, after an engagement with British warships. On May

14th Italian submarines entered Pola harbour and sank an Austro-Hungarian super-dreadnaught of the *Viribus Unitis* class. The Austro-Hungarian dreadnaught *Szent Istvan* was destroyed by Italian torpedo boats off the Dalmatian coast on June 10th. The *Viribus Unitis* was sunk by an Italian monitor on November 1st.

The American armoured cruiser *San Diego* struck a mine off Fire Island on July 19th and sank. There was no loss of life. Between May and October, German submarines operated off the Atlantic coast of the United States, sinking sailing vessels, fishing boats, and some passenger steamers. Submarines sank three British transports carrying American troops to Europe—the *Tuscania*, the *Moldavia*, and the *Persic*. Only 215 soldiers were lost. The American auxiliaries *Tampa* and *Ticonderoga* were torpedoed in September. All the men on the *Tampa* were drowned. On the *Ticonderoga* 102 enlisted men were lost.

German naval losses were fairly well concealed during the war. A statement published in the Berlin *Vossische Zeitung* in July, 1919, disclosed their extent. One hundred and seventy-eight U-boats were destroyed, eighty-two in the North Sea and the Atlantic, seventy-two off the coast of Flanders, sixteen in the Mediterranean, five in the Black Sea, and three in the Baltic Sea. In addition fourteen were blown up by their crews and seven were interned in neutral harbours. Altogether 199 were put out of service.

The destroyers lost numbered forty-nine. One battleship, the *Pommern*, and one battle cruiser, the *Lützow*, were sunk in the battle of Jutland. Other losses included six armoured cruisers, eight modern and ten older cruisers, nine auxiliary cruisers, and sixty-

one torpedo boats. The number of war vessels of all sorts destroyed was 490.

The German naval casualties totalled 29,685, including 10,625 marines. Probably a considerable portion of the marine losses occurred in the military service.

CHAPTER XLII

AMERICA'S PART IN THE WAR

THE United States entered the war lamentably unprepared. In his address to Congress when it assembled on December 8, 1914, President Wilson said:

More than this [a suggestion of voluntary militia training], proposed at this time, permit me to say, would mean merely that we had lost our self-possession, that we had been thrown off our balance by a war with which we have nothing to do, whose causes cannot touch us, whose very existence affords us opportunities of friendship and disinterested service which should make us ashamed of any thought of hostility or fearful preparation for trouble.

This was an extraordinary misjudgment. The German Admiralty's "war zone" proclamation, issued on February 4, 1915, soon proved that the causes of the war could touch us and that we could not hope to avoid entanglement in the European conflict, if we intended to uphold our rights and interests as a neutral. The sinking of the *Lusitania*, on May 7, 1915, was a clear notice to the United States to prepare for the contingency—not to say the certainty—of war. But, unfortunately, the theory of the address of December 8, 1914, was lived up to by the administration for nearly two years longer, except for a brief series of preparedness

speeches made by the President in the winter of 1916.

In April, 1917, there were only 200,000 men in the military establishment. Of these 133,000 were regulars and 67,000 national guardsmen, called into the Federal service in 1916 because of troubles on the Mexican border. Congress had passed the farcical Hay army reorganization act in 1916. It was reluctant in 1917 to resort to conscription. But the country knew that the war could not be won without conscription, and demanded an immediate trial of the principle of selective compulsory service.

The enthusiasm with which the public supported and executed the draft system was one of the revelations of the war. Under the Selective Service law of May 19, 1917—broadened in scope in 1918 to include all able-bodied men between eighteen and forty-five—24,234,021 conscripts were registered and more than 3,091,000 became members of the new National Army. When the war ended 4,000,000 men had served. The Regular Army was expanded to 527,000 and the National Guard to 382,000. But the National Army constituted seventy-seven per cent. of our military forces.

The enlisted strength of the navy on April 6, 1917, was 65,777. By November 11, 1918, it had risen to 497,030. The Marine Corps was enlarged from 15,627 to 78,017. The total number of men serving in the armed forces of the United States was 4,800,000—4,000,000 in the army and 800,000 in other branches. The army had less than 9000 officers in April, 1917. By the end of the war the strength of the officers' corps had been increased to 200,000.

What America could contribute to winning the war in the field was man power. We could not have car-

ried a sufficient reinforcement to Europe in our own ships. Nor could we have supplied our forces there adequately with guns, machine guns, tanks, or airplanes. The Entente Powers were able to furnish aid in transportation and to lend artillery and other equipment. American man power did arrive on the battle line in time, and guaranteed Foch his strategical reserve for the Victory Offensive of 1918.

Two million and eighty-four thousand American soldiers were carried to Europe. American vessels—chiefly the interned German liners taken over at the beginning of the war—transported 927,000. British and British-controlled vessels transported 1,047,000. French ships carried 47,000, and Italian ships 65,000. Only half a million soldiers were delivered from April, 1917, to May, 1918. In the last six months of the war 1,500,000 were delivered. On November 11, 1918, the United States was represented on the Western Front by 1,950,000 men. France had 2,559,000 and Great Britain 1,718,000. Up to the signing of the armistice 1,390,000 American troops had appeared on the firing line.

The transportation of troops naturally outran the capacity of the United States to supply them with field and heavy guns. The American forces in France had, in round numbers, 3500 pieces of artillery, of which nearly 500 were made in this country. They used on the firing line 2250 pieces, of which over 100 were made here. But, on the other hand, the United States manufactured large quantities of smokeless powder and high explosives which were sold to the French and British.

For tanks the American armies had to depend almost entirely on the French and British, the former con-

tributing 227 of the light variety and the latter 64 of the heavier model.

The war also ended too soon for American airplane production to show results. Of the 2698 planes sent to the advance zone for the use of American aviators 667 were of American manufacture.

The American Expeditionary Force did not get into active front line service until April 25, 1918. But thereafter it saw much hard service and greatly distinguished itself. The infantry was composed of forty-two divisions, twenty-nine of which were combat units. In the last week of October, 1918, when these twenty-nine were in action, they held 101 miles of front, or twenty-three per cent. of the Allied line. They advanced in battle 485 miles, and captured 63,079 prisoners and 1378 guns.

The part taken by the American Expeditionary Force in the fighting on the Western Front has been noted in preceding chapters, dealing with Ludendorff's five offensives and Foch's Victory Offensive (Chapters XXXV, XXXVI, and XXXVII). A brief recapitulation may be appropriate here.

The First Division captured Cantigny, in the Amiens sector, on May 28th. The Second Division, with elements of the Third and the Twenty-eighth, helped to stop the German advance in the neighbourhood of Château-Thierry. The Second Division (June 5th-11th) took Bouresches, Torcy, and Belleau Wood—a brilliant operation. Eighty-five thousand American troops co-operated in the repulse of Ludendorff's Fifth Offensive—the Forty-second Division fighting with Gouraud, in Champagne, east of Rheims, and the Third and Twenty-eighth fighting with de Mitry south of the Marne.

Eight divisions—the First, Second, Third, Fourth Twenty-sixth, Twenty-eighth, Thirty-second, and Forty-second—were employed in Foch's attack against the Aisne-Marne salient, beginning July 18th. Elements of the Thirty-third Division took part in Haig's offensive against the Montdidier salient, beginning August 8th. They helped the Australians to storm Chipilly Ridge, on the north side of the Somme. The Twenty-seventh and Thirtieth divisions were used in conjunction with the Australians to break the Hindenburg Line about Le Catelet and in the subsequent advance toward Maubeuge.

The Twenty-eighth, Thirty-second, and Seventy-seventh divisions participated in the first stages of General Mangin's Oise-Aisne offensive, beginning August 18th. The Twenty-seventh and Thirtieth divisions, before storming the Hindenburg Line, had helped to recapture Mount Kemmel. On October 31st two other American divisions—the Thirty-seventh and Ninety-first—were sent to Flanders from the Meuse. They took part in the last stages of the Ypres-Lys offensive, reaching the line of the Scheldt.

The First American Army was organized on August 10th. In co-operation with a small French force it squeezed out the St. Mihiel salient (September 12th–16th). Then it fought the great battle of the Meuse-Argonne (September 26th–November 11th). About 550,000 American soldiers were engaged in the battle of St. Mihiel. One million two hundred thousand fought in the Meuse-Argonne campaign. The strategic effect of the successful American drive for Sedan was to break into two groups the German armies operating in France and Belgium and to precipitate Ludendorff's request for an armistice. Two American divisions—

the Second and the Thirty-sixth—also assisted the French in their advance in October east of Rheims.

The American armies were often handicapped by the lack of field and heavy guns of their own. They were also inexperienced in warfare and may not have been used as economically as the French armies were used in the later periods of the war. But they fought surprisingly well. The twenty-nine combat divisions had 46,739 men killed in battle. But they took 63,079 prisoners, and lost only 4434 prisoners. An army with a record like that shows military quality of the highest type. The American casualties are given in detail in Appendix II.

The United States fought a successful war in spite of the enormous disabilities imposed by the failure of our government to prepare for war. It also, through President Wilson's activities, played a leading rôle in formulating the conditions on which peace was negotiated. During 1918 Mr. Wilson laid down various formulæ of settlement to be applied in concluding peace. The most definite of these were the "Fourteen Points," incorporated in his address to Congress on January 8th. They read as follows:

1. Open covenants of peace, openly arrived at, after which there shall be no private international understandings of any kind, but diplomacy shall proceed always frankly and in the public view.

2. Absolute freedom of navigation upon the seas, outside territorial waters, alike in peace and in war, except as the seas may be closed in whole or in part by international action for the enforcement of international covenants.

3. The removal, so far as possible, of all economic

barriers and the establishment of an equality of trade conditions among all the nations consenting to the peace and associating themselves for its maintenance.

4. Adequate guarantees given and taken that national armaments will be reduced to the lowest points consistent with domestic safety.

5. A free, open-minded, and absolutely impartial adjustment of all colonial claims, based upon a strict observance of the principle that in determining all such questions of sovereignty the interests of the populations concerned must have equal weight with the equitable claims of the government whose title is to be determined.

6. The evacuation of all Russian territory and such a settlement of all questions affecting Russia as will secure the best and freest co-operation of the other nations of the world in obtaining for her an unhampered and unembarrassed opportunity for the independent determination of her own political development and national policy and assure her of a sincere welcome into the society of free nations under institutions of her own choosing; and, more than a welcome, assistance also of every kind she may need and may herself desire. The treatment accorded Russia by her sister nations in the months to come will be the acid test of their good will, of their comprehension of her needs as distinguished from their own interests, and of their intelligent and unselfish sympathy.

7. Belgium, the whole world will agree, must be evacuated and restored without any attempt to limit the sovereignty which she enjoys in common with all other free nations. No other single act will

serve as this will serve to restore confidence among the nations in the laws which they have themselves set and determined for the government of their relations with one another. Without this healing act the whole structure and validity of international law is forever impaired.

8. All French territory should be freed and the invaded portions restored, and the wrong done to France by Prussia in 1871 in the matter of Alsace-Lorraine, which has unsettled the peace of the world for nearly fifty years, should be righted, in order that peace may once more be made secure in the interest of all.

9. A readjustment of the frontiers of Italy should be effected along clearly recognizable lines of nationality.

10. The peoples of Austria-Hungary, whose place among the nations we wish to see safeguarded and assured, should be accorded the freest opportunity of autonomous development.

11. Rumania, Serbia, and Montenegro should be evacuated, occupied territories restored, Serbia accorded free and secure access to the sea; and the relations of the several Balkan States to one another determined by friendly counsel along historically established lines of allegiance and nationality; and international guarantees of the political and economic independence and territorial integrity of the several Balkan States should be entered into.

12. The Turkish portions of the present Ottoman Empire should be assured a secure sovereignty, but the other nationalities which are now under Turkish rule should be assured an undoubted security of life and an absolutely unmolested opportunity of au-

tonomous development, and the Dardanelles should be permanently opened as a free passage to the ships and commerce of all nations under international guarantees.

13. An independent Polish state should be erected which should include the territories inhabited by indisputably Polish populations, which should be assured a free and secure access to the sea, and whose political and economic independence and territorial integrity should be guaranteed by international covenant.

14. A general association of nations must be formed under specific covenants for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small states alike.

The "Fourteen Points" were supplemented, on February 11th, by four principles; on July 4th, by four more principles; on September 27th, by five additional principles. All the principles were abstract in character and envisaged a peace of renunciation and conciliation, rather than a peace of surrender. The most striking of the thirteen principles was the first one of the third set, which read:

The impartial justice meted out must involve no discrimination between those to whom we wish to be just and those to whom we do not wish to be just. It must be a justice which plays no favourites and knows no standard but the equal rights of the peoples concerned.

When, in September, 1918, the Central Powers lost all hope of victory, Austria-Hungary made an appeal

for a conference with the Allies. This was rejected. In October Hertling resigned as the German Imperial Chancellor and was replaced by Prince Max of Baden. The latter made a pretence of acting as the mouthpiece of the Reichstag, rather than of the Emperor. In his newly acquired representative capacity he began sounding out the government of the United States. He announced that Germany was ready to accept the peace terms laid down by President Wilson in the "Fourteen Points" and in the later principles, particularly in the principles enunciated on September 27th.

Secretary Lansing demanded assurances that the new government represented the people of Germany, not the old autocracy. These were formally given. President Wilson then transmitted the correspondence to the Allied governments and asked them if they were disposed to accept peace on the terms and principles indicated by Germany. They assented, reserving the question of the freedom of the seas and stipulating that Germany should make compensation "for all damage done to the civilian population of the Allied states and their property by the aggression of Germany by land, by sea, and from the air."

The German Government was informed on November 5th of these reservations, and also that Marshal Foch had been authorized to receive German armistice commissioners. While armistice negotiations were in progress the Kaiser abdicated and fled to Holland. The Reichstag organized a government, which later became a mildly socialist republic.

Peace with Germany was made, at least in form, on the basis of the "Fourteen Points." Clause X, regarding Austria-Hungary, had been nullified by the recognition of the belligerent status of Czecho-Slovakia and

Jugo-Slavia. Clause II had been annulled by the Allied reservations as to the freedom of the seas. Clause VI, regarding Russia, became inapplicable, because of the continuance of war between the Lenine government and the Allies. Clause I was more honoured in the breach than in the observance in the proceedings at Paris. Clauses XI and XII applied to conditions of peace, not with Germany, but with Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey.

To what extent the other clauses (except VII and VIII, about which there was no dispute) served as the framework of the peace will probably be disputed for generations. No compact was ever made to observe them in the arrangement of peace terms with Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, or Turkey. But they will remain of permanent historical significance as the criteria of the German settlement.

The peace conference met in Paris in January, 1919. A treaty with Germany was signed, at Versailles, on June 28, 1919. It went into effect on January 10, 1920, for the various powers which had ratified it prior to that date. Ratification by the United States was held up by a dispute between President Wilson and the Senate over the question of reservations.

A treaty with German Austria was signed, at St. Germain, on September 10, 1919. One with Bulgaria was signed, at Neuilly, on November 27, 1919. These treaties, and America's part in them, form an episode of extraordinary historical interest, with which the author hopes to deal in a separate volume.

APPENDIX I

DECLARATIONS OF WAR AND SEVERANCES OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS

Declarations of War

Austria against Belgium, August 28, 1914.
Austria against Japan, August 27, 1914.
Austria against Montenegro, August 9, 1914.
Austria against Russia, August 6, 1914.
Austria against Serbia, July 28, 1914.
Brazil against Germany, October 26, 1917.
Bulgaria against Serbia, October 14, 1915.
China against Austria, August 14, 1917.
China against Germany, August 14, 1917.
Costa Rica against Germany, May 23, 1918.
Cuba against Germany, April 7, 1917.
France against Austria, August 13, 1914.
France against Bulgaria, October 16, 1915.
France against Germany, August 3, 1914.
France against Turkey, November 5, 1914.
Germany against Belgium, August 4, 1914.
Germany against France, August 3, 1914.
Germany against Portugal, March 9, 1916.
Germany against Rumania, September 14, 1916.
Germany against Russia, August 1, 1914.
Great Britain against Austria, August 13, 1914.
Great Britain against Bulgaria, October 15, 1915.
Great Britain against Germany, August 4, 1914.
Great Britain against Turkey, November 5, 1914.

Greece against Bulgaria, November 28, 1916 (Provisional Government).

Greece against Bulgaria, July 2, 1917 (Government of Alexander).

Greece against Germany, November 28, 1916 (Provisional Government).

Greece against Germany, July 2, 1917 (Government of Alexander).

Guatemala against Germany, April 21, 1918.

Haiti against Germany, July 12, 1918.

Honduras against Germany, July 19, 1918.

Italy against Austria, May 24, 1915.

Italy against Bulgaria, October 19, 1915.

Italy against Germany, August 28, 1916.

Italy against Turkey, August 21, 1915.

Japan against Germany; August 23, 1914.

Liberia against Germany, August 4, 1917.

Montenegro against Austria, August 8, 1914.

Montenegro against Germany, August 9, 1914.

Nicaragua against Germany, May 6, 1918.

Panama against Germany, April 7, 1917.

Panama against Austria, December 10, 1917.

Portugal against Germany, November 23, 1914 (resolutions passed authorizing military intervention as ally of England).

Portugal against Germany, May 19, 1915 (military aid granted).

Rumania against Austria, August 27, 1916 (allies of Austria also consider it a declaration).

Russia against Bulgaria, October 19, 1915.

Russia against Turkey, November 3, 1914.

San Marino against Austria, May 24, 1915.

Serbia against Bulgaria, October 16, 1915.

Serbia against Germany, August 6, 1914.

Serbia against Turkey, December 2, 1914.

Siam against Austria, July 22, 1917.

Siam against Germany, July 22, 1917.

Turkey against Allies, November 23, 1914.
Turkey against Rumania, August 29, 1916.
United States against Germany, April 6, 1917.
United States against Austria-Hungary, December 7,
1917.

Severances of Diplomatic Relations

Austria against Japan, August 26, 1914.
Austria against Portugal, March 16, 1916.
Austria against Serbia, July 26, 1914.
Austria against United States, April 8, 1917.
Bolivia against Germany, April 14, 1917.
Brazil against Germany, April 11, 1917.
China against Germany, March 14, 1917.
Costa Rica against Germany, September 21, 1917.
Ecuador against Germany, December 7, 1917.
Egypt against Germany, August 13, 1914.
France against Austria, August 10, 1914.
Greece against Turkey, July 2, 1917 (Government of
Alexander).
Greece against Austria, July 2, 1917 (Government of
Alexander).
Guatemala against Germany, April 27, 1917.
Haiti against Germany, June 17, 1917.
Honduras against Germany, May 17, 1917.
Nicaragua against Germany, May 18, 1917.
Peru against Germany, October 6, 1917.
Turkey against United States, April 20, 1917.
United States against Germany, February 3, 1917.
Uruguay against Germany, October 7, 1917.

APPENDIX II

MILITARY LOSSES OF THE PRINCIPAL POWERS

TABULATIONS of the military losses of the war are incomplete and often confusing, because of the inclusion or exclusion of soldiers dying of disease or other causes than wounds.

The Statistical Branch of the General Staff of the United States Army has furnished this statement, corrected to May 31, 1919, of the battle deaths in the armies of the various belligerents:

The Allies and the United States

Russia.....	1,700,000
France.....	1,385,300
Great Britain.....	900,000
Italy.....	330,000
Serbia and Montenegro.....	125,000
Belgium.....	102,000
Rumania.....	100,000
United States.....	48,900
Greece.....	7,000
Portugal.....	2,000
Total.....	<u>4,700,000</u>

The Teutonic Allies

Germany.....	1,600,000
Austria-Hungary.....	800,000
Turkey.....	250,000
Bulgaria.....	100,000
Total.....	<u>2,750,000</u>

The losses figures, as given out, officially or non-officially, for the various belligerents are:

France—Army: 1,089,700 killed; 265,800 missing; total 1,355,500—16.2 per cent. of mobilization of 8,410,000. Navy: 5,521 killed; 5,214 missing; total, 10,735—4.19 per cent. of forces mobilized. The French High Commission in Washington on January 8, 1919, estimated the French wounded at 3,000,000 and the prisoners at 435,000. It put the total French losses, excluding native Colonials, at 4,762,800. Colonial killed and missing are included in the figures for killed and missing given above. Colonial wounded numbered 44,000 and prisoners 3500.

Great Britain—Army: killed, 706,726; missing or prisoners, 359,145; wounded 2,032,142; total, 3,098,113. Navy: killed, 33,361; missing, prisoners, and wounded, 6,405; total, 39,766.

Australia (included in British)—Killed, 58,035; wounded 166,606; missing, 193; prisoners, 438.

Canada (included in British)—Killed, in action or died of wounds, 48,121; died of disease, 4057; wounded, 155,839; missing, 5080; prisoners, 3049; deaths in Canada, 2287; total 218,433.

Italy—Killed or died of wounds, 460,000; wounded, 947,000; prisoners or missing, 500,000.

Russia—(estimated) Killed, 1,700,000; wounded, 5,000,000; prisoners, 2,500,000.

Serbia—Killed, or died of wounds or disease, 292,342.

United States—Army (final revision); killed in action, 34,248; died of wounds, 13,700; died of disease, 23,430; died of other causes, 5740; wounded, 221,050; missing and prisoners, 4435; total, 302,612. Marine Corps (up to July 5, 1919): killed or died from wounds and other causes, 2716; wounded, 3252; missing, 143; total, 6111. Navy: deaths from war causes, 1233.

Germany—Killed or died of wounds and other causes, 2,050,460; wounded, 4,207,028; prisoners and missing, 615,922; total, 6,873,410.

Austria-Hungary—(estimated), Killed 800,000; other casualties, 3,200,000; total, 4,000,000.

Bulgaria—(estimated) Killed and missing, 101,224; wounded, 1,152,399 (?)

Turkey—(estimated) Killed and died of wounds and disease, 436,974; wounded 407,772; prisoners and missing, 103,731; total, 948,477.

APPENDIX III

WHAT GERMANY DOES UNDER THE PEACE TREATY

(Summary prepared by the author and published in the New York *Tribune* of June 21, 1919.)

RESTORES Alsace-Lorraine to France.

Accepts the internationalization of the Saar Basin for fifteen years and of Danzig permanently. The people of the Saar Basin are to decide by a plebiscite, taken by districts, whether they wish to be annexed to Germany or to France or to accept control by the League of Nations.

Recognizes the full sovereignty of Belgium over neutral Moresnet and cedes to Belgium Prussian Moresnet and the districts of Eupen and Malmédy.

Cedes a small strip of upper Silesia to Czecho-Slovakia. Cedes the rest of upper Silesia to Poland, but, except in certain districts in the north-eastern corner, ceded unconditionally to Poland, a plebiscite to determine nationality is to be held between the sixth and eighteenth month after the signing of the treaty.

Cedes to the principal Allied and Associated Powers the district of Memel.

Cedes to Poland without plebiscite most of Posen and portions of West Prussia and Pomerania west of the Vistula and of West Prussia east of the Vistula. Parts of East Prussia are to decide by vote whether they wish to belong to Prussia or Poland.

Agrees to the creation of three zones in Schleswig in which the inhabitants are to decide, by districts, whether they are to belong to Prussia or Denmark.

Recognizes the independence of Austria and agrees that this independence shall be inalienable except with the consent of the council of the League of Nations.

Renounces all territorial and political rights outside Europe as to her own or her allies' territories, and especially to Morocco, Egypt, Siam, Liberia and Shantung.

Reduces her army within three months to 200,000 men, with reductions, determined by the Allies, every three months thereafter, reaching a minimum of 100,000 by March 31, 1920.

Abolishes conscription within her territories.

Agrees to dismantle all forts fifty kilometres east of the Rhine within six months.

Must stop all importation, exportation, and nearly all production of war material.

Agrees to Allied occupation of parts of Germany for fifteen years, or until reparation is made, with the understanding that the army of occupation will be reduced at the end of each of three five-year periods, if Germany is fulfilling her obligations.

Agrees that any violation by her of the conditions as to the zone fifty kilometres east of the Rhine shall be regarded as an act of war.

Reduces her navy to six battleships, six light cruisers, twelve destroyers and twelve torpedo boats, without submarines, and a personnel of not over 15,000.

Must surrender or destroy all other war vessels.

Is forbidden to build forts controlling the Baltic.

Must demolish the fortifications of Heligoland. The fishing harbour is not to be destroyed.

Must open the Kiel Canal to merchant and war vessels of all nations at peace with her and surrender her fourteen submarine cables.

May have no military or naval air forces, except 100 unarmed seaplanes until October 1st to detect mines, and may not manufacture or import aviation material for six months.

Accepts full responsibility for all damages caused to the Allied and Associated governments and nationals.

Agrees specifically to reimburse all civilian damages, beginning with an initial payment of the equivalent of 20,000,000,000 marks, subsequent payments to be secured by bonds to be issued at the discretion of the reparation commission. Within four months Germany may make proposals regarding the manner of the payment of her reparation obligations. Within two months thereafter the Allied Reparation Commission will answer such proposals. The commission is directed to make a final determination of the total due from Germany before May 1, 1921.

INDEX

A

Aerenthal, 2
 Aisne, battle of the, 1914, 39;
 battle of, 1917, 268, 269
 Aisne-Marne offensives, 1918, 327-
 341
 Albanian campaign, 1918, 368
 Albert of Belgium, 20, 22, 41, 350
 Albrecht of Württemberg, 23, 34,
 135, 137, 138, 139, 311
 Alexander of Greece, 291
 Alexieff, 81, 84, 183, 257, 260
 Allenby, 41, 43, 44, 141, 192, 278,
 293, 294, 372, 373, 374, 375, 377
 Alsace, French invasion of, 1914,
 24
 American Expeditionary Forces,
 384-387
 American losses, 397
 America's part in the war, 382-392
 Ancona case, 166, 237
 Antoine, 275, 276, 312
 Antwerp, siege of, 40, 41
 Anzacs at Gallipoli, 96-99
 Aosta, Duke of, 284
 Arabic case, 165, 166, 237, 238
 Archduke Joseph, 361
 Archer, 243
 Ardahan, battle of, 67
 Ardennes, battle of, 1914, 26-
 28
 Argonne offensive, American, 1918,
 352, 353, 356, 357, 386
 "Armed neutrality," American
 policy of, 248
 Armenia, campaigns in. *See*
 Asiatic campaigns
 Armistice preliminaries, 387-392
 Arnim, 324, 325, 326
 Arras, battle of, 1917, 266-268
 Artois, battle of, 1915, 139, 140,
 142

Asiatic campaigns of 1914, 66-67;
 of 1915, 145-150; of 1916, 220-
 224; of 1917, 291-294; of 1918,
 372-377
 Asquith, 234
 Auffenberg, 54, 55
 Australian losses, 397
 Austro-Hungarian losses, 397
 Austro-Hungarian ultimatum to
 Serbia, 2-8
 Avarescu, 216

B

Bagdad expedition, 148-150, 291-
 293
 Baldwin, 98
 Balfour, 252
 Balkan campaigns of 1914, 60-62;
 of 1915, 121-132; of 1916, 207-
 219; of 1917, 290-291; of 1918,
 367-371
 Baltic Provinces, relations with
 Germany, 110, 245, 301, 302,
 303, 309
 Bapaume, battle of, 1918, 346
 Beatty, 74, 152, 153, 154, 227, 228,
 229, 230, 231, 234
 Beginnings of the war, 1-12
 Belgium, invasion of, 19-22; Ger-
 man policy in, 48, 49
 Belleau-Bouresches, battle of,
 1918, 330, 331
 Belligerents, strength of, 13-16;
 losses, 396, 397
 Below, 81, 82, 104, 107, 109, 261,
 284, 285, 286, 314, 345
 Berchtold, 5
 Bernhardi, 324, 325
 Bernstorff, 247, 248
 Berthelot, 337, 340, 352, 356
 Bethmann-Hollweg, 13, 17, 19,
 246

Birdwood, 98, 350
 Bismarck, 207
 Bissing, 48
 Blockade, Allied, of Germany,
 156-158
 Boehm-Ermolli, 84, 104
 Boehn, 337, 338, 339, 340, 345
 Bojadeff, 128
 Bolo Pasha, 272
 Boroëvic, 81, 104, 105, 205, 360,
 361, 365
 Botha, 71, 150
 Bothmer, 186, 188, 189
 Brazil enters the war, 251, 252
 Brest-Litovsk, treaty of, 299-302,
 304
 Brialmont, 21
 Briand, 271
 British losses, 396, 397
 Bruchmüller, 326
 Brusati, 202
 Brusiloff, 54, 81, 105, 181, 183,
 184, 185, 187, 189, 203, 209, 259,
 260
 Bryan, 158, 163
 Bulfin, 374
 Bulgaria enters the war, 124, 125
 Bulgarian losses, 397
 Bullard, 356
 Bülow, General, 22, 23, 29, 31,
 33, 35, 36, 39, 40, 135
 Bülow, Prince, 113, 116, 117
 Byers, 71
 Byng, 140, 278, 279, 280, 281, 312,
 316, 318, 320, 345, 351

C

Cadorna, 118, 119, 201, 202, 203,
 204, 205, 282, 283, 285, 287, 289
 Caillaux, 7, 272
 Cambrai, battle of, 277-281
 Cameron, 348
 Canadian losses, 397
 Cantigny, battle of, 335, 385
 Capello, 283, 284, 285
 Caporetto, battle of, 284-287
 Carden, 88, 91
 Carey, 320, 321
 Carol of Rumania, 208
 Carpathians, battle of the, 84, 85,
 86
 Castelnau, de, 23, 25, 37, 40, 134,
 142, 170, 174, 312

Casualties of belligerents, 396-
 398
 Caucasus operations, 1914, 66, 67;
 1915, 147, 148; 1916, 220-222;
 1917, 293
 Cavan, Earl of, 363
 Caviglia, 364
 Chamberlain, 224
 Champagne, French offensive in,
 1915, 135, 136, 141, 142; 1918,
 352, 356
 Channel ports offensive, Luden-
 dorff's, 1918, 309-326
 Charleroi, battle of, 29
 Château-Thierry, battle of, 330,
 331
 Chauvel, 374
 China enters the war, 393
 Churchill, 41
 Clemenceau, 271, 272
 Cobbe, 292
 Colonial campaigns of 1914, 68-
 71; of 1915, 150, 151; of 1916,
 224, 225; of 1917, 294
 Conneau, 43
 Constantine of Greece, 122, 123,
 125, 126, 218, 219, 291
 Coronel, battle of, 75, 76
 Costa Rica enters the war, 252
 Cox, 97
 Craddock, 75, 76
 Crimea, 301
 Crown Prince of Prussia, 23, 24,
 34, 135, 311
 Ctesiphon, battle of, 149-150
 Cuba enters the war, 252
Cushing and Gulfight cases, 160,
 161, 162
 Czarina of Russia, 182, 253, 254
 Czecho-Slovakia, recognition of,
 305, 391
 Czecho-Slovaks in Siberia, 304-
 306
 Czernin, 299

D

D'Amade, 26, 32, 91
 Dankl, 54, 55, 81, 104, 107
 Dardanelles-Gallipoli campaign,
 87-102
 Debeney, 319, 322, 342, 351, 356
 Declarations of War, dates of,
 249, 251, 252, 393-395

Defeatist intrigues in France, 271, 272
 Degoutte, 338, 340, 350, 354
 Deimling, 24
 Delcassé, 127
 De Lisle, 101, 280
 Demange, 171
 De Mitry, 44, 324, 325, 336, 339, 340, 385
 Déprez, 171
 D'Esperey, 34, 36, 131, 134, 171, 312, 367, 368, 370, 371
Deutschland, submarine, 241, 242
 De Wet, 70, 71
 Diaz, 287, 359, 360, 362, 363, 364
 Dickman, 348
 Dimitrieff, 81, 104, 105, 168
 Djemal Pasha, 145, 146, 147, 377
 Dogger Bank, battle of, 152-154
 D'Oissel, 170
 Dubail, 23, 25, 37, 134, 171
 Dunajec, battle of the, 104, 105
 D'Urbal, 134
 Duval, 272

E

Egypt, British protectorate declared, 65, 147; Turkish invasion of, 145-147
 Eichhorn, 81, 82, 83, 303
 Einem, 135
Emden, exploits of, 78
 Entente Alliance, strength of, 13-17
 Enver Pasha, 63, 64, 66, 67, 377
 Erzerum, Russian capture of, 220, 221
 Erzingan, Russian capture of, 221
 Eugene of Austria, 81, 84, 104, 285, 286
 Evert, 183, 184

F

Falaba, sinking of, 160, 163
 Falkenhausen, 48, 135
 Falkenhayn, 109, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 199, 202, 214, 215, 216, 217, 242, 262
 Falkland Islands, battle of, 77, 78
 Fayolle, 170, 195, 196, 197, 198, 288, 312, 322

Ferdinand of Bulgaria, 122, 123, 124, 370
 Festubert, battle of, 1915, 140
 Finland, 261, 300, 301, 302, 303, 307, 309
 Fisher, 88, 234
 Fitz-Clarence, 46
 Flanders, battle of, 1914, 43-48; 1917, 274-277; Allied offensive in, 1918, 350, 354
 Foch, 29, 34, 36, 41, 46, 47, 139, 170, 266, 269, 289, 309, 320, 321, 327, 328, 329, 330, 332, 333, 334, 335, 337, 338, 341, 342, 344, 345, 347, 349, 353, 385, 386, 391
 Foch's victory offensive, 337-358
 "Fourteen Points," President Wilson's, 358, 387-392
 Francis Ferdinand, 1, 2
 Francis Joseph, 1
 Frederick, of Austria, 110
 French casualties, 396, 397
 French, Viscount, 30, 41, 45, 46, 134, 136, 140, 143

G

Gaede, 135
 Gallipoli campaign, 93-102
 Gallwitz, 128, 129, 311
 Garrison, 241
 Gerard, 164
 Gérard, 171
 German casualties, 396, 397
 German colonies, loss of, 68-71, 150-151
 German East Africa, conquest of, 151, 224, 225, 294
 German peace offer, 1916, 246
 German Southwest Africa, conquest of, 70-71, 150
 German strategy, development of, 17, 18
 Giardino, 364
 Giesl, 8
 Giolitti, 117
 Godley, 97
Goeben and Breslau, 64, 73, 74
 Golz, 92
 Gore resolution, 241
 Goringe, 149
 Gorizia, fight for, 118, 204-206
 Gorky, 302
 Goschen, Sir Edward, 13

Gough, 192, 275, 312, 316, 317, 318, 320, 321
 Gouraud, 171, 336, 352, 356, 385
 Gourko, 85, 103, 183, 258, 259
 Grand Duke Michael, 254
 Grand Duke Nicholas, 56, 83, 85, 109, 181, 220, 222
 Grand Duke of Württemberg, 23, 34, 135, 137, 138, 139, 311
 Grant, 320
 Graziani, 363
 Great Britain's casualties, 396, 397
 Greece, Entente relations with, 1915, 125-127; 1916, 218-219; 1917, 291; losses, 396
 Grey, Sir Edward, 9, 11
 Grodek Lakes, battle of, 106
 Guatemala enters the war, 252
 Guéprette, 91
 Guillaumat, 174, 290, 356, 366
Gulflight and *Cushing* cases, 160, 161, 162
 Gumbinnen, battle of, 52

H

Haig, 31, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 47, 134, 143, 194, 195, 199, 263, 268, 274, 277, 278, 279, 281, 310, 311, 312, 317, 318, 319, 324, 325, 335, 342, 345, 350, 353, 354, 355, 386
 Haiti enters the war, 252
 Hamilton, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 98, 100, 101, 102
 Hardinge, 224
 Hausen, 23, 29, 34, 35, 36
 Havrincourt-Épéhy, battle of, 1918, 347
 Hay, 241
 Hedjaz, Arabian kingdom proclaimed, 147
 Heeringen, 24, 135
 Heligoland, naval engagement off, 74
 Herr, 171, 172
 Hertling, 391
 Hindenburg, 53, 56, 57, 58, 81, 82, 83, 107, 109, 110, 180, 183, 188, 189, 192, 199, 214, 245, 262, 263, 264, 265, 269, 310, 344
 Hindenburg Line, 200, 263, 265, 268, 278, 280, 281, 344, 346, 347, 350, 351, 386

Hindenburg retreat, 1917, 262-266
 Hipper, 153, 154, 227
 Hirschauer, 347
 Hoetzendorff, 56, 57, 119, 202, 203, 204, 284, 286, 288, 289, 360, 361
 Hoffmann, 108, 299, 300, 301
 Holy War, declared by Sheik-ul-Islam, 65
 Honduras enters the war, 252
 Hood, 229, 230
 Horne, 312, 319, 323
 Hoyos, 5
 Humbert, French General, 135, 141, 171, 191, 318, 319, 320, 344, 345
 Humbert, French Senator, 272
 Hunding Line, 356
 Hutier, 314, 320, 322, 332, 333, 336, 342

I

Isonzo, battles of the, 282-284
 Italian campaign of 1915, 118-120; of 1916, 201-206; of 1917, 282-289; of 1918, 359-366
 Italian casualties, 396, 397
 Italy enters the war, 112-118
 Ivanoff, 54, 55

J

Jadar, battle of the, 1914, 61
 Jagow, 6, 163, 164, 238, 239
 Japanese campaign in Kiao-chau, 68, 69
 Jellicoe, 228, 229, 230, 231, 233, 234
 Jerusalem, fall of, 294
 Joffre, 24, 26, 27, 29, 30, 32, 34, 36, 37, 39, 40, 134, 135, 139, 143, 191, 192, 252
 Johnston, 97
 Jonnart, 291
 Joseph Ferdinand, of Austria, 81, 104, 105, 107, 183, 185, 186
 Jugo-Slavia, recognition of, 392
 Jutland, battle of, 226-234

K

Kabil Bey, 147
 Kaledin, 185, 186, 188, 261, 304

Kamerun, conquest of, 70, 150,
151

Kara-Oorgan, battle of, 67

Karl, of Austria, 202, 360, 365

Kerensky, 255, 256, 257, 258, 259,
260, 261, 291, 304

Kitchener, 89, 91, 102, 235

Kluck, 22, 23, 29, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35,
36, 37, 39, 40, 135

Koevess, 128

Korniloff, 105, 257, 259, 260

Krasnik, battle of, 54

Krasnotow, battle of, 107

Kriemhilde Line, 356

Krithia, battle of, 95, 96

Krobatin, 285, 286, 288

Kuchbach, 361, 362

Kühlmann, 300

Kuprikeui, battle of, 221

Kuropatkin, 183, 184, 258

Kusmanek, 81, 85

Kut-el-Amara, capture of, by
British, 149; siege of, by Turks,
150; recapture of, by British,
222-224, 292

L

Lake, 222, 223, 224

Lambros, 218

Langle de Cary, de, 23, 34, 134,
170, 173, 177

Lanrezac, 23, 26, 28, 29

Lansing, 239, 243, 244, 391

Lassigny drive, 1918, 332, 333

Le Cateau, battle of, 1914, 30, 31;
battle of, 1918, 353

Lechitsky, 183, 185, 186, 187, 189,
260

Leelanaw case, 164

Leman, 21

Lemberg, battle of, 54, 55; recap-
ture by Mackensen, 106

Lenine, 256, 257, 261, 300, 301,
304, 307

Leopold of Bavaria, 107, 108, 110,
183

Lerchenfeld, 5

Lesh, 184, 185, 188

Leymarie, 272

Liberia enters the war, 252

Lichnowsky, 4, 5, 9

Liège, siege of, 20-22

Liggett, 348

Linsingen, 84, 104, 105, 107, 110

Lithuania, 300, 301, 302, 303, 309
Lodz, battle of, 57

Long, 253

Loos, battle of, 1915, 142, 143

Lorraine, French invasion of,
1914, 24, 25

Ludendorff, 108, 118, 170, 245,

246, 257, 260, 261, 262, 266,

273, 277, 280, 295, 299, 302,

309, 310, 311, 313, 314, 316,

320, 321, 322, 325, 326, 327, 329,

331, 333, 334, 335, 336, 338, 339,

340, 341, 343, 344, 345, 346, 347,

354, 355, 356, 358, 360, 385, 386

Ludendorff's West Front offen-
sives, 1918, for the Channel
ports, 309-326; for Paris, 327-
337

Lusitania case, 161-166, 237, 382

Lvoff, 254, 255, 256, 258, 259, 304

Lyautey, 271

Lys Valley offensive, Ludendorff's,
1918, 322-326

M

Mackensen, 57, 81, 82, 103, 104,

105, 106, 107, 108, 110, 124,

127, 128, 129, 213, 214, 215, 216,

217, 242

McLemore resolution, 241

Maitre, 273

Mallterre, 133

Malvy, 271, 272

Mangin, 179, 332, 337, 338, 340,

345, 352, 356, 386

Maritz, 70, 71

Marne, battle of the, 1914, 33-37

Marshall, 292, 293, 377

Marwitz, 35, 37, 104, 314

Maubeuge, siege of, 30

Maude, 224, 291, 292, 293

Maud'huy, 40, 41, 134, 141

Maunoury, 27, 29, 33, 34, 35, 39,
134

Maurice, 31, 324

Max of Baden, 358, 391

Mazurian Lakes, battle of, 82

Mertens, 93

Mesopotamian campaigns, 1914,

67; 1915, 148-150; 1916, 222-

224; 1917, 291-293; 1918, 377

Meuse-Argonne campaign, Amer-

ican, 1918, 352, 353, 356, 357

Micheler, 170, 191, 196, 197

Michitch, 129, 369
 Military losses of belligerents, 396-398
 Milne, 369, 370
 Milyukoff, 255
 Mirbach, 307
 Mittel-Europa, 110, 111, 132, 302, 303, 307, 308
 Moltke, the Elder, 19
 Moltke, the Younger, 6, 30, 33, 38, 41, 44, 47, 170
 Monro, 102
 Mons, battle of, 29
 Morgenthau, 5, 93, 145
 Morhange, battle of, 25
 Mount Kemmel, battles of, 324, 325, 386
 Muhlön, 5, 7

N

Namur, siege of, 22, 29
 Naval losses, German, 380, 381
 Naval operations, 1914, 72-79; 1915, 152-155; 1916, 226-236; 1917, 295-298; 1918, 378-381
 Naval "war zone" correspondence between Germany and United States, 157-160
Nebraskan case, 162, 164
 Neutral rights at sea, 156-167, 237-244
 Neuve Chapelle, battle of, 1915, 136, 137
 Nevinston, 98
 "Nibbling," Joffre's policy of, 133-144
 Nicaragua enters the war, 252
 Nicholas II, 50, 109, 182, 183, 254
 Nivelle, 177, 178, 179, 268, 269, 270
 Nixon, 223
 Numbers in the war, 13-17

O

Oppy Line, 267, 268
Orduna case, 164

P

Painlevé, 269, 271
 Palestine campaign of 1917, 294; of 1918, 372-377
 Panama enters the war, 252

Pau, 24
 Peace treaty with Germany, abstract of, 399-401
 Pecori-Giraldi, 202
 Pellé, 318
 Pershing, 347, 353, 357
 Persius, 233
 Pétain, 139, 140, 141, 171, 174, 176, 177, 269, 270, 273, 312, 318
 Pflanzer, 104, 107
 Piave, first battle of the, 1917, 287-289; second battle of the, 1918, 361-363
 Plumer, 274, 275, 276, 312, 319, 350
 Poincaré, 7
 Poland, relations with Germany, 110, 111, 299, 300, 301, 302, 303, 308, 309
 Pollen, 229
 Portugal's entry into the war, 225; losses, 396
 Pou, 240
 Pourtales, 9
 Prasnyz, battle of, 83
 Protopopoff, 182, 253, 254
 Przemyśl, siege of, 55, 56, 57, 84, 85; recapture of, 105
 Pulteney, 43
 Putnik, 61, 62
 Putz, 135

Q

Quéant-Drocourt Line, 267

R

"Race for the Sea," 1914, 38-49
 Radoslavov, 124
 Rasputin, 182, 253
 Rawa River, battle of, 82
 Rawa-Russka, battle of, 1914, 55
 Rawlinson, 41, 42, 44, 192, 342
 Read, 351
 Rennenkampf, 52, 53
 Ribot, 271
 Riga, capture of, 260, 261; naval battle of, 154
 Robeck, de, 91, 92, 93
 Roques, 135
 Ruffey, 23
 Rumania, enters the war, 207-210; conquest of, 210-217; treaty with Entente, 209, 210; with the Teuton powers, 303

Rumanian casualties, 396
 Rupprecht of Bavaria, 24, 40, 135, 311
 Russia, dismemberment of, 299-308
 Russian casualties, 396, 397
 Russian offensive of 1914, 50-59; of 1916, 181-190; of 1917, 259, 260
 Russian retreat of 1915, 103-111
 Russian Revolution, 253-261
 Russian winter campaign, 1915, 80-86
 Russky, 54, 55, 81, 82

S

St. Mihiel, German capture of, 1914, 39; battle of, 1918, 347-349, 386
 St. Quentin, battle of, 1918, 311-321
 Sakharoff, 185, 186, 188, 215, 216
 Salandra, 115, 117
 Salonica expedition, 126
 Sambre, battle of the, 1918, 355, 356
 Samsonoff, 52, 53
 Sanders, 373, 375
 San Giuliano, 115
 Sari-Bahr, battle of, 97-99
 Sarraill, 33, 34, 102, 130, 131, 134, 141, 212, 217, 290
 Sarrebourg, battle of, 25
 Sarykamitch, battle of, 67
 Sazonoff, 8, 9
 Scarpe, battle of the, 346, 347
 Scherbatcheff, 185, 186, 188, 189
 Scherr, 226, 228, 229, 231
 Scheuchenstuel, 360
 Schlieffen, 22, 36, 37, 106
 Scholz, 81, 83
 Schreiner, 93
 Selective Service Act, United States, 251, 383
 Selivanoff, 81
 Selle River, battle of the, 354, 355
 Serajevo, assassinations at, 1-4
 Serbia, Austro-Hungarian invasion of, 1914, 60-62; conquest of, 1915, 121-132; losses, 396
 Severances of diplomatic relations, 395
 Shipping losses through submarines, 236, 295-297, 379

Siberia, Allied occupation of, 305, 306
 Sievers, 82
 Sims, 298
 Skouloudis, 218
 Smith-Dorrien, 30, 31, 43, 134, 224
 Smuts, 224
 Soissons, battle of, 1915, 135
 Somme, battle of the, 1916, 191-200; supplementary battle of the, 1917, 263-265
 Sonnino, 115
 Sordet, 32
 South African rebellion, 70, 71
 Spee, 75, 76
 Stegemann, 38
 Stopford, 99, 100, 101
 Stranz, 135
 Strategy of Entente Powers, 18; of Teuton Powers, 17, 18
 Strauss, 379
 Sturdee, 77
 Stürmer, 182
 Submarine operations, 79, 236, 295-297, 379
 Submarine policy, German, 156-167, 237-243, 245-251
 Suez Canal, Turkish attack on, 146-147
 Sussex case, 237-239, 242, 246, 247, 295
 Suvla Bay, battle of, 97, 99-101
 Szapary, 8

T

Taalat Pasha, 63, 64, 377
 Tannenberg, battle of, 53
 Teuton Alliance, strength of, 13, 17
 Theodoroff, 128, 129
 Thomas, 229
 Tirpitz, 72, 295
 Togo, capture of, 70
 Townshend, 148, 149, 150, 222, 223, 293
 Treaty of London, 116, 117
 Treaty of Versailles, summary of, 399-401
 Trench warfare, cycle of, 143-144
 Triple Alliance treaty, 3, 112, 114, 115
 Trotzky, 257, 300, 301, 304
 Tsingtau, siege of, 69

Turkey, entry into the war, 63-67;
losses, 396

Turkish campaigns. *See* Dardanelles-Gallipoli and Asiatic Campaigns

U

Ukraine, the, 261, 300, 301, 302, 303, 309

United States, declares war on Germany, 249-252; military and naval losses, 397; part in the war, 382-392; relations with Germany, 1915, 156-167; 1916, 237-244; 1917, 235-252; strength of military and naval forces, 383

V

Venizelos, 122, 123, 125, 126, 218, 291

Verdun, battle of, 1916, 168-180; 1917, 273

Victor Emmanuel, 117, 205

Villaret, 171

Vincent, 280

Virton, battle of, 27

Vittorio-Veneto, battle of, 364-366

Viviani, 7, 127, 252

W

Wangenheim, 5, 63, 73, 92

Warsaw, fall of, 108

Weddigen, 79

Western Front operations, 1915, 133-144; 1916, 168-180, 191-200; 1917, 262-281; 1918, 309-358

William P. Frye case, 165

William II, 5, 6, 50, 72, 122, 173, 245, 246, 310, 391

Wilson, General, 289

Wilson, President, 240, 241, 242, 243, 244, 246, 247, 248, 249, 250, 358, 382, 383, 387, 391

Woyrsch, 104, 107

Wurm, 361

Y

Ypres, battle of, 1914, 45-47; battle of, 1915, 137-139

Yser, battle of the, 44, 45

Yudenitch, 220, 221

Z

Zaimis, 125, 126, 218

Zurlinden, 212, 270, 312

*A Selection from the
Catalogue of*

G. P. PUTNAM'S SONS



**Complete Catalogues sent
on application**

The World War

And Its Consequences

By

William Herbert Hobbs

With an Introduction by

Theodore Roosevelt

Theodore Roosevelt said, after a careful reading of the Manuscript: "It is the literal truth, that if I could choose only one book to be put in the hand of every man and woman in the United States, I would choose the book of Professor Hobbs."

G. P. Putnam's Sons

New York

London

The Yankee in the British Zone

By

Captain Ewen C. MacVeagh

and

Lieutenant Lee D. Brown

How did Tommy Atkins and the Yank get on? How did they impress each other? What did they learn about each other?

That is what this book answers. It is not a war book; it is rather a study in the psychology of the average man, British and American; and it is the first intimate story of the Anglo-American relations.

Written by two trained observers it sets forth a wealth of anecdotes, many grotesquely funny, and illustrative "human interest" stories and incidents.

"Wade in, Sanitary!"

**The Story of a Division Surgeon
in France**

By

Richard Derby

Lt.-Col. M. C., U. S. A., Division Surgeon, Second Division

This is a surgeon's story of the war—of that life and death humanly dramatic portion of the war in which the doctors in khaki played their great part.

The book is far more than a mere account of war experiences. It is the first complete and authoritative picture of the struggle from the surgeon's side. Though non-technical in style and thoroughly popular, it points out many of the lessons of the war from the medical standpoint of interest to every physician and every thinking citizen.

To after the war literature the book is a highly valuable addition of absorbing interest.

Average Americans

By

Theodore Roosevelt

Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. A.

12° Photogravure Frontis. 10 Other Illustrations

Colonel Roosevelt was with the first division abroad, fought in the first battle after America's entry, was wounded, promoted, and was with the first troops across the bridgehead. He saw "the big show" from first to last, and he pictures it with clear-cut, graphic force.

At the outset is given an intimate picture of the Roosevelt home life. "My Father and Mother believed in robust righteousness," says the present Colonel, and the meaning and need of it was inbred in all the family. The part played by the elder Colonel Roosevelt in awakening the country to the need of preparedness and the reactions of the war upon him, as expressed in letters to his sons, is developed.

Colonel Roosevelt paints a vivid picture, and not a pleasant one, of the needless cost to America of unpreparedness and incompetency—a cost chiefly paid by the men who fought in France.

The lessons of the war, the author treats with refreshingly robust candor. His views are those of a clear thinking patriot—views of vital interest to every real American.

Deacidified using the Bookkeeper process.
Neutralizing agent: Magnesium Oxide
Treatment Date: MAY 2001

Preservation Technologies
A WORLD LEADER IN PAPER PRESERVATION

111 Thomson Park Drive
Cranberry Township, PA 16066
(724) 779-2111

LIBRARY OF CONGRESS



0 007 629 112 3

